

'STASIS', POLITICAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL SUBVERSION
IN SYRACUSE, 415-305 B.C.

by

DAVID JOHN BETTS, B.A.(Hons.)

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements

for the degree of

Master of Arts

UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA

HOBART

October 1980

To the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university, and contains no copy or paraphrase of material previously published or written by another person, except when due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Signed :.. *D. J. Belts*

CONTENTS

Abstract	iv
Principal Ancient Texts	vi
Abbreviations, Textual Note	vii
INTRODUCTION : Scope and Intention of Thesis	1
CHAPTER 1 : Revolutionary Change and the Preservation of Constitutions	7
CHAPTER 2 : The Nature and Method of Revolutionary Change and Political Subversion in Syracuse, 415-305 B.C.	45
CHAPTER 3 : Political Problems and the Role of the Leader in Syracuse, 415-305 B.C.	103
CHAPTER 4 : The Effect of Socio-Economic Conditions	151
CHAPTER 5 : Conclusion	180
APPENDIX : A Note on the Sources for Sicilian History	191
Footnotes	202
Tables	260
Maps	264
Bibliography	266
Addendum	271

ABSTRACT

The thesis examines the phenomena of *stasis*, political change and political subversion in Syracuse from 415 to 305 B.C. The Introductory Chapter gives a general outline of the problems in this area, together with some discussion of the critical background. As the problems involved with the ancient sources for the period under discussion lie outside the mainstream of the thesis, these have been dealt with in the form of an appendix.

Central to the question of civil strife is the problem of definition and causation. The First Chapter is therefore concerned with the terminology used by the Greeks to describe their civil disturbances, together with a discussion of Aristotle's theory of revolutionary cause and the preservation of constitutions. The conclusion reached in this chapter is that, although revolutionaries were often motivated by their own personal ambitions, their ability to gain support from other sections of the community and, on occasions, carry out successful revolutions, lay in the fact that the government itself had been inadequate in some areas.

Chapter Two deals with the nature and type of revolutionary activity in Syracuse from the point of view of the revolutionaries. This involves an examination of their motivation and method. Their method was dependent, in the first instance, on the means available to them. This led to a discussion of their use of propaganda, the availability of arms and manpower and the use of speed, secrecy and personal violence. Allied to the means available is the extent of support gained by revolutionaries. It is found that there were four main areas of support - group and family associations, the Syracusan people, exiles, and allies and outside powers. The extent of support from each of these areas is therefore reviewed.

Next, the problem is analysed from the point of view of the various governments. The Third Chapter discusses the problems facing those governments and their attempts to maintain their constitutions or position, along with the failures that led to outbreaks of revolutionary activity. It is found that Syracuse had its own inherent problems due to the diversity of their population and the tendency of the Syracusans to entrust command to a single ruler. The success of that single ruler was due to his capacity to command mercenaries, to gain capable and loyal subordinates, to keep the goodwill of the people and to deal with any opposition. Each of these aspects is examined but it is also found that, despite his capability, the single ruler's position always remained threatened since his position was usually unconstitutional. The final section of this chapter therefore involves a discussion of the constitutional difficulties facing the various governments and their failure to find an adequate constitutional arrangement that allowed for the role of the single ruler.

Beneath the personalities and capabilities of the various individuals opposing or controlling the government, lay the fundamental problem of Greek social and economic attitudes. Chapter Four discusses the general aspects of these attitudes and the stresses on the Syracusan constitution caused by the widening of privilege and the change of values that had occurred by the end of the Fifth Century and continued throughout the Fourth Century B.C. In an examination of the specific problems of the economic situation at Syracuse it is found that this was an area in which both governments and revolutionaries alike failed, even though many revolutionaries gained support from the people by the promise that they would improve the economic situation of the poor.

The final chapter reviews and assesses the constant problems that led to a recurrence of civil strife in Syracuse from 415 to 305 B.C., with reference to what may be regarded as general Greek problems and what were peculiarly Syracusan or Sicilian problems.

PRINCIPAL ANCIENT TEXTS

Aelian, Varia Historia (Teubner, Leipzig 1974)

Aristotle, Politics with translation by H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library, London 1932)

Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca Historica XII.41-XIII with translation by C.H. Oldfather (Loeb Classical Library, London 1950)
Bibliotheca Historica XIV-XV.19 with translation by C.H. Oldfather (Loeb Classical Library, London 1954)
Bibliotheca Historica XV.20-XVI.65 with translation by C.L. Sherman (Loeb Classical Library, London 1952)
Bibliotheca Historica XVI.66-XVII with translation by C.B. Welles (Loeb Classical Library, London 1963)
Bibliotheca Historica XVIII-XIX.65 with translation by R.M. Greer (Loeb Classical Library, London 1957)
Bibliotheca Historica XIX.66-XX with translation by R.M. Greer (Loeb Classical Library, London 1954)

Justin, Epitoma Historiarum Philippicarum Pompei Trogi (Teubner, Stuttgart 1972)

Nepos, Great Generals of Foreign Nations with translation by J.C. Rolfe (Loeb Classical Library, London 1929)

Plato, Epistles with translation by R.G. Bury (Loeb Classical Library, London 1929)

Plutarch, Nicias with translation by B. Perrin (Loeb Classical Library, London 1916)
Alcibiades with translation by B. Perrin (Loeb Classical Library, London 1916)
Dion with translation by B. Perrin (Loeb Classical Library, London 1918)
Timoleon with translation by B. Perrin (Loeb Classical Library, London 1918)

Polyaenus, Polyaeni Stratagematon Libri Octo (Teubner, Stuttgart 1970)

Thucydides, Thucydidis Historiae Vols. I & II (Oxford Classical Text, Oxford 1942)
The Peloponnesian War translated by R. Warner (Penguin, Harmondsworth 1954)

Xenophon, Historia Graeca (Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis, Oxford 1900)

ABBREVIATIONS

Fr. Gr. Hist. = F. Jacoby,
Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker
(Berlin 1923 -).

Journal titles are abbreviated in accordance
with the practice in L' Année Philologique.

Some titles of works by ancient authors have
also been abbreviated, but it is anticipated
that these will cause no difficulty.

TEXTUAL NOTE

Throughout this thesis, for Diodorus and
Plutarch Loeb translations and numbering
have been used.

INTRODUCTION : SCOPE AND INTENTION

(The following chapter also touches briefly on the critical background, further details of which can be found in the footnotes and Bibliography.)

Civil strife in its various forms was prevalent in Ancient Greece and has been commented upon as such by ancient and modern scholars alike. The ancient historians, philosophers and orators saw it as one of the major dangers to the survival of the city-state and therefore often digressed from their particular topic to comment on its evils. The modern historians have also noted the recurrence of civil strife in Greece and the standard general works on the Greek city and Greek history mention it in such terms as the besetting evil of the polis or its endemic disease.¹

In recent times, the phenomena of *στάσις*, *πολιτικός* and political subversion has received more particular attention and much scholarly work in this area has been done. But, in my opinion, the work that has been done has been either rather broad and general in its range or restricted to an examination of a specific incident of political upheaval.

Most notable on the broad level are the works which discuss the Ancient World from a Marxist viewpoint. Many of these are conveniently located in the articles and bibliographies in Arethusa 8 no. 1 (1975). Of particular value to the Greek scholar are those by G.E.M. De Ste Croix and R. Padgug.² However, these works are limited by their attempt to explain or describe the conflicts in the Greek World in Marxist terms.³ General works on political theory and the interrelation of classes are numerous, one of the most recent being E. & N. Wood, Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory (Oxford, 1978). In terms of revolutionary cause, A. Fuks, 'Patterns and Types of Socio-Economic Revolution in Greece from the Fourth to the Second Century B.C.', Ancient Society 5 (1974) deals basically with broad socio-economic movements and the resulting stress on a community unable to absorb the changes within its framework.

Fuks, having identified some seventy cases of socio-economic revolution during the period studied, noted the wide range in both space and time of those cases and used them for his cumulative picture of types and patterns of socio-economic revolution. His work contains much that is valuable for an understanding of the conditions which led to revolutions and for analysing the various types of revolution. While his work showed the wide extent of revolutions and fixed revolutionary behaviour within the perspective of broad historical and economic developments, it did not explain why revolutions occurred in some places and not in others and why they occurred at precisely the time at which they did. For example, given the socio-economic premise from which Fuks operates he needed to explain why revolution occurred in Syracuse in 356 B.C. rather than 366 B.C., particularly since the economic conditions were basically the same on both occasions.

Fuks did note that Athens was conspicuous for its lack of socio-economic revolution in the Late Classical and Hellenistic Age. He believed that this was the result of a large middle class, a comparatively good economic situation and the well-developed system of public welfare.⁴ But what also needs to be ascertained is why some places with difficult economic conditions did not experience revolutions of some type and why some places with a reasonable economy did. Part of the answer lies in the fact that not all revolutions are socio-economic ones, a fact that Fuks himself realized.

While a study of those places which did not experience revolutions would be somewhat absurd if carried to any length, I believe that part of the answer can be discovered in the study of a particular place in order to ascertain why revolutions occurred there at some times and not at others and to assess the relative importance of socio-economic factors to other causes of civil strife.

Of the more specific works, the Doctoral Dissertation by R.P. Legon,

Demos and Stasis : Studies in Factional Politics in Classical Greece,

(Cornell University 1966) stands out. Legon dealt with six cases of *στάσεις*, five from the period of the Peloponnesian War and one from the first half of the Fourth Century. He did not concern himself with the meaning of *στάσεις* but accepted the meaning of 'civil strife'; but then his aim was to assess the role played by the demos in a 'stasis' situation and his material was arranged accordingly. Moreover, the scattered geographical extent of his references do not permit any assessment of the instances of *στάσεις* in relation to the continuous history of the particular place at which the upheaval occurred.

Instances of *στάσεις* and *στάσεις* during the Peloponnesian War have received a great deal of attention, most notably by A. Fuks, I.A.F. Bruce, D. Gillis and R.P. Legon.⁵ Many of these articles are written from the viewpoint of the effect of the war between the two major powers and the intervention of those powers on civil disturbances in the cities in Greece. The revolutions during the period at Athens in 411 B.C. and 404 B.C. have, of course, received most attention in both the general works on Athens and in articles, too numerous to mention, devoted specifically to the complex political situations on those occasions.⁶ For the Hellenistic period, the problem of class struggles and civil strife has received attention by W. Tarn and A. Fuks.⁷

As can be seen from this brief account, the attention given to revolutionary struggle has been varied in both range and location. What seems to be absent is work devoted to the study of revolutionary struggles in relation to a single place over a significant time span.⁸ Therefore, the following work is a modest attempt to bridge the gap between the specific and the general. For this reason I have confined myself to the civil problems of Syracuse from 415 B.C. to 305 B.C. This has the advantage of viewing civil strife within a limited geographical area, thereby enabling me to discuss revolutionary activity in relation to the

conditions of that particular area and to assess the relationship between political change and change in socio-economic conditions. Moreover, it is hoped to discover what features of the revolutionary struggle remained constant, irrespective of changes in environmental conditions.

The starting point of 415 B.C. has been chosen since it was the Athenian invasion of Sicily and the stress that it laid upon the Syracusans that marked the beginning of the constitutional problems they were to experience for the next century. The terminal date marks the approximate date of Agathocles' assumption of the royal title and can be taken as inaugurating the Hellenistic era in Sicily. After Agathocles, monarchy was established as a concept which, although not legitimate, was at least acceptable to the Syracusans.

The choice of Syracuse for the study has been made since it was illustrative of the continuous nature of political upheavals and it is the one place, apart from Athens, for which there is, with the notable exception of the years 337-317 B.C. some sort of continuous historical narrative to be extracted from the sources. As a detailed discussion of those sources is outside the mainstream of this thesis, the problems and bias in the principal sources is dealt with in the form of a brief appendix.

Syracuse, of course, had its own particular problems which were different from those experienced by the Greek cities of the Mainland and the extra stresses these placed on Syracusan society is also examined. In the area of Sicilian history, E.A. Freeman's History of Sicily Vols. I-IV (Oxford, 1891-1894) is still indispensable. Notable recent contributions have been made by H. Berve, M.I. Finley, K.F. Stroheker, R.J.A. Talbert and H.D. Westlake.⁹

Since there are several different instances of civil disturbance in the period under question,¹⁰ only one or two particular instances are dealt with in detail at any one time. This is at the time when they most illustrate the point under discussion. Thus, detailed discussions of the

various civil disturbances occur at different places within the thesis. It is hoped that this method minimizes repetition and helps to avoid the monotony of a straight narrative.

Before discussing the situation at Syracuse I have felt it necessary to define and discuss the terminology used by the Greeks to describe their civil disturbances, as well as their view of the causes of such disturbances. The principal works used for this are Thucydides and Aristotle. Again, modern works on these authors are numerous but have not dealt in detail with their terminology in this area. The standard works on Aristotle's political thought remain those of Newman and Barker.¹¹ A recent article by M. Wheeler, 'Aristotle's Analysis of the Nature of Political Struggle', sheds some light on the problem.¹² His work clearly differentiates between *στάσις* and *περιβολή* but he does not deal with the relationship between *στάσις* and other forms of revolutionary behaviour. To give some idea of the prevalence of civil strife in the Greek world, the examples selected to illustrate points in this chapter are mainly from areas outside Sicily. These examples are meant to be illustrative and by no means exhaustive.

The conclusion reached from Chapter One is that although the revolutionaries were often motivated by their own personal ambitions, their ability to gain support from other sections of the community lay in the fact that the government itself had been inadequate in some areas.

Chapter Two therefore deals with the nature and type of revolutions in Syracuse from the point of view of the revolutionaries who, after all, were the instigators of revolutionary change at a particular moment in time. Revolutions, however desirable are nonetheless difficult to carry out successfully. There was always the expectation on the part of the revolutionaries that they would win and that they would gain sufficient support for their cause. The reason why they felt compelled to resort to arms and the basis of their belief that they could gain support must be

found in the performance of the particular government to which they were opposed. The third chapter is therefore concerned with the problems of the Syracusan governments; their constitutional difficulties and their inability to impose sufficient deterrents. It is found that the constitutional arrangements were insufficient to meet the demands of the practical situation and that the Syracusans had a tendency to entrust rule to a single person.

The fourth chapter discusses the socio-economic conditions of the time to illustrate the ways in which these helped to promote instability by creating groups of people willing to support revolutionary change in the belief that their position would be improved by so doing.

In the final chapter the various aspects are reviewed and an assessment made of the constant underlying problems that led to the recurrence of civil strife in Syracuse in the Fourth Century B.C., with reference to what may be regarded as general Greek problems and what was peculiarly Syracusan or Sicilian.

CHAPTER 1 : REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE AND THE PRESERVATION OF CONSTITUTIONS

In a discussion on the causes of revolutionary change, what is meant by revolutionary change must first be clarified. To do this, reference has been made principally to Aristotle's comments on the subject in the Politics, since Book V of that work is the most general and complete extant ancient account of the phenomenon of revolutionary change. Where necessary, reference has been made to other authors, particularly Thucydides, to help distinguish revolutionary change from other forms of change.

The problem of Definition

Aristotle, in the Politics, commented that "many forms of constitution have come into existence with everybody agreeing as to what is just ($\tauὸ δίκαιον$), that is proportional equality ($\alphaναλογικὴν ἴσιν$), but failing to attain it".¹ This failure was due to the definition of what was proportionate equality and the fact that there were different interpretations implies that any definition of a basis of order was potentially discriminatory when seen from another point of view. Therein lay one important source of instability. Aristotle, in fact, suggested that because of this changes ($μεταβολαί$) occurred in constitutions. was a general term used to denote changes in government, varying from reform to revolutionary activity. As such, its use did not necessarily have any revolutionary connotations.

A more specific word used was $στρατηγείν$. This he claimed occurred "when each of the two parties oligarchs and democrats has not got the share in the constitution which accords with the fundamental assumption that they happen to entertain".² This makes the basis of $στρατηγείν$ a conflict between two parties. The nature of such conflicts must be examined to ascertain whether Aristotle believed that they were always revolutionary in the sense that they were aimed at the overthrow of the existing government by force.

Since the first condition of such conflicts was a state of inequality, $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\upsilon$ then is a conflict over political equality, however the different contenders may define equality. In such a situation there were two opposing factors; the existing government which had failed to gain the allegiance of the contending group and the group itself, who engaged in $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ since presumably no other method of change was possible.

The aim of those involved in $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\upsilon$ was to gain political control, either by establishing a new form of government or by making the existing constitution more or less characteristic of its type. Inequality was the starting point and the source of factions ($\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$) from which $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\upsilon$ occurred. $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ then, has the meaning of that sectionalism within a state which was the antecedent to active conflict. It was not revolutionary in the sense that a new form of government established by force, or the threat of it, was necessarily the end point, it was merely the overthrow of the particular rulers, though their successful overthrow may have entailed a new form of government.³

Indeed, Aristotle's use of $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ was quite wide in its application, including such events as the establishment or abolition of certain magistracies,⁴ events which need not have included any sedition, but may have been achieved through ordinary constitutional methods and would come under what we would term reform. Such things would seem to have been better expressed by the wider term $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\beta\omicron\lambda\alpha\iota$. But he restated at 1301b 26-29 that $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ was due to the desire for equality. Obviously then, the reforms were the result of inequality, and in this sense the conflict over the inequality was described as a $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ or factionalism which endangered the smooth running of the state, but did not give rise to active conflict ($\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\upsilon$). Unfortunately, Aristotle did not deal with the problem of at what point the static nature of $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ could be said to have developed into the more active state of $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\upsilon$ which thereby created a type of $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ as an active concept.

To what extent the word *στάσις* can be classified as revolutionary raises the problem of terminology. For C.J. Friedrich, "Political revolution, then, may be defined as a sudden and violent overthrow of an established order".⁵ Accepting this terminology removes the word revolution from its more restricted popular concept of a mass movement against a government, for the definition exists in essence by its explanation of the method and consequence of political disturbance rather than by the composition of those instigating the disturbance. It does, however, have certain limitations, for its emphasis on 'sudden' centralizes the definition around the actual revolutionary event.

Other commentators would extend the term revolution to cover the whole process of pre-planning and organisation before actual conflict (however spontaneous and sudden a revolution may appear to be, this planning is necessary to distinguish a revolution from such acts as assassination), as well as the consolidation of the transferred power. When that power is not transferred they prefer to use the title rebellion or revolt.⁶ In both concepts, violence is an integral part of the definition, since this characteristic distinguishes a revolution from a reform of a more peaceful nature which nevertheless resulted in a change or overthrow of government. One may therefore conclude that revolution occurs when more peaceful methods of change were not possible. The actual recourse to violence in revolutionary activity may be sudden, the revolutionary situation need not be.

It is in fact the potential for violent change, just as much as the whole process of revolutionary change that was covered by the word *στάσις* in Aristotle and Thucydides. Thus the sense and meaning of *στάσις* in the political situation varied in different contexts:

1. It may simply mean the formation of a party in which there was a prevalence of party spirit. In this case there was only a potential for violent change and reconciliation was still feasible.

2. It can have the sense of the actual existence of factions, and hence can be seen as one of the preconditions for revolutionary struggle. It was thus a steady state of continued interaction between rival groups. This was prevalent in Sicily where the cities were said to be in a continuous state of *stasis*, not necessarily confined to those within the city itself, but also including pressure from exiles in the near vicinity, which may or may not have resulted in open combat. It was this mere existence of factions to which Aristotle referred when he said that contempt was a cause of factional strife (*σπουδαίειν*) and attacks (*ἐπιτίθεσθαι* (πρὸς)).⁷
3. It could embrace a whole process or series of processes, beginning with the conditions which led to conflict and including the conflict and the overthrow of the government, as well as the subsequent conditions, particularly since discord often occurred after the change since the opposition was neither reconciled nor quelled. Thus Thucydides, in describing the situation on Corcyra, said that it was in a state of *stasis* through several processes:
 - (a) The seeking of allegiance by the returned prisoners;
 - (b) The attacks made by opposing groups by means of legal impeachments;
 - (c) The actual seizure of power by the few (*οἱ ὀλίγοι*);
 - (d) The reaction from the people (*ὁ ὄχλος*), or perhaps more accurately the leaders of the people;
 - (e) The mass killings;
 - (f) The time during which the Corcyraeans in the city were harassed by the exiles who had established themselves inland.

It was only after the exiles had been successfully exterminated that the *stasis* was said to have ended.⁸
4. *stasis* could occur as distinct from an actual change in the constitution. In such cases it was the active rivalry between two

groups for control of the existing constitution and would cover the concept of a coup d'état. It was in this sense that Herodotus used it when he spoke of the rivalry that led to the original opening of the vote to the people in Athens, by Cleisthenes.⁹

5. It could, but rarely, have an extended application to include rivalries between the various cities. Thus Hermocrates, in his speech at Sicily as reported by Thucydides,¹⁰ mentioned that *στάσις* was especially the cause of the destruction of cities. He then called for unity, not only between private individuals within the cities, but between the cities themselves. In this context it had the meaning of discord or strife, but a discord occasioned by that factionalism which sought to further its interests by appeals to, and involvements with, other cities.¹¹

The one consistent feature of *στάσις* was its factional basis, a basis which usually led to conflict (armed or not). M. Wheeler noted the distinct factionalism evident in the word *στάσις*, but went too far, I believe, when he asserted that, "the prevalence and distinctive character of 'stasis' may be explained as arising from the fact that if an influential or an organised 'opposition' group does come into being, its aim cannot be, as it often is under a modern party system, merely to substitute its policy for that of the group in power; it must be to capture power and, wholly or partially, modify the constitution."¹² Wheeler has not allowed for the instances of *στάσις* which were primarily motivated by personal ambition and were not directed at the constitution but merely at those in charge of it.

A city was not always in a state of *στάσις* with the existence of contending groups. A city reached a state of *στάσις* when the conflicts reached the stage of weakening the city by disunity, thereby endangering its effective running as a unit. When the two opposing groups (whatever their nature) existed in rivalry that still left the city intact, *στάσις* was not used. Thus, Sparta, although showing changes in opinion as the

result of rival policies, was noted for its freedom from *στάσεις* and its general harmony (*ἁμολογία*).¹³

Given its factional basis, *στάσεις* was used to cover a variety of types of revolutionary activity. It had little to do with the numbers involved, for Aristotle spoke of oligarchs against oligarchs and oligarchs against democrats without implying that the whole population, or even a majority were involved. *στάσεις* could involve several people or as few as the case at Syracuse¹⁴ when two ruling men were involved in *στάσεις* as the result of a love affair and the constitution subsequently changed. It incidentally also shows that political ideology need not have been the initial basis of *στάσεις*. But nevertheless, the *στάσεις* situation was only important if those quarrelling were within the politically powerful group, whereby the political stability of the state was endangered. In the above-mentioned case the situation swelled since the two rivals stirred up the people who also became involved in the strife.

Again the factional basis of *στάσεις* was stressed and Aristotle believed that it was necessary to dissolve the factions of powerful men.¹⁵ It was, in fact, the existence of these factions that provided a basis upon which a swelling of conflict could occur. Linked to such factions was, of course, the problem of family rivalries. The problem with these factions was that they could each command a reasonable following and as Aristotle also noted, once a rivalry widened to include large sections of the state, there was the necessity that the groups which supported either side were nearly equal, for if one group was manifestly stronger, the remainder would not have been willing to risk an active encounter.¹⁶ It was at this level that political ideology was often used, and the frequency with which such active states of *στάσεις* occurred in the Greek world lay in the fact that there were always significant numbers to support rival ideologies so that individuals could gain a sufficiently wide support for their own selfish reasons by advocating one or other of the political ideologies; promising

political control to the masses or political exclusiveness to the few.

Aristotle did not believe, however, that *stasis* between different sections of the people (*ὁ δῆμος*) was worth speaking about to any extent.¹⁷ This would imply that he thought such factionalism was capable of being resolved without affecting the existing constitution. Thus, although believing in the existence of such rivalry, he did not consider that it endangered the effective running of the state. This seems an extraordinary viewpoint. He did not, in fact, allow sufficiently for the different aims and desires of those making up the 'demos', nor for the rivalry between individual demagogues and their followers for control of the people. Elsewhere he mentioned how tyrants arose as a result of demagogues winning the people to their side in opposition to the rich,¹⁸ but he failed to note that it was also in opposition to other demagogues and leaders of the people. The case of the rise of Dionysius I in Syracuse typified this, to name but one example.

There were some changes that Aristotle believed occurred without *stasis*. These were election intrigue, carelessness and alteration by small stages.¹⁹ The latter would refer to those changes which were the result of different economic and/or social conditions, but were capable of being absorbed into the constitutional framework, thereby modifying that constitution. In cases where the conditions changed but the constitution did not, the resulting stress on that constitution made it more liable to overthrow as the result of some form of *stasis*. Thus, where a property qualification was altered by small stages, this was an alteration to suit changing conditions. In the case of election intrigue, the problem lay within the constitutional framework. The intrigue was used by individuals for their own personal advancement in terms of the particular constitution and not in an attempt to change that constitution. The elimination of such intrigue did not require any real modification of the constitution, but only in the method of applying the constitution, as for

example, the selection of archons at Athens by lot rather than election in c. 487 B.C. to prevent the possibility of bribery.

The starting point of a 'stasis' situation was not always a political one, but to be titled as *stasis* the groups involved must have some sense of political ideology. Even when the outburst was over such matters as a dowry or a love affair, it was only if the people involved were within the ruling elite or were potential rulers that *stasis* could be said to have developed. Similarly, the use of lawsuits, attributed particularly to democrats²⁰ but quite prevalent among oligarchic governments as well, as the speeches of Lysias reveal, often led to *stasis* since the suits were aimed at the politically powerful and often resulted in the defendant's political defeat.

The events leading to the revolution on Corcyra in 427 B.C. are illustrative of this interrelation between politics and the law. The returned prisoners sought to bring Peithias to trial because of his promotion of Athenian interests. On his acquittal he retaliated by bringing to trial five of his richest opponents on a technical charge. The penalty imposed upon them was severe and although they asked for a reassessment of their fine, Peithias, who was a member of the Council to which the appeal was made, persuaded his colleagues to enforce the full penalty with the result that the five accused, since they faced ruin, resorted to violence.²¹

The pretexts of such charges varied, but the intended result, political removal of an opponent, did not. Thus, at the end of the Peloponnesian War, the oligarchs who sought to destroy the democracy at Athens, first tried to remove the principal advocates of democracy by bringing various charges against them.²²

The nature of a *stasis* situation did require that the participants possess citizenship and independence. There was no sense that slave uprisings created *stasis*. In the advent of such, *νεω-επιχειρ* was employed.

This word had more radical implications than $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$. Aristotle used it when describing a situation at Thurii when the rule passed into a dynasty and the whole system ($\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\epsilon\iota\varsigma$) was changed by those who set to work to $\nu\epsilon\omega\tau\epsilon\rho\iota\lambda\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$ (innovate).²³

From Thucydides, it would appear that $\nu\epsilon\omega\tau\epsilon\rho\iota\lambda\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$ covered a meaning ranging from dangerous subversive action to radical revolution that aimed at changing the whole social and political structure of the state. Thus, when the Athenians demolished the walls of their independent ally, Chios, they did so in the belief that the Chians were planning some revolutionary movement against them ($\nu\epsilon\omega\tau\epsilon\rho\iota\lambda\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$).²⁴ This would seem to mean subversive action aimed at changing the existing status of the relationship between Athens and Chios. In the case of the Spartans, after the Athenians had occupied Pylos which could have become a centre for any helots contemplating desertion, they felt a fear of revolution ($\nu\epsilon\omega\tau\epsilon\rho\iota\lambda\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$) against their constitution. The fear was so strong that they were compelled to place hoplite garrisons throughout their territory, rather than make a full-scale attack on the Athenians.²⁵ In this case, the revolutionary movement would have altered the whole structure of society in Laconia by removing Spartan dominance and elitism. This fear severely hampered Spartan foreign policy and restricted their capacity to engage in external campaigns at long distances from Laconia.

The difference between $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$ and $\nu\epsilon\omega\tau\epsilon\rho\iota\lambda\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$ seems to be that of degree. Both entailed the concept of the overthrow of government. $\nu\epsilon\omega\tau\epsilon\rho\iota\lambda\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$ tended to be feared as about to happen, whereas $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$, in whatever form, was an actuality. $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$ essentially involved the rivalry of factions, but this was not necessarily the case with $\nu\epsilon\omega\tau\epsilon\rho\iota\lambda\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$. The latter involved a fear of the complete change in economic and social system. Thus, those who feared the dynamic nature of Alcibiades at Athens, feared that he was seeking to revolutionize the government in some new or unacceptable way. Those who engaged in $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ strove for some form of

oligarchy or democracy within which to exert their policies and both forms of government were accepted in the Greek world as a whole, loathed though they may have been by sections within the individual cities. Essentially the victors of *στάσις* did not radically alter the social system, nor did they intend to.

The problem with the term *νεωτερίζειν* is that it was used to express fears which when they became an actuality were in fact referred to as a state of *στάσις*. Thus Thucydides, speaking in general about civil disturbances, stated that those who wished to initiate subversive action (*νεωτερίζειν*) easily found support.²⁶ Having acquired this support, *στάσις* ensued. *στάσις* in its revolutionary sense, as distinct from *νεωτερίζειν* required contending factions and an observable point in time when the welfare of the city had become such that effective running of the government was extremely difficult or had ceased to exist.

In the interests of either innovatory revolution (*νεωτερίζειν*) or factional conflict (*σπασμίζειν*) some person or persons were said to be engaged in conspiracy (*συνομιλέειν*). But such a conspiracy may also have meant no more than individual opposition to a city's government, or an attempt by one group to betray (*προδοῦναι*) the city, as in the case of those who admitted the Thebans into Plataea in 431 B.C. On that occasion there was no instance of *στάσις* since the betrayal did not involve conflict within the city based on political control of the government and its policies. Whatever their political leanings, the people of Plataea combined to resist what was regarded as foreign intervention. Such instances of betrayal to another power were frequent in Greece, particularly on occasions of inter-city warfare.

To betray a city to an outside power required the utmost secrecy and, if effective, resulted in a new government backed by the power to whom the city was betrayed. It did not necessarily involve conflict with the betrayer's political opponents, a conflict essential in the concept of

στάσις. But although such betrayals were not described as στάσις themselves, they were often the result of an already existing state of στάσις.

Thus στάσις may be distinguished as a state of conflict over the political control of the city between factions, such that the welfare of the state was jeopardized. στάσις ceased to exist when one of the contending parties managed to gain secure control and was able to establish an effective and unopposed running of government. It was waged between citizens. The examples given by Aristotle of στάσις occurring because of differences in people (τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον) were all examples of Greek citizens within a city,²⁷ the conflict arising when additional settlers from another Greek city had been admitted into the city as citizens. No group was, in theory, inferior to any other group. In the case of Syracuse, it was only after the mercenaries and foreign troops had become citizens that they were said to be engaged in στάσις.²⁸

στάσις ἐκείνη was not employed then in conflicts over citizenship, but rather, given that all had citizenship, over who should have political control, though non-citizens, especially slaves may have been, and often were, brought in to aid a contender to gain political control in an already existing state of στάσις.²⁹ Underprivileged citizens were also used to gain support. In this way, Peisistratus was said to have acquired a politically underprivileged group to support him.³⁰ That such a group did support him against the rich attests to the fact that they felt economically exploited and were therefore prepared to support the leader who promised to alleviate their situation in a way in which the existing government had not. Either that government had not seen the problem or, having seen it, had not considered that it needed solving. It was not political ideology that gave Peisistratus his supporters, but expediency. They did not want, and did not get political power, as was evident a little later when Peisistratus' opponents combined to expel him.³¹

The coalition of Peisistratus' opponents, Megacles and Lycurgus, was short-lived and Peisistratus returned, not with the backing of the under-privileged Athenians, but of the followers of Megacles who had switched sides.³² But that alliance was also only temporary, for when Megacles became reconciled to Lycurgus' faction Peisistratus seems to have gone into voluntary exile.³³ These realignments between the leaders of the various groups show a *οἰκός* situation among the ruling elite, none of whom were powerful enough to rule in their own right. Peisistratus, realizing the shaky nature of coalitions with the ruling elite or sections of it, and the ineffectiveness of local support, returned with money and mercenaries with which to firmly establish himself by force.³⁴

Allied to the quality of citizenship in the use of the word *οἰκός* was the quality of independence. Where a rebellion occurred between a subject city and its superior, no matter how loose or tight that subjection was, the city was said to be in a state of revolt (*ἀφίστηναι*). In 427 B.C. the Lesbians were forced into their revolt from Athens (*ἀποστῆναι*) before they were ready.³⁵ Similar terminology was used in regard to the earlier revolts of Euboea, Samos and Byzantium.³⁶ *ἀφίστηναι* was then, an assertion of independence on the part of a subject city. In a relationship where the element of subjection was not so distinct as it was between Athens and what had been the Delian League, but was rather an alliance between a major and a lesser power, the breaking of the alliance by the lesser power was also seen in terms of *ἀφίστηναι*. Thus the people of Messina were said to have revolted from Athens.³⁷ The cases of such revolts were numerous in times of war, and though often accompanied by some form of *οἰκός*, the latter was neither a precondition nor an inevitable result of the former. That *οἰκός* often occurred when a city revolted was not surprising for there were usually several factions within a city, each of which favoured a different policy.

Later writers, when speaking of a situation where the citizens were

virtually subjects of a tyrant, used *ῥιπιδεύει* or *ῥιπιδεύεις* to describe the revolt of those citizens from that tyrant. Thus the cavalry revolt against Dionysius I in 405 B.C. was referred to as an incident of *ῥιπιδεύεις*.³⁸ At other times when the people rebelled against the Dionysii similar terminology was used.³⁹ In the case of the rebellion of 404 B.C., after Dionysius I had regained his position on Ortygia, the people were divided among themselves (*σπασμένον*) as to whether to continue the siege or not.⁴⁰

Similarly, in the military area, where a desertion occurred as distinct from rivalry within the one army for command, *ῥιπιδεύει* was used. This was the case with Agathocles' general, Pasiphilus, who deserted (*ῥιπιδεύει*) to Deinocrates.⁴¹

Thus *σπασμένον* and *σπασμός* can be distinguished from *νεωτερίζειν*, *συνιστάειν*, *προδίδοναι* and *ῥιπιδεύει*. A further problem of definition arises in Aristotle since he did not differentiate consistently between *σπασμένον* and *μεταβάλλειν*. In the section in Book V on the changes in particular types of government he used *μεταβάλλειν* to describe things which were in fact cases of *σπασμένον*. The point seems to be that change in a general sense can be used for situations of *σπασμένον*; that is, all situations of *σπασμένον* are also cases of *μεταβάλλειν*, but the reverse is not so. In this I would dispute Barker's implied definition as revealed when he said that "In practice the discussion of revolutions (*μεταβολαί*) turns out to be a discussion of seditions (*σπασμοί*), whether they are ultimately followed by a revolution and a change in the constitution, or involve no such result".⁴² *μεταβολαί* by its wide application in Aristotle can hardly be translated as 'revolutions' and although a large part of the discussion on governmental change centres around factional conflicts (*σπασμοί*), some changes involve no sense of *σπασμός*, but are what we would term reforms and some overthrows of government, although revolutionary, do not involve a sense of sedition.

P. Calvert, in his brief discussion, while recognising the wide range of meaning inherent in the word *μεταβολαί* is, due to his translation

of μεταβολή forced to the alarming conclusion that, "for him (Aristotle) therefore, revolution is not an exceptional phenomenon, but a necessary fact of political change. It is a political phenomenon, both violent and non-violent, representing the fundamental process of change which leads to the alteration or displacement of social groupings". Aristotle, although realizing that 'revolutions' were frequent, did regard them as both exceptional and avoidable. Political change itself was less exceptional and since it did not necessarily require the element of potential violence would, I believe, be a more appropriate way of translating Aristotle's usage of μεταβάλλειν and its related words.

Allied to the problem of terminology is the use of the word κινεῖν, for which Liddell and Scott give two basic meanings : to set in motion, change or innovate, and to disturb or stir up. In V 1304b 8 Aristotle stated that "they κινούσιν constitutions, sometimes by force (βία) and sometimes by fraud (δολίῳ)". The word, then, expressed the actual process of change, whereas μεταβάλλειν expressed the phenomenon of change, while σπασίζειν was a term to describe a specific means by which a μεταβολή occurred.

But some forms of attack which resulted in a change of government were covered by the term ἐπὶ τὴν θρόνον and not σπασίζειν, although many causes of the attack were the same. In the section on changes in monarchies, the causes given are the result of the attitude and behaviour of the particular ruler, and whether the end result aimed at removal of the ruler or the fact of the ruler's existence, those who were involved were guilty of ἐπὶ τὴν θρόνον and not of σπασίζειν. ἐπὶ τὴν θρόνον would appear to mean an attack against a particular individual, sometimes with the belief that the removal of the individual would result in the fall of the system. These results, which if successful usually resulted in the extermination of the monarch, were treated more in the vein of treachery (ἐπιβουλή) and those involved were plotters (ἐπιβουλευταί) against the king.

Aristotle's treatment of revolutionary activity in the case of tyranny is similar. Consequently, those involved were often said to be engaged in plotting or treachery.⁴⁵ But the example of the tyranny of the family of Gelo at Syracuse is instructive of another type of overthrow. In that case, those sharing in the rule ($\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\chi\epsilon\upsilon$) engaged in factionalism ($\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$) over the succession.⁴⁶ This factional conflict was between members of the ruling family - between those who, while not actually ruling, had tremendous influence with those who were. It is what we would term a dynastic feud. Gelo's family attached confederates to themselves to expel Thrasybulus, but were themselves expelled as well. This type of factional conflict was akin to the rivalries between families for control of either a democracy or oligarchy, and because of this element of factionalism $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ was the term used. Such factionalism between those who had a share in the government was regarded as one of the two principal methods of the destruction of monarchies.⁴⁷

Thus $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ was used to describe the particular phenomenon of factionalism and rivalry within the state which had, at the very least, the potential to undermine the unity of the state since each of the factions aimed at control of the government for themselves and were prepared to gain that control by legal or illegal means. $\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\iota\kappa\iota$ was used, in relation to the citizens within a city-state, in the cases where the people (or a section of them) rebelled against a tyrant.

Aristotle's Theory of Revolutionary Cause

As can be seen from Aristotle's terminology, when discussing revolutions he was also concerned with political changes in general. He considered that the stability of the state was its natural condition and that consequently any action against it was the result of defects in or perversions of the particular governmental system.⁴⁸ On the ideological level there was always the potential for change since the fundamental basis for the desire for change lay in how men thought their community ought to

be governed. In the Greek world there were two prevalent and different viewpoints; that of the democrats, who believed that if they were equal in any respect they were equal absolutely, and that of the oligarchs who believed that if they were unequal in one respect they were unequal wholly.⁴⁹

Thus a basic instability existed where men did not feel that they had a share in the government in accordance with their fundamental assumption as to whether political justice should be based on numerical equality or on equality according to worth. As C.W. Brown Jr. remarked, "As long as two competing views of justice persist - the one solidly based in the logic of economics, the other solidly based in the logic of politics, the one justifying natural inequality, the other indicating the probable justice of equality - the state must remain in a condition of potential sedition".⁵⁰

But this potentiality for change did not always become an actuality. As Aristotle observed, "When the one or the few or the many rule with an eye to the common interest these constitutions must necessarily be right ones, while those administering with an eye to private interest of either the one or the few or the multitude are deviations".⁵¹ Without necessarily adopting Aristotle's view of true and deviating constitutions, it is obvious that if the existing government, albeit based on the viewpoint of a section of the population, satisfied the needs of those with a different viewpoint, then the opponents had no need to resort to a change of government in order to gain their ends, except where political ideology was felt as a strong principle. This was rare, revolutions were rather the result of the feeling that the existing government was not catering for all the needs of the community.

Because of this need to pursue the common interest, Aristotle counselled that those in oligarchies should treat those outside the ruling clique fairly, honourably and in a democratic spirit⁵² and that they should

take some care of the poor.⁵³ Similarly, in democracies it was necessary to spare the wealthy and not cause their properties or incomes to be divided up.⁵⁴

Thus, although the rival concepts of equality existed, it was possible for them to co-exist rather than be mutually destructive. Their mere existence does not explain why changes occurred at some places and not at others and on what occasions the rivalry became such as to endanger the effective running of the government. The responsibility for such changes lay in the behaviour of a particular government at a particular time. A governmental failure highlighted the precarious nature of the fundamental assumptions used to justify the government's existence. This failure on the part of the government provided a basic reason for bringing about change. Such changes occurred when a significant section of the population, either within the ruling group or outside it, felt that they were being treated unjustly. The leaders of revolutions were therefore motivated by a sense of injustice, either on the political or economic level. Accordingly, they sought to win either honour or gain or to redress the loss of them.⁵⁵

The occasions for such activity were many and varied, and as Barker remarked, "for men possessed by a sense of injustice, and looking forward to the advantages to be gained, the excuse of any occasion will suffice".⁵⁶ But to resort to a violent change of government required, on the part of the revolutionaries, the hope and belief that they would be successful. This meant a sufficiently widespread support for the revolutionaries and a corresponding disaffection with the government. Thus Aristotle, without explicitly saying so, arrived at the conclusion that although the motives of the revolutionaries were an important consideration, those motives were a consequence of the existing government's actions.

For among the seven principal causes given by Aristotle : honour, gain, insolence, fear, excessive prominence, contempt and disproportionate

growth of power,⁵⁷ the first six can all be linked by the common feeling, whether correct on the part of the persons feeling it or not, that they were being unjustly or unwisely treated. Gain, honour and insolence were direct abuses by the existing government, while fear, excessive prominence and contempt were the result of feelings aroused in others by the performance of the government. This lack of confidence in the government could be directed either against the people who operated a particular constitution, rather than against the constitution itself, or against the type of constitution that allowed exploitation of some kind to occur.

A closer analysis of Aristotle's seven principal causes is necessary. Honour (*τιμή*) and gain (*κέρδος*) he asserted were motives (as distinct from objectives) since the revolutionaries saw "other men in some cases justly and in other cases unjustly getting a larger share of them".⁵⁸ The former reveals that a government acted too well in its own interests, that it was too democratic or oligarchic,⁵⁹ while the latter that the men in power abused their position.

In the case of insolence (*ὕβρις*), the people rose against the constitution that allowed such behaviour to occur.⁶⁰ But a change of constitution did not necessarily remove this cause since the fault may not have been so much with the system as with the men in charge of it. Their effective removal ought to have removed the cause rather than create *στάσις* which has wider implications than the solving of an offence at a particular moment by an individual(s). Such behaviour did, however, provide a pretext for factional opposition from which factional conflict occurred.

With fear (*φόβος*) there is a dual concept; the fear on the part of some that they would be punished for some wrong they had actually committed, and fear of the result of impending lawsuits, brought against people unjustly it would seem, and from the example given, this was action on the part of the government.⁶¹ The first instance is an example of individual

selfish behaviour and cannot really be regarded as a result of the particular political structure. But in the second case, no matter who initiated the lawsuit, it reveals that the legal system was capable of being used in the interests of political power rather than justice.

Fear was, in a sense, an indirect cause for it only occurred when there was something to fear. In the case of democracies, Aristotle asserted that the fear arising among the nobles was the result of actions brought against them by the demagogues.⁶² But he did not deal with why the demagogues acted in that way. It was not merely to curry favour with the people. What they were in effect doing was redressing the balance between the rich and the poor, acting, that is, as a result of economic inequality. This must have been such that the poor did not feel that the liturgies provided by the rich were sufficient compensation for the very real economic imbalance.

Excessive prominence (*ὑπεροχή*) was asserted as causing *stasis* "when some individual or body of men is greater and more powerful than is suitable for the state and the power of government",⁶³ but this Aristotle did not qualify, except to comment that it gave rise to a monarchy or dynasty and hence some places had ostracism. The mere fact of excessive prominence need not have mattered except where it was used to abuse one group, or where the person or group in power acted contrary to the wishes of those who invested them with that power. The fear of excessive prominence seems to have emerged from the common Greek feeling which arose from the Fifth Century B.C. propaganda aimed at damning tyranny. It then came to be applied more generally. In actual fact, excessive prominence did not always lead to conflict, as the career of Pericles in Athens revealed. Pericles was careful not to abuse his position and he therefore retained the trust and confidence of the people who had elected him to power. The people only rose against him when other conditions made them feel (correctly or not) that his policies were not in their interests.

This feeling was the result of the effects of the Peloponnesian War and not of excessive prominence as such.

Contempt (*μεταφρόνησις*) as a revolutionary motive was the result of the failure of the government to maintain order. Aristotle cited the example of Thebes, where the democracy was ruling so badly that disorder and anarchy set in.⁶⁴ In effect it lost credibility. Contempt, then, is the result of the failure of the government to retain the confidence of the people. It also implied that those who wished to change the government believed that they were powerful enough to do so.

Of Aristotle's first seven causes of change, the last, growth contrary to proportion (*αὐξήσις παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον*) is of a different category. It is a characteristic over which the ruling government had very little control. The examples given were all changes in the composition of the particular cities, changes that necessitated a corresponding change in the constitution, as at Tarentum, where the great decrease in the notables led to the establishment of a democracy.⁶⁵ Such changes in composition, since they occurred unnoticed were particularly difficult to deal with. It may well be significant that in this section Aristotle consistently used *μεταβάλλειν* and not *σπασιάζειν*. In fact, in some cases the transition could be smooth, as with the Argives who were forced by Cleomenes to admit more citizens.⁶⁶

This type of change was far less easy to deal with than the others. The other causes were all based in human nature. A government could avoid creating the resentment that led people to start a revolution for honour or gain and could behave in such a way as not to display insolence and excessive prominence, nor create fear or contempt. But with disproportionate growth there was a need to modify the existing constitution to allow for the change, or prevent the disproportionate growth in the first place. As Newman noted, "Aristotle's analysis of the causes of *στάσις* and constitutional change reveals, in fact, the existence of causes with

which it is extremely difficult for the statesman to deal, however great his skill and watchfulness. Aristotle himself seems, indeed, to be hardly conscious of this. He hardly realizes how difficult it is to prevent *στάσεις* and constitutional change when they are brought about by changes in the size or credit of classes, or other social changes not easily guided or controlled. He may possibly have underrated the difficulty of doing this, for we find him in 7 (5). 8.1308b 30 advising statesmen under certain circumstances to 'try to increase the midway class' without betraying much consciousness of the difficulty of the task".⁶⁷ Aristotle also assumed that an astute statesman would be able to discern the nature of a growth which may well have begun in small stages and only gradually achieved a disproportionate size. What in effect occurred in such situations was the estrangement of the ruling elite. The introduction of new elements created a realignment of attitudes. These new attitudes led to revolution when allowance was not made for them within the existing constitution.

After the first seven causes, Aristotle added two further causes, somewhat like addenda. These were racial difference (*τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον*)⁶⁸ and geographical locality (*τόπος*).⁶⁹ The examples of racial difference were all cases of people from different Greek cities, not what we would call racial difference at all, with the exception of the example of the Syracusan foreign troops and mercenaries. In such cases, revolutions occurred due to a failure to achieve a satisfactory representative government which catered for the different backgrounds. This was a typical Greek problem since the Greeks looked to their own cities and customs with intense local feeling. Where a significantly different element was admitted into the city, as at Syracuse, factionalism started which led to fighting only after the foreigners had been made citizens. Probably they had been made citizens but given no real political power, and there were, no doubt, significant sections of the population who did not wish them to have been admitted at all.

The consideration of geographical conditions, judging from the example given of Athens, was not so much based on physical conditions of the country as on the distance of some people from the centre of government and the difference of occupation which led to differences in the concept of the type of government preferred. Just how much real difference there was between the Piraeus and Athens is difficult to assess.⁷⁰ The Piraeus, no doubt, contained a large section of metics who did not affect the government anyway, not having citizenship, but they did, of course, have the power to persuade indirectly, especially in the age of demagogues and orators. But on the general level, distance from the centre of government meant a real difference in political power since those in country areas could rarely exercise their right (if they possessed it) to attend the assembly.

At 1303b 15-17 there is a summing up which makes the greatest division in the population that between virtue (*ἀρετή*) and vice (*ποχθηρία*). This division can be seen to be the basis of gain, honour, insolence, fear and contempt. The next division after that was between wealth (*πλούσιος*) and poverty (*πενία*), which he had only dealt with tentatively in his seven major causes. It can, however, be linked back to the basic concept of how men thought their government should be run, a concept illustrated by Pericles in the Funeral Speech when he stated, not that there should be no poor people, but that poor people should not be denied political rights merely because they were poor.⁷¹

But Aristotle did not deal in detail with economic conditions in their broad sense. He touched on them, in a limited way, when he mentioned that men started revolutions when they saw others getting a larger share than they ought,⁷² but this was related to specific moments in time and can be seen as an abuse of position, rather than as a consideration of the general economic situation. He did not deal with the effect of the changing economy on how the government ought to be run, except in the

changes that affected the basis of eligibility for political office, when eligibility was determined by a property qualification. In fact, his view of this was somewhat contradictory. In discussing how to preserve oligarchies he mentioned that the qualification ought to be relaxed or tightened in relation to the changing economy.⁷³ He did not seem to realize the difficulty of doing this without changing the form of the constitution and elsewhere he counselled against such small changes.⁷⁴ The important point is, however, that such changes must be noticed by the ruling government and some allowance made for them.

Linked to this was a need for an awareness that poor people did exist and that some help should be given to them. This was never satisfactorily resolved in the Greek world and it was often within the poorer sections of the community that rival leaders were able to gain support, by promising such things as a redistribution of land or abolition of debts.

In enumerating further examples of the cause of *stasis* and change⁷⁵ he gave examples that can be included under his seven main causes. Petty quarrels and quarrels among the nobles were basically the result of gain, honour, insolence or excessive prominence. Hence he advocated that such factions should be broken up at the beginning, for the whole city often became involved. Just how one could stop a quarrel over a love affair or an estate is difficult to determine. What must be stopped was the extension of the quarrel to include factions. The allegiance of family groups and personal loyalties could not be removed, but it was vital that the conflicts arising from them should not affect the running of the city as a whole. There was a need to distinguish the personal from the political.

In this light, the selfish interests of the ruling group assume importance, for they were prepared to use any means, including political concepts, for their own personal advantage. Thus political expediency was more important than the formulation of a policy based on a constructive

view of the needs of a city at a particular time. Aristotle did come to a recognition of this element when he stated that *στοιχείς* and *φιλονεκερία* were prevalent among nobles. His solution was to guard against this rivalry by legislation, but as Newman remarked, "By what laws would he seek to prevent the rise of discords and rivalries among the notables? Partly perhaps by laws requiring the differences to be at once referred to authorities entrusted with the task of reconciling them Again, men hopelessly at feud might be required by law to go into exile, a cause vainly recommended by one of the elder citizens at Syracuse before the rise of the stasis described in 1303b 20 sqq".⁷⁶

There was, in fact, a need to channel the capacity for *φιλονεκερία* into healthy competition rather than destructive strife.⁷⁷ When rival groups were not prepared to do this, the whole polis became involved.⁷⁸ What Aristotle did not examine was why the whole city was prepared to support one or other of the sides. Their support was often given on the basis of a political promise of some kind, for people did not join an allegiance simply over a personal wrong done by one noble to another. This meant, of course, that those joining one group or other thought that they had something to gain from so doing and this in turn was prompted by the failure of one group to cater for the needs of the other. This failure on the part of the nobles to curtail their rivalry was also mentioned at 1304a 38 where he stated that they stirred up factions due to envy (*φθόρος*), a concept which can be linked to the earlier *κέρδος* and *τιμή*.

Another cause mentioned was the growth in reputation of a particular magistracy or any other section of the state.⁷⁹ In this section, *μεταβάλλειν* was again used, presumably since he spoke of differences which were the result of environmental changes and which were therefore capable of being absorbed into the existing constitution without necessitating active conflict.

The general instability was further aggravated by the size of the

Greek polis, in which every person felt he had, given the right of citizenship, a potentiality for active participation in the government. With such potentiality it was natural that any politically minded individual inclined to whatever form of government admitted his desire for power and served his interest best. In view of this, there was a real danger when the two opposing groups became numerically equal, since, as Aristotle noted, when one group was greatly superior to the other, the smaller group would be unlikely to rebel when it had so little hope of success.⁸⁰

Throughout his account, Aristotle does not deal significantly with the difference between *πολις* which existed because of the abuse of the existing constitution or its weakness in offsetting or coping with the various threats he mentioned, and *πολις* which can be seen in terms of the fact that the nature of the particular government was in itself inappropriate. Consequently, there is no real difference in his account between changes which we would class as modifications in relation to changing conditions, and *πολις* as the result of either:

1. Sufficient sections of the population feeling politically excluded and having been so for a considerable time, or
2. The effect of the immediate situation on the form of government - the extent to which the government was able to cope with tensions that must arise since situations change, or
3. The failure of government to accept or perhaps even recognize the changed situation that has necessitated some change in government.

Beneath the generalized account of revolutionary motivation, Aristotle saw that particular constitutions were prone to particular stresses, most of which were variations of his major causes. In the case of democracies, he considered the licentiousness (*ἀσελγεια*) of the demagogues to be a key feature.⁸¹ This manifested itself either by direct attacks on the owners of property by the common people having been stirred by the demagogues, or by slander, prosecutions or excessive liability for

public services instigated on the part of the demagogues themselves. By so doing they forced the oligarchs to unite against them. Thus the irresponsibility of democratic governments was a prime reason for revolutionary activity against them and as C.W. Brown Jr. noted, "The wealthy are generally strong enough in any state to stimulate a cohesive democratic element, but the wealthy only act as one when the democratic element (usually led by demagogues) threaten either the entire class - or a sufficient number of the rich for all to be afraid".⁸²

From the examples given, it appears that the demagogues acted from economic considerations. At Rhodes, the issue was over pay for public services and state upkeep, the wealthy objecting to financing such a system.⁸³ At Megara, the issue was again economic for the demagogues wished to distribute money to the people.⁸⁴ One would very much like to know why this was necessary. Though Aristotle believed that the demagogues often acted unjustly toward the rich in order to curry favour with the masses, it would seem from these instances that the demagogues were not acting from self-interest only, but rather in response to the economic need of the city (and some of its people) at that particular time.

Within democracies, the constitution also tended to change when the same man was both leader of the people and general.⁸⁵ At this point he emphasized that this phenomenon was more prominent in earlier times than in the Fourth Century B.C., but elsewhere he spoke of the change from democracy to tyranny because of the prominence of the individual without hinting that it was rarer in more recent times.⁸⁶ For both earlier and later times the usual method of gaining sole power was through a combination of military prowess and gaining the confidence of the people by actions hostile to the rich. Such a process relied not only on the popularity of the particular person, but also on the fact that there was a real difference between the rich and the poor.

In the case of oligarchies, Aristotle allowed that a precondition of

changes was the mistreatment of the multitude. This formed a potential for revolutions to occur.⁸⁷ However, such revolutions needed a leader and therefore he dealt with the motives and types of leaders.⁸⁸ As with other forms of constitution, the general failure of oligarchies arose from either the ambitions and behaviour of particular rulers or from the weakness of the constitution itself.

With regard to the performance of the rulers, their failure arose from rivalry to gain support,⁸⁹ personal allegiances and conflicts,⁹⁰ and excessive exclusiveness whereby those who regarded themselves as economically and socially among the ruling class were not admitted to political control.⁹¹ Such rivalries and exclusiveness were dangerous since they often led to the warring factions seeking support from other sections of the population (or from an outside power), thereby undermining the unity of the state.

Aristotle also saw that some oligarchies were vulnerable due to constitutional weaknesses. One such weakness could be found in the method of election. He believed that it was an inappropriate method of election when the magistrates were elected by the people rather than by the classes from which the offices were drawn.⁹² This was dangerous since it created the possibility of members of the oligarchy seeking and depending on popularity with the voters. Another danger existed when the law courts were not filled with those who had political control, for the possibility then existed that the person on trial may try to curry the favour of the people in the hope of a favourable verdict. Aristotle consistently draws a distinction between the part played by the people and that played by the few within any political machine. He therefore reached the point of wishing to restrict legal power to the few. This would not have removed the possibility that the accused would try to influence the jury and hence some conflict may well still have ensued. By not admitting the people into the legal system, he would only lessen the extent of the conflict, he would not

remove its cause. For as long as men were willing to abuse the legal system and utilize it in the interests of political control, instability was inherent. This raises the problem of the failure of the Greek system to achieve any sort of independent arbitration system. As well as being a problem in oligarchies it was present in democracies also, as at Corcyra in 427 B.C. where the wealthy oligarchs were tried in a court which was composed of people of democratic interests who were able to influence the court decision in order to ruin their political opponents.⁹³

There were some causes that were external to the behaviour of the ruling clique that led to change in oligarchies. But these were, in a sense, accidental for they attested to a change in environmental conditions such as the introduction of mercenaries who needed to be catered for within the constitution, or by what Aristotle himself refers to as an accident or chance occurrence (*συντυχία*), the increase in the number of wealthy and therefore of number eligible, under a property-based constitution, to exercise political power.⁹⁴ This was really a further example of what he would term disproportionate growth, albeit a growth which may have occurred in small stages.

Since tyranny was regarded by Aristotle as having the evils of both democracy and oligarchy, it was vulnerable to attack by both the nobles and the people. Because the tyrant did not trust people, mistreated them or settled them in scattered areas, they were willing to rise against him, but as Aristotle noted, it was from the nobles, against whom the tyrant waged war, that the leaders of attacks originated.⁹⁵ It was in the interests of honour and gain that such attacks were made, either the noble himself wishing to have the advantages associated with tyranny and therefore aiming to make himself tyrant, or to avoid the loss of those qualities through being subject to a tyrant. Thus some attacks were against the person of the ruler and others against the office.

The personal attacks on tyrants (as with those on monarchs) were the

result of the mismanagement of the ruler who indulged in insolent behaviour. This created the desire for revenge,⁹⁶ fear of oppression,⁹⁷ or contempt for the particular person.⁹⁸ All such causes Aristotle summed up as originating from two main ones, hatred and contempt.⁹⁹

In general, no matter what type of constitution, one further cause of *stasies* dealt with in passing by Aristotle, was the intervention of an outside power, which he claimed used to happen when Athens and Sparta were contending for control of Greece.¹⁰⁰ This is rather a broad generalization and not supported by examples, perhaps since he felt that the phenomena was so well known that he need cite no examples. It is necessary to examine how such intervention occurred. Rarely was it direct, unasked-for intervention imposed by a major power on the whole population. Generally it arose from a major power supporting an already existing faction within a city, which saw an external backing to their power as necessary for the survival of that power. Thus the *stasies* situation was already present and was capitalized on by major powers.

Thucydides' comments in this area are instructive. He maintained that the escalation of civil strife during the Peloponnesian War was to be seen in the foreign aid engaged. In so far as his comment was limited to the foreign aid sought by the revolutionaries, and the fact that both Athens and the cities of the Peloponnese formed centres of refuge for exiles, the comment was valid, but in so far as he believed that unless Athens and Sparta were at war "there would have been no excuse or desire for calling them in",¹⁰¹ he missed the mark. The Greek cities found ample reasons for calling in not only Athens or Sparta, but other cities to help them in their internal situation. They may simply hire mercenaries, or appeal for help as a colony, as Epidamnus did at the outset of the war,¹⁰² or appeal to a neighbouring city for help. Many cities in Sicily had elements that were prepared to seek assistance from Syracuse, and in Italy the exiles from Rhegium sought aid from their neighbours, the Locrians.¹⁰³

The self-interest of such groups in calling in external aid can be mitigated, in part, by the fact that one faction could not successfully eliminate the discontented parts of the population and hence relied on outside help to maintain (or regain) their position. The conflicting desires of groups within the population, all of whom had been led to believe that active participation in the polis was expected and fundamental to one's existence (this at least was traditional) could not be reconciled, and often led to violence. The violent aspect of such conflicts escalated when major powers were involved, particularly in times of war, but the causes that led to the recourse to violence in the first place, were not the result of external powers or the existence of war, but were to be found in the nature of the particular government and its failure to solve the socio-economic problems of the community which it governed.

Aristotle on the Preservation of Constitutions

Since the basic cause of revolutionary change was injustice of some kind, Aristotle cited the removal of injustice as the means of preserving constitutions. This injustice could be either in terms of the constitution itself or in terms of the management by particular people of a constitution. In both cases, he noted the fundamental truth that those who favoured a constitution needed to be greater in number than those who did not.¹⁰⁴ The particular government also needed to show moderation, particularly in its methods of dealing with sectional interests.

In the first instance he noted that precautions had to be taken against anything being done contrary to the constitution of the time.¹⁰⁵ In the absence of an absolute constitution this was extremely difficult, and elsewhere Aristotle noted, albeit reluctantly, that changes must be made in constitutions. He now noted that illegality often crept in unobserved, and he must be referring to what happened with practice and usage rather than decrees passed in accordance with the constitution. He

was by no means clear on what he regarded as legal, and what as illegal, change. In fact, small changes were often necessary to retain confidence in the constitution, particularly when the constitution needed to be adapted to changing conditions. His attitude seems to stem from his belief that any change in a particular constitution led to either a perversion of that constitution or changed it into another constitution.

On the whole, he was not concerned with a change in constitutional form that needed to be made in view of changing conditions and which would, if made at the appropriate time, prevent violent revolutionary change. Such changes do in fact follow from his primary maxim that those in favour of a constitution should be more than those who were not. From this it follows that any major shift in conditions needed to be accompanied by a change in the constitution.

Another fundamental safeguard was dependent on the behaviour of those in charge of the government. Those in office had to be sure to give proper treatment both to other members of the ruling body and to those outside it.¹⁰⁶ In this area, short term of office was considered an advantage since it was not so easy to do wrong if only in office for a short time.¹⁰⁷ Similarly, it was essential that promotions were of a minor nature and spread over a long period of time. Restraints must also be imposed by the laws so that no citizen became excessively prominent or influential as a result of wealth and family connections.¹⁰⁸ This was difficult in practice, since family connections and alliances were a fundamental basis of Greek society, and concerted interest in politics by groups was necessary for an understanding of governmental processes and policies. Part of the problem with the democracies of that time was that the people's confidence in them was shaken by the fact that rule was sometimes exercised by those who neither knew the constitution thoroughly nor were adept in handling it.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, in most systems, some offices needed long tenure for the effective shaping of consistent policy or conduct of

business, especially in times of war. In the absence of long tenure, consistent policy was only achieved by the formation of groups who strove to have friends of a similar viewpoint succeed to a particular office. This accentuated the rivalry between factions for the control of an office.

Such rivalries and ambitions needed to be checked from the outset. This required a considerable degree of foresight on the part of those in power. They had to recognise danger from certain people or sections of society and take action against it. The usual method was exile. This was, however, only a respite. If an individual were exiled, there were always his followers and friends to continue opposition to the government,¹¹⁰ and if a whole group were exiled, that group would band together and, having gained support from an external source or from discontented sections within their own city, effect their return by force.¹¹¹

Aristotle did not, in fact, deal with the mechanics of preventing change in democracies and oligarchies. However, with tyranny, he noted two methods whereby it could be preserved and dealt with them in some detail. The two options were repression and conciliation. Repressive methods were aimed at making the subjects unable to revolt. This was done by such things as keeping the people poor, occupied on buildings or external war, unarmed, the use of alien troops and a spy service, and sowing distrust between the various classes of society.¹¹²

On the conciliatory side, the tyrant could gain the goodwill of the people by using his strength in moderation, refrain from using his power and office as a source of gain and by exercising a degree of self control in his personal behaviour to avoid falling into contempt.¹¹³

On the economic level, Aristotle saw that due to economic increases, changes in the relative sections of the population occurred and therefore there needed to be an adjustment in terms of property qualification required for political privilege.¹¹⁴ This is contrary to his disbelief in small changes but it did have the advantage of not alienating those of a

similar economic and social standing from those who controlled the government. But in general, exceptional prosperity needed to be guarded against and Aristotle believed that there should be a large number of those of medium wealth.¹¹⁵ He did not seem to realize the difficulty of any government controlling the size and nature of the various classes, especially since some form of state control over wealth would be, in part, against his own argument against the communistic approach of Plato.¹¹⁶

On the political level, apart from avoiding resentment through excessive prominence and mismanagement, and fear of a loss of honour, Aristotle believed that the holding of office should not be a source of financial gain. For as he observed, the majority did not so much resent being debarred from office as the thought that officials were helping themselves to public money. Hence the handing over of office needed to be public and an account rendered.¹¹⁷

The principle needed was that of the middle way, whereby those not within the ruling group were not alienated by those governing. To consolidate a government's position the people needed to be educated to the way of living that belonged to that constitution.¹¹⁸ For the leaders, they needed loyalty to the established constitution, a capacity for the work involved and the kind of honesty and goodness that belonged to the way of life in question.¹¹⁹

Throughout, Aristotle failed to allow for what could be regarded as necessary and what were unnecessary changes. Consequently, he had no real solution to the problem of disproportionate growth, a problem which may well have been the result of an expanding or more diverse economy.

Furthermore, his system based on moderation was static in concept. It presupposed that an unquestioned constitutional framework could be set up and that allegiance to that system could be gained by education and law. But no matter what the educative system, the widening of contact throughout the Greek world and beyond, which had occurred from the Sixth Century B.C.

onwards, meant that alternative governmental systems were known. The knowledge of such alternative systems, together with the effect of outside contacts on the economic and social life of the polis resulted in an awareness of the faults within a particular governmental system and the desirability, given a change in conditions, of altering the constitution to a more acceptable form. Sparta, of course, by remaining aloof from such outside contacts and ideas was able to retain a stable constitution, reinforced by a narrow social system and the necessity of ruling a subject population. But Sparta was exceptional.

Also, Aristotle advocated the use of law to retain a static situation. He talked, for example, of creating laws against faction (*σέκεις*) and rivalries (*φιλονεικίαι*) among the nobles.¹²⁰ He claimed that the astute politician ought to be able to discern such factionalism and rivalry at the outset and prevent others outside the immediate quarrel from entering into it. This was extremely difficult to do with alliances based on personal allegiances. Though the various political associations known as *ἐταίρειαι* were particularly strong, they remained loose associations of friends, against which no legal system could effectively legislate.¹²¹

Similarly, it was difficult to prevent men becoming too powerful in office, friends or wealth,¹²² particularly in times of war when the outstanding and successful general naturally acquired greater preeminence and a group of friends ready to support him. Success in warfare also resulted in the particular general gaining the confidence of the people and hence their support should he wish to advance politically. Conversely, failure in war meant a corresponding loss of prestige and political effectiveness. From the point of view of friendship, it is difficult to see how the law Aristotle proposed could determine who would be a friend of whom.

Concluding Remarks

Despite Aristotle's detailed account of the different types of changes in, and methods of preserving constitutions, several basic factors

emerge. Although there was always a potential for revolutionary change, the realization of that change only occurred when the government had failed to retain the allegiance of the people over whom it ruled. Thus he saw that revolutionary behaviour was the result of the behaviour of the existing government in conjunction with the desires and aims of the revolutionaries.

Thus, the ultimate success of a government lay in the extent to which it was able to maintain an identification between its leaders and its citizens; or hold those citizens down by force or fear. The ruling group in the Greek cities could rarely command a sufficient majority of active support to maintain its position by force. How successfully they were able to maintain an identity could not be gauged by the political fanaticism of some political clubs, but rather from the view of the majority of the citizens. The general populace had to be convinced that the existing government was the most suitable. In such a case, they did not support revolutionary movements.

The attitude of the general populace can be gauged from Thucydides' work. It would appear that, throughout the Peloponnesian War, the middle sections of the population (*τὰ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν*) were, on the whole, content. *ὁ δῆμος* was a term used loosely by Thucydides to sometimes designate those in charge of a democratic faction, as in the description of events at Corcyra where *οἱ δὲ ἄγχι* were in conflict with *ὁ δῆμος*; ¹²³ and sometimes to express the concept of the populace generally, as in the description of the internal trouble at Megara, where neither of the opposing sides felt confident of the support of the people. ¹²⁴

But the *δῆμος*, due to its nature was a flexible unit and could be used by one or other of the contending parties for power, especially if it were offered things that had not been forthcoming from the existing government. At the very least, its passive acceptance of a regime was necessary. Thus the oligarchs in the revolution at Athens in 411 B.C. created suspicion throughout the city so that the general populace feared each

other, especially since they had been led to believe that the number supporting the new oligarchy was far larger than it was in actuality. They therefore remained silent. Thus, although revolutionary initiative came from members of the ruling elite or political clubs, a revolution needed the passive or active support of the general populace for its continued success.¹²⁵

Where individuals could maintain a sufficiently large following they often resorted to more constitutional methods to achieve their ends. Thus Alcibiades and Nicias combined to effect the ostracism of Hyperbolus in 417 B.C., showing that they could command a sufficient political following prepared to accept their initiative.¹²⁶ This was allied to the respect of people for traditional families. At Athens, the Alcmaeonids relied on the respect for their family name in their political campaigns in the Fifth Century B.C.¹²⁷ That such support was insecure, however, is shown by the condemnation of Alcibiades by the assembly in 415 B.C.¹²⁸

But when the use of constitutional methods was not possible, individuals who had become disorientated from the system, often as a result of the behaviour of the ruling elite, were prepared to resort to subversive action. To do so required support, and this was found from the disaffected sections of the community, the employment of mercenaries, or the enlistment of foreign aid. Because Aristotle did not deal with the difference between violent and non-violent change, he did not deal with the effect of military force in revolutions in any detail in Book V. As Newman remarked, "We gather, for instance, from 6 (4).13.1297b 16 sqq. that changes in the relative importance of different arms of the military force of the State bring with them changes of constitution, but we hear nothing of this in the Book before us".¹²⁹ Changes in the relative importance of the cavalry, hoplite and naval contingents undermined the claim of the oligarchs that they should have more political control because they were more involved in the defence of the city. On another level, there was the problem of the

prestige and following that centred around a successful general.

What was needed was a government that could make some provision for the successful general and could change with changing conditions, yet still retain the respect and confidence of the people in its efficiency and validity. It was this dilemma of a valid constitution despite changing conditions that led to the constant oscillations between forms of government in many Greek cities.

At the end of the Fifth Century B.C., the Greek world was experiencing a process which dated back to the end of the Sixth Century, of oscillation between varying forms of democracy and oligarchy (with the exception of Sparta and the backward towns). Thucydides noted that the leaders of democratic movements used, as justification for their power, the slogan of political equality for the multitude (*πλήθος τε ἰσονομίᾳ πολιτικῇ*) and the few used the concept of temperate or moderate aristocracy (*ἐπιτοκρατικός σύστημα*) to justify oligarchy.¹³⁰ That the leaders of both points of view co-existed in a city and could propound their point of view, reveals a diversity of approach upon which a leader could gain sufficient support to, if not actually overthrow a government, at least harass it in such a way as to limit its effective control. Thus Athenagoras, in the debate at Syracuse, mentioned that people within the city created rumours to frighten the populace and to try to gain the government for themselves. Action was not taken against such people, he complained, and hence the city was rarely tranquil, but suffered many civil disturbances.¹³¹ Athenagoras was speaking from his own political viewpoint, but the fact that he used such a plea attests to a continued state of unrest between the opposing elements in the city.

Because of this diversity there was a move, particularly in times of war, when the underlying economic and social stresses were highlighted, to look toward the outstanding individual. In wartime he provided a focal point for resistance and his success in that area gained him popularity

with the result that the people believed that he would also be able to resolve the economic and social problems of the time. To this end, in Sicily in the Fourth Century B.C., the confidence of the people was often vested in the single ruler. There was, however, no corresponding constitutional move to legitimize that position, nor were the social and economic stresses successfully resolved, so that *οτλοισ* , *αποστασις* and political subversion remained continuous phenomena.

CHAPTER TWO : THE NATURE AND METHOD OF REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE AND POLITICAL
SUBVERSION IN SYRACUSE, 415-305 B.C.

A. Revolutionary Motivation

Syracuse, in the Fourth Century B.C. experienced several instances of *στάσις*, *ἀντιστάσις* and political subversion. A survey of these instances reveals a variety in the nature of the change attempted and in the aims of those who instigated the attempts.¹ Broadly speaking there were two different types of aim. In the first case there were those who aimed at changing the existing constitution, and in the other there were those who sought to change the person in charge of a particular constitution.²

In the former category can be placed Hermocrates' attempt, Dionysius I's gaining of the tyranny, the peoples' opposition to him in 404 B.C. and 396 B.C., Dion's professed aim in returning from exile, the opposition to Dion on the part of Heracleides, Hippo and the Syracusans in 356 B.C., the exiles who appealed to Corinth in 346 B.C. and the expedition of Timoleon in response to that appeal, the taking over of control by the oligarchs in c. 320 B.C. and the democratic expulsion of them and finally, Agathocles removal of oligarchic opposition and subversion of the democracy in the revolution of 317 B.C.

Within this group there was, however, a wide difference in motive. The motives of Hermocrates, Dionysius, Dion and Agathocles appear to be primarily personal. Hermocrates worked in opposition to the extreme democracy of Diocles because it was that democracy which had exiled him. Although he was able to discredit Diocles and effect his exile he was unable to obtain his own recall, indicating the lack of general support for him among the demos at Syracuse. Since he then returned in secret, at the head of a group of mercenaries, it would seem that the Syracusan fear that he wished to make himself tyrant was not wholly unjustified. The attempt miscarried, but it taught his followers, one of whom was Dionysius, a

valuable lesson.

The establishment of Dionysius' tyranny raises more questions than is often realised. Why Dionysius was chosen will be dealt with later, but why those who backed him were prepared to support one man, rather than try to create an oligarchic clique also needs to be examined. I would suggest that the answer lies in the fact that they saw the impossibility of creating an oligarchy in opposition to the newly inspired democracy,³ despite the fact that the leader of the democratic movement was in exile. Moreover, it was probably a very small group of influential people who sought the change, since the cavalry, who would have been from the wealthier group, held the abortive demonstration against Dionysius in the same year as he assumed the position of general with full powers.

In view of their numerical inferiority, the failure of the use of force by Hermocrates, and the certainty of strong and widespread opposition to any constitutional change that tried to limit the franchise or curtail the power of the people,⁴ the supporters of Dionysius opted to subvert the constitution and place Dionysius in sole control. In this they were successful since they achieved it within the framework of the constitution, the threat of Carthage making a sole general both reasonable and acceptable to the people. The motives of the principal instigators of this take-over were personal. Dionysius and Philistus operated from a desire for personal honour and fame with the wealth attached to it,⁵ while Hipparinus was motivated by the selfish desire to acquire wealth to offset that which he had squandered.⁶

The personal element was also foremost in the actions of Dion. A review of his alleged motives in the light of what he actually achieved are indicative of this. Aristotle spoke of the overthrow of Dionysius II as a *stasis* between those having a share in the tyranny.⁷ In the initial conflict Dion fared badly and was exiled. It was only after this that he considered taking the people to his side. This was not through a concern

for their condition but rather for his own self-interest. This personal motive was also stressed by Aristotle when he spoke of tyrannies being overthrown as a result of contempt.⁸ It must be remembered that, although Dion had contempt for Dionysius II, he left his return until such a time as Dionysius II forced his hand. The stay of ten years in Greece, during most of which time he was inactive, is hardly indicative of the political and social reformer and zealot that Dion was reported to be in the sources. The people were prepared to support Dion since they had no-one else and he promised to restore their freedom, but his attitude to their situation was basically the same as Dionysius, as his opposition to the appointment of Heracleides, his repeal of the land bill and his retention of supreme office showed.⁹

In the case of Agathocles, the confused and contradictory accounts of his rise to power¹⁰ are unanimous, however, in their portrayal of Agathocles as an opportunist motivated by personal ambition. His mentality was the mentality of the mercenary soldier who allied himself to whichever side promised the greatest reward. As it happened he capitalized on the divergence of interest between the rich and the poor. Having gained the support of the poor and come to some agreement with the Carthaginian general, Hamilcar, he succeeded in being elected *ἐπικτήτορ ἀυτοκράτωρ* in 317 B.C., a position which he converted to that of self-proclaimed monarch in c. 305 B.C.

At the outset of his career Agathocles seems to have been associated with an oligarchic clique and it was only when the leaders of that group, Sosistratus and Heracleides, did not recognise his deeds of valour because of their jealousy (*φθόρος*) that he denounced their resolve to establish an autocratic government.¹¹ His knowledge of their intentions, which was proved accurate by the subsequent events, implies that he was at that time in their confidence. Being out of favour he left Syracuse but returned to help the democrats when they expelled the oligarchy of the Six Hundred from

the city. Some sort of reconciliation was then effected by the Corinthian commander, Acestorides, Agathocles being ordered to leave the city and the exiles being allowed to return.¹² Agathocles then gathered a large army in the interior and the Syracusans invited him back, no doubt through fear of further civil warfare, and appointed him general and guardian of the city.¹³

To achieve his ambition and being greedy for power (*ἐπιθυμῶνς ἀνδρῶν* *δυναστεύειν*) he created another army which was loyal to himself and attached to it all those who, because of their poverty and envy, had come to hate the powerful group. With their aid he massacred the oligarchs¹⁴ and was 'persuaded' to become *στρατηγὸς ἀνδρῶν*. Thus, although he attached to himself the poorer elements who were motivated by their social and economic distress and proclaimed himself as a champion of democracy, he was himself primarily motivated by personal ambition.

In contrast to the motives of Hermocrates, Dionysius, Dion and Agathocles, the actions of the people in 404, 396, 356 and 346 B.C. reveal a different type of motivation. The uprising of the Syracusans in 404 B.C. was based on a desire to overthrow tyranny and restore the constitution of Diocles.¹⁵ It was unsuccessful due to the disorganisation of the Syracusans and the further inducement to rebel in 396 B.C. was quickly silenced.¹⁶ The main motive on that occasion was antagonism toward Dionysius' foreign and domestic policies. A similar type of motive, based on social and economic considerations, was at the basis of the opposition to Dion of Heracleides, Hippo and the Syracusans in 356 B.C. It too was short-lived since the Syracusans were helpless against Dionysius II's mercenaries and were therefore forced to concede to Dion whatever measures he saw fit to impose, in return for his military support.

The exiles in 346 B.C., although desiring to be rid of tyranny were also handicapped by their lack of military force. They therefore appealed in the first instance to Hicetas at Leontini, and secondly to Corinth for help. The arrival of Timoleon and his subsequent flushing out of tyrants

from Sicily provided a brief respite from civil strife and a return to some form of moderate oligarchy or democracy.¹⁷ This was again subverted by the manoeuvres of the group which came to be known as the Six Hundred who, being motivated by their own selfish desires and pursuing their interests at the expense of the poorer elements in the community created a large section of the population willing to accept and support Agathocles.

The second group, those who sought to change the leader but not the constitution, namely Dion, Callippus, Hipparinus, Nysaeus, Dionysius II on his return to Syracuse, Hicetas, and possibly Deinocrates in his opposition to Agathocles, were more obviously motivated by personal ambition. All struggled for the honour and gain to be achieved through personal ascendancy and ruled by virtue of their mercenary forces in defiance of any legitimate constitutional position. In this, their approach was similar to that of Hermocrates, Dionysius I and Agathocles.

In fact, the key role played by individuals in the civil disturbances at Syracuse from 415 B.C. to 305 B.C. and their limited aims, confirms Aristotle's assertion of the personal element in revolutionary motivation.

B. Revolutionary Method

The principal concern of those who wished to gain ascendancy over those in power was the means whereby they could effectively displace the existing government. Their second concern was to acquire as much support for their own cause as was possible and consistent with the government that they intended to establish. The two principal methods in the area of means were propaganda and force. For support there was the range of family ties, friendships and clubs based on the group-mentality principle, the people as a whole in either a voting capacity or as a source of manpower, exiles, and the tacit or active support of allies outside Syracuse.

1. Means

(a) Propaganda

The striking feature about revolutionary behaviour in Sicily was the lack of any positive programme on the part of the revolutionaries. In its place there was the prevalence of propaganda, the nature of which depended on the relative positions of the leaders and their opponents.

The usual method was to discredit the existing government over its policies or their implementation, thereby causing the people to lose confidence in it. It was a negative appeal, but successful nonetheless. It was by this method that Dionysius initially gained power. At the time of his rise, Syracuse was in a state of unrest due in part to the machinations of Hermocrates who, although having successfully discredited the character of the then leading general, Diocles, and caused his exile in 408 B.C.,¹⁸ had been unable to effect his own recall. On that occasion Diocles had been replaced by Daphnaeus and others who, although rich and prominent, were unable to gain popular support. With the Carthaginian invasion in 406 B.C., the military decision by the generals to evacuate Acragas supplied Dionysius with an occasion to discredit them.¹⁹ The general mood of the Sicilians under the conditions of war at this time can be gauged by the fate of the Acragantine generals, four out of five of whom were stoned to death for their military decisions by the Acragantine assembly, held amid "great uproar and tumult".²⁰

The atmosphere was thus favourable for antagonism toward generals²¹ and Dionysius tried to stir up the Syracusan assembly to violence against their generals. The mood of the assembly was not as intense as that at Acragas (nor was the effect of war so immediate upon them) and hence the procedure was more regular. But even though the presiding archons cautioned against such behaviour, threatening to impose a fine on those who created an uproar,²² this was bypassed by Philistus' offer to pay any amount

of such fines. Dionysius therefore continued to make general accusations against the generals together with emotional appeals against the most renowned citizens, from which group these generals came, and advised that the generals not come from the more renowned citizens but from those favourable to the populace. He also maintained that the renowned had contempt for the citizens.²³ Thus a purely military failure became superseded by vindictive appeals on class grounds. The whole tactic rested on the unfounded belief that the less wealthy could improve their position by electing generals who were opposed to the rich and that because the existing generals were renowned and wealthy they were therefore less patriotic in their conduct of war.²⁴

Thus by playing on popular sympathies and prejudices Dionysius succeeded in having the generals dismissed and new ones chosen. He himself was of course among those elected. Since these new generals had not been elected on the basis of a positive programme they were not allied by a common bond or policy. No doubt they were not from the most influential groups,²⁵ but there was no way that Dionysius could control the re-election and hence he had no guarantee that his new colleagues would succumb to his wishes. He therefore began a campaign of non-cooperation with them and spread rumours of their collusion with Carthage. That such rumours found widespread credibility (although Diodorus maintained that the respectable citizens did not believe them)²⁶ attests to the fact that unpatriotic behaviour was all too common.²⁷ The attack was made more open and both the generals and the local magistrates were accused of neglect.²⁸ What exactly the generals could have done in their short term of office is not clear and hence the accusations are of a general kind, except the supposed overtures made to Dionysius by Himilcon.²⁹

By a dramatic resignation and the lodging of formal accusations Dionysius succeeded in having himself elected general with supreme powers. All this he had achieved within the framework of the constitution. The lack

of any real substance in the accusations was the probable reason for the postponement of the trial of the alleged traitors.³⁰ The purpose of discrediting the archons was to counteract any initiative on their part, a necessary step since they had the power to convene the assembly and may well have done so in Dionysius' absence.

By using similar tactics as Hermocrates Dionysius succeeded, due in part to the different conditions but also to the influential support he had and his ability to convince the people that he was working on their behalf. But the tactic of discrediting the government was a particularly dangerous one when achieved, as in Dionysius' case, on very slender grounds. As G.C. Field remarked, "one thing that strikes anyone is the extraordinary sense of insecurity which all public men, orators and generals alike, must have felt. Hardly anyone of prominence escaped trial at some time in his career, and few avoided condemnation either to payment of a heavy fine, to exile, or even to death".³¹ When the attack was on military grounds it was even more dangerous since it implied that the accuser could and would do better.

Dionysius himself was accused of failure with the evacuation of Gela in 405 B.C., but the disaffection was restricted to the cavalry.³² Again in 397/396 B.C. with the advent of a further Carthaginian invasion, Dionysius' position was threatened. On the strength of a Syracusan naval victory in 396 the people began to agitate against Dionysius, especially since the war situation meant that they had their arms back.³³ Although it had been a naval victory, the centre of opposition was again the cavalry from which the spokesman against Dionysius, Theodorus, came. He used the popular propaganda about ancestral freedom and the loss of the ancient laws followed by specific accusations about Dionysius' land settlement, his plundering of temples and his use of mercenaries.³⁴ He maintained that Dionysius had exiled men of property and had remarried their wives to slaves and "mixed-up" men, a reference no doubt to Dionysius' land reforms

and extensions of citizenship.³⁵ Most prominent of all was the attack on Dionysius' war policy both in the previous war and the new one.

Theodorus' confidence was based on the fact that the people had weapons and on what he believed to be allies from Greece and the Peloponnese. But he overstepped the mark for Pharacidas, the Lacedaemonian sent with reinforcements from the Peloponnese, maintained, and rightly so, that he had been dispatched to help the Syracusans and Dionysius against the Carthaginians, not to overthrow the rule of Dionysius. Interestingly there was the expectation that Sparta would interfere and her reputation after the Peloponnesian War had shown that in many cases she did.³⁶ As the mercenaries also rallied around Dionysius the situation was saved for him and he dismissed the assembly.

The call to preserve freedom had been part of Theodorus' attack and it is this aspect of propaganda that was often prominent, particularly on the part of those who opposed a tyrant. Dion claimed to be bringing the Syracusans their freedom, and so did Timoleon whose appointment by Corinth was in support of exiles, not of the recognised government of Syracuse.

In various ways Dion had tried to influence the running of Dionysius II's government prior to his return from exile in 357 B.C. When Dionysius II took over the tyranny in 367 B.C. Dion sent for Plato, hoping, it would seem, to influence the tyrant's mind. The attempt had a fair chance of success since Dionysius II had been indulged in his youth and badly reared³⁷ but nevertheless had a capacity for learning.³⁸ In fact Dion's sending for Plato makes no real sense unless Dionysius II was backward in purpose and capable of being influenced by philosophical and educational means, these means in this context being regarded as a type of propaganda. The attempt failed, partly due to the counter-propaganda of the opposing group who pressed for and gained the recall of Philistus,³⁹ a keen supporter of tyranny, and partly because of Plato's own attitude. For as Grote remarked, "Not only did Plato decline entering upon political

recommendations of his own, but he damped, instead of enforcing, the positive good resolutions which Dion had already succeeded in infusing".⁴⁰ In fact he seems, with the often found egotism and arrogance of the intelligent, to have proposed that nothing short of a complete and lengthy re-education was possible.⁴¹ This was hardly a practical remedy for the situation at hand.

While Dion was in exile, Dionysius II invited Plato to Sicily, presumably since he hoped to dissuade Dion from any further political activity against him.⁴² While Plato was there in 361/360 B.C. Dionysius II sold Dion's property, thereby making his exile complete. The diplomacy with Plato had in fact failed and Plato could well be regarded as advocating dangerous attitudes and policies. Not that the people generally would be affected by Plato's ideas, despite Plutarch's assertion that they were filled with great hope.⁴³ If the common people knew anything at all about Plato's ideas, a fact in itself highly unlikely, they certainly would not have favoured the elitist concepts embodied in them. But he may well have been influential with certain groups. His followers were certainly guilty of undercover work while they were at Syracuse, for Speusippus sounded out popular opinion to report it later to Dion.⁴⁴ Since he could hardly have approached random people in the street it is tempting to think that he contacted known associations or clubs which he believed would be favourable to Dion's cause. It would seem then that Dion was working subversively before the final rift occurred with the sale of his property and the remarriage of his wife.

When Dion returned from exile he claimed to be bringing freedom to the Syracusan people and on the strength of that call many of the rural Syracusans joined him⁴⁵ and on entering the city the renowned and cultivated men welcomed him. He entered with his brother Megacles and a bodyguard of one hundred mercenaries and on the basis of his claim to be freeing the people from tyranny was elected general with full powers⁴⁶

along with Megacles and in conjunction with twenty colleagues, ten of whom were among the twenty-five exiles who returned with him.⁴⁷ These twenty seem to have been nominal only and Megacles was very much overshadowed by his brother. The nature of the election as transmitted in the sources reflects the general propaganda in favour of Dion and against Dionysius II for in Plutarch the people vote "in their joy and affection" and in Diodorus, "with one voice".⁴⁸

But although Dion claimed to be freeing the Syracusans he in actual fact did very little to effect this.⁴⁹ What he seems to have meant by freedom was freedom from Dionysius, and while keeping control of the government in his own hands, he did nothing to establish an effective government in Syracuse as can be seen in the chaos that occurred after his death in 354 B.C.

Dion's lack of positive programme was the foundation upon which opposition to him was based. Shortly after his arrival into Syracuse rumours started to the effect that the Syracusans had merely exchanged a stupid and drunken tyrant for a watchful and sober master.⁵⁰ The allegation was made by a certain Sosis who also claimed to have been attacked by Dion's mercenaries. Although Sosis was proved to have lied, there were many who shared a resentment of what they believed to be "dire acts of tyranny"⁵¹ and hence a person, known for his "baseness and impudence" as Sosis was, was given credence in the first place.⁵² Sosis was in fact a brother of one of Dionysius' bodyguard, planted it would seem to create factionalism. It worked because of Dion's highhandedness and it was this autocratic behaviour that Heracleides used as a basis for his opposition.⁵³

At the end of the Fourth Century B.C., Agathocles combined the two claims of protecting the cause of the people and giving the Syracusans their freedom to effect his rise to power. As a supposed supporter of democracy he was elected general and protector of the people.⁵⁴ In that

capacity he was able to allege that he was being plotted against "because of his sympathy for the common people".⁵⁵ By so doing he precipitated the street revolution against oligarchs in 317 B.C., after which, on calling an assembly, "he proclaimed that he was restoring liberty undefiled to the people".⁵⁶ By a feigned reluctance to have command, just as Dionysius I had staged his dramatic resignation, he succeeded in being elected *στρατηγὸς ἀποκρᾶτωρ*. It was only at that stage it would appear, that he promised to abolish debts and redistribute land to the poor.⁵⁷

Thus the attempts to attain power were justified in terms of propaganda and not of positive programme. This propaganda was either negative in nature or offered nothing specific in relation to the problems of Syracuse other than the most immediate concerns; in the case of Dionysius I the positive aspect was the implied ability to deal with Carthage, in the case of Dion, the abolition of the tyranny of Dionysius II, and in the case of Agathocles, the restoration of the democracy after the rule of the Six Hundred.

(b) Availability of Arms and Manpower

Any revolutionary change or government established extra-constitutionally required force or the threat of force. In Greece in the Fourth Century B.C., since the individual was required to supply his own armour, there was a potential supply of manpower from the citizen body provided that the propaganda proposed was sufficient for them, or sections of them, to believe that they ought to support the particular cause advocated. Two factors played a large part in gaining the allegiance of citizen troops. These were success as a military commander and the offer of increased pay. Such allegiance could come from either the other commanders or from the body of troops as a whole.

In the case of Hermocrates, on hearing of his banishment along with the other Syracusan generals in 410 B.C.,⁵⁸ a banishment caused by their

political opponents in Syracuse but made on the pretext of failure in the Peloponnesian War, the captains, maritime soldiers and pilots stood by him and offered to resist the appointment of new generals.⁵⁹ The specification of Hermocrates' supporters implies that the mass of rowers were not so favourably disposed toward him.⁶⁰ In the event the offer of support was rejected and Hermocrates sought the help of Pharnabuzus. Nevertheless, the captains took an oath that when they returned to Syracuse they would see to it that these generals were recalled from exile.

The ever-present threat of war with Carthage or the existence of war, accentuated the problem of the relationship between a commander and his troops. The successful pursuit of a war (either defensively or aggressively) necessitated a strong single commander who could pursue a consistent policy. Such a position was, however, one which could enhance the status and power of the particular general for the allegiance of the soldiers tended to be toward the general in the first instance and Syracuse secondarily. It was fear of this possibility that motivated Dion's opponents prior to his exile. For Dion, by virtue of his wealth and position had offered to furnish fifty triremes to fight Carthage, or negotiate a peace with them and this, as Plutarch maintained, caused envy and hatred.⁶¹ It was obvious to them that Dion, with such a force, could hold Syracuse to ransom if he so desired, or could use that power to effect a change of government from Dionysius II to one of his own nephews who were half brothers to Dionysius.

It was the allegiance of the army that Dionysius I depended upon and he gained it in the first instance by increasing their pay. The two thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry who went with him to Gela in 406 B.C. were promised double the pay which the city had determined, the extra amount being paid by Dionysius from the confiscated possessions of the rich exiled or killed Geloans.⁶² On returning to Syracuse he had a decree passed which also doubled the pay of the mercenaries.⁶³

The citizen army was not, however, a stable one for maintaining personal ascendancy, nor was it a most suitable one for prolonged warfare, since its allegiance was dependent on the commander retaining his elected position and of there being no opposition spokesman to change its ideas. Since the army had a vested interest in the running of the city there was always the danger that it would turn against its leader. Thus, in 404 B.C., after Dionysius had concluded peace with Carthage, the hoplite branch of the army took the opportunity of Dionysius' expedition against the Siceli to revolt, and having slain Dionysius' commander, sent for help from the exiled cavalry at Aetna.⁶⁴ They also sought and gained the support of the Messenians and Rhegians.⁶⁵ The Syracusans put a price on Dionysius' head and promised citizenship to any mercenaries that cared to desert. Some accepted the offer. Dionysius, being besieged on Ortygia, came to an agreement with the Syracusans that he be allowed to depart by sea.

On coming to this agreement the Syracusans seem to have disbanded. They had apparently constructed engines to destroy Dionysius' fortress but no use of these was made.⁶⁶ There was a real difficulty in keeping such a popular movement together for any length of time and although they had elected generals from the men who had slain Dionysius' commander, there was a lack of any real cohesion exemplified further in the fact that the cavalry force from Aetna was discharged. Thus Dionysius, having made secret negotiations with the Campanian mercenaries on the island and being reinforced by the arrival of another three hundred mercenaries was able to restore his position at Syracuse, especially since the Syracusans were engaged in *otiolis* over the policy of maintaining the siege or abandoning the city. After a victory in battle, Dionysius sensibly restrained the mercenaries from any unnecessary slaughter. The remaining seven thousand Syracusan revolutionaries fled to Aetna.⁶⁷ Dionysius was able to take Aetna without much difficulty and the exiles then fled to Rhegium.⁶⁸ Profiting from this experience, Dionysius took possession of the arms of

the Syracusans.⁶⁹ Henceforth they were armed for battle at a fixed point from the city and relinquished their arms at that point before returning to the city.⁷⁰

Dionysius in fact created a huge arsenal of equipment. As Parke noted, "Some details of its contents have been preserved: 140,000 shields, with daggers and helmets (...) of an equal number; and breastplates of all varieties and finely worked, more than 14,000 in number. The details given by Diodorus are interwoven with a vivid narrative, in such a way as to suggest that the source must be an eye-witness of these preparations, i.e. Philistus".⁷¹ In this way Dionysius had access to a ready supply of arms whereas his internal opponents were weaponless.

As a result of this centralization of weapons, Dion found it necessary to bring weapons with him when he sailed against Dionysius II in 357 B.C. These weapons were distributed among the Syracusans as far as possible, the remaining Syracusans equipping themselves as best they could from makeshift arms.⁷²

Because of the precarious nature of the relationship between the general and the citizen force, recourse was made to the use of a personal bodyguard and the employment of mercenaries. Dionysius, in his rise to power, had worked to a large extent through the constitution but he realized that an assembly that was fickle enough to exile the supporters of Hermocrates in 408 B.C. and then recall them in 406 B.C. was obviously not a body to depend upon. Its support was valuable for his initial subversion but for his position to be unassailable he needed a more secure foundation. Thus he sought to acquire a bodyguard but since he could not rely on the citizen body as a whole to vote for it he ordered all men under forty years of age to gather at Leontini with their arms. Leontini was chosen since it was at that time "full of exiles and foreigners" who would desire a "change of government".⁷³

Diodorus claimed that "the majority of the Syracusans would not even

come to Leontini".⁷⁴ It is difficult to see what he could have meant by this for presumably the citizens had to obey their general in military matters, particularly since Dionysius was *στρατηγὸς ἀποκράτωρ*. I therefore take this to mean that since the sections of the population not in the hoplite divisions were excluded as were those over forty years of age who may well have held more conservative political views, the number who actually went to Leontini was small in comparison to the total Syracusan citizen population. On the old pretext of having been attacked Dionysius called an assembly.⁷⁵ This assembly would not have been the Leontines since they were exiles and foreigners, but would have been that section of the army assembled there. In this limited assembly he was voted a bodyguard of six hundred whom he personally selected from those present. There was some opposition to this rash move in the form of a suggestion that the Syracusans be given an equal number of guards, but this suggestion was not upheld.⁷⁶ Dionysius selected a thousand men as a bodyguard.

With a bodyguard of citizens loyal to himself and the goodwill of the mercenaries who were faithful to whomsoever gave promise of secure employment, Dionysius was able to secure himself on Ortygia, thereby utilising the geographical peculiarity of Syracuse to further strengthen his position.⁷⁷ The use of a bodyguard was not confined to tyrants. Dion, on his arrival at Syracuse had a personal bodyguard of one hundred men and Heracleides was also voted a bodyguard on his arrival. Dion kept his bodyguard until his death as can be deduced from the fact that his assassins had to be recognized to gain admission to his house.

More widespread than the use of a bodyguard and increasingly important in the Fourth Century B.C. was the use of mercenaries to gain power. Hermocrates in 410 B.C. gathered together mercenaries to accomplish his restoration to Syracuse by force.⁸⁰ The attempt failed because Hermocrates arrived in Syracuse without the main body of his forces and therefore was defeated by the Syracusans.

Dion and Heracleides, in a similar situation to Hermocrates, employed mercenaries from Greece in c. 360-357 B.C.⁸¹ The mercenaries were hired for Dion's personal service and not on the pretext of liberating the Syracusans for it appears that they were hired without knowing their destination.⁸² Thus they were loyal to Dion and not to a cause. The rallying point was Zacynthus and from there Dion sailed with eight hundred to a thousand mercenaries.⁸³ Heracleides, either as part of a strategy, or because of disagreement with Dion, sailed later.⁸⁴ He brought a further fifteen hundred mercenaries with him.⁸⁵ As well as being used in attempts to overthrow governments, they were also used to maintain them. In this latter capacity they were used by Dionysius I in what was probably the largest standing army of the time.⁸⁶

If the mercenaries provided a source of manpower they also had their own inherent problems. Many were adventure seekers with the accompanying mentality. As such they were prone to looting and violence. Dionysius realized this for he dispatched the Campanian mercenaries who had helped him regain control in 404 B.C. after he had paid them. The move was justified in view of their treacherous actions at Entella where they slew the men who admitted them and married the wives.⁸⁷

The violence of mercenaries was a new feature and is often commented on as such. During the factionalism that resulted in the withdrawal of Dion and his mercenary troops to Leontini in 356 B.C. the Syracusans do not seem to have been able to establish a disciplined armed force. Consequently, on Nypsius' arrival with food and money for the besieged forces of Dionysius II on Ortygia, despite a naval victory by the Syracusans, the mercenaries on Ortygia were able to break through the siege wall and pour into the city.⁸⁸ The resulting violence was recorded by Plutarch : "For it was the sack of the city that was now going on, its men being slain, its walls torn down, and its women and children dragged shrieking to the acropolis, while its generals gave up all for lost and were unable to

employ the citizens against the enemy, who were everywhere inextricably mingled with them".⁸⁹

A greater problem with the mercenaries was the question of payment. In the absence of a successful war the maintenance of mercenaries was difficult in an economy based on fluctuating annual returns. When pay was not forthcoming the mercenaries became a formidable threat. In 396 B.C., after the Carthaginians had retreated, the mercenaries under the leadership of Aristotle pressed for payment.⁹⁰ Obviously the pay had fallen into arrears and was used by the mercenaries as a pretext for expressing general discontent with Dionysius I. Dionysius grabbed Aristotle and said he would send him back to Sparta for trial, something he could hardly have done if Aristotle were merely seeking his right of pay. For Dionysius, disaffection among the mercenaries was dangerous lest they should ally themselves to the Syracusans. The incident with Aristotle was probably related to the disaffected mercenaries whom Dionysius had got rid of during the Carthaginian war a little earlier.⁹¹ On this occasion Dionysius quelled the discontent by giving the mercenaries land grants in Leontini, having removed the Leontines to Syracuse before the war.⁹²

The need to pay mercenaries was no doubt the reason for the many and varied attempts of Dionysius to raise funds. The spoils of war and the confiscation of land from exiles went part of the way but he had to resort to many irregular methods. There were various forms of taxation; the direct property tax which it would appear amounted to 20% per annum⁹³ and indirect taxes as in the case of the women who had to pay a fixed amount to the temple in order to wear gold⁹⁴ and the tax on the ownership of cattle and sheep.⁹⁵ He also had imposed levies for specific purposes, as in the case of money to build a fleet.⁹⁶ Finally, there were the various temples he plundered or borrowed from.⁹⁷

Dionysius I, by virtue of his position, was able to finance his production of arms and in one way or another deal with the problem of

paying his mercenaries. For commanders who lacked the resources of Dionysius the problem was far more acute. In 356 B.C. the Syracusans as a whole were short of immediate funds⁹⁸ and since the engagements against Dionysius II's forces were at that time largely being conducted at sea,⁹⁹ a decree was passed to the effect that Dion's mercenaries not be paid.¹⁰⁰ It would appear that the mercenaries that had come with Heracleides now joined the forces of Dion for the proposal was backed by Heracleides in an attempt to remove the source of Dion's power. The mercenaries rallied around Dion and moved to Leontini where they were welcomed.

As mentioned above, land was sometimes granted in lieu of pay and so was the offer of citizenship. This seems to be the point of the offer of equal civic rights made to Dion's mercenaries by the Syracusans.¹⁰¹ But such compensations brought further problems. Citizenship immediately gave the ex-mercenary a vested political interest in the running of the city and hence he became the same as the citizen soldier, and the grants of land gave the mercenary something worth fighting for as distinct from allegiance to his employer. Dion was able to capitalize on this latter point when he entered Syracuse in 357 B.C. Dion was able to take the fortress on Epipolae since he had spread the rumour that he was going to attack Leontini and Catana first and hence the mercenaries at Epipolae deserted their commander, Timocrates, and went to defend their land.¹⁰²

The mercenaries had in fact become a force of their own and thereby created a new factor in the instabilities of the Fourth Century B.C., particularly in situations where there were several possible employers, or where the lack of a strong leader left a power vacuum in which the various armies of mercenaries, headed by mercenary leaders, fought for control among themselves. This factor had become evident in Dionysius II's time and as Parke noted, "Dionysius II's relations with his mercenaries were unsatisfactory, and this consideration must have helped to inspire Dion and Heracleides with the idea of returning by force and expelling the tyrant".¹⁰³

The problem became prominent in the years following Dion's assassination. Callippus had in fact been able to conspire against Dion since Dion had not only become alienated from the Syracusans but had also, it would seem, been displaced by Callippus in the allegiance of the mercenaries. Callippus had many accomplices, among them some of the mercenaries.¹⁰⁴ Callippus was not able to take over smoothly from Dion for there was confrontation between his forces and the faction consisting of Dion's friends. The latter were defeated and fled to Leontini.¹⁰⁵ Callippus retained control for only thirteen months for the Dionysian family returned with troops and took advantage of Callippus' absence at Catana to wrest control of Syracuse from him.¹⁰⁶

In quick succession the rule was assumed by Hipparinus (353-351) and Nysaeus (351-347), both of whom were Dionysius II's half brothers and Dion's nephews. Hipparinus it would appear was assassinated while drunk¹⁰⁷ and Nysaeus was expelled from Ortygia by Dionysius II¹⁰⁸ who re-established full control of Syracuse so that the distinguished citizens had recourse to Hicetas who was then ruling Leontini. They approached Hicetas since they "felt confidence in one who was a Syracusan by birth and possessed a force that was able to cope with that of Dionysius".¹⁰⁹

The result of the ten years since Dion's return was disastrous for Syracuse and for Sicily. Factions were numerous; Dion's friends, Dionysius II's group, briefly Hipparinus and Nysaeus, Hicetas and his group, and all had their mercenary followers. Hence the advice in Plato's Eighth Letter that the contending parties ought to combine as the threat of Carthage and the possible barbarization of Sicily was imminent.¹¹⁰ The proposal for the three heads of the various groups to combine¹¹¹ was impracticable in view of the now bitter rivalry, but the principle of a strong accepted ruler was sound as the arrival of Timoleon proved.¹¹²

The general result of the period was the devastation of Sicily as a whole, the problem being further exacerbated by the mercenary forces who

were out of work and willing to support any who promised pay.¹¹³ It seems that none of the contending parties could number a sufficiently overwhelming mercenary force to gain control and they all lacked the support of the citizens.

(c) Speed, Secrecy and Personal Violence

The recourse to speed was noticeable in groups who believed that quick decisive action would result in a successful change of government. Dionysius I had used the military failure of the generals at Acragas as a basis with which to attack the wealthy generals, thereby gaining ascendancy himself. In turn, the wealthy used the occasion of Dionysius' evacuation of Gela in 405 B.C. to express their discontent. To them, no doubt, his despotism was an affront for not only was their own power curtailed, but it was replaced by one who was not of the most distinguished families. The demonstration was initiated by the cavalry returning from Gela, their general dislike of Dionysius having been inflamed by the evacuation. Their action has the appearance of a momentary impulse. They entered Syracuse ahead of Dionysius, outraged his wife and ransacked the place in a burst of futile revenge.¹¹⁴ Perhaps they genuinely thought that Dionysius was deserting to the Carthaginians¹¹⁵ for apart from seeing to it that the city gates were closed they took no real precautions in anticipation of his arrival. The people generally were not aroused, probably since the cavalry, being among the wealthy, could not rely on their support. After all, the people had voted the extraordinary powers to Dionysius in the first place.¹¹⁶ Dionysius, on entering Syracuse, killed a few of them and the remainder fled to Aetna. The whole action failed since it had been ill-conceived. It had in fact been a reaction to a particular situation and had not been pre-planned or organised with a view to gaining wide support for their opposition.

A similar spontaneous act as the result of a specific incident was

evident in the Syracusan agitation against Dionysius in 396 B.C. On that occasion, Theodorus, the spokesman for the Syracusans, used a naval victory by the Syracusans during Dionysius' absence to stir up the Syracusans against Dionysius.¹¹⁷ By that time however, Dionysius was far more powerful and the failure of the Spartan commander, Pharacidas, to support the Syracusans seems to have decided the issue. The Syracusans were in fact disorganised and seem to have hoped that Pharacidas would provide the focal point for their opposition.¹¹⁸

The often mentioned speed with which Dion overthrew Dionysius II is not in the same category as the above examples. It is true that he moved swiftly from Heracleia Minoa to Syracuse, but the expedition had been planned for two or three years and was not unexpected, for although Dionysius II was away in Italy at the time, he had left a naval detachment under Philistus to intercept the expedition at Iapygia.¹¹⁹ Because of this, the expedition had avoided the coast and sailed through the open sea and had been blown off course.

Allied to the tactic of speed was the necessity, in some cases, for secrecy. Hermocrates was secretly admitted to Syracuse, but owing to lack of support failed in his attempt.¹²⁰ The possibility of groups within the city working secretly to plan to overthrow the government (with or without outside help) was a factor of which the various leaders were keenly aware. Thus the many stories of Dionysius I's fears of plots.¹²¹ Apart from his bodyguard, fortress on Ortygia and his disarming of the citizens, his methods of security were varied, including a network of both female and male spies¹²² and extraordinary security checks such as the story of his testing of the triarchs to ascertain which of them obeyed him unquestioningly and which did not.¹²³

It was precisely such fears that helped Dionysius II to decide to exile Dion. Philistus, one of Dionysius' advisers, alleged that Dion "had been in conference with Theodotes and Heracleides concerning a subversion

of the government".¹²⁴ Dion himself, when established in Syracuse, was aware of the possibility of opposition growing against him in secret and it was this fear that enabled Callippus to succeed. The stories of Callippus' actions are presented to show Dion's nobility and gullibility but the fact emerges that Dion had recourse to the use of undercover agents for Callippus "was authorized to meet secretly with whom he would and talk freely with them against Dion, in order that no lurking malcontents might remain undiscovered".¹²⁵ Callippus was thus placed in an ideal situation to discover the extent of the support upon which he could rely and to obtain suitable people to effect Dion's assassination.¹²⁶

Dion's death was also an example of the belief that the removal of a person or persons by violence could solve the political situation. This was in fact a false belief for while it temporarily weakened a faction, in the absence of a positive programme of reform, it did not come to terms with the underlying problems which had caused the general discontent. It removed the person in power but not the basis upon which such power rested or the cause for that power's existence. Thus Callippus replaced Dion as leader of Syracuse¹²⁷ and was in turn replaced by Hipparinus, Nisaeus and Dionysius II. Dionysius II was himself displaced by another single ruler, Timoleon, though in that instance, not by personal violence since Dionysius seems to have come to some agreement with Timoleon.

Violence was not only used against those in positions of authority. Dion had used a similar tactic when he had caused Heracleides to be murdered¹²⁸ and it was in part that murder which had led to Syracusan discontent with Dion, for Heracleides had been the chief opponent of Dion and had, on occasions, worked for the interests of the general populace. Earlier, Dionysius I had removed his opposition by effecting the deaths of Daphnaeus and Demarchus.¹²⁹ But he saw to it that they were denounced as traitors and that their deaths were the result of a vote by the assembly, thereby at least giving a semblance of justice to his action.

In the main, the actions based on spontaneity and personal violence achieved no real stability and those which involved secrecy were hampered by the very nature of their operation for they were restricted to relatively few persons and hence could not necessarily have the guarantee of wide support or acceptance. The motives of those engaged in this type of activity tended to be personal and had as their aim personal ascendancy rather than the welfare of Syracuse.

2. Support

(a) Group and Family Associations and Loyalties

A primary source of support for those seeking to take over a government or to keep control of the existing government was the range of personal friendship ties. These were informal in nature and structure, but since they were based on similarity of ideas and attitudes could be used for political ends if necessary.¹³⁰

In a system dependent on voting such groups vied with each other for the support of the people and tried by their arguments, put forward by their best speaker, to persuade the people to adopt their viewpoint. Also, no doubt, less creditable means were used such as stacking the assembly or coercing it by the presence of force.¹³¹ Dionysius I, once he had become general, used such means and the ratification of Dionysius II's position was done by an assembly which only had the power to say yes to what was already a 'fait accompli'.¹³²

But even in an open assembly there were groups who were constantly trying to gain ascendancy over their rivals. The whole debate between Athenagoras and Hermocrates before the Athenian expedition of 415 B.C. centred around the political attitudes of the two men. Much of Athenagoras' attack on Hermocrates' proposals was based on the fear that any extraordinary measures taken because of the need for increased security may have led to an oligarchic take-over.¹³³ The fear makes no sense unless

Hermocrates had a band of followers ready to support him in his efforts to gain political power.¹³⁴ Even after his banishment there was still a group of Hermocratean supporters in Syracuse with whom he was in contact when he returned to Sicily and it was this group who opened the gates for him in his attempted coup d'état in 408 B.C.¹³⁵

Similarly, Athenagoras must have had a group of supporters in 415 B.C. He was not only the leader of the demos but also had the most influence by his power of persuasion.¹³⁶ The debate over preparations for the coming Athenian invasion had become a political argument between two factions, so much so that one of the generals proposed that no one else ought to speak to the assembly and that they should not be making attacks upon each other but should confine themselves to the point at issue, namely the security of Syracuse.¹³⁷

Throughout the war with Athens there was a faction in Syracuse in contact with the Athenians and it was on the strength of their advice that Nicias counselled non-withdrawal before Demosthenes' arrival. As Plutarch commented, "For not a few of the men of Syracuse were in secret communications with Nicias. They urged him to bide his time, on the ground that even now they were worn out by the war and weary of Gylippus, and that if their necessities should increase a little, they would give over altogether".¹³⁸ They were in contact with Nicias again after the Athenian defeat on Epipolae and again Nicias refused to abandon the siege of Syracuse since he had confidence in what they had told him.¹³⁹ Hermocrates was able to capitalize on Nicias' Syracusan contacts after the final Athenian naval defeat by sending a messenger, ostensibly from Nicias' friends, who counselled Nicias to postpone his withdrawal.¹⁴⁰

In 412 B.C., in Hermocrates' absence, Diocles and his colleagues were able to gain ascendancy over the assembly to effect constitutional changes which made the government even more democratic.¹⁴¹ The most notable change seems to have been the introduction of lot for the election

of magistrates, thereby removing the reliance on influence and campaigning to secure election. Diocles was also instrumental in securing Hermocrates' banishment. Hermocrates' supporters do not seem to have had the general support of the people. Hermocrates was aware of this himself,¹⁴³ and hence even though he was able to secure Diocles' condemnation he was unable to obtain his own recall.¹⁴⁴

The political function of friendship ties was not always linked to loyalty to a particular individual. As Connor remarks in relation to ties at Athens, "Through friendship, the man who did not pursue an active political career might yet have some say in the decisions of his city. The state itself could also benefit. Friendship ties would provide it with some stability and continuity that might otherwise be lacking when the boule went out of office at the end of the year and a totally new one, chosen by lot, came into power. The policies espoused in the previous year might be carried on by men who were friends of the original formulators, and thus knew intimately the background of the proposals".¹⁴⁵

Such continuity also existed within groups planning to take over the government. Thus, although Hermocrates failed, Dionysius came forward as leader of the remnant of Hermocrateans, not all of whom had been banished.¹⁴⁶ Although the external situation was more precarious when Dionysius rose to power and he was able to use that fact to his advantage, other factors were also involved in his success. In the first instance there was the consolidated plan of his immediate supporters who were prepared to play a subordinate role. That they did not fight among themselves for leadership was a factor that contributed to their success. Why, however, did they choose Dionysius? In the case of Hipparinus, the motive is clear. Although influential, he had squandered his fortune and hoped to regain it by supporting Dionysius.¹⁴⁷ But Philistus was in no such circumstances and this leads one to conclude that the wealthy clique that backed Dionysius did so for a particular reason. I believe the reason can be

found in Hermocrates' failure. Hermocrates was not popular with the people and hence his surviving supporters looked for someone who would be. Since Philistus was wealthy enough to withstand any fine that the presiding archons could impose on Dionysius for creating an uproar,¹⁴⁸ Dionysius was able to slander the generals in the interest of advancing his own cause.

Secondly, Dionysius was able to gain the confidence and credulity of the populace. Since he was not classed among the most wealthy and distinguished he was able to smear with impunity such sections of that group as held power. Thus he was elected to the position of general on the basis of his supposed affinity with the interests of the populace. One of Dionysius' first actions as general was to effect the recall of exiles, among whom were those of his friends who had been involved with Hermocrates in 408 B.C.¹⁴⁹

Allied to friendship ties were family ones. Marriages could strengthen an existing friendship or, in the case of a judicious marriage, increase the number and range of supporters. Thus Dionysius cemented his friendship with the Hermocrateans by marrying Hermocrates' daughter and after her death, allied himself to Hipparinus' family by marrying that man's daughter, Aristomache.¹⁵⁰ In this way Dion was connected with the ruling family, a connection which was further enhanced by his niece, Sophrosyne being married to her halfbrother Dionysius II, and Dion's own marriage to his niece, Arete.¹⁵¹

As a result of these close ties, Dionysius I left a delicate situation when he died in 367 B.C. According to Plutarch and Nepos, Dion had wished to confer with Dionysius about dividing his kingdom among Aristomache's children (whom presumably he thought he could guide) which would have increased his own power and influence.¹⁵² The move was unsuccessful but nevertheless Dion was still in a powerful position since he had training in governmental procedure in a way in which Dionysius II had not. Later, when the rift between Dionysius II and Dion was complete,

Dionysius compelled Dion's wife to be remarried to Timocrates, a loyal and close follower, thereby severing the closeness of the family tie between Dion and himself.¹⁵³

The ties of friendship and family not only meant numerical support but also the elevation of friends to positions of honour and power. Dionysius I justified Hipparinus' support by restoring his wealth and increasing it with gifts to Hipparinus' son, Dion.¹⁵⁴ Dion enjoyed the use of this wealth even while in exile, until c. 360 B.C. when Dionysius II confiscated Dion's property, an act which he justified by maintaining, on the ground of family relationship, that he was Dion's son's trustee.¹⁵⁵ Dion's position at Syracuse had been the result of his father's connection with Dionysius I. Hence he was a trusted friend and adviser to Dionysius and was obviously foreign diplomat for him, arranging all-important business with the Carthaginians.¹⁵⁶

Naturally, Dionysius arranged it that relatives or close friends held the principal commands. Philistus, like Hipparinus, was rewarded for his support. He was made commander of the garrison that guarded the citadel, a position he held for a long time.¹⁵⁷ Likewise, Dionysius' brother, Leptines, was commander of the fleet until 390 B.C.¹⁵⁸ when the position was put in the hands of his other brother, Thearides. Thearides was also sent with much ostentation to the Olympic Games of 388 B.C. as Dionysius' representative and it was that occasion that provoked Lysias' invective against Dionysius.¹⁵⁹

If they became suspect for any reason he just as naturally relieved them of their commands. Thus Leptines was relieved of command for pursuing a policy contrary to Dionysius' wishes¹⁶⁰ and later, in 386 B.C. both he and Philistus were banished since Leptines gave one of his illegitimate daughters to Philistus in marriage without having consulted Dionysius.¹⁶¹ Leptines was reconciled to Dionysius and was recalled to Syracuse a year later where he married Dionysius' daughter and was made commander of land

troops.¹⁶² Philistus was recalled by Dionysius II in 367 B.C.¹⁶³

Even under tyrannies coalitions of friends continued to work in their own interests. The whole conflict that ended in Dion's banishment was between Philistus and his supporters and Dion and his friends. Philistus was successful and that success was due in part to his allegation that Dion "had been in conference with Theodotes and Heracleides concerning a subversion of the government".¹⁶⁴ Even after Dion's exile the coalition of friends continued to operate for when Heracleides was allegedly implicated in the trouble with the mercenaries c. 361/360 B.C., Theodotes and a certain Eurybius tried to mediate on his behalf. They were unsuccessful and Plato's involvement with them led to Dionysius II's assertion that Plato could not be a friend to both him and Theodotes' group.¹⁶⁵

Dion in fact kept contact with his friends in Syracuse when he was in exile. He also acquired new ones from his association with the Academy. These new friends were a source of both moral and active support. Speusippus worked for Dion's interests when he was at Syracuse in 361/360 B.C.¹⁶⁶ and some members, notably Callippus and the seer Miltas were part of the expedition of 357 B.C. It was Dion's alienation from his friends that in part motivated his later assassination.¹⁶⁷ The Academy was not a political group as such, but as Gouldner remarked, "Far from politically uninvolved Plato's Academy seems to have contending, politically animated factions within it; far from politically uninvolved, members and students of Plato's Academy are engaged in the most desperate forms of politics - they teach themselves the postgraduate seminar in politics : military coups, espionage, intrigue, duplicity and assassination".¹⁶⁸

In the long term, the existence of rival groups, albeit loosely structured, was not conducive to a lasting stability. The various groups worked primarily in their own interests and not for the general welfare of Syracuse.¹⁶⁹ When those interests were compatible with those of Syracuse,

as in the case of Dionysius I, who promised to solve the problem of the Carthaginians and did, stability resulted. When the interests were not those of Syracuse, the personal interests came first. In effect this was the case with Callippus' action for by the murder of Dion a power vacuum resulted and instability arose as a result of the rivalry of the various groups who wished to fill that vacuum.

Moreover, the ties of friendship were not static but had the capacity to change with different circumstances. Dionysius I's friends were loyal to him and this, combined with his tight control of the armed forces, enabled him to retain control. Dion however, was not able to command a similar loyalty and he failed as a result of his alienation. So too, when two powerful groups existed the support of one led to the alienation of the other. This was the problem that Dionysius II faced and his support of Philistus and his friends was at the expense of Dion's group. This was the first stage in the series of events that led to Dionysius II's first expulsion.

Furthermore, the links by marriage could be altered by death or divorce. In the case of family bonds, while they could create a strong bond of loyalty, they also contained the potential for bitter family feuds and rivalry as in fact occurred after Dion's death when Dionysius II was in opposition to his half-brothers, finally assuming power by expelling Nysaeus in 347/346 B.C.

(b) Use of the People

The populace as a whole was used for support either by manipulating its voting capacity, or more directly by numerical support for a cause. That they often responded readily attests to the fact that they felt that real problems existed and that these problems would be solved by supporting a particular person whom they believed would improve their position. Their at least tacit support was necessary for the smooth operation of the government or for the successful transference of power, and it was the lack

of this that had resulted in the failures of Hermocrates, the cavalry in opposition to Dionysius, Dion and the oligarchic Six Hundred.

The people were called in on various pretexts, often of the most general kind. Dionysius I had gained support by an effective use of duplicity. The Syracusan government at the time was democratic, but Dionysius treated it as if it were an unpopular oligarchy.¹⁷⁰ Eventually he was successful in having himself elected *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ*.¹⁷¹ The problem of this position was that it does not seem to have had a time limit imposed for there was no such qualifying clause as 'until the end of the war with the Carthaginians', which was, after all, the reason for the extraordinary command. Presumably the position was subject to review annually, but once a bodyguard had been voted, albeit by a later stacked assembly at Leontini, there was very little the people could do to force Dionysius to relinquish command. In fact, according to Diodorus, the Syracusans repented their elevation of Dionysius after that assembly had adjourned,¹⁷² but before another assembly was convened Dionysius had secured his bodyguard.

Once Dionysius was in control the people were dependent on a spokesman who could put forward their interests or co-ordinate them in concerted action. The inability of the people to initiate independent action for any length of time was the reason for Dionysius' success in quelling the only serious opposition from the people in 404 B.C.¹⁷³ After that, Dionysius had little trouble in suppressing any opposition as he did with the trouble in 396 B.C. when Theodorus spoke out against him.¹⁷⁴ He then seems to have courted the people's goodwill for "he won the favour of the multitude by kindly words, honouring some of them with gifts and inviting them to general banquets".¹⁷⁵ When Dionysius II assumed control he was accepted by the Syracusan assembly without opposition. Dionysius I had in fact gained the support of the people and had continued to enjoy it due, no doubt, not only to his largess, but also to his moderate nature and lack of excesses

and violence.¹⁷⁶

The problem of the general elevated by the people continued to threaten the stability of Syracuse. Dion in this context was just another side of the same coin. Having gained the support of the country people around Syracuse and the welcome of the citizens in Syracuse, both he and his brother, by virtue of their role as liberators of Syracuse were elected generals with absolute power. Twenty others were chosen to be their colleagues, although in what capacity is obscure.¹⁷⁷ From the subsequent events it appears that their position was very much a subordinate one.

But without having taken Dionysius II's stronghold, Ortygia, Dion had to be careful to retain the support of the people and his problems in this area illustrate the precarious nature of support by the people and the extent to which the people were persuaded by what they were told. They were always liable to be influenced by counter-propaganda. Dionysius II was aware of this and hence he tried, when he was besieged on Ortygia, to undermine the people's faith in Dion. This he did by means of a subversive letter to Dion, supposedly from Dion's son, Hipparinus.¹⁷⁸ The manoeuvre was successful for the people became suspicious of Dion and his family connections with the tyrant.

It was at this point that Heracleides arrived with reinforcements for the revolutionaries and the whole question of the allegiance of the people became highlighted for they now had an alternative leader. His late arrival was attributed by Diodorus to a delay through storms, but by Plutarch to a quarrel between Heracleides and Dion back in the Peloponnese.¹⁷⁹ Whatever the reason, they soon quarrelled in Syracuse and the quarrel was over command.¹⁸⁰ Heracleides' arrival was a threat to Dion since the people "at once turned their eyes towards other leaders".¹⁸¹ Heracleides was originally a friend of Dion,¹⁸² but it would appear that the friendship was by now rather strained. It is difficult to assess

Heracleides' position accurately for the sources are generally pro-Dion and hence Heracleides suffers by comparison. Although Plutarch acknowledged his military capacity he qualified it by saying that he was "irresolute, fickle and least to be relied upon in an enterprise involving power and glory".¹⁸³ This assessment may well have been the result of attempts by pro-Dion sources to justify his murder for from the time of his arrival until his death he was quite resolute and consistent in his opposition to Dion, although his activities were limited because of Dion's tight control over affairs, a control which he appears to have had no intention of relinquishing.

The whole problem seems to be that Heracleides was popular with the people in a way that Dion was not. Heracleides was, in fact, a man of great distinction¹⁸⁴ and "had no less influence with the aristocrats than Dion and by them he was unanimously chosen to command the fleet".¹⁸⁵ I take this to mean that he was their candidate for the position, for it was the people's confidence in him that resulted, according to Plutarch, in their calling an assembly of their own and choosing Heracleides to be admiral.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, the people believed that Heracleides was free from any aims at tyrannical power¹⁸⁷ and hence they preferred him to Dion. Thus the people tried to initiate action of their own and in so doing tried to show the dependence of leaders on their support.

Dion's reaction was both immediate and unreasonable. He could not forbear to share the command¹⁸⁸ and he complained that he would no longer be *στρατηγὸς ἀντοκράτωρ* if he had to relinquish the naval command.¹⁸⁹ There was no logic in this assertion for Dion was supposed to be sharing absolute power with Megacles and was assisted in some way or other by twenty colleagues. But these were probably supporters or followers of Dion in a way that Heracleides was not. At Dion's instigation the Syracusans reluctantly revoked the command and then he himself called an assembly and appointed Heracleides admiral and persuaded the people to let Heracleides

have a bodyguard like his own.¹⁹⁰ What in effect Dion did was to make it clear that all appointments were to be subject to his approval, that Heracleides was to owe his position to Dion's favour, and that the assembly was not to take independent action.

Heracleides however, due to his influence with the people, was able to oppose Dion's supremacy. Through the agency of Hippo three popular measures were proposed and passed : a land redistribution, a measure to deprive the mercenaries of their pay, and a proposal to elect new generals. Twenty-five generals were elected, Heracleides among them.¹⁹¹ Since Dionysius II had left Ortygia, leaving his son in charge, it would seem that Heracleides and the other generals felt that they could maintain the siege merely with the support of the citizens and hence continued employment of the mercenaries was unnecessary.¹⁹² But the citizen force was badly disciplined and ill-organized and as a force, in the absence of a strong single authority, they were particularly vulnerable to the more experienced professional mercenaries still on Ortygia. Dionysius' commander, Nypsius, was able to break through the siege wall, pour into the city and wreak havoc on the virtually defenceless citizens.¹⁹³

The Syracusans were then forced to seek help from Dion again. There was, however, dissension within Syracuse for although the cavalry and "more respectable citizens" urged Dion to come back, the generals maintained that the situation was under control and that Dion's help was not needed.¹⁹⁴ Due to the perilous situation created by the attacks of Nypsius' troops, the Syracusans were forced to admit Dion and his mercenaries to drive Nypsius' forces back to the garrison.

Dion was again elected *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ*, a command which originally included both land and sea forces but, since this was opposed by the sailors and day-labourers, Dion was forced to yield command of the sea to Heracleides.¹⁹⁵ Since many of these men would have been the rowers of the ships, together with the fact that they may well have commanded a

majority in the assembly, Dion was forced to concede the issue, particularly as Dionysius' forces were still on Ortygia and a disaffected navy would have swung the balance in Dionysius' favour. On the matter of land redistribution, an issue which did not directly affect the military situation but did affect the class structure, Dion was firm and he repealed the earlier decree despite the displeasure of the people.¹⁹⁶

The rivalry continued, the 'better class of Syracusans' maintaining that Heracleides was in collusion with Dionysius II, while the sailors and soldiers with Heracleides when he was stationed at Messana believing that Dion intended to make himself tyrant.¹⁹⁷ The situation became somewhat critical with the people in Syracuse running short of provisions when the two groups were reconciled by the Spartan adventurer, Gaesylus. Part of the compromise was the discharge of the fleet "since it was of no use, while it involved great outlays for the crews, and caused dissension among the commanders".¹⁹⁸ With a concentrated effort on the siege of Ortygia, Dionysius II's son, Apollocrates, was forced to come to terms with Dion, abandon the citadel and its arms, and sail across to Italy.

After the expulsion of Dionysius II's forces the relationship between Dion and the people worsened. Nepos claimed that Dion "distributed among the soldiers the property of those who were opposed to him",¹⁹⁹ and it would appear that he had to resort to such confiscations to meet expenses. This would have become necessary since there was a shortage of money as the Syracusans had been unable to pay the mercenaries earlier and had, in part, disbanded the fleet as an economic measure. Moreover, Plutarch, who made a point of applauding Dion's way of life, mentioned that he was generous to his allies, particularly his Athenian associates, and to his mercenaries, to an extent that was "beyond his resources".²⁰⁰

Not only did Dion not relinquish his extraordinary command, but he also tried to keep control of the government and influence the Syracusan way of life. On the level of everyday life he was anxious to curb the

Syracusans who were apparently given to excess licence and luxury;²⁰¹ and in regard to the government, he felt himself to be in a position whereby he could invite men to attend the council, an issue upon which Heracleides seized. Such highhanded behaviour, together with the failure to demolish the fortifications on Ortygia, exacerbated the relationship between Dion and other Syracusans and the murder of his rival, Heracleides, was keenly resented.²⁰² Consequently, Callippus became confident that he could replace Dion.

In general, the people could be swayed by emotive appeals on class grounds, fear of the closeness of war, which resulted in their granting of extraordinary commands, fear of replacing one tyrant with another, the latter fear being all the more valid, given the political situation of the first half of the Fourth Century B.C. As a group they needed a leader either to advocate their cause or to organize them for military action. As such they were subject to the pressure of the most powerful commander or the most persuasive speaker, often responding to what were immediate situations. These leaders did not necessarily work in the interests of Syracuse as a whole, but rather in the interest of their own position and power. Without a leader who was backed by force, but willing to work in their interests, there was very little the people could do and any spontaneous uprising or independent action was shortlived and bound to be unsuccessful when opposed by a commander with mercenary forces.²⁰³

(c) The Role of Exiles

Exile was a convenient method for one group to get rid of any leader or group that appeared to be too powerful. The alternative method, death, was not always possible unless the leader could gain a conviction on the basis of alleged treachery as did Dionysius I against Daphnaeus and Demarchus or was ruthless and powerful enough to silence opposition by wholesale slaughter, as did Agathocles. Exile, however, produced a group

of people who had cause to resent their city and who were willing to regain their status by effecting an overthrow of the government that had banished them.

For co-ordinated action, exiles needed two things, a leader and a base from which to operate. Hermocrates, by establishing himself at Selinus in 409 B.C., created such a base.²⁰⁴ From there he was able to ravage the Carthaginian territory in Sicily (Hannibal's main forces had returned to Carthage) thereby gaining prestige for himself, and by returning the bones of the dead Syracusans who had fallen at Himera, embarrassing the Syracusan generals who had neglected to do this. He was also able to keep in contact with his friends in Syracuse who, when other means of diplomatic intrigue had failed, were able to open the gates for him. His base was also the focal point for such Sicilians as had been left homeless by the Carthaginian invasion and no doubt for other Syracusan exiles as well. In all, he gathered a force of six thousand, of which only one thousand were mercenaries.²⁰⁵

Similarly, the cavalry who opposed Dionysius I in 405 B.C., established themselves at Aetna²⁰⁶ when they were exiled and from there went in support of the people's uprising in the following year. On the failure of that uprising, some seven thousand Syracusans joined the cavalry.²⁰⁷ Dionysius offered them lenient terms and some returned, but many remained at Aetna waiting for the opportunity to go against him. Dionysius was able to take the place without too much effort in 403 B.C.²⁰⁸ and the exiles were forced to flee to Rhegium where they continued to try and influence that government in its anti-Dionysian policy.²⁰⁹ To forestall the use of Aetna as a refuge, and to increase his security on the island, Dionysius planted an outpost there.

The disinclination of Dionysius II to have a powerful or influential exile in opposition to him was, I believe, the reason for the vagueness about Dion's departure.²¹⁰ I would contend that he was politely invited to

leave indefinitely. Aelian simply stated that he was driven out,²¹¹ but Plato asserted that Dion was plotting against the tyranny²¹² and this is in agreement with the account in Plutarch.²¹³ But the pretext seems somewhat obscure. That Dion had advised the Carthaginians to deal through him together with Dionysius II hardly seems treasonable, particularly if Dion still held the position of foreign diplomat as he had done under Dionysius I.²¹⁴

If, as Plato asserted,²¹⁵ Syracuse was in a state of *στάσις* at that time, then Dion's removal makes more sense. The statement is also confirmed by Plutarch's remark that the Syracusans were cheered by the expectation of some revolutionary action when they heard of Dion's departure,²¹⁶ indicating that the rift must have been well known, as well as Dionysius II's attempt to make light of the incident. Dionysius could not afford to take the risk of possible subversive action on the part of Dion, nor, it would seem, could he alienate Dion's influential connections by a formal exile.

I would assert, therefore, that the letter to Carthage was merely a pretext which was stretched to gain his point in the absence of the necessary solid proof of the suspected underground activity. Removing Dion removed the key to a potential supply of force for any opposition, for not only was Dion able to afford to equip forces himself, there was also the possibility of Carthaginian support since Dion had the goodwill of the Carthaginians. No doubt it was in the interests of Carthage to have a Syracuse weakened by civil strife or a government sympathetic to Carthage.²¹⁷ It also removed a powerful person who had close ties with the tyranny and may well have supported the claims of Dionysius I's other sons.²¹⁸

After his departure, Dion had adherents in Syracuse who sent him his revenues and "other things",²¹⁹ and in view of these connections, Dionysius II felt compelled to counsel Plato to urge Dion not to seek to

VENTEP⁴ while in Greece.²²⁰ The official reason for Dion's departure was, of course, different and came in the form of a public statement that Dion had merely gone on a journey. This was an attempt to allay the fears of Dion's relatives and to quell the unrest of some of the court. To confirm this view Dionysius II sent Dion two ships with some of his wealth and allowed the revenues of his property to be sent to him.²²¹

There was also an element of secrecy about the circumstances relating to Dion's actual departure.²²² It was a hushed up affair and it was this, I believe, that led Diodorus to report the story that Dion left of his own accord in fear of an impending accusation.²²³ The departure of the two vessels with Dion's possessions was, however, no secret and these left after Dion's departure. Since Plutarch mentioned that these ships were in the command of Dion's kinsmen it was presumably at this stage that Dion's brother, Megacles left.²²⁴ More important was the connection between Heracleides and Dion's exile. They had obviously had close contact in Syracuse otherwise there would have been no point to the accusations of Philistus.²²⁵ I will not deal here with how Heracleides came to be with Dion in Greece,²²⁶ but obviously the two worked together in Greece and the return to Sicily was a joint venture, in theory at least.

While in Greece Dion took the opportunity to promote his cause by gaining the goodwill of the Greek cities, including the Spartans, who made him a citizen, a rare honour on any occasion and not one in keeping with the spirit of their alliance with Dionysius.²²⁷ In effect, Dion's actions in Greece were regarded as subversive and it was as a result of those actions that Dionysius began to fear Dion's popularity and therefore stopped sending him the revenues from his property. Much of Dion's prestige and influence had been the result of the status he had acquired from the use of the wealth derived from that property. When Dionysius confiscated and sold Dion's property he made Dion publicly and formally an exile.²²⁸

The conduct of Dion in Greece showed what an influential exile could do. Nevertheless, the force that Dion took with him to Sicily was comparatively small.²²⁹ Significantly, very few of the Syracusan exiles joined him.²³⁰ Dion arrived at Minoa and by marching overland to Syracuse was able to enlarge his numbers from people from the surrounding cities, as well as from the country folk of Syracuse.²³¹

At the end of the Fourth Century B.C. the opposition of Deinocrates to Agathocles showed what a large co-ordinated body of exiles could do to hamper the effectiveness of the government. On this occasion, although the core of his followers were Syracusans, his numbers were swelled by exiles from other Sicilian Greek cities, exiles who had also been displaced by Agathocles. The exiles also had the support of the Carthaginians.²³² The coalition was created in 312 B.C. and it was as a result of a severe reverse from this coalition, together with the loss of control of Sicily with the exception of Syracuse, that Agathocles conceived of his plan of carrying the war into Africa.²³³

The coalition in Sicily remained in force until 309 B.C., when the death of the Carthaginian general resulted in a division of the forces. Acragas then briefly took up the cause of Sicilian freedom, possibly with the intention of gaining control herself²³⁴ and the condition of Sicily was sufficiently unsettled for Agathocles to feel compelled to return to Sicily and leave his son in charge of the African forces.²³⁵ On the death of the Acragantine general, Xenodocus, in 307 B.C. Deinocrates, with his band of exiles, again led the forces opposed to Agathocles.²³⁶

The situation became all the more serious when one of Agathocles' generals, Pasiphilus, having heard of the revolt of Agathocles' African army in Libya, deserted with his forces to Deinocrates.²³⁷ Agathocles was forced to negotiate with Deinocrates²³⁸ who was by then commanding a force of twenty thousand soldiers and three thousand cavalry and had gained control of several cities in Sicily.²³⁹ Although initially unsuccessful in

his overtures, it would appear that some agreement was reached between the two men, for in 305 B.C. Agathocles successfully defeated Deinocrates' forces, only a fraction of which were actually involved in the fighting.²⁴⁰ After that defeat, the effective opposition of exiles to Agathocles' rule was quelled.

In the absence of wealth or sufficient numbers, exiles could and did gain the assistance of other powers willing to reinstate them in the interest of gaining a hold over Syracuse. Some Syracusan exiles were with Nicias on the Athenian expedition and gave him advice about the topography of the place: "Some Syracusan exiles who were with them had told them of a piece of ground near Olympeium, which was the place they did occupy in the end since it was a position where the cavalry could do them no harm to speak of".²⁴¹

Dion not only gained moral support from the Greeks for his return, but was assisted by the Carthaginians, for although they gave no active support, the commander at Minoa allowed Dion to march through his territory and agreed to send the surplus weapons and armour on after him, thus allowing Dion to make a swift march through Sicily.

The cities of Sicily were possibly havens for Syracusan exiles and their capacity as such may well have determined Dionysius I in his policy of planting mercenaries at Catana, Sicels at Naxos²⁴² and of giving the lands of Leontini in lieu of payment to his mercenaries. The exile would use such places as a base from which to harass the government at Syracuse. At the very least the fact that Greek cities were independent units and prepared to harbour exiles favoured the cause of revolutionaries. For as Balogh noted, while revolutionaries knew the risk they ran by plotting a change of government, "it was only necessary, if such a plot ended in failure, to reach the border, and it would be fairly possible to lead a satisfactory, though non-political life elsewhere".²⁴³

Certainly the exiles who established themselves at Aetna had to be

expelled and once Dionysius I had control of Eastern Sicily, Rhegium offered asylum to exiles from Syracuse and the other Sicilian cities.²⁴⁴ One of the exiles, Heloris, they chose to be their general to lay siege to Messina and they settled the Naxians and Catanians at Mylae.²⁴⁵ Neither plan was successful, except in that it drew Dionysius' attention to Italy once more and hence he attacked them in 393 B.C. and again in 390 B.C., finally taking the place in 388/387 B.C.

To gain support for a cause, the recall of exiles was sometimes advocated. One of Dionysius' first acts in 406 B.C. was to do this. These were men whom the democracy had exiled and included those involved with Hermocrates' abortive coup. The returning exiles owed their reinstatement to Dionysius and would therefore be ready to support him. Dionysius II, when he assumed the rule, also recalled the exiles, possibly as a popular measure and possibly in the hope that factional strife would cease.

Thus, while exile was used as a means of getting rid of opponents and was therefore an attempt at stability, at the same time it created a body of malcontents who were willing to support whomsoever recalled them or who were prepared to effect their return by overthrowing the existing government.

(d) Allies and the Extent of Outside Intervention

In support of their cause revolutionaries often sought help from other powers. This support could either be a tacit one insofar as other cities provided a refuge for exiles, or it could be active in that they provided manpower and arms for the revolutionaries. The four most obvious areas for support were the Greek cities of Sicily and Italy, the native population on the island, the major powers of Mainland Greece, and Carthage.

(i) Greek Cities of Sicily and Italy

There was a duality in the relationship between Syracuse and these cities. Just as the government in Syracuse wished to have governments in

these cities which were favourable to their own, or were prepared to accept Syracusan overlordship, particularly under such strong rulers as Dionysius I and Agathocles, so too, the cities themselves (or elements within them) were prepared to support revolutionaries, not so much because of political ideology, but because they hoped that the overthrow of the particular government at Syracuse would mean a loosening of Syracusan dominance and, at times, of gaining their own autonomy. In the period in question here, the principal cities in Sicily who were prepared to support revolutionaries were Leontini, Messana and Acragas.²⁴⁶

Leontini, being close to Syracuse geographically and possessing a strategic position overlooking the corn-producing Leontine plain, was the most affected by Syracusan affairs. Her independence had been threatened by Syracuse in the last quarter of the Fifth Century B.C. It was probably fear of Syracusan dominance that had led to the renewal of her alliance with Athens in 433 B.C.²⁴⁷ By 427 B.C. she was at war with Syracuse and appealed for help from Athens.²⁴⁸ Although that help was given the result was inconclusive. It would appear that Leontini was at that time democratic, but with a strong oligarchic party opposing them for when in c. 423 B.C. a decision was made to enrol new members as citizens, the oligarchs appealed to Syracuse and Syracuse, not averse to using the internal situation at Leontini to further her own expansionist aims, drove the common populace out of the city, but then transferred the oligarchs to Syracuse, made them Syracusan citizens and Leontini became Syracusan.²⁴⁹

A little later some of the oligarchs returned to Leontini and, on being joined by the scattered populace, kept up a war against Syracuse, establishing themselves in one part of the town, but Leontini proper remained Syracusan. It was these exiles who appealed to Athens in 416 B.C.²⁵⁰ On the Athenian withdrawal, Leontini no longer had any semblance of independence and it can be assumed that the opposition of the exiles was flushed out. It was spoken of as an outpost (*προπολίς*) of Syracuse

when Dionysius went there to acquire his bodyguard.²⁵¹ Its status was, however, a precarious one, for it was always capable of pursuing a policy in opposition to Syracuse.

In 406 B.C. its population became further diversified when the refugees from Acragas were settled there²⁵² and it must have been at this point that the Leontines in Syracuse revolted and returned to their own city.²⁵³ Its independence and autonomy was granted in the peace made between Dionysius I and the Carthaginians in 405 B.C., but it must have remained opposed to him for he campaigned against it in 403 B.C., and finally removed the inhabitants from there to Syracuse.²⁵⁴ In 396 B.C. the city was given to Dionysius' mercenaries.²⁵⁵ Nevertheless, it continued to be a base for revolutionary activity. In 356 B.C., on Dion's arrival in Sicily, it revolted from Dionysius II²⁵⁶ and it provided a refuge for Dion and his mercenaries when they fell from favour with the Syracusan populace.²⁵⁷ The people of Leontini, descendants of Dionysius I's mercenaries, were sympathetic to the cause of the mercenaries and granted them civic rights. At a meeting of allies (*σύνταχοι*), presumably those allied against Dionysius II, the Syracusan action was denounced.²⁵⁸

In 353/352 it continued to harbour political refugees for the friends of Dion, having been unsuccessful against Callippus, fled there.²⁵⁹ When Dionysius II regained Syracuse in 346 B.C., the "best and most noble" of the Syracusans went to Hicetas who had by then made himself tyrant of Leontini. They chose Hicetas as their general and it was from Leontini that they appealed to Corinth for help.²⁶⁰ Hicetas then used Leontini as a base for operations against both Dionysius II and later, Timoleon. When Timoleon transplanted the population to Syracuse,²⁶¹ he presumably resettled it with new colonists, after which it seems to have ceased playing an active political role for it was not prominent at all in the coalitions supporting or opposing Agathocles.

Messana was also prepared to support the cause of Syracusan exiles

or revolutionaries. In 404 B.C. they responded to an appeal from the Syracusans when they revolted from Dionysius I, sending, together with the Rhegians, eighty manned triremes.²⁶² What exact action they were involved in is not known, but presumably they left after the Syracusans had given Dionysius permission to sail away, for the three hundred mercenaries who came by sea to help Dionysius had no difficulty in landing at Syracuse.²⁶³

Messana was often a refuge for exiles. It was these exiles who prompted the Messanians to make the abortive expedition with the Rhegians against Dionysius in 399 B.C.²⁶⁴ In the following year, Dionysius gained their goodwill by granting them a large tract of land on their borders.²⁶⁵ During the subsequent war with Carthage, the city was razed to the ground, after which Dionysius re-established the place with a population of one thousand Locrians and four thousand Medmaeans.²⁶⁶ This was a population favourable to himself and he further secured the place by planting a garrison there. From the story in Polyaeus it appears that he worked together with a section of the Messanian population and that he created and abetted a situation of *ο-α-ο-α* upon which he could capitalize.²⁶⁷

But such loyalties were not long-lived. In 357 B.C. the Messanians helped Dion in his overthrow of Dionysius II²⁶⁸ and they provided a base at which Timoleon's forces could land in 344 B.C. After the expulsion of the tyrant Hippo by Timoleon, the Messanians regained their autonomy and once again harboured exiles so that later Agathocles was forced to take action against them.²⁶⁹ Agathocles finally forced them to expel the Syracusan exiles and to receive back their own exiles,²⁷⁰ men who were antagonistic to the Messanian government and who would, at the very least, weaken the place through internal dissension. He also killed those known to be opposed to his rule.

Acragas was also a strong supporter of Syracusan exiles. In 357 B.C., together with the Geloans, Camarinaeans and Messanians they aided Dion in his march to Syracuse.²⁷¹ Forty years later they provided a haven

for the large number of Syracusans who fled from Agathocles' revolution.²⁷² From Acragas, the exiles organised a war against Agathocles and were joined by Gela and Messana,²⁷³ peace being made at the instigation of the Carthaginians.²⁷⁴

Of the cities in Italy, the two who were the most embroiled with Syracusan and Sicilian affairs were Locri and Rhegium. Locri remained a faithful ally of the Dionysii until the slaughter of Dionysius II's family after he had returned to Syracuse in 347 B.C. Rhegium, on the other hand, was constantly anti-Syracusan in general and anti-Dionysian in particular. During the Athenian invasion she had been pro-Athenian and after the rise of Dionysius she had been prepared, together with the Messanians, to help the people of Syracuse against him.

In 398 B.C. Rhegium rejected the alliance implied in the marriage proposal of Dionysius²⁷⁵ and in 394 B.C. offered asylum to all those expelled from Sicily by him.²⁷⁶ Under the leadership of the exiled Syracusan general, Heloris, they attacked Messana, but after a series of campaigns against them Dionysius took the city in 388/387 B.C.²⁷⁷ The city was refounded by Dionysius II and became a convenient base at which Timoleon could land and helped him to elude the Carthaginians and cross into Sicily.²⁷⁸

(ii) The Native Population of Sicily

Of the native population, the Sicels had the most potential for involvement in Syracusan affairs. The Sicans remained a scattered population in the western section of the island and showed little interest in the Greek cities at all. The Elymians, mainly at Segesta, although being partly responsible for bringing in the Athenians and the Carthaginians at the end of the Fifth Century B.C. for support in their territorial disputes with Selinus, likewise showed little interest in Eastern Sicily.

The Sicel centres of the inland and those who were subject to

Syracuse could, however, be approached for support against the Syracusan government.²⁷⁹ In the advent of foreign invasion, steps were taken by the Syracusans to secure their loyalty.²⁸⁰ It was part of Alcibiades' plan to form alliances with the independent Sicels and to detach the others from Syracusan subjection.²⁸¹ Some joined the Athenians,²⁸² but others sided with Gylippus.²⁸³ This difference of policy among the Sicels reveals that they were by no means a cohesive body. In the Fourth Century B.C. the independent Sicel towns played little part in the conflicts over Syracuse. Dionysius I had conceded their independence in his treaty with Carthage in 405 B.C.²⁸⁴ Later he conducted campaigns against them and secured their loyalty by a network of garrisons. But he was also careful to cultivate their friendship. This he did by his lenient treatment of them as at Enna²⁸⁵ and by granting them territory as in the case of the territory of the Naxians which he gave to the neighbouring Sicels when he destroyed Naxos.²⁸⁶

But there was no active attempt to enlist the support of the Sicels in domestic conflicts. Some are mentioned as having joined Dion and some were involved with Timoleon on his arrival in Sicily.²⁸⁷ Presumably some were also among the men of the inland towns who supported Agathocles,²⁸⁸ but by then the Sicels had become very much Hellenized and since the whole of the eastern area had received an influx of Greek settlers after Timoleon's victory, the distinction between Greek and Sicel had become negligible.

What is more surprising is the lack of positive action on the part of those Sicels who had been subject to the Syracusans. Although the treaty of 405 B.C. had secured Sicel independence, one would reasonably expect that those living within Syracusan territory would have remained in a subordinate position. That there was no agitation from them in the internal conflicts in the Fourth Century B.C. inclines me toward the attractive suggestion made by Mosse²⁸⁹ that it was in fact these Sicels who

were referred to in the complaint by Theodorus when he said that Dionysius had given the wives of banished nobles to slaves.²⁹⁰ They were also the same group that had become New Citizens at the beginning of his rule,²⁹¹ and must be distinguished from the usual type of domestic slave who was freed during a time of crisis to help fight the Carthaginians but was returned to his master once the danger had passed.²⁹²

(iii) Mainland Greece

The two main cities of Greece, Athens and Sparta, were not concerned with the internal politics of Syracuse in the Fourth Century B.C., and neither helped Syracusan exiles nor the Syracusan government in any official capacity. In the case of Sparta, she morally supported the tyranny of the Dionysii, allowed mercenaries to be recruited from the Peloponnese, and occasionally sent captains to help them.²⁹³ In return, the Dionysii helped Sparta with whom they had an alliance.²⁹⁴ It was in fact Sparta's non-action against Dionysius I to which Lysias drew attention in his Olympic oration.²⁹⁵

The Athenian attitude was a little more complex. She had been willing to form alliances with the cities in Sicily and as Westlake remarked, at the time of the Peloponnesian War the Athenians "welcomed the opportunities afforded by these alliances to establish their influence firmly in Sicily and to curb the increasing power of the Syracusans, who, it was believed, might well send naval and financial aid to the Dorians of the Peloponnese".²⁹⁶ However, it must be remembered that the Athenian expedition of 415 B.C. was not primarily aimed at disrupting the Syracusan political situation, but rather at securing Sicily under Athenian leadership. That Nicias later had contact with a certain group within the city was typical of Greek strategy.²⁹⁷ The Athenians had been called in by other Sicilian cities hostile to Syracuse, they had not been called in by an internal faction within Syracuse, and despite Alcibiades' assertion, the

Syracusans remained remarkably united, and under the leadership of Gylippus, successfully defeated the Athenians.

In the Fourth Century B.C., Athens, like Sparta, recognized the Dionysii as the government of Syracuse, finally securing an alliance with them in 368/367 B.C.²⁹⁸ The actions of those of the Academy who supported Dion were not reflective of official Athenian policy. In fact, the embarrassment of Plato about the part played by members of the Academy in Dion's expedition accounts for the apologetic nature of the Seventh Letter in which he was at pains to show that he was basically neutral in the matter and that the actions of Callippus in Syracusan politics were neither a reflection on the Academy nor on Athens.²⁹⁹

However, Corinth, as the mother city of Syracuse, was a natural place for appeals to be sent. But this does not mean that such appeals were always acted upon. The response of Corinth to the Syracusan appeal for help against the Athenians had been as much a response to anti-Athenian sentiment as to pro-Syracusan feeling.³⁰⁰ Moreover, it was a response to the Syracusan government in its fight against external aggression and was not related to Syracusan domestic politics.

In the Fourth Century B.C. we hear of two appeals made by Syracusan exiles to Corinth; the first from Dion in 358/357 B.C.³⁰¹ and the second from the exiles stationed at Leontini in 346 B.C.³⁰² In the first instance, as far as we know, there was no response, but in the second there was. This shows an inconsistency in Corinthian policy which is not readily explainable. A review of the circumstances surrounding the two appeals is necessary.

When Dion made his appeal, the position of the Dionysii was well established and had been so for almost fifty years. Furthermore, the ties between Corinth and Syracuse were not particularly strong at that time, nor indeed after Timoleon's expedition, and consisted mainly of the formal ties between the mother city and its colony.³⁰³ The lack of response to Dion's

appeal and his expedition³⁰⁴ is indicative of Corinth's neutrality of attitude and Plutarch, when writing about the appeal made in 346 B.C., had no real foundation for praising the city's hatred of tyranny,³⁰⁵ nor did Diodorus when he claimed that "the Corinthians concluded that it was only right to assist people who were offshoots of themselves".³⁰⁶ They had certainly shown no such inclination before. The presence of Nicoteles, the Corinthian, as a leader of the rebellion in 404 B.C.³⁰⁷ is in no way indicative of official Corinthian support and as Talbert remarked, "there is no evidence to support Stroheker's presumption that Nicoteles was sent out by Corinth, like Timoleon".³⁰⁸

But in 346 B.C., the Corinthians did respond to the appeal from Syracusan exiles. I would suggest that the reason for the support forthcoming on this occasion can be found in the different circumstances surrounding the appeal. In this instance, Dionysius II had only just resumed power after ten years of political instability at Syracuse. His government was not as firmly established by tradition as it had been in 358 B.C. Secondly, there was the possibility of using Carthage's rearmament in Sicily as a pretext for sending Corinthian help. This, however, raises the vexed question of the purpose of Timoleon's mission.

The earliest reference to Timoleon's mission, in Aristotle, implies that the nine triremes engaged the Carthaginians and the inference is later made by Aelian,³⁰⁹ with the result that the impression is gained that the Corinthians sent aid since the Syracusans were attacked or threatened by the Carthaginians. Part of this impression may have been the result of a confusion between Timoleon's difficulty in eluding the Carthaginians at Rhegium and some supposed action at Syracuse. That the expedition was directed against the Carthaginians is further substantiated by the statement of Plutarch that the appeal was prompted by fear of the Carthaginians.³¹⁰ But as Westlake noted, Plutarch's statement is modified by the end of the sentence where it is inferred that assistance was sought against

tyrants.³¹¹ Westlake further showed that the latter view was presupposed elsewhere and underlay the whole narrative of Plutarch. In support of this assertion he mentioned Hicetas' comment that the Corinthians need not come to Syracuse since he had formed an alliance with the Carthaginians against Dionysius II;³¹² the fact that Andromachus of Tauromenium was described as one who co-operated with the Corinthians in liberating Sicily,³¹³ obviously from tyrants; and that the distrust of Timoleon because of Callippus and Pharax suggests that, like his predecessors, Timoleon had been sent out to eradicate tyranny.³¹⁴ To this evidence I would add the fact that Timoleon, on arrival in Sicily, did not advocate combined action against the Carthaginians, despite the fact that they had tried to hinder his arrival, but instead, responded to an appeal from a section of the population at Adranum and then concentrated his action against Syracuse. It was only after Hicetas began to use his Carthaginian alliance to the full that the question of Carthage assumed importance.

Thus I would agree with Westlake that the cumulative evidence as against the comment by Plutarch, shows that Timoleon was sent in response to an appeal against tyrants in general, and Dionysius II in particular. The evidence of Nepos³¹⁵ and Diodorus³¹⁶ further points in this direction. Finally, as Westlake also noted, the prime movers of the appeal were the aristocratic Syracusan exiles, and the main qualification for Timoleon's appointment was his supposed hatred of tyranny.³¹⁷

The actual support given by Corinth was only minimal and this can be explained by the fact that Corinth had not significantly revived after the Peloponnesian War.³¹⁸ Corinthian aid consisted mainly in providing a general, helping him to recruit mercenaries, and providing him with ships. As Westlake astutely remarked, "When Timoleon sailed for Sicily, he was no more than a commander of mercenaries, dispatched with the not very enthusiastic blessing of the Corinthians".³¹⁹ Moreover, the purpose of Timoleon's mission was left vague most probably because it was, indeed, a

vague one. The possibility of a Carthaginian War and the unsettled nature of Sicily as a whole meant that Corinth was able to send help without appearing to interfere in the domestic situation at Syracuse. This explains, in part, the sending of assistance in 346 B.C. when she had not done so in 358 B.C., but the actual reason for intervention at all must remain an enigma.³²⁰

But it did show that Corinth had the potential to aid exiles and was appealed to for help in that capacity. But with the exception of the Corinthian support in sending Timoleon, the mainland cities of Greece either supported (or at least recognised) the established government at Syracuse or took no active part in the internal politics of the place.

(iv) Carthage

In the case of Carthage, a distinction needs to be made between the effect of the presence or threat of Carthaginian power and actual real involvement by Carthage in Syracusan politics.³²¹

Her principal concern in the first half of the Fourth Century B.C., as in the Fifth, was the protection of her interests in the western half of Sicily. Admittedly the invasion that resulted in the destruction of Selinus and Himera in 410/409 B.C. showed an increased aggression, but after that aggression, Hannibal returned to Carthage and disbanded his large army. It was only after Hermocrates' incursions into Carthaginian territory that Carthage launched a further expedition into the Greek sector of the island and destroyed Acragas and Gela. The various subsequent wars conducted by Dionysius I against Carthage only resulted in changes in the border between the Carthaginians and the Greeks, and after the conclusion of the war begun in 383 B.C.³²² when Carthage gained Selinus, Heraclea Minoa, Thermae as well as that portion of Acragantine territory west of the River Halycus, the resulting situation which left one-third of the island to Carthage remained stable, with the exception of short-lived changes, for a century.

More important was the effect the presence of Carthage had on the Syracusan political atmosphere. The Syracusan generals of 406 B.C. were accused of treachery (*προδοσία*)³²³ due to their failure at Acragas, a charge which Dionysius capitalized on by having the generals deposed. Likewise he spread rumours about supposed collusion between his own colleagues and Carthage.³²⁴ Despite the vagueness of these allegations and the absence of tangible proof, the prevailing mood was sufficiently electric and the faith of the Syracusans in the patriotism of their leaders sufficiently low for Dionysius to be elected *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ*.

Such tactics could of course be used against Dionysius himself and there were various rumours that he was in collaboration with the Carthaginians and that he did not wish to end the wars with them since it enabled him to retain his command. Such suspicions came to a climax in 396 B.C. when Theodorus accused Dionysius of deliberately prolonging the war and of avoiding decisive action.³²⁵ There is no need to believe Theodorus' words, but they serve to illustrate the extent to which the question of Carthage could be used for political purposes. In this instance Dionysius was powerful enough to withstand the charges, but in the time of Dionysius II, Dion was not so fortunate. Dion was exiled on the pretext of collusion with Carthage, for he "had written to the Carthaginian officials, urging them, whenever they should treat with Dionysius for peace, not to hold their interview without including him, since he would help them to arrange everything securely".³²⁶ According to Timaeus, as reported by Plutarch, Dion was then accused of conspiracy (*συνομοσία*) with the Carthaginians and sent from Sicily.³²⁷ Dion was certainly on friendly terms with the Carthaginians since he had been diplomatic ambassador to them under Dionysius I and had presumably continued in that office under Dionysius II. But to make Dion's offer evidence of treason seems exaggerated. The real motive for his exile must be found elsewhere,³²⁸ but his connection with Carthage was thought to be a reasonable excuse for that exile.

On his return to Sicily, Dion landed at Heraclea Minoa and was received by the Carthaginian commander who was a guest-friend of his.³²⁹ The policy of Carthage at this time is clear. Though she gave no real active support, she gave moral support, for the commander allowed Dion to march through his territory and was prepared to arrange for Dion's surplus armour to be sent after him.³³⁰

During the first half of the Fourth Century B.C., then, Carthage did not actively involve herself in Greek politics, but her presence was used by Syracusan politicians in the furtherance of their own interests. After Dionysius II's first expulsion much of the Dionysian empire collapsed and the Greek cities became truly independent, although many fell prey to one or other of the military adventurers who set themselves up as tyrants by force. Carthage was again not involved, but as Warmington noted, "the way was open for Carthage in the following generations to intervene in the internal affairs of the Siceliot cities at the request of Greek politicians".³³¹ The key feature to note is that it was 'at the request of the Greek politicians'. For what became a new policy on the part of Carthage seems not so much a change on the part of Carthage as a readiness to utilize the opportunities offered to them by the Greeks. The Greeks themselves no longer felt the hesitancy of using Carthaginian support that had been prevalent in the Fifth and early Fourth Centuries B.C.

Hicetas was the first to actively bring the Carthaginians into the arena of Syracusan civil disturbances. This he did in c. 346 B.C. for support in his attempt to wrest Syracuse from Dionysius II. The sources are contradictory about the initiator of the alliance between the two. According to Plutarch, Hicetas had been secretly negotiating with the Carthaginians while ostensibly supporting the appeal made by the exiles to Corinth.³³² In the account of Diodorus, it was the Carthaginians who approached Hicetas.³³³ Despite Plutarch's bias against Hicetas as yet another foil for the "good" Timoleon, I am inclined to accept his account

in this instance since the initiative in the Syracusan campaign remained with Hicetas, the Carthaginians only coming in when asked to do so by him. For before Timoleon's arrival, while Hicetas besieged Dionysius II on Ortygia, he ordered (ἐκέλευεν) the Carthaginians to see that Timoleon did not land in Sicily.³³⁴

Carthaginian interest in the matter is difficult to ascertain. Talbert believed that it was probably since she feared that Timoleon might have some influence on the situation in Sicily and might therefore disrupt the plans that had been made with Hicetas.³³⁵ But as Westlake had remarked, "It is difficult to believe that the Carthaginians felt their interests to be seriously endangered by the despatch of an obscure Corinthian at the head of a few hundred mercenaries".³³⁶ But it was important to Hicetas and possibly the Carthaginians honoured their alliance with him since he had made certain concessions to them.

After Timoleon's successful arrival, Hicetas' alliance assumed more importance, but once again the initiative lay with him as to the extent with which he would use Carthaginian aid. In 343 B.C., after Dionysius II had come to some agreement with Timoleon, but before his departure to Corinth, Hicetas "found fault with himself because, when so large a force of the Carthaginians was at hand, he was using it in small detachments and secretly, as though he were ashamed of it he therefore called in Mago their general together with his whole armament".³³⁷ The result was the occupation of the Great Harbour by a huge Punic Fleet.³³⁸ But what must at best have been an uneasy coalition broke down, particularly due, it would seem, to the fraternisation between Hicetas' mercenaries and the mercenaries of Timoleon.³³⁹ This was a sufficient pretext for Mago who had "long wanted to go away", and his fleet departed, having accomplished nothing.³⁴⁰

The Carthaginians were no longer involved in Syracusan affairs and Timoleon was able to defeat Hicetas, once Hicetas had lost his Carthaginian support.³⁴¹ After the Battle of the River Crimisus, the Carthaginians were

more interested in forming coalitions of the tyrants of the Greek cities against Timoleon and a powerful Syracuse. These were led by Gisco and after some successes³⁴² peace was made with Timoleon.³⁴³

But the Carthaginians had now become a potential ally for discontented factions of Syracuse. The exact nature of their involvement in the disruptions that led to the rise of Agathocles is, however, difficult to assess since the principal source, Diodorus, is extremely compressed, the events being crammed into his narrative of 317 B.C. At the outset of the trouble, the Carthaginian general, Hamilcar, was prepared to use such forces as he already had in Sicily to aid the Syracusan oligarchs who had been expelled from Syracuse by the Syracusans.³⁴⁴ It was this coalition that must have led to the Syracusan election of the Corinthian general, Acestorides, who in an attempt to avoid *stasis* within Syracuse, exiled Agathocles³⁴⁵ who, because of his hostility toward the oligarchs, would have been a hindrance to any reconciliation between the Syracusans and the Carthaginian-backed oligarchs. Although Diodorus does not expressly say so, there is the strong implication that the ensuing peace made with the Carthaginians was made on the condition that the Syracusans received back their exiles.³⁴⁶

The power of Carthage had thus been the means of shifting the balance in the domestic affairs of Syracuse. Warmington suggested that Carthage preferred the oligarchs since they were less prone to war, at least in Sicily, since they had the most to lose by it.³⁴⁷ But if this were the Carthaginian preference it is difficult to reconcile with the alleged collusion between Hamilcar and Agathocles in 317 B.C. Agathocles, after his expulsion by Acestorides, had gathered together an army in the interior and "after he had become an object of dread, not only to his own fellow citizens but also to the Carthaginians, he was persuaded to return to his own city".³⁴⁸ Unfortunately, Diodorus does not mention who did the persuading. Moreover, Agathocles would hardly need to be persuaded to

return to Syracuse. What was more likely was that the Syracusans had to be persuaded to accept him back. I would suggest that Agathocles was granted some sort of immunity in return for which he took an oath not to do anything against the Syracusan people.³⁴⁹ The mediator between them would seem to have been Hamilcar.³⁵⁰ No doubt Hamilcar was wary lest the disruptions in the interior of Sicily spilled over into the Carthaginian section of the island. It must have been a similar concern which prompted him to act as mediator between Agathocles and the Greek cities in opposition to him in 314 B.C., an act for which he was later condemned by the Carthaginian government since the treaty concluded was favourable to Agathocles.³⁵¹

Hamilcar's motive, then, seems to have been to establish peaceful conditions both within Syracuse and throughout the rest of Sicily, and he consequently allied himself to whichever of the contending Syracusan factions helped him to secure that.³⁵² But by 314 B.C., Agathocles' power had become so strong that the Carthaginians condemned Hamilcar for his involvement with him.

Thereafter, the fear of Agathocles' power was sufficient to induce the Carthaginians to support those Syracusans in opposition to him. What the Carthaginians did not want was a strong Greek Sicily in opposition to them. Accordingly, when Deinocrates, in 312 B.C. appealed for aid³⁵³ they first responded with a show of strength with such ships as they already had in Sicily³⁵⁴ and then followed this with the launching of the full scale operation of 311 B.C.³⁵⁵ Deinocrates and the Carthaginians co-operated until 309 B.C. when, on the death of the Carthaginian commander, the two armies separated.³⁵⁶ After Agathocles made peace with the Carthaginians in 306 B.C.,³⁵⁷ they took little interest in Syracuse until after his death in 289 B.C. when dissensions in Syracuse again saw them acting as mediators.³⁵⁸

On the whole, Carthage showed little interest in Syracusan politics, but in the second half of the Fourth Century B.C. responded when assistance

was requested, preferring however to act as mediator, except when a particularly strong leader threatened their interests. In such a case, she formed a coalition with Syracusan exiles and other Greek cities who were also opposed to Syracusan control.

Thus, while outside powers did not actively promote *στάσις*, they were sometimes prepared to capitalize on it should it arise. The whole situation was somewhat circular, for because they responded at all, subversive elements were more ready to show their hand.

CHAPTER THREE : POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND THE ROLE OF THE LEADER IN SYRACUSE,
415 - 305 B.C.

Civil disturbances and revolts, however seemingly necessary, were difficult to carry out successfully. This leads one to the conclusion that people only resorted to such methods of change when less violent avenues of change were denied them. Coupled with this was the belief that the government was failing to satisfy the needs of those who resorted to violence. Thus, although the impetus of revolutionary behaviour lay with the revolutionaries, part of the responsibility for the revolutionary situation and the outbreak of active conflict must be found in the performance of the particular government of the time.

One would expect that such a failure in government was the result of an inability to cope with some environmental change, but this was not necessarily the fundamental basis in a politically conscious community such as the Greek World. In fact, Aristotle saw that a fundamental basis for the desire of men for change lay in the view of how men thought their community ought to be governed. Of course, men's political awareness of such facts may in itself be the result of environmental factors. The different views of equality and inequality were such that a government that catered for such differences could not be achieved except where there were no distinctions in wealth and social standing. Where these distinctions were present, as they were in the Greek World, there arose a feeling on the part of a section of the community that they did not have a share in the government in accordance with the fundamental assumption that they held on equality, one section believing in numerical equality, the other in equality according to worth.¹

Thus, no matter what the political system adopted in the Greek polis, it held within it the seeds of instability, for its acceptance depended on one's viewpoint. But the mere existence of such a condition

need not have led directly to change : the two different attitudes could have existed in a state of healthy conflict by stimulating new ideas instead of being mutually destructive. If the existing government, albeit based on the viewpoint of a section of the population, satisfied the needs of those with a different viewpoint, as the tyranny of Dionysius I successfully did, then the opponents had no need to resort to a change of government to gain their ends, except where political ideology was felt to be a strong principle and this was rare. Opposition was usually based on the feeling that the existing government was not catering for all the needs of the community.

Such a situation provided, given the right conditions, a basis upon which factions arose and factional conflict occurred. That they occurred at one specific time and not at another was the result of specific conditions that highlighted the underlying differences in the community and gave rise to the desire for conflict. Among the seven principal causes of civil strife given by Aristotle,² gain, honour and insolence were all based in a failure in management on the part of the rulers, and excessive prominence, fear and contempt were a failure on the part of the government in its relationship with those whom it ruled.

This failure of the rulers reveals the fact that the power system depended on the willingness of the society to entrust the running of the government to those who were in charge. As Aristotle pointed out, "The point is that if the constitution is to have a good prospect of maintaining itself, it must be such that all sections of the community accept it and want it to go on".³ Thus the success of the government was dependent on the extent to which it could satisfy the needs of the community and keep the confidence of those it governed. In practice, this meant the ability to act (or appear to act) on behalf of the diverse sections of the population, those who were rich, the poor, those with oligarchic sentiments and those who favoured democracy.

While this was true of most Greek cities, the problem was more acute in Syracuse in the Fourth Century B.C. since there was no firmly established nobility and the wealthy or distinguished families did not have the weight of historical tradition on which to base their claim to superiority. Hence, also, the lack of claim on the part of revolutionaries to be restoring the ancestral constitution.⁴ The problem was further aggravated by the phenomenon, established by the tyrants of the Fifth Century B.C. of transferring huge masses of the Sicilian population from one place to another.⁵ This, together with the greater extension of citizenship created instabilities not experienced in Greece Proper.

With such a diverse population the tendency existed to look for a strong, single commander, either in the belief that he would solve the underlying problems created by such a population, or when the threat of a Carthaginian war necessitated a general in whom the people had confidence. On the psychological level, a single ruler was a person to whom all sections of the population, regardless of their origins, could look with esteem and respect. The personality of the leader was therefore important if he were to maintain his position.

But although there was a fundamental need for a powerful head, in opposition to this was the fact that such elevations were either extraordinary or extraconstitutional and were usually resented because of this. There was a basic weakness in the constitution since it could neither prevent the rise of the single ruler nor provide an adequate legal basis for his power.

Diversity of the Population

As Alcibiades mentioned in his speech in 416 B.C. advocating the Sicilian expedition, "The Sicilian cities have swollen populations made out of all sorts of mixtures and there are constant changes and rearrangements in the citizen bodies".⁶ Alcibiades, of course, was arguing that the

Sicilians would not therefore be very zealous in the defence of their cities, a mistake as it happened, and though his information was largely coloured by the transplantations of the first half of the Fifth Century, in 423 B.C. the powerful citizens of Leontini had been incorporated as citizens of Syracuse.⁷ Although they subsequently left, such a movement could not but have had unsettling effects.

By playing on the division between the rich and the poor, a division which existed despite the increased democratic nature of Syracuse after the defeat of the Athenians, Dionysius succeeded in gaining power. Once in power, he not only redistributed the land, giving allotments to the poorer citizens, but also enrolled as citizens some of the manumitted slaves.⁸ It would seem that he created a new class system, albeit with a strong military flavour, the common citizens being given a sense of equality beneath the superstructure of military control. It was this new system that led to the temporary opposition to him in 404 B.C. on the part of the people of Syracuse, who promised citizenship to such of Dionysius' mercenaries as would join them.⁹ Dionysius had little trouble regaining control and then sought the goodwill of the people with his programme of fortifying Syracuse.¹⁰

A further objection against Dionysius I was raised in 396 B.C., this time to the fact that Dionysius had given "the wives of the banished in marriage to slaves and to a motley throng" together with the fact that "he put the weapons of the citizens in the hands of barbarians and foreigners".¹¹ The first complaint was no doubt a reference of Dionysius' extension of the citizenship and his inclusion of some slaves in that extension. What he had in effect done was break down the exclusiveness of citizenship and, by marriage arrangements, dispel the barrier between old and new citizens.

In the second case, although he had not given the mercenaries citizenship,¹² since he had disarmed the citizens and relied largely on the

use of mercenaries for the defence of the city, he undermined the position of the citizens. For the citizens' claim to political privilege rested largely on the fact that they were able to defend the city, the oligarchs favouring the view that since the wealthy were able to afford to furnish the cavalry, triremes and hoplite armour they should rule, and the democrats believing that since they manned the navy they should also have political rights. In fact the increased democracy in the time of Diocles was the consequence of the fact that the Syracusan navy had played a major part in the defeat of the Athenians.¹³

Dionysius I continued his policy of increasing the population of Syracuse by infusing new blood into it, the inhabitants of Caulonia and Hipponium being moved there in 389 and 388 B.C. respectively.¹⁴ The cosmopolitan nature of Syracuse and the lack of cohesion under a central leader was the cause of the successful take-over by Callippus once the people had lost confidence in Dion. Plutarch, commenting on Callippus' plot noted that Callippus was encouraged by the fact that many of Dion's friends had been killed by war, that since Heracleides' death the Syracusans were without a leader, and that Callippus himself was in favour with Dion's soldiers.¹⁵

After Dion's death, Syracuse was controlled by successive rulers who were supported by their mercenary forces, the citizen population having no say in the matter until the exiles at Leontini appealed to Corinth in 346 B.C. In general, the population at Syracuse had become seriously depleted. Together with many of the Greek Sicilian cities, the city was destitute of inhabitants and the country districts neglected and uncultivated.¹⁶ The general poverty of the time was evident in the problems Timoleon faced in paying his mercenaries. Some he sent into the Carthaginian zone on a plundering expedition,¹⁷ others deserted before the battle at the River Crimissus partly because of lack of pay,¹⁸ and apart from allowing three days for collecting booty after the victory, he left his mercenaries to plunder

the region again.¹⁹ In Syracuse itself, money was gained by reselling the houses and the sale of public statues.²⁰

The Syracuse that Timoleon took over in 343 B.C. "had not citizens enough, since some had perished in wars and seditions while others had gone into exile from tyrannical governments".²¹ Many it would seem had sought refuge in the garrisons around the country, once the strongholds of Dionysius II, but now either neglected or in the hands of Timoleon.²² In fact, although the population was believed to have exceeded one hundred thousand at the death of Dionysius I, it had dropped to a figure scarcely above ten thousand.²³ Because of this Timoleon undertook a programme of colonisation.

At first the colonisation programme was not particularly successful for the larger number of colonists must have arrived after the conclusion of peace with Carthage in 339 B.C. In the initial stage it would seem that five thousand went from Corinth, including the Syracusan exiles, followed by another five thousand which would give Plutarch's figure of ten thousand.²⁴ The Corinthians aided the return of the exiles by providing transports, convoys and leaders. Furthermore, the discrepancy between Diodorus and Plutarch on the time of the proclamation for colonists can, I believe, be resolved by placing the proclamation for the exiles on Timoleon's gaining Syracuse, but the general proclamation to all Greeks, after the Battle at the River Crimissus, when reconstruction of the area was beginning.²⁵

The appeal was more successful in Sicily and Italy which together contributed fifty thousand settlers, making a total of sixty thousand.²⁶ Not only was Syracuse itself repopulated but also the outlying areas. Centuripae was probably settled, for its inhabitants were granted Syracusan citizenship when it was freed from local tyrants,²⁷ as was Agrigum which received ten thousand settlers.²⁸ The towns of Aetna (which had been rid of the Campanian mercenaries), Adranum, Centuripae, Enna and Morgantina (presumably in the area) all issued coins and enjoyed prosperity at this

time.²⁹ The support which they subsequently gave to Agathocles suggests that they contained a large number of immigrants hostile to the Syracusan nobles.³⁰

"Since all the colonists were apparently given Syracusan citizenship, whether settled at Syracuse or elsewhere, the Symatheus basin was now largely peopled by citizens of Syracuse."³¹ Timoleon also transferred the people of Leontini to Syracuse and presumably sent new settlers and Syracusans there since the place continued to exist.³² Additional settlers were also sent to Camarina.³³ This trend was carried out throughout Sicily, Acragas and Gela being repopulated with people from Velia.³⁴

The new settlers recultivated the land and a surplus obviously began to amass for trade resumed.³⁵ To confirm this new prosperity Diodorus mentioned the building programme at Syracuse.³⁶ In fact one of the advantages of this new influx of colonists must have been the great deal of money brought in by them which served to boost the economy.

But this infusing of new blood was not without its problems. Not only was the population of a very mixed nature but it was also spread over a large area with the result that most of those who nominally belonged to the Syracusan assembly lived too far away to have been able to attend meetings except on rare occasions. Significantly, Timoleon's funeral was delayed a few days to enable those in the countryside to attend.³⁷ Thus the assembly at Syracuse must have been an unrepresentative body, dominated by those in Syracuse for there does not appear to have been any regional representation.

This lack of regional representation was a factor upon which Agathocles capitalised in his rise to power. The men of Morgantina and other cities of the interior supported him since they were "unceasingly hostile to the Six Hundred who had been members of the oligarchy in Syracuse and hated the populace in general because they were forced to carry out its orders".³⁸ Thus, Timoleon's colonisation programme and the

infusion of new elements into the community, while promoting economic progress, did not successfully create stability.

The Role of the Single Leader

With such a diverse population the trend existed to look to the outstanding man who seemed able to co-ordinate the diverse interests. The unsettled nature of the Syracusan concept of leadership is seen in the nature of their office of the Board of Generals. What little we do know of this office indicates a lack of established numbers, the numbers fluctuating from time to time.³⁹ Given this lack of tradition surrounding the Board there was a tendency to entrust command, especially when an emergency situation arose, to a single commander rather than the collective body of generals.

At the time of the Athenian expedition this practice was already apparent. The normal number of generals at that time was fifteen, but in the summer of 415 B.C., after some Athenian successes, Hermocrates counselled limiting the number of generals and giving them unrestricted power, while the assembly was to swear an oath to them.⁴⁰ In the interest of increased military efficiency he removed the necessity to consult the assembly on matters of strategy. The number chosen was three, possibly as a safeguard against one commander assuming too much power. The three chosen were Sicanus, Heracleides and Hermocrates⁴¹ and they took office at the end of the term of the regular generals.⁴² The assembly, however, still retained the right to prolong their appointment or dismiss them, for in the following summer of 414 B.C., after further lack of success, attributed in part to bad luck, but also to a suspicion of betrayal on the part of the generals (a groundless one it would seem) it deposed the generals and chose another three.⁴³

This general distrust continued despite the Syracusan victory over the Athenians, for Hermocrates and his colleagues, on the pretext of their

lack of success in the Aegean⁴⁴ were banished at the instigation of Hermocrates' then political rival, Diocles. Such changes were obviously not conducive to consistent military strategy and what was badly needed was an outstanding general who could maintain power despite opposition and was not subject to the continual pressure of maintaining office.

This problem of strong centralised control was temporarily solved during the Athenian invasion by the arrival of Gylippus from Sparta. Gylippus had the prestige of Sparta to support his role as leader and since his appointment had nothing to do with Syracusan politics his command was not subject to annual renewal by the Syracusans and he was able to co-ordinate the Syracusan forces unhampered. Since he did not owe his position to popularity among the Syracusans he could, and did, enforce discipline. His extraordinary position gave him respect since he was obviously free from self-interest in Syracusan politics and from any suspected collusion with the Athenians.

However, Gylippus' actual position was never clearly defined. Alcibiades had advised the Spartans to send a general who would not only be in charge of the Spartan contingent but would take over command of all the Syracusans and their allies, something which appears to have been particularly necessary since the Syracusan generals were having difficulty in gaining the full support of the Syracusan populace in the war effort.⁴⁵ Although Thucydides' words are ambiguous as to whether he was sent in command of the force from Greece or as a commander for the Syracusans,⁴⁶ when he joined forces with the Syracusans in Sicily he immediately acted as supreme commander and was accepted as such.⁴⁷ It was not necessary to confer an official Syracusan office upon him. His position was purely military, being the co-ordinator of the armed forces. He was quickly able to organise the Syracusan defences and prevent the blockade of Syracuse, so that, despite minor reverses in battle, he was still respected.

Thereafter, as Gomme pointed out, Gylippus was in charge of the land

forces while the Syracusans controlled the naval action and as "the Syracusans gained confidence in their fleet, and the combination of military and naval operations became increasingly important, the authority of Gylippus diminished and by the time of the final defeat, the retreating Athenians were harried by 'the Syracusans and Gylippus'".⁴⁸ In the accounts of the treatment of the captured Athenian generals and other prisoners Gylippus was subordinate to the decision of the Syracusan assembly, but was able to voice his opinion.⁴⁹

No matter what the exact nature of Gylippus' position in Sicily he was able, in the first instance, to co-ordinate the Syracusan forces without opposition and he remained a focal point throughout the campaign both for his military skill and for his ability to uplift the morale and confidence of the Syracusans. As Plutarch remarked, "that the whole achievement of deliverance was his, is the testimony not only of Thucydides, but also of Philistus, who was a Syracusan and an eyewitness of the events".⁵⁰

Throughout the Fourth Century B.C., with the exception of the years 337-317, Syracusan history was dominated by the individual leader. This was done either by the seizure of power and maintaining of it unconstitutionally or by the appointment of an extraordinary command. In the latter area, Timoleon's appointment was both similar to that of Gylippus and significantly different from it. It was similar in that he was an outsider appointed by a city in Greece, in this case Corinth, to help co-ordinate the Syracusans, but it was different in that his mission was not at the request of the government of Syracuse but was in response to an appeal from exiles. More importantly, at some time in Syracuse he must have been made an official Syracusan officer as distinct from a Corinthian aiding the Syracusans, and his sphere of operation was not limited to the military field.

When the exiles of Syracuse appealed to Corinth for help in 346 B.C.⁵¹ the Corinthians voted to send help and looked for a commander.

According to Diodorus the exiles actually asked for "as general, a man who would administer their city and curb the ambitions of those who aimed to become tyrants".⁵² Timoleon was chosen, his chief quality being his supposed hatred of tyranny.⁵³ Exactly what orders were given to Timoleon we do not know, and Corinth would not have been able to impose a general on the Syracusans, particularly in response to exiles. Plutarch emphasized the democratic nature of both Corinth and Timoleon in order to attempt to give the impression that Timoleon was a popular choice, thereby concealing the fact that he was an unconstitutional, revolutionary leader at the head of a motley mercenary force when he first arrived in Sicily. As Talbert noted, "Until Dionysius had actually fallen, Timoleon can have had no legally justifiable position in Sicily; yet the confusion and disorder which prevailed in the island naturally made a legal justification of his presence quite unnecessary".⁵⁴

The fact that Diodorus mentioned that Timoleon retired in 337/336 B.C., after having been a general for eight years, has been used by some scholars to assert that Timoleon must have been appointed an official position in Corinth, Kahrstedt⁵⁵ believing he was made *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ*, "Huttl⁵⁶ and Berve⁵⁷ opting for the ordinary position of general. But surely Diodorus' comment can be taken to mean no more than 'having commanded troops' and as Talbert stressed, the claim that it meant 'having been a general of Corinth' is rather farfetched.⁵⁸

Indeed, there is no evidence that Timoleon held a Corinthian office when he went to Syracuse. Corinth reaped some benefits from the expedition, particularly since Timoleon needed an agent to help with his colonisation programme and to send, in the first instance, military reinforcements, and later, experienced legislators, but as far as we know, the political links between Corinth and Syracuse remained as loose both during and after Timoleon's time as they had been before the expedition.

However, it does seem likely that Timoleon held an office at

Syracuse for part of his career. Plutarch's statement about Demaentus' accusation implied that Timoleon held a Syracusan office, and that he did hold one seems the only reasonable way of explaining how he effected a number of somewhat autocratic measures outside the military field. He is mentioned as having enlarged the citizen body, brought in new colonists, divided the land, organised the sale of all Syracusan property and transplanted the population of Leontini.⁵⁹ These were measures effected by a man with a great deal of authority, certainly more than that of a plain military command. If Timoleon had merely led troops he need not have held a Syracusan office, but could have acted in a similar capacity to that of Gylippus. But his sweeping civil measures can only have been carried out with official Syracusan authority.

I would maintain that further evidence of Timoleon's having held office can be found in the fact that so much is made of his resignation. As Plutarch mentioned, "he laid down office and command when he had overthrown the unlawful rulers".⁶⁰ We do not know whether Timoleon was elected first for a year and then re-elected annually or whether he was elected for an undefined period. Again, the fact that he resigned would suggest the latter. The time of gaining his position would have been on the liberation of Syracuse, when a representative assembly could have taken place to effect the election⁶¹ and when, by his demolition of Ortygia, he had shown his disinterestedness.⁶² Before this, the Syracusans could not but have regarded Timoleon's position with suspicion for he may well have been just another of those adventurers from the mainland that had come to Sicily from time to time in the last fifty or so years.⁶³

Even after laying down his official position, Timoleon's opinion was still sought and his advice adhered to.⁶⁴ It would seem then that he also had Syracusan citizenship since that was a prerequisite for holding Syracusan office. Not only did he attend the assembly and speak in it but he was also attacked in it over his conduct as general.⁶⁵ That he was

referred to as Corinthian in the honorary decree passed after his death need not be significant; for even if he had become a citizen of Syracuse, he would still have been thought of by all as Corinthian for that was where he was born and had spent the greater part of his life. Furthermore, it was possible to hold citizenship of more than one place.

The general diplomacy and tact of Timoleon as a leader was such that the Syracusans passed a decree that in the event of a war with foreigners (as distinct from with other Greek cities) the Syracusans would request a general from Corinth.⁶⁶ This was no doubt an attempt to deal with the problem of the successful military general who was able, having been granted extraordinary powers, to seize the government. The only time we know of the decree having been used was in 317 B.C. when Syracuse was at war with Carthage and Acestorides, the Corinthian, was elected general at Syracuse.⁶⁷ This safeguard was not, however, successful because Agathocles was able to rise to power through his own military skill.

The use of an extraordinary office in order to gain power was the key feature in Dionysius' rise. In 406 B.C. the problem of the co-ordination of the Syracusan army became imminent⁶⁸ and Dionysius I accused the generals of incompetence in the defence of Acragas and supposed collusion with the Carthaginians.⁶⁹ He was successful because "the people, which for some time past had hated the generals for what they considered to be their bad conduct of the war and at the moment was spurred on by what was being said to them, immediately dismissed some of them from office and chose other generals, among whom was Dionysius, who enjoyed the reputation of having shown unusual bravery in battles against the Carthaginians and was admired by the Syracusans".⁷⁰

Thus the successful commander needed both military skill and popularity. Due to this popularity, together with the blackening of his colleagues' characters, Dionysius I succeeded in having himself elected *στρατηγὸς ἀποκράτωρ*.⁷¹ The ease with which he achieved his aim reveals

the extent to which the faith of the Syracusans was invested in the individual rather than the collective group. By doubling the pay of the mercenaries, acquiring a bodyguard and establishing himself on Ortygia, Dionysius placed himself in a relatively unassailable position, a position he confirmed in the treaty with Carthage in 405 B.C. in which it was stipulated that the Syracusans were to be subject to him.⁷² This was a cunning piece of strategy. Dionysius had been elected to a supreme position as the result of the need to deal with the war with the Carthaginians. Once peace was made the reason for his elevation would have been removed. What Dionysius succeeded in doing by means of the treaty was to imply that peace was only possible if the Syracusans continued to accept his overlordship.

Dionysius' success illustrates the potential in a military situation for one man to stand out from his colleagues and subvert the constitution. The prestige he gained was sufficient to enable Dionysius II to assume control unopposed. When opposition to Dionysius II did occur it was again centralised in the personality of the individual.

At the end of the Fourth Century B.C., despite the revised constitution of Timoleon, Agathocles rose to power in a similar way as had Dionysius at the end of the Fifth. But in this instance, it was not the threat of Carthage that resulted in Agathocles being granted an extraordinary position, but rather as a result of the *stasis* in Syracuse itself. Agathocles, under the patronage of the wealthy Syracusan, Damas, whose widow he married on that man's death, had gained renown as a military commander, particularly after the Syracusan expedition to aid Croton in c. 320 B.C.⁷³ It would seem, as Tillyard pointed out, that "his chief hopes in these early years were for glory in war, and he was fortunate in finding a patron who could help him, for on the whole it would seem that the ruling oligarchy stood for the cause of the old burgess of Syracuse as against such newcomers as Agathocles".⁷⁴

When he was refused preferment he retired to Italy, acting first as a mercenary at Tarentum and then leading the exiles who aided Rhegium against an attack by Sosistratus and Heracleides.⁷⁵ The thwarting of the ambition of Agathocles by the oligarchs, due to their exclusiveness and selfishness was politically short-sighted in the extreme for it created the situation where a capable (and as later events proved, popular) commander in opposition to them.

After the oligarchic group at Syracuse was expelled, Agathocles was recalled and was foremost in the military operations against the exiles who were being supported by the Carthaginians. It was probably fear of this growing ascendancy that led to the Corinthian Acestorides, who had been elected general,⁷⁶ forcing Agathocles to leave the city. When peace was made with Carthage, Syracuse received the exiles back,⁷⁷ possibly in accordance with a provision in the treaty. Since Agathocles had raised a formidable army in the interior, he also was allowed to return, provided he took an oath to undertake nothing against the democracy.⁷⁸ He was subsequently made general and 'protector of the peace' until harmony in the city was established.⁷⁹ Thus his dictatorship was limited and he appears to have had colleagues in office with him since he made the point later that he would not accept office if he were to be hampered by colleagues. Agathocles was, however, able to enrol whatever men he chose and for a supposed campaign against Erbita he enlisted all those who were most likely to favour his designs.⁸⁰ With such a body he effected a bloody revolution and purged the city of all those with oligarchic sympathies.⁸¹ In the ensuing assembly he was elected *στρατηγὸς ἀντοκράτωρ*.⁸² Agathocles, like Dionysius, succeeded because of his military strength and his popularity as a result of supporting the lower classes against the wealthy.

But it was one thing to gain power and another thing to keep it. The successful leader needed to retain the loyalty of his troops, secure the allegiance of capable advisers and subordinates, secure the goodwill of

the people so that they wished him to continue in command, and reconcile or deal with any opposition.

(a) The Leader of Mercenaries

Dionysius I's strength had been based on his mercenaries. In his rise he had been generous with their pay and they had stood in support of him against the people.⁸³ He used them in the first instance as part of his bodyguard, secondly for garrison duty in the places he annexed,⁸⁴ and thirdly for the pursuit of aggressive warfare either against Carthage or throughout Sicily and Italy. Where disloyalty was apparent he was quick to act, either by placing them foremost in battle⁸⁵ or, as in the most serious opposition led by Aristoteles, by settling them with land in lieu of pay.⁸⁶ In general, Dionysius was a capable leader of mercenaries and was successful in his handling of them. In this he set the tone for the Fourth Century B.C. in Sicily. For, if the successful commander needed mercenaries, it was also true that they needed him to be sure of secure employment.

By the middle of the Fourth Century B.C. the mercenaries had become a serious problem, both in Greece itself and in Sicily in particular, where there was the added problem that many were non-Greeks, which led to Plato's assertion that the island was becoming barbarized.⁸⁷ Such a diverse group needed particular skill to be successfully organised. Moreover, Greece seems to have got rid of its unwanted mercenaries by sending them westward.

This was evident in the force that left with Timoleon, some of whom were the mercenaries who had taken part in the Phocian sack of Delphi.⁸⁸ Plutarch maintained that he took these men in the absence of more suitable recruits, but this could hardly be the case for Timoleon sought troops after the Peace of Philocrates in 346 B.C. Isocrates, writing shortly after this peace, made it clear that there existed in Greece a dangerously high number of men willing to become mercenaries.⁸⁹ Therefore, if Timoleon had offered the usual low wage of the time,⁹⁰ he should have had no

difficulty in recruiting a force at a time when the supply exceeded the demand. Thus, either he did not offer a sufficient wage, or less disreputable mercenaries doubted his chances of success, or the Phocians were approached to conveniently get them out of Greece. Most likely it was a combination of these three factors, the lack of pay being offset by the prospect of booty. In Timoleon's time we hear that Phalaecus took his mercenaries, who could find no employment because they had plundered Delphi, from Corinth toward Sicily and Italy.⁹¹

Timoleon arrived at Tauromenium with a thousand mercenaries⁹² and when Dionysius II surrendered Ortygia he picked up a further two thousand.⁹³ This was supplemented by a further two thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry sent as reinforcements from Corinth.⁹⁴ At the battle at the River Crimisus he also incorporated the forces of Hicetas in his army. To manage such a large body of men with different backgrounds required skill as a commander and the ability to pay.

His skill as a commander was evidenced by his success on the island, but in the field of pay he was not quite so successful. After the capture of Syracuse a thousand men were sent into the Carthaginian zone for plunder⁹⁵ and his only major trouble before the battle at the River Crimisus was largely due to arrears in pay.⁹⁶ Timoleon swiftly sent the rebellious mercenaries back to Syracuse to collect their pay. Similarly, where there was superstition among the troops he skilfully turned it around to his own advantage.⁹⁷

It was essential to hold the soldiers by the strength of one's personality, for the mercenary had little interest in any specific cause, something which was borne out by the fraternisation between the mercenaries of Timoleon and those of Hicetas at the siege of Syracuse.⁹⁸

The allegiance of the mercenaries was particularly necessary in the event of an unsuccessful campaign. Callippus, after he had lost Syracuse, was later killed by some of his own mercenaries. The commander was apt to

be betrayed by his mercenaries if they felt that service to him no longer held the prospect of secure employment or bountiful rewards. Thus, the mercenaries of Hicetas handed him over to Timoleon in c. 339 B.C.⁹⁹ and those of Mamercus of Catana, a little later, deserted and handed the place to Timoleon.¹⁰⁰ In both these cases it was not Timoleon's cause that motivated the mercenaries, but rather the fact that he had been so successful that they felt that their respective commanders faced imminent defeat in any case.

A greater problem for the leader was the control of mercenaries in the absence of war. Dionysius II had trouble in this area since he neither had the expansionist policy of his father, nor did he resort to temple looting so that he was hard pressed to pay his soldiers. To offset this he tried to reduce the wages of the older mercenaries¹⁰¹ but they rebelled in their own interests and the attempt was unsuccessful. What they also did was to make it quite clear that whether Dionysius seriously wanted to resign the tyranny or not, as they believed Plato was inducing him to do, they were not prepared to allow it since it would have meant unemployment for them.¹⁰² Nevertheless, having the security of the settlement on Ortygia, they served him faithfully against Dion until Dionysius' son, Apollocrates was forced to surrender them to Dion and abandon the place because they had become mutinous through lack of food.¹⁰³

Dion also had trouble in controlling his mercenaries, but in his case it seems to have been his personality rather than lack of security that caused their disaffection. Although they had stood behind him when the Syracusans had refused to pay them after his first entry in Syracuse,¹⁰⁴ and saved the city after the counter attack of Dionysius II's forces,¹⁰⁵ they became alienated from him after the surrender of Ortygia. Thus, despite the land grants they received,¹⁰⁶ many aided in his assassination.¹⁰⁷

Timoleon was more successful in his handling of mercenaries after his campaigns had ceased. How he did this is largely a matter of

conjecture. It is possible that he used citizen levies after the battle of the River Crimisus in order to decrease the number of mercenaries. As Parke suggested he may also have granted land to those mercenaries who wished to remain in Sicily after their discharge.¹⁰⁸ It was certainly imperative that the large number of men should be expelled or given the land and security to become citizens. If they had been allowed to remain on the island without the means of earning a livelihood, they would have turned to brigandage or to supporting mercenary leaders in their seizure of Sicilian towns, as had happened in the years after Dion's death. Also, Demaretus and Deinarchus may well have taken a force back to Greece for both are heard of as serving with Philip and Alexander.¹⁰⁹

But whatever methods Timoleon used, he succeeded in disbanding the huge mercenary forces, thereby removing the instability that such forces created. The next trouble we hear of in Sicily came from internal political conflicts and on that occasion Agathocles re-established a large mercenary force.

(b) The Allegiance of Capable Advisers and Subordinates

As well as being successful and popular himself, the single ruler also needed to have capable and faithful advisers, particularly when they commanded part of the army. A rebellious general could seriously threaten the position of the ruler. At the outset therefore, the leader strove to become *στρατηγὸς ἀποκράτωρ* and to be independent of any colleagues. Thus, Dionysius I, having achieved that position, then changed the commands of the military posts so that they were in the hands of his most faithful followers.¹¹⁰ Likewise, Agathocles insisted that if he were to be *στρατηγὸς ἀποκράτωρ* he would not accept the position if he had to work with colleagues "for he would not consent as one member of the board to be held legally responsible for acts illegally committed by the others".¹¹¹ This, of course, was a legal quibble. Not all generals were deposed because of the actions of some of them. It is clear from the account of

Hermocrates' exile that only some of the generals were exiled and after Dionysius I's first attack on the generals, the people only dismissed some of them.¹¹² Obviously, then some still retained their position despite Dionysius' harangue.¹¹³ There is no evidence that this situation changed throughout the Fourth Century B.C. and Agathocles' stipulation must be seen as a means of obtaining sole command and of being able to choose his own subordinates.

Not only tyrants, but their opponents also were careful about their colleagues and subordinates. Timoleon had a free hand in his selection of subordinates and he used capable mercenary leaders. As Talbert commented, "Despite the sources' lack of interest in Timoleon's subordinates it is clear that he had excellent lieutenants, either sent out to him (like Deinarchus and Demaretus) or presumably selected by him...."¹¹⁴ In the cases where the commanders were sent to him he still retained the right, no doubt, to retain them or dismiss them if they were incompetent. His position was, however, exceptional, for as an outside liberator of Syracuse he was able to select his officers independent of any Syracusan elections.

Dion had not had such an unrestricted scope, for having been elected *στρατηγὸς ἀποκρίτωρ*, together with his brother and twenty subordinates,¹¹⁵ his supremacy was later undermined when the Assembly chose Heracleides as admiral.¹¹⁶ Dion opposed the election on the ground that it was contrary to his own position and made it quite clear that he wished to retain the right to approve of the appointment of any subordinates.¹¹⁷ From the military point of view his opposition was justified since the subsequent rivalry between himself and Heracleides seriously endangered the concerted campaign against Dionysius II.

When firmly established in power, tyrants made sure that their chief ministers and commanders were men whom they could trust. Their trust was gained either by substantial gifts of land or by kinship ties. In the case of land grants, Dionysius I distributed the best Syracusan land to his

friends and high officers and established other friends and some mercenaries in the dwellings on Ortygia.¹¹⁸

More common, however, was the practice of securing loyalty by family connections. Dionysius made use of his brothers, Leptines and Thearides as well as his brother-in-law, Polyxenus.¹¹⁹ Agathocles followed a similar policy. He left his brother, Antander, in charge of Syracuse when he campaigned in Africa,¹²⁰ and left his son in charge of the African army when he returned to Sicily.¹²¹

But when such advisers were disaffected or suspected of disaffection they posed a problem. Unless they were undoubtedly guilty of treason their death would create further trouble. The more usual solution was the verdict of exile, but this gave rise to the possibility that the exile would return and try to reinstate himself by force. In Dionysius' time, Philistus remained surprisingly loyal when in exile, but another friend, Heloris, who had been one of Dionysius' advisers when he was besieged by the Syracusans in 404 B.C.,¹²² after being banished, led the forces of the Crotonians and Rhegians when they were fighting against Dionysius.¹²³ Fortunately, these were external wars and Heloris' activity was confined to Italy and did not affect the internal situation at Syracuse.

Dionysius II was not so successful in gaining or controlling capable advisers. Having recalled Philistus, he was faced with the rivalry between Philistus and his friends and Dion and his group. In fact, Philistus' friends had advocated his recall for the purpose of counteracting Dion's influence.¹²⁴ Had Dionysius II been a stronger ruler he could have suppressed the rivalry or turned it to his own advantage, but since he was inexperienced he was heavily dependent on his advisers. Thus the potential existed for the advisers to wield more power than the leader and hence rivalry for the chief position of influence was intense.

Dion had apparently made his intentions quite clear from the outset. According to both Nepos and Plutarch, he had wished to confer with

Dionysius I about dividing the kingdom among Aristomaches' children, even though Dionysius II was the eldest son.¹²⁵ On the failure of that attempt he then tried to gain ascendancy in two ways. Firstly, he sent for Plato in an attempt to influence Dionysius II by philosophy,¹²⁶ and secondly he offered to use his wealth and position to settle the war with Carthage.¹²⁷ It was this ascendancy which created envy and hatred among the other advisers and led to Dion's exile. What is clear about Dion's early career is the extent to which he was prepared to support tyranny so long as his own influence was assured.¹²⁸

When Dion returned from exile to fight Dionysius, Dionysius did have loyal subordinates, but after the death of Philistus they do not seem to have been particularly capable. Timocrates had already failed to hold the fortress on Epipolae and had lost the rest of the city as well; and Apollocrates, although reinforced by mercenaries under Nypsius, was forced to abandon Ortygia.

(c) Gaining the Goodwill of the People

As well as leading mercenaries, having loyal subordinates and capable advisers, the leader had to gain and retain the goodwill of the people as a whole. There is a degree of difficulty in assessing the extent of acceptance of the individual leader by the masses due to the bias in the sources. The sources believed that tyranny was bad and that therefore the people resented it. Conversely, Timoleon, since he expelled tyrants from Sicily was accorded lavish praise and written of as though he were a popular choice. Nevertheless, it is obvious that both Dionysius I and Agathocles were particularly successful in gaining the confidence of the people. Both set themselves up as champions of the democratic cause in opposition to oppressive oligarchic control, falsely in Dionysius' case, but with some degree of justice on the part of Agathocles.

In the case of Dionysius I, even before he gained sole power he was popular, partly through his military skill and partly as a result of his

denunciation of the wealthy and renowned citizens. He knew how the people felt and "by suiting every word of his harangue to the people to the predilection of his hearers and his own personal design, stirred the anger of the assembly to no small degree".¹²⁹ Having gained their confidence, he was able to persuade it to recall the exiles,¹³⁰ dismiss his colleagues and elect him to sole command.¹³¹ Thereafter, the assembly continued to meet, giving the appearance that the democracy was still intact, but Dionysius had assumed for himself the right to convene it. He made it appear as though the people made the decisions, and in the case of war or peace they still retained that right. This was particularly necessary if he were to have the support of the people in the event of war. Thus, when planning the war against Carthage in c. 398 B.C., he called an assembly of the Syracusans and urged them to make war on the Carthaginians.¹³² The ultimate decision, and hence the responsibility, for the war thereby lay with the people.

The power of the Assembly was one of the features of Timoleon's reformed constitution. Throughout his Sicilian career he had been careful to win the support of the people. His demolition of the fortress on Ortygia, his redistribution of land and his colonisation programme were all actions which gained the confidence of the people.

Precise knowledge of Timoleon's constitution is, however, limited. The ancient sources regarded it as a 'democratia',¹³³ and they give instances of decisions being taken by the assembly. Apparently every Syracusan citizen could attend, including the newly arrived settlers.¹³⁴ The Assembly had participated in the auctioning of the statues,¹³⁵ had punished the wives, daughters and friends of Hicetas,¹³⁶ condemned Mamercus,¹³⁷ had voted that Syracuse should always employ a Corinthian general against people of another race,¹³⁸ and had passed the decree granting Timoleon posthumous honours.¹³⁹ It had a certain freedom of action as can be gauged by the attacks of the two popular leaders,

Laphystius and Demaenetus.¹⁴⁰ Their accusations indicate that not all sections of the populace were completely satisfied with Timoleon's constitutional arrangement. But his success reveals that a greater number were than were not.

At the time of Agathocles, the Assembly appointed him chiliarch¹⁴¹ and elected generals.¹⁴² Agathocles denounced his opponents in the assembly¹⁴³ and summoned it after his seizure of power.¹⁴⁴ Since the Assembly had the right of electing generals before the tyranny of the Dionysii and had it again in Agathocles' time, presumably they regained it under Timoleon.

But the fact that the constitution was described as democratic and that decrees were made in the assembly does not necessarily mean that real power lay in that body for, as Finley noted, popular assemblies had continued to meet under the tyrants.¹⁴⁵ It had operated under the Dionysii and not only did they have the right to convene it but they also exercised the right to dissolve it should it be troublesome.¹⁴⁶ Just how free the Assembly was in the time of Timoleon is difficult to assess. As Talbert remarked, "Plutarch's enthusiasm for Timoleon, combined with the latter's undoubted attempts to remove all signs of tyranny at Syracuse has created the misleading impression in the Life that Timoleon was a convinced democrat".¹⁴⁷ Timoleon himself, for example, continued to enjoy widespread civil and military powers until his resignation in 337 B.C.

What Timoleon did do was to gain the support of the people for the actions he undertook. In the constitutional area these seem to have been done in two stages. Plutarch mentioned the reforms as having taken place after the capture of all Syracuse and before the battle at the River Crimissus and stated that Cephalus and Dionysius, simply termed lawgivers, had come from Corinth to help in the work.¹⁴⁸ Diodorus, however, placed one set of laws just after the capture of Syracuse in 343/342 B.C. and a further set some time after the battle at the River Crimissus.¹⁴⁹ Cephalus

arrived for the second set, to preside over and set right or amend the laws.

After the capture of Syracuse and Dionysius' departure, it is obvious that some constitutional arrangement would have been necessary, but with the threat of Carthage still imminent this must have been somewhat makeshift. Talbert suggested that it may well have been at this stage that the democratic constitution mentioned by both Plutarch and Diodorus was proclaimed.¹⁵⁰ Such a measure would have brought immense support and would also have provided a means for the official election of Timoleon to some Syracusan office.

Accepting this supposition, Cephalus and Dionysius would have been summoned to make the temporary constitution more secure. Talbert believed that they were called from Corinth because of the historical link between the two places and added the point that they would be sympathetic to oligarchy.¹⁵¹ This may well be the case, but I would stress that the primary reason for outside legislators was to remove this sphere of work from the Syracusans in order to avoid the possibility of any self interest on the part of any Syracusan legislators. The logical place to look for such persons was Corinth.¹⁵² Although the proposed method of acquiring them was quite different, the need for a disinterested set of law givers was one of the principal recommendations of Plato's Seventh Letter.¹⁵³

This second set of laws would be particularly necessary with the influx of new citizens which would only have reached its maximum after the defeat of the Carthaginians.¹⁵⁴ In this set of laws, Timoleon was mentioned as definitely drawing largely on the laws of Diocles. Much controversy has ranged about both the nature of those laws and the role of Cephalus, particularly in view of Diodorus' statement that Cephalus was not a law giver but an interpreter of the law "since men found the laws of Diocles, written as they were in an ancient style, difficult to understand".¹⁵⁵

Some scholars have therefore asserted that the Diocles meant is an

otherwise unknown lawgiver of archaic times.¹⁵⁶ This requires a great deal of explanation as to why such a set of laws were never mentioned in earlier contexts in any of the extant sources. In view of the professed democratic basis of Timoleon's legislation it would seem likely that the Diocles to whom Diodorus referred was the Diocles who was a leader after the Athenian expedition. The reforms made at that time were merely said to have been more democratic¹⁵⁷ and hence much of the original legislation, in whatever wording it existed, must have been retained. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assert that, in the absence of use for sixty years, the laws, many of which would have been expressed in conventional legal usage, would have presented some difficulty. It was sufficiently difficult at least to justify Timoleon calling in a person who was ostensibly regarded as an interpreter of the laws but who in fact may well have reformed some of them. In this way Timoleon avoided incurring the resentment that Dion had incurred when he tried to bring in outside legislators.¹⁵⁸

Thus, in his reconstruction of Syracuse and its constitution, Timoleon used tact and diplomacy, thereby retaining the goodwill of the people that he had gained when he first captured Syracuse. Timoleon's character and prestige were such that even after his resignation, and in part as a result of it, the people were prepared to willingly follow his advice. He had gained that prestige from his success in dealing with tyrants (a military prestige in fact) and from his fairness in dealing with the internal situation.

The tyrants were no less careful to gain the people's confidence. Dionysius I, although he had successfully gained it through his military skill, ran the risk of losing it when he maintained his absolute position. On the two occasions when the people did challenge his position he showed moderation after he was victorious. After the uprising of 404 B.C., when the people were disorganised and fleeing, "not many of them, however were slain, since Dionysius, riding among his men, stopped them from killing the

fugitives".¹⁵⁹ Those who returned to Syracuse after the rebellion he also treated kindly.¹⁶⁰ Similarly, after the agitation of 396 B.C., Dionysius pursued a policy of winning the people with gifts and public banquets.¹⁶¹

Throughout his career, Dionysius showed moderation and according to Nepos was "free from licentiousness, extravagance and avarice, in a word, from all passions except that for absolute and permanent dominion".¹⁶² Instead he campaigned against Carthage, strongly fortified the city, and cultivated Syracuse as a centre of art and learning. Thus he won favour with the populace, and this was further increased by the fact that many were new citizens whose only real association with Syracuse was the fact that Dionysius had put them there.

Agathocles similarly courted the favour of the masses. After his attack on the wealthy in 317 B.C., he "showed himself affable to the common people and won no slight popularity by aiding many, by encouraging no small number with promises, and by currying favour from all with philanthropic words".¹⁶³ He was also careful not to offend the Syracusan sense of freedom, allowing the assembly to still meet and assuming none of the trappings of absolute power, not even a bodyguard.¹⁶⁴ During the Fourth Century B.C., in terms of popular appeal, Hipparinus, due to drunkenness, and Nysaeus, due to the assumption of regal habits and licentious practices, were singularly lacking.¹⁶⁵ But they only seem to have held Ortygia and were thus very much apart from the people with whom they had very little contact.

In the absence of military skill, tact and personality, the leader was liable to lose the favour of the people and they were then prepared to support revolutions against him. When Dionysius II assumed control he did so unopposed but he was careful to have his position acknowledged by an assembly of the people. His appeal is difficult to assess since again the sources were biased and made much of his reversal of fortune and the moral lesson to be derived therefrom.¹⁶⁶ Despite this moralizing tendency it

does seem evident that Dionysius lost contact with the people since they were prepared to join Dion against him.

Not that there was any really specific charge against him apart from the rather general one of an oppressive tyranny. In the first instance it would appear that he did not mingle with the people and win them by the strength of his personality as his father had done, but then neither did he mistreat them.¹⁶⁷ He seems to have done nothing at all, for although he encouraged philosophy and learning, the people in general gained very little from this. This would not have mattered if he had secured their goodwill in the area they did understand, military success. Personal popularity still depended largely on military prowess. But Dionysius II had no popular military campaigns and his policy in general was non-aggressive and non-imperialistic, other than insofar as securing the territory that his father had gained.

In a similar manner, Dion, although at first popular, lost that popularity when he failed to fulfill what he had ostensibly maintained was his purpose in opposing Dionysius II. When he first returned the rural people were prepared to support him, despite the fact that they were unarmed.¹⁶⁸ The people in the city must also have been under suspicion of favouring Dion for we hear that Dionysius' commander, Timocrates, "took steps to prevent disturbances in the city".¹⁶⁹ What these measures were we do not know but they were obviously ineffective. Not only did Timocrates lose the city and the fortress on Epipolae¹⁷⁰ but was unable to break through to the garrison on Ortygia and fled in consequence.

Timocrates' failure illustrates the problem of control without the willing support of the people, in the absence of a large standing army. Dionysius' main forces were in Italy at that time¹⁷¹ and it would seem that the skeleton garrison was sufficient to keep the unarmed Syracusans in check, but not so Dion's mercenaries supported by the people. With widespread Syracusan support, the capture of Syracuse with the exception of

Ortygia, and a small but effective mercenary force, Dion was in a favourable position.

However, he failed to retain that position, due largely to his failure to retain the goodwill of the people. Because of his past associations and relationships with tyrants he was held in suspicion. With correct handling this could have been overcome. But with the arrival of Heracleides and the subsequent rivalry between the two men; a rivalry which culminated in the murder of Heracleides; Dion became alienated from the people.

Dion made the mistake of appearing very much like a tyrant himself. He retained a bodyguard, employed mercenaries, used undercover agents and kept control over the elections. The two most immediate issues that led to his final downfall were the failure to demolish Ortygia (the visual representation of tyrannical power) and his sending to Corinth for governmental help without the consent of the people. The fact that the second issue was held against him whereas fifteen years later Timoleon succeeded with a similar proposal points to the difference between the two men. Timoleon was careful to court the people's favour. He did demolish the fortifications on Ortygia and he was tactful in his use of Corinthian legislators.

Dion however, remained aloof from the people, acting on his own initiative and presenting the people with decisions after those decisions had been made. As Plato had advised him, "do you also bear in mind that you are thought by some to be unduly wanting in affability, so do not forget that successful action depends on pleasing people, whereas arrogance is next neighbour to isolation".¹⁷² Whether this particular advice was actually given to Dion by Plato or was written at some later time, it is indicative of the sort of warning that could have been given by an astute political person. Dion's failure to heed such advice resulted in alienation at first, and then assassination.¹⁷³

Thus the successful Syracusan leaders in the Fourth Century were those who could combine military expertise with the ability to win the confidence of the people, either by the strength of their personality or by initiating what the Syracusans believed to be fair and just measures. When the people lost confidence in the government they either agitated against it or, more usually, readily supported other leaders against it.

(d) The Ability to Deal with Opposition

Incidents of *stasis* and *stirres* from subordinate commanders, relations or the people as a whole, although disruptive, were not totally disastrous if the government was strong enough to deal with them. The ability to suppress any opposition was vital to the leader's continued success.

At the outset of their careers, Dionysius and Agathocles both forcibly removed those who were opposed to them. Dionysius I arranged it so that his chief opponents, Daphnaeus and Demarchus were condemned¹⁷⁴ and he was quick to use force against the uprising of the cavalry in 405 B.C.¹⁷⁵ and of the people in 404 B.C.,¹⁷⁶ albeit moderately in the latter cases. Thereafter he pursued a policy of reconciliation in Syracuse, merely directing his attention against dissident exiles at Aetna and elsewhere. As Diodorus remarked about him on the occasion of his double marriage in 398 B.C., "he now renounced the oppressive aspect of his tyranny, and changing to a course of equitable dealing, he ruled over his subjects in more humane fashion, no more putting them to death or banishing them, as had been his practice".¹⁷⁷

Agathocles was even more ruthless in his approach. After he had been made 'protector of the peace' in 317 B.C.¹⁷⁸ and had acquired an army of his own choosing, he summoned Diocles and Peisarchus, the men regarded as leaders of the Six Hundred, and had them and their forty friends killed.¹⁷⁹ After that he engaged in the mass slaughter of the wealthy and renowned citizens with the result that, according to Diodorus, four

thousand were killed and a further six thousand fled into exile.¹⁸⁰ Although Diodorus' numbers may well be exaggerated, it is obvious that Agathocles removed the bulk of any opposition, a precaution he further strengthened by lodging accusations in the Assembly against those who had some role in the Six Hundred. His method, although ruthless, was effective for the alternative of exile always created the possibility that the exile would return as Hermocrates and Dion had done and challenge the leaders' position. Both Dionysius I and Agathocles were concerned with those places which gave refuge to exiles, hence Dionysius' campaigns in Italy, especially against Rhegium, and Agathocles' problems with Acragas.

Apart from the active use of force, other security measures could be taken. The principal one was the establishment of fortresses as Dionysius did throughout Sicily. Chief among these, of course, was the fortress on Ortygia at Syracuse. Having established himself there, Dionysius, "perceiving that the Island was the strongest section of the city and could be easily defended, divided it from the rest of the city by an expansive wall and in this he set high towers at close intervals He also constructed on the Island, at great expense, a fortified acropolis as a place of refuge in case of immediate need, and within its walls he enclosed the dockyards which are connected with the small harbour".¹⁸¹ He further strengthened his position by building a second wall across the acropolis.¹⁸² It was there that he established a vast arsenal of weapons,¹⁸³ including those which he had confiscated from the Syracusans.¹⁸⁴ The fortress remained a central point for the leader's forces until it was demolished by Timoleon in 343 B.C.

From Ortygia troops could be sent against rebellious Syracusans. In 404 B.C. it formed a rallying point for Dionysius I. His newly acquired Campanian mercenaries were able to force their way through to him and a further three hundred mercenaries were brought to him by sea.¹⁸⁵ So too, Dionysius II's commander was able to sally forth into Syracuse from the

fortress and wreak destruction on the Syracusans after they had dismissed Dion and his mercenaries.¹⁸⁶ As well as a centre from which to send forces, its close proximity to the rest of Syracuse allowed the ruler to maintain an aura of authority. Although virtually impenetrable, it could be besieged as it was by Dion's forces when they starved Apollocrates into surrender, or it could be attacked from the sea with a sufficiently large force, which Dionysius II must have done when he wrested the place from Nysaeus in 346 B.C.

The general impenetrable nature of Ortygia raises the problem of why Dionysius II finally surrendered to Timoleon in 343 B.C. The surrender was obviously negotiated on the part of Dionysius as is evident by the lenient treatment of him later. But what could have induced him to surrender? As Westlake commented, it would have been uncharacteristic of him to surrender after the Battle of Adranum. The circumstances of his earlier life do not show him to have been a coward, whatever the hostile sources may say of him. When he had left in 356/355 B.C. he had taken the trouble to dispatch a mercenary force to help his son and it was only lack of supplies that had induced his son to surrender.¹⁸⁷

There is no reason why he should have abandoned the place. It is possible that news from Locri discouraged him, but it is not quite clear when that occurred.¹⁸⁸ He may have suffered from shortage of food, but the blockade was not strict until the Punic fleet arrived, and even then Plutarch had Dionysius slip out and four hundred men slip in despite the blockade. Moreover, Dionysius certainly possessed ships with which he could arrange to have supplies brought in. In any case, there does not seem to have been an acute shortage of food until the year after Adranum.¹⁸⁹

The times of Dionysius' surrender given by Plutarch and Diodorus are both suspect. Plutarch claimed that it occurred immediately after the Battle of Adranum.¹⁹⁰ This is highly improbable. Timoleon had won only one victory, he was far from Syracuse, possessed small forces at the time

and very few allies; whereas Dionysius had the means of gaining food, two thousand mercenaries and the stronghold of Ortygia. He could have withstood a siege or sailed away, either of which policies would have been safer than trusting Timoleon, of whom he knew very little at this stage. Similarly, Diodorus' assertion that Dionysius was frightened into surrendering once Timoleon had taken over Syracuse from Hicetas is incomprehensible.¹⁹¹ All that had in effect happened was that the city had changed masters from Hicetas to Timoleon. Dionysius' position on Ortygia was in no way affected by the change.

The most likely time for Dionysius to negotiate with Timoleon was when Hicetas appealed for formidable reinforcements from the Carthaginians.¹⁹² Dionysius must have then realized that he faced the prospect of being more overwhelmingly blockaded by sea as well as being besieged by land. In anticipation of this, and in return for aid and supplies coming into Ortygia, Dionysius must have agreed to admit Timoleon's forces, especially since Timoleon had by then gained Mamercus of Catana as an ally. It was from Catana that food was slipped into Ortygia.¹⁹³ Thus, Dionysius came to some agreement with Timoleon because his situation on Ortygia was becoming extremely dangerous, particularly as he had no allies in Sicily or, after the Locrians had rebelled, in Italy either. He could not therefore depend on importing a regular supply of food.

Timoleon would have gained from such an agreement also. Although he had defeated Hicetas at Adranum, to defeat Hicetas when supported by the Carthaginians was another matter. He also, no doubt, proclaimed that Dionysius surrendered to allay any suspicions on the part of his Sicilian allies that he was in collusion with the tyrant. I would also postulate that Dionysius did not slip through to Timoleon's camp, as Plutarch believed,¹⁹⁴ but remained on Ortygia until Timoleon's capture of the whole of Syracuse in 343 B.C. This reconstruction removes the problem of explaining why Dionysius would be so stupid as to go to Timoleon's camp on

trust when he was far safer on Ortygia and of how Timoleon could explain the continued presence of Dionysius in his camp, for Dionysius certainly did not go to Corinth until 343 B.C.¹⁹⁵

The combined action of Timoleon and Dionysius would also explain why Hicetas, after the Carthaginians left, withdrew from Syracuse with only token fighting. A token fight further explains the contradiction in Plutarch when he said that Hicetas was willing to hold the parts of Syracuse in his possession but, on the other hand, that Hicetas was quickly put to flight and that none of Timoleon's forces were wounded or killed.¹⁹⁶

With Timoleon's capture of Syracuse and Dionysius' departure, the stronghold on Ortygia was demolished. Dionysius had been forced to compromise his position due to his lack of allies.¹⁹⁷ He was therefore unable to deal with the many forces opposing him except by coming to terms with one of them.

But by far the best method of dealing with opposition, once in power, was to try to avoid it. This could be achieved at two levels. At the most rudimentary level was the ability to detect and deal with discontent before it became widespread. For this reason, both Dionysii as well as Dion used a secret service. It was the use of this service that helped to create the many stories about Dionysius I's attempts to discover plots,¹⁹⁸ his fears for his own safety and the precautions he took in that area.¹⁹⁹

On the broader level was the use of tact and diplomacy to appease people and make them willing to accept single rule. Dionysius, after he had established his tyranny was careful to use discretion. Timoleon was particularly successful in dealing with people, showing political astuteness when he agreed that those who opposed him should feel free to express that opposition through the proper channels.²⁰⁰ But it must be noted that he died shortly after his resignation²⁰¹ and we have no means of knowing how long the Syracusans would have been prepared to accept his advice so willingly.

Thus the successful leader needed to retain military control, have faithful and loyal subordinates, win the confidence of the people, and be capable of dealing with any opposition. In this way he could retain power by the strength of his personality. But no matter how successful the individual was in these areas, the basic problem still existed that the single ruler's position was extraordinary or unconstitutional and was, at times, deeply resented as such.

Constitutional Difficulties

The major problem in this area was the failure of the constitution to provide for the phenomenon of the successful leader. There was no effective way of opposing a successful general backed by military forces, nor was there a clearly defined and regular position for him.²⁰²

After the Syracusan defeat of the Athenians, the constitution became more democratic. But the Assembly was at the mercy of the persuasive speaker. The way lay open for the leader who could convince the people that he was working in their interests. This Dionysius I was able to do by playing on their fear and distrust of the regular generals, in the face of the threat of Carthage. As Plato remarked in a letter ostensibly written to counsel the followers of Dion in 353 B.C., the Syracusans at the time of Dionysius fell under the rule of despots due to their 'unmeasured love of freedom'.²⁰³

This was indeed what occurred, for on the strength of a military failure (a failure not due to negligence or betrayal), and on the basis of unsubstantiated rumours, the populace was prepared to dismiss their generals and elect Dionysius *στρατηγὸς ἀποκράτωρ*. This was a dangerous procedure and Diodorus remarked that some later regretted the action, once the emotion of the moment was no longer felt.²⁰⁴ It was further complicated by the fact that there was no means of making the general lay down his extraordinary position. Thus Dionysius I and Agathocles, once in power, retained their positions irrespective of the wishes of the people.

In the case of Dionysius, it cannot be determined for certain whether the position was originally held for an indefinite period, or whether the election was for one year, to be reviewed annually.²⁰⁵ But even if the latter were the case, the ratification was only a formality as was obvious in the assembly that Dionysius II spoke before, after the death of his father. Since both Dionysii had a large mercenary force, the people would have realized the uselessness of voting them out of office.

The case of the rule of Dion and Megacles, which merely filled a gap until proper elections were held, was an exceptional one. In their case, they were not re-elected when the elections were held.²⁰⁶ It was only after the failure of the regular generals to counteract the forces of Nypsius that Dion was called in to help the Syracusans again. After being victorious, "Heracleides came forward with a motion that Dion should be chosen general with absolute powers by land and sea". The people agreed, on the condition that Heracleides retain the position of admiral, since he was "altogether more a man of the people than Dion and more under the control of the multitude".²⁰⁷

Usually, however, there was no time limit on such positions since the position was created to meet an emergency situation of indefinite duration. As Westlake commented, "Since unscrupulous dictators, such as Dionysius, were able to prolong their tenure of office indefinitely, no constitutional means of terminating a dictatorship appears to have existed, and the dictator was probably expected to lay down his office as soon as his special task was accomplished".²⁰⁸ Dionysius' continuance in the position was a point seized upon by Theodorus in 396 B.C. when he concluded his harangue with the proposition that "if he is willing to lay down office of his own accord, let us allow him to leave the city with his possessions; but if he does not choose to do so, we have at the present moment the fairest opportunity to assert our freedom".²⁰⁹

The opportunity to which Theodorus referred was the fact that the

Syracusans had their weapons. It is therefore obvious that Dionysius could not be removed by constitutional means, especially since he had the power to dissolve the Assembly. Moreover, he had force to secure his position. In contrast, Dion retained his position when he was no longer acceptable, without protecting himself adequately against the anger which retaining his position incurred. Timoleon, on the other hand, resigned his position when his command was fulfilled, but there is no indication that he was under any constitutional obligation to do so.

In general, however, when the Syracusans could see advantages gained by the rule of a capable commander, they accepted that rule. After 396 B.C., Dionysius I had no serious opposition. He was able to deal with Carthage, strengthen Syracuse and its hold over the rest of Sicily, and extend his influence into Southern Italy. This ascendancy of Syracuse, the result of Dionysius' policies, gave benefits to the Syracusans as a whole, and, in part, justified his continued position. In fact Dionysius succeeded in bringing to fruition what had been a trend in Syracusan foreign politics since the mid-Fifth Century B.C. In the latter half of the Fifth Century, Syracusan imperialist tendencies had become apparent. The defeat of Acragas in 445 B.C. was taken by Diodorus as marking the definite establishment of Syracusan hegemony in Sicily,²¹⁰ a hegemony acknowledged by all other cities. And it seems probable, in view of her subsequent actions, that she aimed at something more than hegemony.²¹¹

Such a policy required capable and respected generals. Under the democracy there was a general distrust of generals and hence the Syracusans were inclined to change their generals frequently, thereby not allowing any one general sufficient time to implement policy or co-ordinate military strategy. This, together with the conflict between rival families, enabled one person to rise above the others if he should get the support of the people. The situation is illustrative of Aristotle's comment that "the greatest number of tyrants have risen, it may be said, from being demagogues,

having won the people's confidence by slandering the nobles".²¹²

The same was true of the rise of Agathocles, but at that time the constitution seems to have been fluctuating between democracy and oligarchy. Whatever the constitutional arrangements made by Timoleon, and these included such democratic elements as the election of generals by the Assembly,²¹³ it is clear from Diodorus' account of the rise of Agathocles, that the sectional interests of the wealthy families had gained ascendancy, in either an unofficial capacity as part of the numerous clubs which strove to acquire key positions in the State for themselves, or by the establishment, for a short period of time, of the rule of Six Hundred.

Much discussion about the Six Hundred centres around whether it was a political club or a constitutional council.²¹⁴ But the main point is, surely, that the two are not incompatible. It was a more organised and larger group than the usual political clubs, and possibly consisted of a union of several clubs, one of which was that to which Heracleides and Sosistratus were attached. It would seem reasonable to assert that they were a club, but at the time when they seized power, they ruled as an oligarchy. For this reason, Diodorus remarked that when those around Sosistratus were expelled, many others were also expelled "on the ground that they had been members of the oligarchy of Six Hundred".²¹⁵

Further evidence that some oligarchy existed is seen in the fact that when these men were exiled and democracy resumed, a war arose between the exiles and the supporters of democracy, at which time Agathocles returned to Syracuse. After Agathocles' expulsion by Acestorides and his second return, Diodorus passed the comment that the various clubs were divided and "important differences existed, but the chief group opposed was the council of Six Hundred, which had directed the city in the time of the oligarchy".²¹⁶ This, I believe, indicates that they had been an oligarchic Council, but that after that, they once again existed as a club in opposition to both Agathocles and some other clubs. The fact that

Agathocles gained support from people who were hostile to both the Six Hundred and the democracy further illustrates the difference between the Six Hundred and any democratic Council that may have existed. It is also noteworthy that Agathocles, after the revolution of 317 B.C., called an Assembly and lodged the accusation that the Six Hundred had brought the oligarchy into existence.²¹⁷

What does emerge, despite the confusion of terminology, is the fact that the leading families were blind to the reality of the political situation. They obviously operated the constitution in their own interests and made no concessions to the people, particularly the poorer elements, nor did they conceive of anything like a system of reform that could have removed the sources of discontent. Because of their exclusiveness, Agathocles was able to rise to the position of tyrant with the claim that he was restoring democracy.²¹⁸ He was able to continue in power since he retained the confidence of the people (his executions were largely directed against the wealthy minority) and as a result of his military prowess against Carthage and throughout Sicily.

But on the advent of a weak or passive ruler, there was no constitutional safeguard to protect the position of the single ruler. Thus Dionysius II's policy of peace and non-imperialism lost him the favour of the masses and ultimately his position. On his first expulsion, there was, however, no constitutionally sound alternative as can be seen from the years of chaos that continued until Timoleon reorganized the constitution. But Timoleon was not able to solve the problem of the power of the successful general, nor the inclination of the Syracusans to entrust government to an individual.

The only executive position (apart from the military ones) instituted by Timoleon, on which we have information, was the Amhipolia of Olympian Zeus.²¹⁹ It is not clear whether he elevated an existing institution or created a new one. The office was held annually, the years

being dated by the office.²²⁰ The method of election was to decide by lot from candidates of three aristocratic families or classes, one candidate being chosen from each by popular vote.²²¹

This office may have been a concession to the upper classes, but it clearly held little authority. It was possibly instituted to conceal where the real power lay, for it was a position of glory rather than one of political power. The office remained into Roman times, a further indication that it had no potent political force and despite the three and a half centuries of its existence, none of the Amhipoloi made a mark on Syracusan history. As Westlake noted, "the silence can hardly be accidental, for at times of unrest, such as that which preceded the tyranny of Agathocles, the Amhipolos of the year would surely have taken some action to maintain the constitution, had his powers been more than formal."²²²

The Syracusans were not without some safeguards against the ascendancy of the single ruler, but these were ineffective. In the first instance they had recourse to fines against individuals who created an uproar in the Assembly. These the archon of the time had imposed on Dionysius I when he attacked the conduct of the generals.²²³ The move was unsuccessful since Philistus was wealthy enough to pay any amount of such fines that the archon might impose. There was obviously no provision for dismissing a troublemaker from the Assembly and the fact that they thought the imposition of a fine was a sufficient deterrent is probably indicative of the attitude that the demagogues who were most likely to stir up the Assembly were not from the wealthier classes and hence a fine would be sufficient to silence them.

Another safeguard was the threat of exile, but this tended to be a weapon in the hands of politicians for the removal of their rivals. It is noteworthy, however, that even after Hermocrates succeeded in discrediting his rival, Diocles, the Syracusans would not receive him back "since they were wary of the daring of the man and feared lest, once he had gained a

position of leadership, he should proclaim himself tyrant".²²⁴ But, of course, exile was only possible where the intentions of the individual were known or suspected beforehand. Once Dion had gained power in Syracuse, although the people suspected him of tyrannical intentions, they needed him and his forces to expel Dionysius II. Once he had established himself as *στρατηγὸς ἀποκράτωρ* and retained that position indefinitely, they were not in a position to exile him. Exile had the added problem that the person exiled would effect their return by force. Hermocrates, the exiles at Leontini who appealed to Timoleon, Dion and Agathocles had all tried to do this, with varying degrees of success.

The other attempted safeguard was to limit the office of general in a major campaign to a Corinthian. This decree was passed in view of Timoleon's honourable behaviour.²²⁵ It would appear that it was a modification of an earlier law, mentioned by Diodorus in Theodorus' speech against Dionysius when Theodorus claimed that "The chief command must be given, according to the laws, either to citizens, or to the Corinthians who dwell in our mother city, or to the Spartans who are the first power in Greece".²²⁶ Of the decree passed in Timoleon's time, we only hear of it having been used once when, during the factional strife that preceded Agathocles' dictatorship, Acestorides was elected general.²²⁷ Although he was able to temporarily check the disturbances by ordering Agathocles out of the city and effecting the recall of the other exiles, he was unable to prevent Agathocles' return since Agathocles had an independent military backing.

Thus, despite these various safeguards, single rulers were able to establish themselves in power and retain that power unconstitutionally. The lack of sufficient deterrents for revolutionaries was fatal in a community in which the nature of the government was a controversial issue. Without centralized forces, a government was unable to guarantee that the city was safe from insurrection. It was the ability to give that guarantee

that helps explain the prevalence of tyrants in Syracuse. Unlike oligarchies and democracies, they successfully maintained their position by the threat of or use of force.

But, the power of the tyrants of the Fourth Century B.C. was unconstitutional. This is evident from the bulk of the references to their position in the ancient sources. In the case of the two Dionysii, even if they were occasionally addressed as monarchs, they did not rule by virtue of monarchy as a constitutional position. Some scholars, by gathering together a few scattered references to the Dionysii as kings, have sought to maintain that the tyrants formally used the title of king. I will deal with the views of S.I. Oost since his article is the most recent to put forward this viewpoint.²²⁸

Oost considered that the best evidence for the use of the royal title is found in Lysias' speech against Andocides, where Lysias speculated that an acquittal for Andocides might lead to him being elected king archon.²²⁹ He then proceeded to point out that Andocides had flattered kings, but that Dionysius of Syracuse was not deceived by him. On the basis of this, Oost asserted that "we surely seem here to be dealing with an official and therefore religious title, not flattery or courtesy", and that we might well expect a remark that Dionysius was really only a tyrant, if in fact he did not bear the royal title.²³⁰ Oost believed that the implication was that the title was to be regarded in the traditional and sacred form of ancient Greek kingship.

Oost has failed, however, to acknowledge the essentially rhetorical nature of the work and therefore of the presentation of the information contained within it. He is right in his assertion that it was not flattery or courtesy, but this does not mean that it ought to be taken as official and religious. The point that Lysias was making was the extent to which Andocides was known in the Greek world and to illustrate this he mentioned his contact with autocratic rulers, loosely grouping the lot under the

title of *βασιλεύς*. Specific detail on this point was not relevant to Lysias' purpose and the distinction between tyrant and king unnecessary.

In fact, the grouping together of kings and tyrants as odious autocrats occurs elsewhere in Lysias. In his Olympic Oration he stressed the danger to Greece of the King of Persia and of Dionysius, referred to there as a tyrant.²³¹ The distinction was necessary in that instance since the invective was directed primarily against Dionysius, whose representatives were present at the games. Accordingly he pointed out Dionysius' unconstitutional position by referring to him as a tyrant.

If, as Oost believed, on the evidence of Oration VI, Dionysius I assumed the royal title before c. 399 B.C. when that speech was delivered,²³² then it is necessary for him to explain why Lysias referred to Dionysius as a tyrant in his Olympic Oration of 388 B.C., or how Dionysius came to lose the title at a time when his power was both more secure and more extensive. Furthermore, Oost's claim that the use of *βασιλεύς* implied a reference to the traditional concept of kingship is based on a juxtapositioning of this reference with that to the Athenian king-archon. But the king-archon was mentioned as a position to which the impious Andocides may be elected and the consequent horror of all Greeks who came to attend the mysteries if they were to find Andocides in that position. It was then necessary for Lysias to show that the rest of the Greek world knew who Andocides was and thus the mention of Dionysius must be seen in the latter context only.

One further speech by Lysias, the speech 'On the Property of Aristophanes', mentioned Dionysius and there he was merely referred to by name.²³³ I maintain, therefore, that very little weight ought to be placed on the varied and loose terminology of an orator. Moreover, if, as Oost believed, the Athenians were aware of Dionysius' position as king, it seems extraordinary that they did not use that title in their decrees concerning him.²³⁴ In those decrees it was the Athenians who wanted something from

Dionysius, not the reverse, so it is highly probable that they would have referred to him in the highest possible terms, and this would have been as a king, if it had been possible to do so.

What he was referred to as in the decrees was archon of Sicily. This would appear to be a stroke of diplomacy and an attempt to explain Dionysius' power throughout Sicily. There is no need to believe, as did Beloch, that this was proof that the title was hereditary.²³⁵ As Finley astutely commented, "Archon was a common title in Greek cities, among them Athens itself, designating the annually elected chief official, but the word also had the generic sense of 'ruler'".²³⁶ He also pointed out that Sicily was a geographical term and not a political one and for this reason the title should be seen as meaning the places over which Dionysius ruled, a phrase which is actually used in one of the treaties. This use of ἀρχή in the general sense of ruler also occurred in Diodorus. Theodorus, in his speech against Dionysius I urged that if Dionysius laid down his ἀρχή of his own free will, he ought to be allowed to leave the city, and Dionysius II was said to have tried to come to terms with Dion in 356 B.C. by offering him half his ἀρχή and then the whole of it. Another wide term used by Diodorus was δουρεία.²⁴⁰ This word also had the general meaning of holding power and did not denote an official position as such.

In the case of the Athenian decree of 368/367 B.C., in order to avoid the use of the word tyranny, yet make provision for the continuance of the treaty should Dionysius die, it was made binding to Dionysius' descendants as well. Dionysius' tyranny had by then been operative for thirty eight years, it was known to be strong, and it was likely therefore that it would pass to one or other of his relations on his death.²⁴¹ I see no reason why "it is natural to connect such a provision with royalty".²⁴² The only assumption that can be made is that it was assumed the Dionysius' rule would be hereditary, not that it was necessarily royal.

The other direct reference to Dionysius as a king occurs in

Polybius.²⁴³ Polybius noted that both Agathocles and Dionysius became tyrants of Syracuse and were officially recognized as kings of the whole of Sicily. But, as Oost himself recognized, Polybius was "more heated in his opinion than is ordinarily the case for he was engaged in polemical argumentation".²⁴⁴ In such instances, Polybius was certainly not free from error, and since he was praising these two men in contrast to the Egyptian Agathocles, his terminology was not meant to be precise, but rather illustrative. It is similar to his error when attacking Timaeus' alleged inaccuracy. At that point Polybius had Hermocrates take part in the Battle of Aegospotami and thus share in the Spartan defeat of the Athenians²⁴⁵ when in fact, not only had Hermocrates been deprived of his command in the Aegean in 410 B.C., but had been dead for some four years when that battle took place. So much for Polybius' accuracy when discussing his personal likes and dislikes.

Oost also referred to the references to the regal attire and equipage of Dionysius I and Dionysius II. He cited the example of Bato of Sinope who mentioned a diadem, the purple, and other equipment of Dionysius.²⁴⁶ However, he conveniently omitted the fact that the fragment, while mentioning such regalia, referred to Dionysius as a tyrant. Oost further mentioned the fragment of Duris.²⁴⁷ This fragment mentioned a long robe and a crown of gold, together with a buckled mantle usually worn by tragic actors. Given Dionysius' interest in the theatre, such dressing up need mean no more than a predilection for fine clothing, with, of course, the feeling of magnificence and glory that was attached to it. It is not mentioned that these things were official symbols of office and in any case, such regalia was common to both tyrants and kings. Moreover, the mention of such clothing had a didactic purpose. It was thought to be extravagant in itself and even more so for one who was not actually a king. Thus Diodorus thought it praiseworthy that Agathocles, before he was a king, "neither assumed the diadem, nor employed a bodyguard, nor affected a

haughty demeanour, as is the custom of almost all tyrants".²⁴⁸

A similar viewpoint can be adopted toward the mention of Dionysius' royal equipage by Diodorus²⁴⁹ and the royal chariot Plutarch mentioned as being put at Plato's disposal.²⁵⁰ In both cases the word βασιλικός need mean no more than courtly for tyrants, like monarchs, did have a court and the adjective was used to express the splendour, luxury and wealth of a court. To express such a concept, the authors could hardly say 'tyrannical equipment'. This, if it had any meaning at all, would be taken as referring to the tyrant's bodyguard and arsenal.

The word βασιλικός, therefore, is appropriate in context but does not necessarily imply royal in the monarchical sense. The reference of Diogenes the Cynic to Aristippus as being Dionysius' royal dog can be treated in the same way.²⁵¹ Furthermore, a comment made in an obviously satirical light can hardly have the weight of serious evidence. I have heard of the Prime Minister of Australia referred to as 'the little dictator', 'His Lordship' and even 'His Highness' in satirical pamphlets. Neither the authors of those pamphlets nor their readers would take any of such references to denote or indicate an official position.

Oost correctly noted that the Roman authors quite commonly referred to both Dionysii as 'rex' or used related words.²⁵² Quite reasonably, he also asserted that it strains credulity to believe that all such references derive from the favourable account of Philistus. Besides the fact that the word 'tyrannus' was also frequently used, the works of Cicero and Nepos were concerned with moral and ethical considerations and the word 'rex' had sufficiently odious connotations to the prevalent Republican sentiments to suit the authors' purposes at the time in which they wrote. The word was used, therefore, not with care toward constitutional precision, but rather to engender a feeling of disapproval. Justin, writing some three centuries later, was notoriously loose in his terminology and can hardly be used with reliability on such matters.

Against these scattered references, Plato, Aristotle, Diodorus and Plutarch constantly referred to the Dionysii as tyrants and their rule as a tyranny, or they merely mentioned them by name. Oost himself recognised that tyrant and tyranny were the common reference, but to illustrate the extent of those references I have listed them below.²⁵³ Polyaeus and Aelian, it might be noted, used similar terminology.²⁵⁴ The sheer body of evidence that the rule of the Dionysii was recognised as a tyranny should be sufficient to dispel Oost's theory.

Three minor points made by Oost also need to be considered. His assertion that Diodorus at XIV 66.1 said that no-one would compare Dionysius with Gelo may mean that such comparisons may well have been made, putting the two on more or less the same footing,²⁵⁵ has no weight as evidence of Dionysian royalty. Apart from the fact that the comparison is meaningless if Oost's claim for Gelo's royalty is not conceded, the words were put in the mouth of Theodorus who was being deliberately provocative. Moreover, if Oost's hypothetical comparisons had been made, they would most likely have been made on the basis that both Gelo and Dionysius were tyrants and both fought against the Carthaginians.

Oost's conjecture that Diodorus or his sources may have carefully expunged a number of references to Dionysius' royalty²⁵⁶ appears to me to be somewhat desperate. It arises from seeing more in the word βασιλικός than is actually meant, as I have discussed above. If such a line of argument is to be indulged in, one could accuse Plutarch, because of his reference to Timoleon's resignation from the μοναρχία of having expunged a number of references to Timoleon's monarchy, something no-one has seriously considered, since the context and narrative of Timoleon's career in Sicily make it clear that the word means sole command.

Thirdly, Oost found the appointment of Dion to στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτης²⁵⁸ odd, "if for half a century the power of tyrants had been expressed through this nominal office".²⁵⁹ I do not see why this should be odd at all. The

Dionysii had held office in defiance of the Syracusans, and I know of no other appropriate office to which Dion could have been elected by the Syracusans. The fact that the Dionysii had abused the position (as in fact Dion also did later), does not negate the validity or purpose of the office.

There is then, no real foundation for Oost's view that the Dionysii were recognised as kings as well as tyrants. The position of the Dionysii was unconstitutional. The major philosophers and historians alike regarded them as tyrants. Whatever the Dionysii may have said about themselves on occasions, and this in itself is undermined by Oost's own acknowledgement that politicians frequently lie,²⁶⁰ and however 'regal' their court, they were clearly not acknowledged as kings.

Similarly, Agathocles was regarded as a tyrant and held position by virtue of his military strength and the nominal position of *στρατηγός* *αὐτοκράτωρ* until c. 305 B.C. when, in imitation of the Hellenistic kings, he proclaimed himself king.²⁶¹ In contrast to Dionysius, Agathocles was recognised as such by other powers, and he used the title on the coins minted after his assumption of the kingship.²⁶² But the position was not made constitutional and after the murder of the younger Agathocles by Archagathus, Agathocles, just before his death, "declared that he restored to the people their self-government".²⁶³

In fact the whole problem of Syracusan politics in the Fourth Century B.C. was the bifurcation in attitude among the Syracusans toward the role of the single ruler. On the one hand, there was the deep rooted Greek fear of tyranny, and on the other, the Syracusan willingness to entrust the government to a general with full powers, as they did to Dionysius I, Dionysius II, Dion, Timoleon (probably), and Agathocles. Diodorus noticed this when he said that "more than anywhere else this tendency toward the rule of one man prevailed in Sicily before the Romans became rulers of that island".²⁶⁴ However, the continued ascendancy of each of these individuals was not given a corresponding constitutional legality.

CHAPTER FOUR : THE EFFECT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

In investigating the more general conditions that promoted revolutionary change it is necessary to distinguish between external and internal conditions. The major external condition that affected Syracuse in the period in question here was the existence or threat of war, principally with Carthage. The existence of war can be said to have caused revolutionary change insofar as a war produced precarious situations which made the internal decisions at Syracuse more crucial than they would otherwise have been. In such cases, decisions were often made in the light of the nearness of armed forces or as a result of the competence or incompetence of those in charge of the war effort. Thus, war provided occasions on which military ability was used as a political weapon. It was just such a weapon that Hermocrates used against Diocles, Dionysius used to obtain office, and Dion's opponents used to secure his exile.

But the support for the instigators on such occasions came from groups who were already prepared to support one group against another. What needs to be questioned is the reason for the existence of such sectionalism, for it was the existence of such rival groups that was a precondition of revolutionary change, irrespective of war or the possibility of one group obtaining outside assistance. It is this condition for revolutionary change which will be the main concern here.

The motives attributed to the revolutionaries by Aristotle and Thucydides were all based on inequalities.¹ The basis of those inequalities needs to be reviewed in the light of what the revolutionaries hoped to change and why they thought it necessary to resort to arms or the threat of them in order to achieve their ends.

On the simplest level, there were two factors - the two (or more) contending factions and the people as a whole, who might be initially ignored, but whose acceptance was necessary for any change to be effective. In all cases there was a belief on the part of the opposing factions that

they should rule and that they should have power. The existence of factions was a key feature in revolutionary change, for it was these factions who could use the people in a co-ordinated way.

These factions were split over the question of different political ideologies, or over who should be in control of a particular ideology. Where the conflict was within a particular ideology, it centred mainly around the personal desire for power and most truly reflects personal motivations. This was evident in the conflicts between rival groups in the court of Dionysius II and in the fights that occurred in the years between his expulsion and his return. Where the conflict was between different ideologies it had wider implications concerning the socio-economic basis of those who were to control the government. Insofar as groups maintained the right to leadership on the basis of socio-economic elitism, this can be said to have engendered revolutions in a century when socio-economic conditions were undergoing considerable change.

While the motivation of those who led revolutions was often of a personal kind, the support given to them by various sections of the population was usually given in response to socio-economic grievances. In this area there were two types of grievance. In the first instance, many revolutions were supported by those who wished to gain the political privileges which had been denied them because of their socio-economic status. The second type was a desire for a complete socio-economic change and was distinguished by the cry for abolition of debts, for redistribution of land and for economic-social equality.²

The General Socio-Economic Situation

While not being a prime motive for revolutionary change, the fact that sharp divisions in wealth and social standing existed could be used by revolutionaries as a basis upon which to gain support for their cause.

A. Fuks, in his various articles, argued that the consciousness of the division between wealth (πλοῦτος) and poverty (πενία) only became

really developed after the seventies of the Fourth Century B.C.³ In the sense that these concepts became more prominent as distinct concepts after that time, particularly through the rise of unemployment and the creation, on the Greek mainland, of large numbers of rootless people, many of whom sought relief through mercenary service, his comment was valid. But when he sought to differentiate, albeit with allowances for the difficulty of so doing, between politically and economically motivated revolutions, he seems to have under-estimated the economic and social basis of political attitudes in both the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.

In fact it was the existence of sharp social and economic divisions that enabled politicians to use the widening or lessening of the franchise as a political slogan. Statesmen were prepared to enlist an under-privileged group to their side if it enabled them to secure their political position.⁴ This is not to say that what the people believed they would get was what they actually did get, but the fact that they gave their support shows that they believed they would benefit from so doing. How illusionary this belief was will be dealt with later. What is important to note here is that throughout the Fifth Century B.C. the poor, often equated with the many, were prepared to support those who who promised political privileges in the hope that this would bring them other privileges and that an antagonism existed between the rich and the poor, although it was not often expressed as such, but rather in terms of the political concepts of oligarchy and democracy.

G.E.M. De Ste Croix noted this and his comments are worth quoting in full: "It is not legitimate to object that although the economic character of Greek party divisions is clear enough by Aristotle's time, the situation was not the same in the Fifth Century. In fact there is ample evidence to prove the existence of precisely the same general groupings, not only in the early Fourth Century, but also in the Fifth. Xenophon, for example, specifically opposes the terms *δημος* and *πλουσιώτεροι* and defines the demos

(whose rule is *δημοκρατία*) as *οἱ πένητες τῶν πολιτῶν* and in the brilliant little oligarchic pamphlet containing a fictitious conversation between Alcibiades and Pericles, incorporated in the *Memorabilia*, we find the ruling power in a democracy, *τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος*, opposed to (and conceived as tyrannising over) the owners of property. Similarly, the Oxyrhynchus historian, writing in the year 396, divides the Athenians into *οἱ ἐπιτεκτεῖς καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες* and *οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ δημοτικοί*. For the Fifth Century we have a contemporary pamphlet, that of Pseudo-Xenophon (the "Old Oligarch"), which takes it for granted that the Greek states were deeply divided on social and economic lines into broad groups between which there existed a permanent and deep-seated antagonism".⁵

At Syracuse, such divisions were firmly established by 415 B.C. when Athenagoras, as reported by Thucydides, represented the alternative to democracy as rule by the owners of property.⁶ A very basic, but sometimes overlooked point, is the fact that those who supported oligarchic control did so on the basis of a property qualification, extreme oligarchs advocating a high lower-limit for that qualification. Since ownership of land was a criterion for social and economic superiority, such a political belief was firmly based on a recognition of social and economic difference.

Such attitudes resulted in antagonism toward and prejudice against the rich. These prejudices existed even when democratic rule enabled the less wealthy to exercise some political rights. Thus Dionysius I, in his rise to power, not only used the fact that the generals of the time had failed in their campaign against Carthage, but also laid emphasis upon their social and economic standing. He lodged appeals against the most renowned citizens (*ἐπιστημότατοι*) and advised the assembly not to choose generals from the influential (*δυνατώτατοι*) citizens but from those favourable to the populace (*δημωτικός*), maintaining that the renowned citizens had contempt for the general people.⁷ In so doing he played upon popular prejudices and gained popular sympathy. In this way he succeeded

in having himself and other new generals elected and after further discrediting his own colleagues became general with full powers. His ability to secure his advancement by these means reveals the rift that existed between the rich and the poor in Syracuse and the readiness of the poor to elect a person who professed to be against the rich and socially superior. The ease with which he did this also shows the extent and intensity of that rift.

The terminology used to describe the two groups is instructive. Those who were ἐπισημότατοι and δυνατώτατοι were opposed to those who were δημοτικοί. In Diodorus' description, the effect of the rumours was great with the common crowd (δημοτικὸς ὄχλος) but less with the respectable citizens (χαρίστῃσιν) since they did not believe them.⁸ Since some of the generals were relieved from office by the assembly, this indicates that the "common crowd" were far greater in number than the "respectable", "renowned" and "powerful" citizens. Dionysius further exploited the class divisions when he secured for himself a bodyguard from the "men without property".⁹

The opposing groups were believed to be in existence by the end of the Fifth Century B.C. and from the pamphlet of the Old Oligarch, which has been dated to the last quarter of the Fifth Century,¹⁰ the terminology used to describe the two groups is apparent. There was the propertied class who were usually called οἱ χρηστοί, but also οἱ πλουσιοί, γενναῖοι, ὀλίγοι, δυνατώτατοι, δεξιώτατοι, εὐδαίμονες, ἄριστοι, βέλτιστοι, τὸ βέλτιστον. Since these words were used more or less synonymously it shows that the wealthy and socially superior were equated with the few and that in terms of morality they were also regarded as better citizens. In opposition to them were the poor, usually described as οἱ πονηροί or ὁ δῆμος, but also as οἱ πέντες, δημοτικοί, δημόται, χείρονες, τὸ κάκιστον, πλῆθος ὁ ὄχλος.¹¹ The correlation of ὁ δῆμος and poverty is explicit in two passages where ὁ δῆμος was opposed to οἱ πλουσιοί¹² and it is implicit

throughout.¹³ There was also the equation that the poor were many and that it was an evil thing to be poor. Such terminology was repeated in the extant sources on Syracuse in the Fourth Century.¹⁴ That such terminology was also used by the Old Oligarch is evidence that it was prevalent in the time in question and was not the result of linguistic usage that developed in accordance with the conditions under which the later authors (or their sources) wrote.

One consistent feature that emerges is the fact that the wealthy were a minority and the poor were the majority. The leaders of the demos were nearly always members of the upper class or close to it¹⁵ until, in Sicily, the time of Agathocles who, although the son of an obscure new colonist, was able to rally a sufficient force of poor citizens and mercenaries to overthrow the rich who held the power at that time.¹⁶

The relationship between the leaders and the more wealthy citizens meant the plight of the poor was rarely improved. For, whatever measures Dionysius took to relieve the situation of the poor, and these seem to have been considerable in the area of unemployment,¹⁷ he himself remained allied to the influential group and he obviously restored Hipparinus' lost wealth since Dion was able to live in comfort. Dionysius' desire to link himself with the powerful clique at Syracuse is evident in his marriages, first to Hermocrates' daughter and then to Hipparinus'.¹⁸

Dionysius, however, did show some sense of social justice insofar as it was the wealthy who bore the brunt of his methods of direct and indirect taxation. By this means, as well as by looting of foreign temples and the spoils of war, he was able to finance his standing army, the refortification of Syracuse and his wars with Carthage. By the strength of his personality he was able to reconcile the paradox of being allied to the social elite with his supposed championship of the poor.

But in a less popular person the duality of such a position was a danger. This was a problem faced by Dion in 356 B.C. His own wealth and

his connections with the wealthy group and in particular with the tyrant, alienated him from the group which had at first hailed him as the liberator of Syracuse.¹⁹ Dion sought to free Syracuse from the tyranny but he was not in favour of a complete socio-economic revolution, whereas many of his supporters, some of whom came from the country areas, envisaged just such a radical change. As A. Fuks noted, "The story of Syracuse in 356 B.C. is first and foremost a story of stasis - a struggle between Dion and the forces warring for the preservation of the existing socio-economic order and the forces striving to revolutionize it".²⁰

Dion was in fact opposed to those who wished to restore a democracy of the kind that had existed before Dionysius I's time. His "intransigence, his haughty behaviour, his past connections with tyranny, his bodyguard - all these contributed to the feeling of the Syracusans that they might have exchanged 'a stupid and drunken tyrant for a watchful and sober master'".²¹ It was amid this feeling of distrust that the Syracusans looked to Heracleides as a leader and at some time after his arrival he took sides with the popular movement. This popular movement included the rural poor as well as the poor in the city. The latter group gained greater confidence after the defeat of Dionysius II's naval force since many of the poorer classes were those upon which the manpower of the fleet was based.²²

After the naval victory and further dissension the forces of Dion were expelled, but the popular party was hard pressed to retain control against Dionysius II's commander, Nysius, and felt it necessary to ask for further assistance from Dion and his mercenaries who were then stationed at Leontini. But when a respite occurred following Nysius' initial attack, the popular leaders (*δημαγωγοί*) began again to counsel against accepting Dion's help and accordingly new messengers were sent to Dion, some coming from the generals themselves, forbidding his advance. Significantly, the cavalry and more respectable citizens (*γυμναῖοι*) acted independently and urged Dion to hasten his return to the city.²³ The issue was resolved when

Nypsius launched a further attack and Dion's help was essential to avert the complete destruction of the Syracusans.

On resuming power Dion was forced to make concessions. Although he was at first elected general with absolute power by land and sea,²⁴ a move favoured by the aristocracy, the opposition from the "sailors and day labourers" forced him to yield command of the sea to Heracleides.²⁵ The rivalry between the two opposing groups, Heracleides and the naval forces and Dion and the land forces, continued until the fleet was disbanded "since it was of no use, while it involved great outlays for the crews, and caused dissension among the commanders ...".²⁶

The lack of any social or economic policy on the part of Dion shows that his real concern was not the condition of the people.²⁷ The opposition that grew up against him was largely due to a divergence of interest between himself and those whom he claimed to be liberating. As A. Fuks astutely noted, "the populace welcomed Dion as a saviour and chose him 'strategos autocrator' of the Syracusan democracy. But the liberation from the tyranny was regarded by the demos as only the first step on the way to freedom. The next step they hoped for should have been liberation from want and poverty ...".²⁸ The people in fact were not so much motivated by opposition to tyranny as such, but rather by the desire to alleviate their economic distress, which they believed necessitated a change of government.

But Dion had no such economic and social aims. The economic and social situation remained basically the same and Dion saw to it that the political one did also. Whatever the stated aims of Dion are in the tradition,²⁹ they were not carried out. They are, however, indicative of his general position. The key features of those aims were just laws and rule by a minority. The advice given in Plato's Seventh Letter at 337B-D, which was supposedly in accord with Dion's ideas, was strongly elitist in nature. It made the unfair correlation of social standing and wealth with intelligence and fairness. The men who were supposed to be the only ones

capable of forming and administering the laws were "men who are, in the first place, old, and who have wives and children at home, and forefathers as numerous and good and famous as possible, and who are all in possession of ample property".

It can be seen from such beliefs that there was little real concern for economic and social inequalities. In Dion's case, there was not even a real move toward just laws. Admittedly he was only in control of Syracuse for less than two years, but there is no indication of any activity apart from sending to Corinth for advisers. All he actually achieved was to alienate the poorer since their plight was not improved in any way and the richer through his self will and aloofness and his ambition to "curb the Syracusans who were given to excess, license and luxury".³⁰ Furthermore, by placing himself in the key governmental position, Dion had prevented the operation of the normal processes of government, through which some of the problems may have been solved. His failure to solve adequately the constitutional question led to the chaos of the decade after his death, a chaos which further ruined Syracuse and Sicily economically.

Dion is perhaps the most obvious failure in this area, but in general, the alignment of those in power with the socio-economic elite and their failure to solve the problem of the poor, particularly in relation to changing conditions, was the cause of the frequency with which civil disturbances occurred in the Fourth Century B.C.

The Widening of Privilege and the Change of Values

The economic and social changes of the Greek World in the Fifth Century B.C. had brought about an increase in international outlook which undermined the economic, social, psychological and moral security of the inward-looking polis with its aim (however idealistic that aim may have been) of self sufficiency. In Syracuse, the wars with the Athenians and the Carthaginians stressed this tension by demanding international commitments, but they were by no means its cause.

Whether over a matter of foreign alignment or not, there were, within most Greek cities, a variety of individuals or groups who had not only differing, but opposite viewpoints on policies, privilege and the welfare of the state. These viewpoints not only existed side by side but, in a community where censorship was rare, were freely expressed in speech and action, tempered only by vague laws such as the one at Athens with which Socrates was charged,³¹ and supposedly by the constitution. Both these underwent changes in the interests of those in charge of government, and the constitutional weakness that existed insofar as there was no provision that could establish a constitution that included the rival claims of the oligarchs and democrats meant that a significant number of people in each community were living under a system which they did not uphold. This in itself was not dangerous. There would be very few governments (if any) that could effect a constitution that was satisfactory to all its citizens. The danger lay in the evenness of the split among those who had the potential to exercise political control and in the fact that they were prepared to resort to arms to achieve their ends.

Political subversion was also prominent in speech and in the literature. That Athens allowed such criticisms of political policy as seen in Aristophanes' plays and the speeches of the orators may be admirable in terms of freedom of speech, but it also provided the means for the expression of subversive attitudes. Because of the potential for literature to undermine the government, Dionysius I seems to have had some form of censorship. This would seem to be the point of Aelian's comment that although Dionysius promoted tragedy he did not like comedy.³² In like manner, he curbed freedom of speech by having a well developed network of spies.³³ Such a system must have continued under Dionysius II and there is the statement by Plato that even when he and Dion talked directly to Dionysius they had to be careful not to express their advice openly but to "put it in veiled terms".³⁴

The problem that was created socially with the emergence of democracy and democratic thought was the tendency, as the Old Oligarch complained, to remove the distinctions between classes, distinctions which had been the basis of polis society and continued to be so. However much modern critics might praise the democracy of Periclean Athens, it was still the men of wealth and influence who were in control of the government, the difference being that they were dependent on the vote of the people for their position. This was also true of the democracy at Syracuse at the end of the Fifth Century B.C. Daphnaeus and Demaretus, the generals ousted by Dionysius, were both men of wealth and influence. Dionysius himself, initially gained his position by the consent of the people. This, however, was a dangerous body, for its support was not always forthcoming.

Therefore, there were many influential men who did not want to take the risk. Dionysius I realised this and was careful to back his elected position with military forces that were dependent on him. But in general, those who maintained the right to exclusive control naturally resented the power of an assembly to decide which of those of privilege or influence should be in power. It did not mean that the oligarchs abused the people, they merely felt that the people had usurped its natural domain. The claim of the oligarch was based on his belief that since he contributed more to the wealth of the state he thought that he should have more control of the government. With the decline in class distinction this position became increasingly more difficult to maintain.

The decline in class distinctions was accompanied by a change in values. The inherent feature of the civil strife within the Greek communities was the shifting of allegiances in the community. These allegiances became cemented in the political associations and clubs. Individuals became more organised in pursuing their own interests and took their norm as the norm for the state, and judged their opponents according to their norm and not according to any absolute criteria of the state.

This was seen in the methods of dealing with defeated opponents. These were often charged with treason or conspiracy as were Daphnaeus and Demaretus. In some cases the formality of a charge was not considered necessary. In this way, Dion, since he expected Heracleides to oppose his measures, "yielded to those who had long wished to kill him, but whom he had hitherto restrained; so they made their way into the house of Heracleides and slew him".³⁶ Dion was later himself killed in the interests of political expedience.

In the last quarter of the Fourth Century B.C. Agathocles' revolution was primarily directed against his political opponents, many of whom were killed during the street fighting, while others escaped death by going into exile.³⁷ Because rival groups acted according to their own standard, in a situation of civil strife disintegration occurred in every area of the wide field of previously accepted standards of action and thought.

The whole situation was exacerbated by the psychological expectations of the individual about his place and value in the city. A.W. Gouldner noted that to gain fame and esteem, the qualities regarded as the most worthy, individuals had to enter a contest system in which they were victorious over others, particularly over their equals.³⁸ It was for this reason that Aristotle laid such stress on honour as a cause of civil strife.³⁹

Prestige was gained primarily in the military field. A strong tyrant, like Dionysius I effectively blocked this area of personal advancement to all but his closest friends and relations. Hence the uprising initiated by the cavalry in 405 B.C.⁴⁰ and, significantly, the opposition in 396 B.C., which was in response to a Syracusan naval victory, had as its spokesman a member of the cavalry class.⁴¹

Control of the military positions and key political offices that brought this prestige was very much in the hands of the socio-economic

elite. The ruthlessness with which men from within the elite and outside it sought to acquire these positions of prestige undermined the social order, "for the maintenance of any social order depends on the degree to which a group's collective interests coincide with those of its individual members. Social order depends on the extent to which the individual will simultaneously contribute to the group's needs in pursuing his own ends. The contest system, on the contrary, disposes individuals to make decisions that are often at variance with the needs and interests of the group There was thus induced a destructive conflict between private interests and those of collectivity".⁴²

Although they fought for honour among themselves, the socio-economic elite were united in opposition to men of obscurity or poverty who sought to gain prestige. It was rare for a man in poor circumstances to gain a key position in government and when they did so it was obviously exceptional since the sources felt compelled to remark on that fact. Thus Agathocles' story was related in the light of the fact that he was successful even though his father was supposedly poor and had had to teach Agathocles the trade of a potter.⁴³ This attitude was also reflected in the vocabulary used for the two opposing classes. Words of praise were used for the minority whereas most words used for the majority were derogatory. Moral qualities were thereby attributed to social classes, the positive qualities being the privilege of the wealthy minority.⁴⁴ This was linked to the concept that the wealthy and successful citizen was able to lavish goods on the city and to help his friends, thereby becoming morally superior and being regarded as a *2^{ος} β^{ος} πολ^{ος}ης*.⁴⁵

Since the contending parties had no absolute constitution upon which to base any overthrow of the government, and rarely, it would seem, the economic or social conditions of the community, they used political jargon to justify their position, if they bothered to justify it at all. The oligarchs usually based their claim on wealth and the democrats on freedom.

Both groups claimed, at times, to be restoring the ancestral constitution, whatever that was meant to mean.⁴⁶ Thus Theodorus complained that Dionysius I had prevented the Syracusans governing their city in "accordance with our ancient laws",⁴⁷ laws which in fact could not have been so very old since Diocles was said to have made the constitution more democratic after the defeat of the Athenians.

Most oligarchs belonged to the landed estates and had as a consequence the privilege of hoplite armour and/or the ability to own a horse. The distinction between these and the other citizens remained in most cities where a considerable amount of agricultural production was still present. It was one of the complaints of the Old Oligarch that "Indeed the steersmen, the boatswains, the under-boatswains, the look-out officers, and the ship's carpenters, those indeed who give the state its strength, much more than the heavy-armed infantry and the distinguished and the good",⁴⁸ were given more preference under a democratic system.

This concern with those who were connected with the navy, men who were of the poorer classes and owned little or no land was a problem at Syracuse also. At Syracuse, a considerable proportion of the people retained interest in the land, and for them, the problem of a democratic government was not that it necessarily ruled badly, but that it ruled in its own interests. It was to undermine the claim of such people to political control that Dion disbanded the fleet as soon as he could conveniently do so.

But apart from those who were connected with the navy, inferiority was associated with all those who were non-propertyied. This can be seen in Aristotle's division of the Greek world into four social elements: farmers, menially occupied, traders and those employed by others.⁴⁹ The social strata was closely allied to economic status and occupation. Thus, those engaged in menial occupations or employed by others were considered as less worthy socially than those who held their own farm. But when, with a

power like Syracuse, a great deal of economic prosperity was dependent on the rowers in the trading ships and in the navy, these people, socially inferior in the sense that they were employed by others, could, and did, claim a share in the government.

On another level, political freedom (*ἐλευθερία*) also brought with it the demand for economic freedom and it was this type of freedom that Hippo sought when he brought forward the proposal for the redistribution of land and house in Syracuse in 356 B.C., arguing that "liberty was based on equality, and slavery on the poverty of those who had nought".⁵⁰ The concept in general is, as A. Fuks noted, that "there is no true liberty without economic equality, be the political order what it may, nor is true civic liberty in a state possible except on the basis of economic-social equality".⁵¹ In the same article, he developed the link between social status and economic condition. This was centred around the difference between those who were *πλοῦσιον* and those who were *πένυτες* since this difference was basically between those who did not have to work for a living and those who did.⁵²

Because of the inherent social conditions the two opposing groups could not be reconciled. These irreconcilable elements in the community did not matter where there was an established and recognised constitution. At Sparta, for example, there was no questioning of the constitution or of what type of constitution should be adopted until the latter half of the Third Century B.C. But much of this respect for the constitution was the result of the fact that Sparta had been economically and socially insular and had therefore experienced very little change in those areas. Consequently, the constitution suited the structure of the society and the way of life of the citizens. In other Greek communities, the changes were such that the constitution became wider in its concept or failed to satisfy the demands of quite large sections of the community. Citizens sought, therefore, to achieve their ends, not by modification of the constitution, but

by change, a change which, in the advent of opposition, frequently required some measure of violence.

The widening of privilege and the change of values in no way affected the relationship between the Greek citizens and their slaves. The existence of slaves naturally remained unquestioned by the Greeks of the Fifth and Fourth Century B.C.⁵³ Where slaves were freed during a state of civil disturbance, this was for numerical support, not because there was a feeling that slavery was unjust or that slavery was a root cause of the poverty of the poorer citizens. It was part of the complaint by Theodorus in 396 B.C. that Dionysius I had given the wives of exiles to slaves.⁵⁴ Although Theodorus was a man associated with the cavalry and therefore high in economic and social standing, he was using arguments that would also appeal to the crews of the Syracusan fleet and his attitude toward slavery was the same as that of the poorer citizen. Both resented any suggestion of an extension of citizenship.

Nor was there any real sense of social and economic pressure from slaves in an attempt to improve their status. As G.E.M. De Ste Croix remarked, "A class can be purely a set of individuals set apart from other classes. As a set of separate entities it is not a class in its fullest sense - until it becomes united and self-conscious it is not a class for itself".⁵⁵ And the slaves in the period in question here did not become a class in any real sense. It is in this area that the Marxist distinction between exploited and non-exploited classes is largely inappropriate and leads to difficulties. Ste Croix's emphasis on the struggle between the exploiting and exploited classes led him to remark that "in antiquity, slave, the exploited class per excellence, must not be seen as somehow outside that struggle".⁵⁶ Such a position does not allow sufficiently for the very fundamental difference between slaves and free men. Free men had citizenship and the benefits associated with it, with the result that the principal conflict arose from the issue that, given citizenship, to what

extent should there be political and/or economic equality. Thus the conflict, since it was based on the assumption of citizenship, was completely independent of the position and status of slaves. The question of whether slaves should be exploited or not was never asked, whereas whether it was right that citizens should be exploited and do similar work to that of slaves was. Exploitation on this level was well discussed by R.A. Padgug when he demonstrated that while political concepts of democracy emphasised man's equality, economic reality dictated their inequality, with the result that "the poor wished to use politics to bring about a satisfactory economic condition; this is what their passionate partisanship of democracy involved. The rich wished to model political power on economic reality, in essence this was the propaganda of pseudo-Xenophon and the oligarchic party. Gradually it became clear that the close combination of politics and economics was doomed".⁵⁷

There were thus two contradictory movements. One movement, attenuated by democratic ideology, emphasized the widening of privileges to include all citizens equally and brought with it a corresponding change of values. The counter movement, initiated by the socio-economic elite was directed at maintaining their elitism and arresting the extension of privilege. The tension which resulted from these opposite concepts and aims was the basis upon which civil disturbances occurred.

The Economic Situation in the Fourth Century B.C.

With regard to the relationship between the economic situation and the existence of civil disturbances in the Fourth Century B.C., a distinction needs to be made between cause and effect. A general survey of the economic conditions of the Fifth Century B.C. reveals that most cities had evolved an economic condition under which they were able, in normal circumstances, to purchase abroad the deficiencies in their own land.⁵⁸ In terms of general wealth Sicily in general and Acragas and Syracuse in particular had enjoyed prosperity. The one particular commodity in which Syracuse

abounded was corn, being able to produce sufficient for export to the Greek mainland.⁵⁹ In fact, the general wealth and luxury of the Sicilian Greeks, in contrast to other Greeks, had become proverbial.⁶⁰

But the general economic situation was basically precarious. In the first instance, the cities had no real sense of any reserve fund of any magnitude. This was evident in the extraordinary measures taken by Dionysius I to gain extra income at Syracuse.⁶¹ Secondly, in times of war, those with wealth in land, which was the case with the majority of the citizens, were liable to hardship, since land was frequently ravaged by the enemy. Thirdly, the lack of any reserve also meant the lack of ready cash to meet immediate expenses. This became a serious problem in the Fourth Century B.C. when the increased use of mercenaries required money with which to pay them. Dionysius I was able to circumvent this problem by granting land in lieu of payment, but for both Dion and Timoleon, their effective power was severely threatened, at times, through their inability to pay their mercenaries.

However, under normal conditions, Syracuse was not in a desperate economic situation. On the level of cause, then, it was not the lack of resources that promoted civil strife, but rather the uneven distribution of those resources. Conflict was over the ownership of land (or the lack of it), the cry being for a redistribution of land, usually accompanied by a call for the cancellation of debts. The cry came from the poorer citizens. There was no pressure from metics, in whose hands the bulk of the trade was centred, for landownership or the full citizenship that accompanied it.⁶² Moreover, since the wealth of the metics was not invested in land, revolutions based on economic necessity were not primarily directed against them.

The problem of land distribution in Syracuse was a constant one throughout the Fourth Century B.C. Dionysius I carried through some degree of land reform, but the nature of that reform is not altogether clear. In

c. 404 B.C., according to Diodorus, "As for the territory of Syracuse, he picked out the best of it and distributed it in gifts to his friends as well as to the higher officers, and divided the rest of it in equal portions both to aliens and citizens, including under the name of citizens, the manumitted slaves whom he designated as New Citizens".⁶³ He also distributed the dwellings among the common people (οἱ ἔχλοοι), except those on Ortygia which he gave to his friends and mercenaries. It is difficult to ascertain exactly who the aliens (ξένοι) were, for from the context it is apparent that they were neither mercenaries nor freed slaves. Presumably they were such Greeks as had been removed to Syracuse in the wake of the Carthaginian invasion and who had remained there after Dionysius had concluded peace.

The land given would have come from that confiscated from the exiled cavalry who had revolted in the previous year. Some intermingling seems to have occurred for Dionysius was later accused of having married the wives of the wealthy to "slaves and a motley throng".⁶⁴ When the later influx of people from Caulonia⁶⁵ and Hipponium⁶⁶ occurred, they too must have been provided with land. Dionysius also settled his mercenaries, not only in Syracuse but in the nearby cities of Catana and Leontini as well.

What is clear from all this is that Dionysius had two distinct levels in his land settlement. The best land was given to his friends and high officers and it was therefore inferior land that was distributed among the other Syracusans. Certainly Hipparinus gained from the land settlement for he had his wealth restored, and this was increased by the gifts which Dion received from Dionysius.⁶⁷ Thus the better land was being concentrated in the hands of a few people, and with the exception of the years 354-341 B.C., the problem was not that the land was unproductive, but that it had become concentrated in the hands of too few people.

The period for the decline in Syracusan agricultural production has been a matter of debate. For the later date, I have taken the date of the

battle at the River Crimisus, since it was only after the defeat of the Carthaginians that the reconstruction under Timoleon could have effectively begun. That Syracuse and Sicily generally was in a devastated condition at the time of Timoleon's arrival was attested to by Diodorus, Nepos and Plutarch.⁶⁸

For the beginning of the decline I follow Edelstein, who pointed out that under Dionysius II, "Sicily remained peaceful and prosperous until Dion's attacks. The devastation of the country was the consequence of the constant warfare that followed the assassination of Dion and ended, after Dionysius' return to Syracuse in 346 B.C., with his final expulsion ..."⁶⁹

Over this latter point there is controversy. Edelstein was in fact arguing his case that the proposals for the cure of the evils of Sicily, attributed to Dion in Plato's Seventh Letter, were inappropriate for the time at which the letter purported to have been written. Solmsen refuted the idea in his review of Edelstein's book, stating that, while not knowing where and why there was a need for additional settlers, "War and devastation there had been enough in the previous half century, during which people had at times been transplanted from their home towns to Syracuse or another city. Thus the overall conditions would indicate need for repopulating .."⁷⁰ Talbert agreed with this general point in his own argument that the Sicilian population would have declined as a result of the disorders of the half century before 353 B.C. and that therefore the proposals suggested in the letter would have occurred to any perceptive observer in 353 or 343 B.C.⁷¹

I am at a loss to understand to what disorders in the years 400-353 B.C. Solmsen and Talbert refer. The various wars with Carthage had not been continuous and there had been no war with Carthage after Dionysius II's succession in 367 B.C.⁷² The territory in the eastern end of Sicily had been made more secure by Dionysius I's network of forts and he had successfully displaced those whom he had exiled from Syracuse from the towns in

Sicily, thereby removing what could have been a constant source of harassment to the stability of Syracuse and Sicily.

Furthermore, after c. 390 B.C., Dionysius' major campaigns were concentrated in Italy and did not therefore effect the countryside of Sicily. Dionysius II had a non-aggressive policy and took part in no major campaigns either inside or outside Sicily and this no doubt gave a further period of stability. It is true that Dionysius transplanted populations from one city to another, but the last of such transplants had occurred in 388 B.C. when the people of Caulonia and Hipponium were moved to Syracuse.⁷³ Apart from the initial unsettling effect of such moves there was little economic or social upheaval as a result of them.

The exact nature of the economic situation during the period is more difficult to ascertain due to scarcity of source material. Dionysius I's refortification of Syracuse and building programme generally, the maintenance of his standing army and his military campaigns must have required an immense outlay of money. Where this money came from can only be surmised. Some was acquired from war plunder, sale of slaves and temple looting, but much is also made of the methods of taxing the Syracusans. There was the 20% direct taxation on property,⁷⁴ indirect taxation on cattle, sheep and luxuries,⁷⁵ and levies made for specific projects, and in some cases compulsory loans whereby the creditor was payed back with devalued money.⁷⁶ What all this does reveal is that there was something to tax and that agriculture and farming were operating with a fair degree of success.

Trade was also still flourishing, for after the first two most serious Carthaginian invasions of 410 B.C. and 406 B.C., Carthaginian merchants were still operating in Syracuse. This is evident from Diodorus' remark that, after Dionysius had succeeded in securing a vote for another war against Carthage in c. 398 B.C., "Syracusans, with the permission of Dionysius, seized as plunder the property of the Phoenicians, for no small

number of Carthaginians had their homes in Syracuse and rich possessions, and many also of the merchants had vessels in the harbour loaded with goods, all of which the Syracusans plundered".⁷⁷

During Dionysius II's time, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we can assume that conditions remained the same as under Dionysius I, and since he conducted no wars, I would argue that, if anything, they improved. This would be in part offset, no doubt, by the heavier taxation needed to maintain his standing army, for three sources of income - war booty, sale of slaves and temple looting - were not available to him. Evidence of the general economic stability under Dionysius II can be gleaned from the fact that Dion was able to enjoy the profits of his extensive property and live in comparative luxury while in exile, until c. 360 B.C. when his property was sold. In neither Plato nor Plutarch, both of whom deal with Dionysius' appropriation of Dion's property was there any mention that the land had become devastated or wasted. In fact, Plato remarked that if the property were correctly valued it would have been worth about a hundred talents, no small fortune in ancient Greek terms.⁷⁸

There was, of course, on occasions, a shortage of ready money as can be seen from Dionysius I's need to use extraordinary levies. But this was true of the general Greek financial situation and was the result of the lack of Greek concern for any great accumulated reserve. Very few cities had any real reserve fund and those which did only had a limited supply as in the case of Athens at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War when her reserve fund was seriously depleted after the siege of Potidaea.⁷⁹ By 427 B.C. she was forced to introduce the property tax on her citizens in order to finance the continued siege of Mytilene.⁸⁰

In Syracuse, ready money was needed with which to pay mercenaries and at times this presented a problem. Dionysius II tried, unsuccessfully, to initiate some form of reduced payments according to severity of

service,⁸¹ and in 356 B.C. the Syracusans voted not to pay Dion's mercenaries.⁸² In the latter case this does not mean that they could not pay, but only that they would not in an attempt to dislodge Dion from the source of his power. But they do seem to have been short of funds for their later attempt to win over Dion's mercenaries was through a promise of civic rights, not of ready cash.⁸³ Diodorus also remarked that the city was short of funds,⁸⁴ but it must be remembered that such reserve fund as may have existed, would have been in the control of Dionysius II on Ortygia.

To sum up, I support Edelstein's view that the disasters that ruined Sicily did not occur to any great extent until after Dion's assassination, and that if Syracuse was not as prosperous as she had been in the Fifth Century B.C. she could at least provide for her home needs and engage in some overseas trade.

All this is not to say that there were no poor people. Obviously there were, as the land demands of 356 B.C. make clear. But it was a problem of distribution, not of scarcity or wastage of land. The inequitable distribution of land that had existed under Dionysius I must have continued, and perhaps worsened, under Dionysius II for in 356 B.C., even before Dionysius II's forces had been expelled from Ortygia, the Syracusans, under the leadership of Hippo, proposed a redistribution of land and houses.⁸⁵ It was clearly passed despite the opposition of Dion, himself a large landowner until Dionysius II confiscated his property and prompted his fight for 'liberation', and other wealthy men of the cavalry class. These were the people who were regarded as *γνώριμοι* and *ἀριστοί*.⁸⁶ The supporters of the bill can be inferred from the later opponents to that group who were described as *ὁ κατωτὸς ὄχλος καὶ βδελυγτός*.⁸⁷ As A. Fuks remarked, "The sources speak in general of 'the poor', 'the propertyless' (*ἐκτῆμονες*) whose oppressive poverty (*πενία*) the 'Redistribution of Land and Houses' was intended to redress".⁸⁸ These poor were obviously in the majority, for despite Dion's opposition, the bill was duly passed, followed

by two other decrees with more specifically political implications - to stop the pay of Dion's mercenaries and to elect a new Board of Generals to replace Dion and his colleagues.

In the unsettled period that followed, with the Syracusans fighting Dionysius II's forces and being compelled to seek Dion's help again, the actual redistribution cannot have proceeded very far, if indeed, it had begun at all. When Dion did return,⁸⁹ although the masses tried to insist that the land be redistributed (which would further indicate that no real redistribution had as yet occurred), he opposed them and repealed the former decree, thereby gaining displeasure from the people.⁹⁰ As Fuks noted, "The impression given by the text is that the *ἐκκατάγωγός* decree was not repealed by vote, but rescinded by Dion (*ἀκυρώσας*) on the strength of his position".⁹¹

Thus the economic groupings in Syracuse had become the same as before Dion's stay at Leontini, with the majority of the citizens in a situation of poverty or near-poverty.⁹² The problem was further aggravated by the unsettled years before Timoleon's victory at the River Crimisus. In accordance with the need to reconstruct Syracuse, Timoleon effected large land reforms, together with an extensive colonisation programme to supplement the, by then, severely depleted population.⁹³

When the offer of citizenship to colonists was made at Corinth, it was claimed that plots of land would be allocated equally and justly.⁹⁴ This promise was supposedly fulfilled, but the distribution cannot have been so equitable in practice. It must have taken place long before many of the colonists arrived as the narrative of Diodorus makes clear. As Westlake noted, "Since it would be uneconomical to leave large tracts of the best land uncultivated for subsequent division among an indeterminable number of colonists, latecomers received somewhat inferior plots".⁹⁵ Former Syracusans would have had the advantage for, although it would appear that all land was confiscated for redistribution, in almost every

case an occupant regained the estate hitherto owned by him. So too, with the houses, where the owner had the option of repurchase, this would make little sense unless he could also acquire the adjacent land.⁹⁶ In fact, Nepos claimed that the new settlers gained "the estates that had become vacant as the result of war".⁹⁷ This land was, no doubt, uncultivated and inferior and would have taken longer to establish as a profit making concern. The owners of such land would have therefore become comparatively poorer in relation to those whose lands were readily yielding produce.

A further problem arises as to what exactly was meant by equally and justly (*ἐπ' ὅσον καὶ δίκαιος*). Since people had the option to buy land they had previously owned, there must still have been a considerable variation in the size of the different land holdings. I would surmise, therefore, that equally merely meant that so much land cost a fixed amount, double that quantity twice as much and so on. Justly, I would assume must have meant that some further adjustment was made in relation to the quality and productivity of the land sold. Under such circumstances, the wealthier were still able to buy larger claims, particularly as there does not seem to have been any limit imposed on the size of the holding. The land was therefore redistributed but not equally redivided in any real sense.

That the land system was not faultless and was open to abuse is apparent from the fact that within twenty years the old cry for land grants and cancellation of debts was again raised.⁹⁸ The upper classes had obviously contrived to appropriate large tracts of land, thereby invoking the hostility of the masses, particularly it would seem, those colonists who had settled further inland.

This had occurred when Syracuse was experiencing an economic revival after the troubles of the middle of the century.⁹⁹ The key feature of this revival was the renewal of stable agricultural production and the export of surpluses. As Diodorus remarked, "But now new settlers streamed into the land in great numbers, and a long period of peace set in, the fields were

reclaimed for cultivation and bore abundant crops of all sorts. These the Siceliot Greeks sold to merchants at good prices and rapidly increased their wealth".¹⁰⁰

That this wealth was gathered in the hands of a few is revealed by the fact that Agathocles was able to enrol in his army many of the men of the interior as well as "those of the citizens who because of poverty and envy were hostile to the pretensions of the powerful".¹⁰¹ It was this section of the population who welcomed the revolution led by Agathocles and whose support Agathocles further secured by promising an abolition of debts and redistribution of land.¹⁰²

Thus, the failure of the governments of Syracuse in the Fourth Century B.C. to solve the problem of the division between the rich and the poor was instrumental in the continued recurrence of civil strife. Such a failure Aristotle had recognised when he placed the division between rich and poor as a second major division that caused revolutions.¹⁰³ It manifested itself in two ways. Firstly, it provided an issue for individuals agitating in favour of a change of government, and secondly, the poor, as a group, provided a ready source of support for revolutionaries since they tended to regard a change of government as the only means whereby they could improve their position. Even when not actively involved in any overthrow, their tacit approval of a change of government because of this belief meant that revolutionaries could act in the confidence that they had a more than fair chance of success, once in power.

The basic problem lay in the fact that a division in wealth ran contrary to the Greek concept of all citizens in a polis being free and equal and hence gave rise to constant resentment. Finley noted this when he said that "The obvious difficulty with the city-state as a community, with its stress on mutual sharing of both burdens and benefits, was in the hard fact that its members were unequal. The most troublesome inequality was not between town and country, not between classes, but simply between

rich and poor".¹⁰⁴

In terms of the effect on the economy, civil disturbances were disastrous. On the simplest level, wealthy citizens were endangered during a situation of *στάσις*, *ἀντιστάσις* or even when individuals were engaged in political subversion. The metics, for example, although not a prime target of revolutionaries, often suffered due to the unsettled conditions that accompanied civil disturbances and became the targets for looting, plunder or systematic confiscation.¹⁰⁵ But whether metic or citizen, the wealthy were vulnerable, irrespective of their political convictions, during a time of violence. Diodorus made this point quite clear when he described the revolutionary situation that brought Agathocles to power in 317 B.C. At that time, apart from plundering the property of the Six Hundred and their supporters, against whom the revolution was in fact directed, "the armed mob, having seized power, did not distinguish between friend and foe, but the man from whom it considered most profit was to be gained, him it regarded as an enemy".¹⁰⁶ The supporters of the revolution were motivated by general hatred and the belief that they would be able "by the slaughter of the wealthy to redress their own poverty".¹⁰⁷

On another level, exiles could, and did, harass the countryside around a city in an attempt to bring that city into submission. For this reason, Dionysius displaced the exiles at Aetna in 403 B.C.¹⁰⁸ and later forced them out of the towns in Sicily. Agathocles also, after assuming power, was careful to see that Syracuse was amply stocked with provisions and that opposition to him, an opposition primarily initiated by exiles, was minimised before he engaged in foreign wars. Thus, as Diodorus said about his treatment of Messene and Tauromenium in 310 B.C., "his intention was to wage war on the Carthaginians, and he was getting rid of all opposition throughout Sicily".¹⁰⁹ These cities had harboured Syracusan exiles, hence the necessity of directing action against them. Despite these precautions, the people of Syracuse experienced famine due to the

actions of Deinocrates and the Acragantines, who besieged them by land, and the Carthaginians who controlled the sea and prevented the importation of grain. The situation was relieved when Agathocles won a naval victory against the Carthaginians in 307 B.C. and secured a means of importing food.¹¹⁰

But most disastrous of all was continued civil disturbances such as occurred in the years between 354 and c. 341 B.C. The various conflicts over rule at Syracuse and the renewed influx of mercenaries devastated Sicily as a whole, and Syracuse in particular. The problem of mercenaries in Greece Proper who were seeking employment or were prepared to band together under a leader to advance their own interest was a problem with which Isocrates had been concerned. He saw an Asian campaign as a solution to the problem.¹¹¹ But many had found employment in Sicily under the two Dionysii. With the expulsion of Dionysius II by Dion, bands of mercenaries existed for whom there was no constant employment and who were prepared to support whichever leader promised employment. Callippus, Nysaeus, Hipparinus and Hicetas, all contenders for Syracuse, had mercenary armies as did the tyrants of the other Sicilian cities at the time. The result was that "For many years, because of domestic troubles and border wars, and still more because of the numbers of tyrants who kept constantly appearing, the cities had become destitute of inhabitants and the open country had become a wilderness for lack of cultivation, producing no useful crops".¹¹²

The effect of civil disturbances was to aggravate an already precarious economic situation. The general failure of revolutionaries to effect any real and lasting change in the socio-economic strata meant that the economic problems that were instrumental in causing revolutions remained as a constant underlying problem. There was no real development of an economic policy that could see economics as distinct from land ownership and in a system which precluded other forms of wealth socially, and in many cases politically, argument over land ownership was bound to continue.

In terms of land distribution there was no attempt at genuine equality. All that seems to have occurred was a change in the persons holding the land so that the differences in size and value of holdings remained with the result that similar antagonisms occurred again a few years after any redistribution.

What needed to be looked at was the potential for other forms of economic development and the value of including those forms among the accepted occupations of a citizen, but partly due to slavery and partly due to extreme conservatism, these were precisely the areas which both governments and revolutionaries alike ignored.¹¹³

CHAPTER FIVE : CONCLUSION

From this investigation, it can be seen that Aristotle's belief that the prime cause of civil disturbances in Greece was the seeking of honour and gain by individuals or small groups (together with the states of feeling that were a result of this), was indeed applicable to the Syracusan situation from 415 to 305 B.C. There was the dual aspect of this that Aristotle also noted. Just as the various governments were exclusive and denied honour and gain to some individuals, those individuals in turn prompted revolutions or subverted the constitution in order to obtain them.

This feature was prominent in all three of the different forms of government experienced by Syracuse during the time in question. In the case of the democracy at the end of the Fifth Century B.C., the action of Diocles in securing Hermocrates' banishment led to Hermocrates' retaliation in effecting Diocles' banishment and attempting to reinstate himself by force. Although Hermocrates was unsuccessful it taught Dionysius and his friends a valuable lesson. Two years later they successfully subverted the constitution by the pretence of championing the poor.

At the end of the Fourth Century Agathocles subverted the constitution by a similar means. He claimed to be securing economic equality for those who had been oppressed by the oligarchy of the Six Hundred. But in actual fact, both Dionysius and Agathocles were primarily concerned with leadership and the advantages attached to it. Agathocles was particularly motivated by this since the honour and glory of a military campaign, honours that were a necessary stepping stone to a political career, were denied him. Thus the oligarchy of the time can be held partly responsible for the subsequent revolution.

The oligarchy had failed to take into account the fierce nature of the deeply embedded contest system in Greek society which dictated that to fulfil one's ambition one had to obtain prominence and recognition above others. Just as the democracy under Diocles can be said to have forced

Hermocrates' hand, so too did the oligarchy force Agathocles' hand. Both governments fell through their failure to adhere to the maxim, noted by Aristotle, that those in the ruling clique should treat those outside it fairly. The general insecurity of generals under such a situation helps to explain why individuals sought to put the basis of their position on grounds other than that of the will of a democracy or oligarchy. The answer they found was in a tyranny established on the basis of mercenary support.

But the various tyrannies were also exclusive. The tyrants gave powerful positions and the honour associated with them to their relations and friends. This did not matter when appeasement of the general populace was achieved or when the threat of force was sufficient to deter other well-known citizens from organising a revolt or revolution. In this Dionysius I was successful, two oppositions to his rule, by the cavalry in 405 B.C. and by the people led by a member of the cavalry class in 396 B.C., being quelled by the use of force in the first instance and the threat of it in the second. He then sought to appease the people by his public works and by his military prowess in his various campaigns.

That opposition to Dionysius I should come from the cavalry was not surprising. They were the top class in the military field, but their claim to exclusiveness had already been undermined by the victories of the Syracusan fleet over the Athenians. The supremacy of Dionysius I further blocked their means of advancement. Aristotle had correctly observed that although the general populace might be discontented with a tyrant, it was from the nobles that attacks originated. When the people did initiate a revolt of their own accord, without a recognised leader, as they did in 404 B.C., they failed due to lack of co-ordination.

But a tyranny could always be undermined. There was a potential for a situation of *ἀντιπαραστάς* to arise since one of the ruling clique or another from the nobility could win over the people by claiming to be giving them back their liberty, as both Dion, and Timoleon at the request of nobles.

exiles, did.

Dionysius II was not successful, largely due to his inability to deal with opposition. Dionysius I had exiled several leading men, yet his position was not undermined by them. Heloris' activity against him was confined to Italy and did not affect his position at Syracuse. But Dionysius II, by trying to thwart Dion's ambition by sending him into exile created a figurehead for opposition to his rule. Moreover, since Dion had the use of his wealth he could recruit mercenaries and buy weapons. Dion returned on the pretext of liberating the Syracusans from their oppressive tyranny and was initially successful in gaining support as a result of that claim.

However, as it became increasingly obvious that Dion was motivated by personal ambition and his rivalry with Heracleides and the Syracusans came to a head he became alienated from the people and his assassination in 354 B.C. led to ten years when control of Syracuse was blatantly fought over by people wishing to instal themselves as tyrants. In turn the claimants were Callippus, Hipparinus, Nysaeus, Dionysius II and Hicetas.

Timoleon perhaps stands out as an exception among the seekers of power, but then physical disability may well have prompted his resignation from government. Be that as it may, his attempt to stabilise the Syracusan constitution, in whatever form that took, failed. Rivalry and oppression had again come to the forefront by 320 B.C. This failure was no doubt due, in part, to the large influx of colonists who came to Syracuse in c.340 B.C. Many of these would have brought different ideas with them as to what the best constitutional arrangement might be. Moreover, such original inhabitants as had survived the chaos in the years after Dion's death must have been of a mixed background as a result of the population transplants of Dionysius I earlier in the century.

This created what Aristotle referred to as racial difference and the resulting diversity in population was a key feature in the political

upheavals in Syracuse. Added to this was the problem that the new influx under Timoleon created a disproportionate growth not adequately catered for in the constitutional arrangements. The settlers were placed over a wide area so that a sufficiently large section of the population was away from the centre of government and unable to participate in it in any real sense; what in fact Aristotle referred to when he had said that geographical conditions were a cause of *στάσεις*.

Since, in practical terms, a constitution is the result of either spontaneous growth or of deliberate invention and in both cases must be acceptable to the community in which it exists, it is difficult to see how the Syracusans could have effected a workable constitution in the Fourth Century B.C. Spontaneous growth had been arrested by the long period of tyranny for the first half of the century and the deliberate invention of Timoleon, albeit done under the pretext of a revision of the existing code, must at best have been extremely makeshift. This may well explain why the sources were vague in their terminology as to what exactly the details of that constitution were. Nor could it have suited all sections of the community. Not only were the citizens of very different backgrounds, but such a constitution could hardly have the weight of 'the traditional constitution'.

Moreover, the period of tyranny together with the war years from 356-343 B.C. had ensured that there could be no simple return to the previous arrangements of government as had existed before the rise of Dionysius I. In fact, Dion's dilemma in this area when he ousted

Dionysius II from power had led to the claim that Dion had merely wished to replace Dionysius with himself.

To have succeeded the constitution needed a predominance of consent or, where the community was divided in opinion as Syracuse most certainly was, the forces of the government needed to be stronger than those of the opponents. Aristotle had observed this feature when he stated that those in

favour of a constitution must be greater in number than those who were not, if the constitution were to succeed. At the time of Agathocles' take-over they were not, and although Agathocles was opposed for several years by Deinocrates, once a reconciliation between the two men had taken place, Agathocles was firmly established in power.

The variation of background at Syracuse was indeed wide. 'Being' a Syracusan did not have the same sense as 'being' an Athenian or 'being' a Spartan. The only distinctive feature of Syracusan life we know of was its luxury and comparative wealth in contrast to other Greek communities. This lack of a unified background must have led to an increase in the factionalism that Aristotle saw as a basic feature of *πολεις*. Agathocles, for example, was a comparative newcomer to Syracuse. His father had moved there during the resettlements of Timoleon. Heracleides and Sosistratus, the men who blocked his advancement, may well have seen him as an upstart. To achieve his end, Agathocles enlisted the support of many men from the interior, most of whom would also have been newcomers.

Even under the comparative stability of Dionysius I's government factionalism had been rife. It was not a rivalry between rich and poor, but rather between contending factions of the comparatively wealthy. Traces of it can be seen in the banishments at the end of Dionysius I's rule and it came into the open in the rivalry between Philistus and his friends and Dion and his group when Dionysius II took over the tyranny.

Not that the opponents of tyranny were at all unified among themselves. The effort against Dionysius II was seriously endangered by rivalry between Dion and Heracleides (another member of the nobility) who used the services of Hippo to bring the antagonism of the poor to the forefront. A fragment of Theopompus (Fr. 194) sheds further light on this factionalism. He mentioned that Heracleides and Athanis were *προσφύται τῆς πόλεως* and that Archelaus was leader of the mercenaries.

Although Callippus murdered Dion, various friends of Dion centred

themselves at Leontini under Hicetas and they were joined, after Dionysius II's return to power in 346 B.C., by other nobles from Syracuse. But these nobles distrusted Hicetas' motives since they sent to Corinth for additional support. On Timoleon's arrival they supported him in opposition to Hicetas as well as Dionysius II. Although the sources are silent about the years 337-320 B.C., rival groups must have continued for various clubs, one of which became the core of the Six Hundred, were prominent at the time of Agathocles' rise.

Aristotle had believed that the solution was to check these factions and their rivalries at the outset, but the history of Syracuse from 415 to 305 B.C. shows that this was not possible. Of course such rivalries could be minimized by restraint on the part of the ruler, as shown by Dionysius I and Timoleon, but they could not be wholly removed. In the area of factionalism it was difficult to take action against it since the ties were personal rather than formal. The use of spies by the Dionysii and Agathocles went part of the way and so did the use of exile. But spies created as much ill-feeling as they were intended to remove and the careers of Hermocrates and Dion show that exiles still maintained contacts at Syracuse and were able to attempt to regain their position by force.

What seems to have been lacking was a means whereby such factions could express their viewpoint without resorting to force or a change of government. This was a general Greek problem for factions saw allegiance as being to the faction rather than to the city itself, except when the city was indeed the faction since the faction had exclusive control. The existence of these factions did not always lead to attempts to subvert the constitution or change the government. These attempts occurred when a failure in the government highlighted the precarious nature of the basis on which that government's claim to rule rested and made its opponents confident to attack it. The occasions on which such attacks were successful were those when the opponents to the government found a successful leader

who gained at least the tacit support of the people.

But this internal diversity, factionalism and constitutional instability did not mean, as Alcibiades thought when he advocated the Athenian expedition of 415 B.C., an inability to co-ordinate in fighting against a foreign threat. But their method of achieving that co-ordination was a distinctive feature of Syracusan history and brought with it further internal constitutional stresses. The tendency of the Syracusans was to entrust command to a single ruler, and in particular, to the successful military general. Such people rose to power, partly by their military ability but also by their ability to discredit their predecessors. There was no positive programme advocated.

This tendency was, no doubt, partly the result of the nearness of Syracuse to the potentially hostile power of Carthage, a nearness not experienced by other Greeks until Philip of Macedon had established his leadership by various diplomatic manoeuvres. But Philip was sympathetic to Greek thought and ways of life and did not actively intervene in Greek internal affairs until forced to do so by the Greeks own inability to settle their quarrels. Carthage, on the other hand, had shown extreme hostility to Greek sentiment in the invasion of 410 B.C. and although she did, on the whole, act the diplomat in the Fourth Century B.C., there was no guarantee that this would always be the case.

Finley saw this foreign environment as fundamental in causing the instability of the Sicilian Greeks. He suggested that an answer to the failure of the Sicilian Greeks to make a success of the city-state way of life lay in the fact that "their behaviour was profoundly influenced and disturbed by the fact that they lived in an alien environment. The Carthaginians, Etruscans and others were outside but near at hand, the Sicels, Sicans and Elymians were on the island itself, and in the case of Syracuse at least, within their own territorial sphere, some as a servile element others as tributaries and potential rebels."¹

In the face of this alien environment together with the fact that the Syracusans themselves were of very mixed backgrounds, the Syracusans looked for a single ruler who could lead them against any potential foreign enemy. In the case of the Athenian invasion, the leader was supplied for them by Sparta and he returned to Sparta after his mission was accomplished. But when they elevated their own citizens to extraordinary positions to meet emergency situations, they did not have the means of forcing the person so elevated to relinquish command once the emergency had passed. Nor did they create a constitutional arrangement to legitimize his position. Once elevated, such a leader became excessively prominent and this engendered resentment and hatred from other sections of the community. Not only had Aristotle counselled against such excessive prominence but he also saw that a fundamental occasion for the change in government from democracy to tyranny was when the same person was both leader of the people and general.

The Syracusans were particularly prone to a fusion of the military and the political, but had no political tradition for that fusion in their constitution. This can be seen in the variation of the number in the Board of Generals and their tendency in an emergency to limit the number of generals, as they had done on the advent of the Athenian invasion. Perhaps part of this lack of tradition can be seen in the fact that the Syracusans had not psychologically accepted the role of a Board of Generals under an oligarchy or democracy. The historical figure who had defeated the Carthaginians was Gelo and the period of Syracusan history regarded by the Syracusans as their glorious period was the time of Gelo and Hiero.²

Thus, the single outstanding ruler was the tradition, if anything was. For eighty of the hundred years from 405 to 305 B.C., Syracuse was in the control of a single ruler who held his position in defiance of any constitutional arrangement, with the possible exception of Timoleon from 343 to 337 B.C., whose position was at least extraordinary. Under such circumstances, the revolutionary was able to base his recourse to revolution on the fact

that he was returning legitimacy to the government.

But no matter how ambitious the individual and his group of friends, he needed to gain wide support if he wished his take-over to be successful. In the military area this was primarily done by the use of mercenaries, which, incidentally, meant the ability to pay them and meant that the chief revolutionaries came from the wealthy class. At the beginning of the Fourth Century B.C. the mercenaries were an asset in that they helped Dionysius I to stabilise his government. But by the middle of the century they had become a problem since the numbers of them actually in Sicily and the ready availability of them from Italy and Mainland Greece meant that rival claimants for power could each muster their own mercenary army. In this context it is instructive to remember that the core of Timoleon's forces were mercenaries. By the end of the Fourth Century B.C. the situation arose where the rival claimants for power at Syracuse, Agathocles and Deinocrates, fought the issue out between them with the support of their mercenary armies, in a series of encounters throughout the whole of Sicily.

The mercenaries were also a problem in that, unless they were given citizenship (in which case they ceased to be mercenaries in the real sense) their loyalty was to the individual person who could afford them. They had no interest in the validity of the cause for which they fought and were accordingly unconcerned as to whether the government they were fighting to establish was in agreement with the needs of the Syracusans.

The other main area of support was the Syracusan citizens³ and at the times when they joined in successful revolutions, notably when they supported Dion in 356 B.C. and Agathocles in 317 B.C., they did so because of their socio-economic situation rather than for any definite political ideology. In fact, the supporters of Agathocles from the inland areas were anti-oligarchic and anti-democratic. The citizens believed that their position would be improved by a change of government. Thus Aristotle's assertion that the division of poverty and wealth was a second major cause of

revolutions.

The fallacy of the belief on the part of the Syracusans that their position would be improved with a change of government can be seen from the fact that although Syracuse was wealthy enough for most of the Fourth Century B.C., significant numbers remained poor and underprivileged as the support of Dion and of Agathocles showed. Aristotle had observed that governments had to be careful to make some provision for the poor. He saw the answer to the problem in the creation of a large number of moderately wealthy people. But this was not possible in practice, without a complete readjustment in Greek socio-economic attitudes. In Syracuse, the area of poverty was one with which the various governments would not or could not deal.

Even at the times when Syracuse was a democracy, at the end of the Fifth Century B.C. and in the constitutional arrangements made by Timoleon when some of the work at least was done by elected bodies, the problem was not solved. For the leaders, even under an elected system, were those who had gained the respect of the people. This had its socio-economic implications because the people preferred to vote for a name, and the name was that of one of the established families or a person of outstanding military valour. This again meant the wealthy who could afford their own armour - we hear of no person who was an extremely successful rower rising through the ranks to become politically prominent. There was in fact no means of rising to prominence through the military hierarchy. One was born into that hierarchy and it was more a case of how successful one was in that military area against men of equal standing than of rising from a low to a high position.

Basically, however, the poorer citizens wanted material comforts rather than position. Dionysius I had gone part of the way in improving their lot, but his son's neglect in that area led to the numbers who wanted the land to be redistributed after Dion had 'liberated' Syracuse, even

though Ortygia had not at that time been captured. But Dion eventually repealed the bill for land redistribution. It illustrates how the revolutionary leaders also neglected the plight of the poor. All the leading families were blind to the reality of the political situation. They made no concessions to the people, nor did they conceive of anything like a system of reform which could have removed the areas of discontent. This accounts for another aspect of the prevalence of tyranny in Syracuse. The aspiring tyrant always had a source in the citizen body from which he could gain support in his initial rise to power.

On the geographical level, Syracuse was an ideal place for splinter groups to establish themselves. Until Timoleon demolished the fortifications on it, Ortygia was a natural fortress from which to control the Syracusans and Leontini, loosely part of Syracuse throughout the Fourth Century B.C., a convenient base from which exiles could operate.

But the principal reason for the recurrence of *orlogoi*, political change and political subversion in Syracuse from 415 to 305 B.C. was the fact that the Syracusans failed to establish a constitution that allowed for the role of the single ruler. They had a definite need for such a leader and because of the diversity of their population the tendency was to entrust rule to just such a person. However, they could not conceive of a system of government that was not the usual city-state type and therefore did not give legitimacy to the continued position of a prominent general.

APPENDIX : A NOTE ON THE SOURCES FOR SICILIAN HISTORY

The main problem with the sources for Sicilian history from 415 - 305 B.C. is the general lack of survival of the contemporary accounts and the consequent reliance on derivative literature. This has resulted in the need to consider not only the intentions, purposes and prejudices of the extant authors, but also the approach of the authors from whom their knowledge was probably derived. Because of the vastness of such an undertaking for the sources of the whole of the Fourth Century B.C., only those problems which have some bearing on the body of the text will be discussed here.

Moreover, I do not consider it necessary to discuss in detail the various sources of passages in the extant authors, but only the general traditions and biases that can be detected. In cases where the general tone and method has made the location of the particular source fairly certain, then the bias in the extant authority is so obvious that the location of the original source adds nothing to our realisation that the information was, indeed, biased; although, of course, it may explain, particularly in the case of Diodorus, seeming inconsistencies in characterization. Thus, unless one is studying a 'lost' historian, I consider that the source of the bias is irrelevant in such instances since it can be considered in the light of the extant author's opinions.

Where an attribution is less certain a great deal of controversy rages, several scholars, with equally cogent arguments, often coming to quite different conclusions. To illustrate this point I will take a cross-section of viewpoints on Diodorus' narrative on Sicilian affairs in Book XVI.

N.G.L. Hammond sees the Sicilian narrative as being divided into three sections - the account of the liberation of Syracuse by Dion (ch. 5-6, 9-13, 16-20), the first stage of Timoleon's career to the expulsion of Dionysius II (65-70), and the later career of Timoleon down to his death (72.2-73.3, 77.4-83.3, 90.1).¹ From this Hammond argued that Group 1 showed a general impartiality toward the leaders, Dionysius II, Heracleides and

Dion and that it was a detailed account, probably drawn from one source. In Group II he noted that Timoleon was eulogized, Hicetas mentioned without censure and that the account was also detailed, coming from one source, probably the same as Group I. His third group he saw as lacking moderation and being extravagant in its praise of Timoleon. This, he believed, indicated a different source from the first two groups.

Of the principal authorities for these events, Ephorus, Theopompus and Timaeus, Hammond ruled out Ephorus since his account was known to end in 357/356 B.C.² and therefore fell short of the time period covered by the first two sections. He further added that the vivid detail of Diodorus' account was not compatible with the acknowledged dullness of Ephorus. Timaeus he rejected on general grounds because of Timaeus' hatred of tyranny. Thus he believed that Theopompus was the source for the first two sections. Since, however, Theopompus could not be the source for events after 343/342 B.C.,³ he believed that Group III must have been derived from Timaeus. This he believed was in accord with the extravagance of the third section, for it was probably Timaeus who was responsible for the extreme praise of Timoleon. Finally, Hammond came to the conclusion that Diodorus did not conflate his sources. Hammond's conclusions were accepted by R.K. Sinclair with the modification that "the inadequacy of our information does not rule out the possibility of at least minor checking of the principal source by reference to another".⁴

H.D. Westlake agreed with Hammond's view that there was a probable change of source after the expulsion of Dionysius II to Corinth and that the section describing the mission of Timoleon up to that point was derived from a single source, that of Theopompus.⁵ He also agreed that the later events were based on Timaeus.⁶

However, he disagreed that the section concerning the liberation of Syracuse by Dion was derived from Theopompus. His main ground for objection was the fact that he felt that the view of Dion found there (6, 9-13, 16-20)

was hardly one that Theopompus would have held. As evidence, he noted that the narrative was a panegyric on Dion, that Dion's philosophical training was mentioned twice with obvious approval, something hardly likely from Theopompus who was known to detest Plato, and that the impartiality of the narrative, to which Hammond drew attention, was incompatible with the violent partisanship of Theopompus, who was unlikely to have praised Philistus and Nypsius, officers of the tyrant, or Heracleides, the champion of the Syracusan proletariat.⁷

Westlake also noted that the first chapter of the Sicilian narrative (5) was wholly concerned with Dionysius and had, as Hammond had pointed out,⁸ a close affinity with the content of the final section on the banishment of Dionysius to Corinth (70.2-3). But this, he argued, did not necessarily mean that the intervening account of Sicilian history was derived from the same source. He therefore came to the conclusion that Diodorus began Group I with Theopompus but broke off after 5 "when he found that Theopompus was more interested in Dionysius than Dion",⁹ and moved to another source. After demonstrating that this source could not be Timaeus¹⁰ he came to the conclusion that Ephorus was the most likely since the attitudes were all compatible with the probable outlook of Ephorus and Ephorus was known to have ended his account at approximately the point where Diodorus "so strangely breaks off his narrative before reaching the final struggle for Syracuse".¹¹ When Diodorus resumed his narrative on the mission of Timoleon, the objections to the use of Theopompus were no longer valid and he again returned to that author. Thus, Westlake postulated for Hammond's first two groups, Theopompus (5), Ephorus (6, 9-13, 16-20) and Theopompus (65-70). Ephorus as the base for the account of Dion was also accepted by Fuks.¹²

The problem of the source identification for Group II and III was taken up by R.J.A. Talbert who, after a detailed discussion of the differences between Plutarch and Diodorus on the events narrated in

Group III, came to the conclusion that if Timaeus was Plutarch's main source for those events then Diodorus' source for Group III was not Timaeus.¹³

Furthermore, Talbert argued that, contrary to Hammond's view, Groups II and III were based on the same source.¹⁴ At first he had thought that the source may have been Theopompus who could have included Sicilian affairs outside his Sicilian digression, but finally suggested "with due caution that for his whole narrative of Timoleon's career Diodorus used an unknown historian for his main source, and that he also referred to Theopompus' Sicilian Excursus for the fall of Dionysius II".¹⁵

To sum up these viewpoints on Diodorus' Sicilian narrative in Book			
XVI :	5-6, 9-13, 16-20	65-70	72-73, 77.4-83.3, 90.1
Hammond	Theopompus	Theopompus	Timaeus
Sinclair	Theopompus	Theopompus	Timaeus
Westlake	Theopompus (5), Ephorus	Theopompus	Timaeus
Fuks	Ephorus		
Talbert		X (Not Theopompus)	X (Not Timaeus)

As can be seen, there is no agreement on any one section. This is perhaps not particularly surprising since all the scholars argued from the probable viewpoint of the earlier lost source in conjunction with an interpretation of Diodorus' tone and most insisted on a single source for particular sections. In this context it is instructive to remember that, as Sinclair pointed out, it is by no means certain that Diodorus used a single source for sections of his work and that cross-checking may well have occurred.¹⁶ Sinclair further questioned the use of fragments to illustrate the derivation of a detail when he noted that "It is hardly satisfactory to insist that a particular detail could have been drawn only from the particular fragment which happens to have been preserved."¹⁷

Before leaving this discussion, I would like to add that where Diodorus is concerned scholars seem to grant him no inventiveness and very little intelligence. For example, Hammond's objection to Ephorus as a

source for Diodorus in Group I would be removed if one allowed that Diodorus may have made Ephorus' dull account more vivid, or, at least, supplemented the dull account with vivid touches from another source. Worse still, Westlake asks us to believe that Diodorus started writing his section from Theopompus and then found out that Theopompus concentrated on the Dionysian family and therefore looked for another source. Surely Diodorus would have the sense to read the whole account of his source before writing a particular section, especially since his work was of a different type to that of his source and required some revision or abridging. Moreover, I see no reason why the similarity between the introduction of Dionysius II and the comments when he is expelled from Corinth may not be the result of Diodorus himself.

Thus, I prefer to leave definite attribution of sources unresolved. However, there are obviously divergent traditions observable in the extant sources and these I will point out, together with possible reasons for the divergence.

1. 415-406 B.C. : Athenian Invasion and Hermocrates' Actions

For the period of the Athenian invasion we have the contemporary account of Thucydides who devoted Books VI and VII to the campaign. Thucydides is all the more valuable because of his objectivity in this instance, since his malice toward Cleon and his theory that the Athenians lost the war due to their failure to choose generals of the calibre of Pericles do not affect his narrative of the sequence of events. Perhaps traces of bias can be seen in the extreme folly revealed by Athenagoras in his speech, a speech typical of the worse type of demagogue, but then Athenagoras may, indeed, have been extremely reckless, particularly if he did try to convince the Syracusans that the Athenians were not coming at all. In contrast, Hermocrates' speech was concerned with measures for the defence of the city. Subsequent facts show that Hermocrates was zealous in the defence of the city. However, Thucydides did not make the mistake of seeing Hermocrates as the saviour of the city. His whole narrative shows that the

key feature was the generalship of Gylippus. In this he was supported by another contemporary, Philistus, who was a child at the time and an eye-witness of the events.¹⁸ That there was, however, a divergent Sicilian tradition that overrated the role of Hermocrates and underrated that of Gylippus is evident in the remarks of Timaeus on the matter.¹⁹ It may well be this tradition that was responsible for the variant accounts of the condemnation of the Athenian generals. Thucydides mentioned that Demosthenes and Nicias were killed against the will of Gylippus,²⁰ but Diodorus, whose account generally adds little to that of Thucydides, records a long speech in which Gylippus supports Diocles' proposal that the generals be killed.²¹ It was a convenient tradition whereby the blame for that action was shifted from the Syracusans to Gylippus. But it is a minor point and the accounts of Thucydides and Diodorus do not vary significantly and are supported by the relevant sections in Plutarch's lives of Nicias and Alcibiades.

For Hermocrates' actions on returning to Syracuse we have the contemporary brief notes in Xenophon's Hellenica and the fairly straightforward account of Diodorus.

2. 406-337 B.C. : The Dionysii, Dion and Timoleon

The chief extant authorities for the period are Plato, Diodorus, Nepos, Plutarch and Justin.

Central to the question here is the authenticity, date and purpose of Plato's Letters. Much discussion has centred around their authenticity and it is not my purpose to add to the already voluminous literature on the subject.²² Little of value can be said that has not already been said by J.E. Raven.²³ For the purposes for which I have used the Letters I would stress two points that Raven made in regard to Letter VII. Firstly, that the letter, even if not by Plato himself, was composed at a time shortly after his death. Even the most vehement of the opponents to the authenticity of the letters concede that the letters in language style and diction

belong, at the latest, to the end of the Fourth Century B.C. Secondly, since the letter was obviously composed for publication, then the events mentioned concerning Sicilian affairs would need to be generally accurate or it would fail to achieve its aim of defending Plato's actions, as it would have been read by people who were familiar with the events of the time.²⁴

I would also add that the letters were believed to be authentic by Cicero²⁵ and Plutarch²⁶, both of whom had access to the lost historians of the time, and neither found the contents of the letters to be in violent disagreement with the general course of events as recorded by the historians. In adopting this attitude I must concede that I am assuming that the letters accepted by Cicero and Plutarch are the same as those we have today.

The purpose of the Sicilian letters is self evident. They attempt to defend the part played by Plato and the Academy in Syracusan politics. As such they tend, in the main, to be pro-Dion (although some faults of Dion are acknowledged)²⁷ and anti-Dionysian. Plato's letters can be seen therefore as part of the tradition that concentrated Syracusan history on the liberators. This tradition can be seen later in the works of Nepos and Plutarch, both of whom were primarily concerned with the lives of the liberators, Dion and Timoleon.

But there was another tradition which centred Syracusan history on the tyrant house, using its fall as a theme to illustrate a moral purpose. Westlake pointed this out in his discussion on Theopompus, supporting his view that Theopompus was part (if not the founder) of such a tradition on the basis that many of the fragments deal with the vices of the Dionysii and on the fact that his narrative was known to end with the expulsion of Dionysius II to Corinth, thereby omitting the later and greater achievements of Timoleon.²⁸

That two rival traditions in motive and interpretation existed is by no means surprising. The principal contemporary sources on which the traditions were based were extremely partisan in their approach. Philistus,

who covered the rule of Dionysius I and the first years of Dionysius II down to c. 362 B.C.²⁹ was a friend of Dionysius I and an acknowledged supporter of tyranny. As such his sympathies can be easily guessed. Ephorus, who although not a partisan in Syracusan politics, seems to have most probably accepted Philistus' account for Plutarch criticizes Ephorus for his extreme praise of Philistus.³⁰ Athanis, who wrote a History of Dion was also partisan as can be seen from the fragment of Theopompus where he is linked with Heracleides, the opponent of Dion.³² Morrow also believes that "the fact that his history is explicitly a continuation of Philistus' makes it highly probable that it was written from the perspective of Plato's opponents".³³

Of the opponents to tyranny, Timonides was a member of the Academy who joined Dion's expedition and is supposed to have written an account of the expedition to Speusippus.³⁴ His viewpoint may also be easily guessed. Theopompus, although not directly involved, was extremely vehement and moralistic in his opinions and can hardly be termed an objective recorder of events. As Von Fritz noted, "It was the unanimous opinion of antiquity that the most striking feature of his works was the bitterness of his judgements on personalities, nations and forms of government. Even the most casual survey of the fragments which have come down to us shows that this opinion was justified".³⁵

Finally, Timaeus, writing in the time of Agathocles, wrote a history of the Greeks in Sicily and Italy from ancient times down to 264 B.C.³⁶ Timaeus' hatred of tyranny was well known and he was criticised by Diodorus for his general partisan attitudes³⁷ and by Plutarch for the malice he showed in his account of the death of Philistus.³⁸

It was this conflicting tradition that was transmitted through to Diodorus, Nepos and Plutarch, either directly or through the medium of the secondary biographers of Hellenistic times.³⁹ But of all the partisan literature, Philistus' account seems to have been least preserved, except

perhaps in the favourable portions of Diodorus' account of Dionysius I. In both traditions the Dionysii fare badly. In the tradition concentrating on their tyranny it was the degeneracy of the house that was of interest rather than their success as rulers. In the second tradition they became the natural foils for the 'good' liberators and were treated accordingly.

There are traces of the laudatory approach to the liberators in Nepos but it is particularly apparent in Plutarch's accounts. In Dion, Dion is given lavish praise and after Dionysius II left it was the leaders of the 'demos' and Heracleides who became the foils for Dion's good actions and intentions. Heracleides is presented as an opportunist who persuaded the people in the interests of his own advancement.⁴⁰ His positive points are overlooked and the impression is gained that Dion reluctantly consented to his assassination. A more balanced view of the relations between the two men is found in Plato and Nepos.

Even more excessive is Plutarch's eulogy on Timoleon.⁴¹ Like Dion, Timoleon faces more than one adversary. He is contrasted not only with Dionysius II but also with Hicetas. Timoleon's virtue and good fortune is made much of and Plutarch's treatment of this in contrast to the vices of Hicetas and the decadence of Dionysius II is well discussed by Talbert.⁴²

This moral and ethical purpose of Plutarch caused him to gloss over some details of which we would like to know more, such as Timoleon's alliance or agreement with Hicetas before the Battle at the River Crimisus. This raises another problem with the use of Plutarch by the historian. Plutarch was primarily concerned with the biography of a particular person and the moral lesson to be derived from it. His material was therefore arranged or selected accordingly. The historian must therefore extract fact from moral purpose and supply, where possible, explanations on points where Plutarch is silent or glosses over an issue.⁴³ The centralization on the individual person was in itself a method which resulted in the eclipsing of other protagonists and the subordination of wider issues to the life of the

particular person.⁴⁴ Diodorus' account is, in this regard, more balanced since he was concerned with a general historical survey. That, of course, created its own problems since Diodorus' Sicilian narrative was interspersed with the events of the rest of the Greek world.⁴⁵

By the time of Justin, the moral point of interest was the fall of Dionysius II from a position of such power. As Westlake pointed out,⁴⁶ Justin, in fact, believed that the ignominious career of Dionysius II was the only noteworthy feature of Sicilian history in the middle of the Fourth Century B.C.⁴⁷ Both the expulsions were attributed to local uprisings and neither Dion nor Timoleon were mentioned.⁴⁸ Justin's work is an epitome with little real understanding of military or political history and must be used with caution, although at times his work fills in otherwise inexplicable gaps. But, as Justin said at the beginning of his work that he took from Trogus such passages as seemed to him specially interesting,⁴⁹ it is obvious that no real balance can be expected in his account. This explains why there is a great deal of rhetorical ornament while whole series of facts are summed up in a single phrase.⁵⁰

Thus the sources for the Dionysii, Dion and Timoleon vary in their emphasis, value judgements, attribution of motive and view of the role played by the unexpected. This results in a difference in approach but, on the whole, the actual facts are consistent,⁵¹ even though they often have to be extracted from the bias and preconceptions that cloud them.

3. 320-305 B.C. : Agathocles

The career of Agathocles suffers in a similar way to that of the Dionysii since both Diodorus and Justin, the principal sources, derived their information from contemporary historians who took a definite moral attitude to tyranny and who were extreme in their adherence to one view or the other. Diodorus acknowledged this in his comments about the narratives of Callias and Timaeus. Callias was accused of giving Agathocles, his paymaster, undeserved praise.⁵² It would seem that he was the official

court historian and his viewpoint was formed accordingly. Timaeus, on the other hand, was accused of blackening Agathocles' reputation because of his own personal feud with the tyrant and Diodorus goes so far as to say that "the last five books of this writer, in which the acts of Agathocles are comprised, ought not to be accepted as truthful history".⁵³

The standpoint of the other two contemporary authorities on Agathocles, Antander and Duris, can not be known for certain. We can guess that Antander, being Agathocles' brother and a colleague in the tyranny, probably wrote a favourable account, but the fragments of Duris' works as a whole are such a strange assortment of anecdotes and trivia that no real sense of his attitude or principles can be gauged.⁵⁴

The biased nature of the contemporary sources accounts for the oscillation in Diodorus between hostility and friendliness in his account of Agathocles, and the consistent hostility in Justin's brief summary. It also accounts for the variation in detail and emphasis by Diodorus, Justin and Polyaeus in their accounts of the rise of Agathocles.⁵⁵

The general problems of Diodorus and Justin have been mentioned above. One further problem with Diodorus, most observable in his account of Agathocles' rise, is the fact that his annalistic approach covering the whole Greek world necessitated not only fragmentation of a particular account but also compression of a series of events under one year. Thus all the sequence of events leading to Agathocles' rise are included under 317 B.C. when he actually assumed power, with no indication as to the extent of time between each of the stages that led to his take-over.

FOOTNOTESINTRODUCTION

1. Many authors deal with the general evils of *stasis* when speaking about the events on Corcyra in 427 B.C. Typical of the comments made are those of Grote who spoke of the vindictiveness of the democrats, the exclusiveness of the oligarchs and the resulting *stasis* as being "among the foremost causes of misfortune in Greek commonwealths". A History of Greece (condensed version, edited by J.M. Mitchell and M.O.B. Caspari, London 1907), 442-449. On the general situation in the Greek World, V. Ehrenberg's comments reflect the prevalent attitude: "The citizens were assembled like one large family round the hearth of the Polis, a life in common which received its inner tension from the natural assertion of the individual and its urge towards competition (*ζῆλος*), but was seriously threatened only by the degeneration of that competitive spirit, by internal strife (*stasis*)." The Greek State (New York 1964), 90.
2. G.E.M. De Ste Croix, 'Karl Marx and the History of Classical Antiquity', R.A. Padgug, 'Classes and Society in Classical Greece'. I have been unable to obtain the book by De Ste Croix, Class Struggles in the Ancient Greek World, due to be published by Duckworth this year. However, preliminary comments on the nature and range of the book, which state that it will cover the period 700 B.C. to 600 A.D., indicate that its coverage must be of a general kind.
3. One particular book, M.O. Wason, Class Struggles in Ancient Greece (London 1947) is an extreme work of this kind. Wason sees the class struggles as the result of crude economic forces and does not allow for the complexity of the socio-political structure and thought of the Greeks.
4. 60 note 13.
5. A. Fuks, 'Thucydides and the Stasis in Corcyra : Thuc. III 82-3 versus Thuc. III 84', AJPh 92 (1971), 48-55; I.A.F. Bruce, 'The Corcyraean Civil War of 427 B.C.', Phoenix 25 (1971), 108-117; D. Gillis, 'The Revolt of Mytilene', AJPh 92 (1971), 38-47; R.P. Legon, 'Megara and Mytilene', Phoenix 22 (1968), 200-225.
6. The civil disturbances of the time of Solon and Peisistratus have also received detailed study.
7. W.W. Tarn, 'The Social Question in the Third Century', in The Hellenistic Age (Cambridge 1973). A. Fuks, 'Agis, Cleomenes and Equality', CPh 57 (1962), 161-166; 'The Bellum Achaicum and its social Aspect', JHS 90 (1970), 78-89 and 'Slave War and Slave Troubles in Chios in the Third Century B.C.', Athenaeum 46 (1968), 102-111.
8. The works on Athens on the revolutions of 411 and 404 B.C. are basically concerned with the political groupings of the revolutionaries. Athens, moreover, was comparatively stable in the 5th B.C. and these revolutions were the exception. For the time of Solon and Peisistratus our knowledge is mainly centred around those two individuals and a continuous chronology of the conditions of the time is almost impossible.
9. See Bibliography for details.

10. See Table I.
11. N.L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle Vol. IV (Oxford 1902).
E. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford 1946) and The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (Dover republication, New York 1959).
12. Articles on Aristotle 2 : Ethics and Politics, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji (London 1977).

CHAPTER ONE

1. Aristotle Politics V 1301a 26-28 (Loeb translation). Unless otherwise stated, Loeb translation and numbering is used.
2. Aristotle, Politics V 1301a 37-39.
3. Aristotle, Politics V 1301b 6-17, 1302a 8-13.
4. Aristotle, Politics V 1301b 18-26.
5. C.J. Friedrich (ed.), Nomos VIII, Revolution (New York 1969), 5.
6. For example, P. Calvert, A Study of Revolution, (Oxford 1970), C. Macpherson, 'Revolution and Ideology in the Late C20th', in Nomos VIII, Revolution, ed. C.J. Friedrich (New York 1969), P. Amann, 'Revolution: A Redefinition', Political Science Quarterly 77 (1962), 36-53.
7. Aristotle, Politics V 1302b 25-26.
8. Thucydides, (Oxford Classical Text) III.70.1-85.3, IV.2.3, IV.46.1-48.5.
9. Herodotus, (Oxford Classical Text) V 66. The verb used by Herodotus, *ἑπὶ τὴν πόλιν*, had the general meaning of attaching people to one-self and came to include attachments made for political purposes.
10. Thucydides, IV.61.
11. This range of meanings is wider than that implied by P. Calvert, Revolution (London 1970), Chapter 2, where he sees *orders* in terms of a breakdown, a collapse, or a social dissolution, without sufficiently allowing for the interaction between groups that led to the breakdown.
12. M. Wheeler, 'Aristotle's Analysis of the Nature of Political Struggle', Articles on Aristotle 2 Ethics and Politics, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji (London 1977), 160.
13. Such rivalry was evident at the outset of the Peloponnesian War in the debate between Archidamus and the ephor Sthenelaidas. (Thucydides I.79.1-87.3) Lysias, in Oration XXXIII. 7 commented that the Spartans were free from 'stasis' (*στάσις*).
14. Aristotle, Politics V 1303b 21-27.
15. Aristotle, Politics V 1303b 28-29.
16. Aristotle, Ibid. V 1304a 39-1304b 3.
17. Aristotle, ibid. V 1302a 12-13.

18. Aristotle, ibid. V. 1310b 15-17, 1305a 22-28.
19. Aristotle, ibid. V. 1303a 14-25.
20. Aristotle, ibid. V. 1304b 22.
21. Thucydides, III.70.3-70.5.
22. Lysias, Oration XIII 'Against Agoratus', 12, 17-38, 48, 52; Oration XXX 'Against Nichomachus', 12-14. Lysias' speeches also reveal the weakness in the Athenian legal system whereby an accused person could save himself by denouncing others. See especially, Oration VI 'Against Andocides' and Oration XIII 'Against Agoratus'.
23. Aristotle, Politics V 1307b 18-19.
24. Thucydides, III.51.
25. Thucydides, IV.41, 55.
26. Thucydides, III.82.1, 2.
27. Aristotle, Politics V 1303a 25-1303b 4. *στῆσις* could, however, have an extended application to other races when those races fought among themselves. Thus the Libyans who had revolted (*ἀποστῆναι*) from the Carthaginian army in 396 B.C. were said to *στῆσιν* for leadership among themselves. (Diodorus XIV.77.6).
28. When mercenaries fought among themselves in the army, as they did under Agathocles as a result of the murder of Acargathus and their lack of pay, *στῆσις* was used since the army was considered, like a body of citizens, as a single unit. (Diodorus XX.34.1). Similar terminology was used by Diodorus when he spoke of the quarrel among Dionysius I's mercenaries in 396 B.C. (XIV.72.2) and of the difficulties Timoleon experienced with his mercenary army at Agrigum in 344 B.C. (XVI.78.3). Moreover, as the distinction between mercenaries and citizens became less pronounced by the end of the Fourth Century B.C., *στῆσις* came to be used in reference to the disputes between the two groups. This occurred with the mercenaries forced upon Syracuse by the Carthaginians in 289 B.C. Since they were unable to vote, the city became full of *στῆσις*. (Diodorus XXI.18.1).
29. Aristotle, Politics V 1304a 17.
30. Aristotle, Politics V 1305a 18-24, Constitution of the Athenians XIII.4, Herodotus 1.59.3-6.
31. Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians XIV.3, Herodotus, I.60.1.
32. Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians XIV.4, Herodotus I.60.2-5.
33. Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians XV.1, Herodotus I.61.2-4.
34. Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians XV.2-4, Herodotus I.62.1-64.1.
35. Thucydides, III.2.1.
36. Thucydides, I.114.1, 115.5.
37. Thucydides, IV.1.1.

38. Plutarch, Dion III.1, Diodorus XIV.44.5. For both Plutarch and Diodorus, Loeb translations and numbering are used throughout.
39. In 404 B.C., Diodorus XIV.8.1, in 357 B.C., Diodorus XVI.10.2.
40. Diodorus XIV.9.4.
41. Diodorus XX.77.2.
42. E. Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (Dover republication New York 1959), 486-487.
43. P. Calvert, Revolution (London 1970), 34. Elsewhere, Calvert does in fact equate μεταβολή with political change (see 39). M. Wheeler, op. cit. emphasises the need to distinguish between σύνεσις and μεταβολή and tentatively suggests, "Metabolê describes a completed act, the establishment or revision of a constitution. Stasis describes a situation, the essential feature of which is the use of violence or 'illegal' behaviour by two or more groups." (161).
44. Aristotle, Politics V 1311a 23-1312a 39.
45. Both Dionysius I and Agathocles used the pretence that they were plotted against to assist their rise to power. Diodorus XIII.95.4, XIV 6.4. Both the Dionysii were apprehensive that people were plotting against them (ἐπεβουλεύω) and Dionysius II feared that Dion would plot against him while Dion was in Greece. Plutarch, Dion IX.2, Diodorus XV.7.3, Plato, Epistle VII 329C, 333C, 346B.
46. Aristotle, Politics V 1312b 10-15.
47. Aristotle, ibid. 1312b 38-39.
48. This is in contrast to such thinkers as Hobbes who believed that the natural condition is one of war, conflict and violence and that the state is an artifice created to avert such misfortunes and hence civil violence is a potential condition beneath the surface of the state at any time, no matter how adequate the government. On the philosophical standpoints of Aristotle and Hobbes see C.W. Brown Jr., 'Aristotle and Hobbes : The Speculative Antagonism of Civil Disorder' in Struggles in the State : Sources and Patterns of World Revolution, ed. G.A. Kelly and C.W. Brown (New York 1970).
49. Aristotle, Politics V 1301a 26-36.
50. C.W. Brown Jr., op. cit. (19).
51. Aristotle, Politics III 1279a 27-32.
52. Aristotle, ibid. V 1308a 4-11.
53. Aristotle, ibid. V 1309a 21-23.
54. Aristotle, ibid. V 1309a 15-21.
55. Aristotle, ibid. V 1302a 32034. E. Barker maintained that "It is important to notice that economic motive does not appear prominently in Aristotle's philosophy of seditions. He does not suggest that revolts are due to the impoverishment of the poor, nor does he mention the cry

for the abolition of debts and the redistribution of estates. It is a sense of political injustice that seems to him responsible for sedition." The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (Dover republication New York 1959), 488. While admitting that Aristotle did not deal specifically with economic motivation as such, there are many references to economic considerations throughout his section on revolutions. These are interwoven with political considerations, and although the fight was often said to be over political privilege, it was the advantages to be gained from that privilege just as much as the privilege itself which was a driving force of revolutionaries. Much of the discontent was in fact the result of economic conditions and it was such things as the abuse of political privilege in the interests of wealth (an abuse of which both democrats and oligarchs were guilty) that Aristotle noted was often a motivating force for revolutionaries. A brief but useful discussion of Aristotle's consideration of economic motives as part of the underlying conflicts in a *polis* situation is found in M. Wheeler, op. cit. (163-166).

56. E. Barker, op. cit. (488).
57. Aristotle, Politics V 1302a 35-1302b 3.
58. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1302b 1-2.
59. It was part of the complaint of the Old Oligarch that the democracy in Athens worked too well in its own interests. Pseudo-Xenophon, The Constitution of the Athenians, translated H. Frisch (Copenhagen 1942). See especially I.1, I.8, II.20, III.1.
60. Aristotle, Politics V 1302b 9.
61. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1302b 21-25.
62. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1304b 20-24.
63. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1302b 15-17.
64. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1302b 26-31.
65. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1303a 4-6.
66. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1303a 7-8.
67. W.L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle Vol. IV (Oxford 1902), 276.
68. Aristotle, Politics V 1303a 25-1303b 4.
69. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1303b 7-15.
70. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1303b 7-10.
71. Thucydides, II.37.1.
72. Aristotle, Politics V 1302b 1-2.
73. Aristotle, *ibid.* 1308a 35-1308b 6.
74. Aristotle, Politics, V 1303a 21-25.
75. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1303b 17-1304a 17.

76. Newman, op. cit. (388).
77. Aristotle, Politics V 1308a 31-35. Thucydides observed the role played by rivalry when he mentioned that a root cause of *στάσεις* lay in the ambition (*φιλοτιμία*) and greed (*πλεονεξία*) of the revolutionaries and the zealous self-interest (*πρόθυμος*) of those striving for victory (*φιλονικεῖν*) III 82.8.
78. Aristotle, Politics V 1303b 31.
79. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1304a 18-33.
80. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1304a 39-1304b 4.
81. Aristotle, Politics V 1304b 20-21.
82. C.W. Brown Jr., op. cit. (7).
83. Aristotle, Politics V 1304b 27-30.
84. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1304b 35-39.
85. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1305a 7-8.
86. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1308a 20, IV 1296a 3.
87. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1305a 38.
88. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1305a 39-1306a 19.
89. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1305b 23-36.
90. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1306a 33-1306b 3.
91. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1305b 36-39, 1306a 13-19.
92. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1305b 30-36.
93. Thucydides III.70.3-70.5.
94. Aristotle, Politics V 1306b 6-16.
95. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1311a 8-20.
96. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1311a 33-1311b 36.
97. Aristotle, *ibid.* 1311b 36-40.
98. Aristotle, *ibid.* 1312a 1-15.
99. Aristotle, *ibid.* 1312b 17-21.
100. Aristotle, Politics V 1307b 20-25. Outside intervention was also mentioned in relation to the fall of tyrannies: V 1312a 40-1312b 9.
101. Thucydides III.82.1, translation R. Warner, Thucydides : The Peloponnesian War (Middlesex 1954), (208).
102. Thucydides, I.24.6-25.2.

103. Thucydides, IV.1.3.
104. Aristotle, Politics V 1309b 16-18.
105. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1307b 31-35.
106. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1308a 3-11.
107. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1308a 14-24.
108. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1308b 11-20.
109. The trial of the generals in Athens in 406 B.C. is perhaps the best known case of a miscarriage of justice. The generals were tried and condemned collectively by one vote. This was contrary to the law. Although the people later regretted their decision, it did not bring the generals back to life. See Xenophon, Hellenica I.7.1-35 and Plato, Apologia 32B 1 - C 3.
110. At Megara in 424 B.C., the people suffered not only the invasions of the Athenians, but also the harassment from oligarchic exiles, victims of an earlier *σφαγής*, who were stationed at Pegae. These exiles had friends within the city who agitated for their recall with the result that the leaders of the democratic party entered into negotiations with the Athenian generals since they thought that their position would be strengthened should the exiles be returned. Thucydides IV.66.1-3.
111. The use of external aid together with the support of discontented sections of the population was evident in the restoration of the Athenian democracy in 403 B.C. When the Thirty had come to power many citizens went into voluntary exile, often through fear of impending actions against them. The number of exiles was so great that the Spartans, who supported the Thirty, realised their potential danger and accordingly voted that the Athenian exiles from all over Greece should be delivered up at Athens. This proclamation was opposed by the Thebans and Argives, the Thebans actually voting that "anyone who witnessed an exile being led off and did not render him all aid within his power should be subject to a fine" (Diodorus XIV.6.3 Loeb trans.). It was with the aid of the Thebans that Thrasybulus and the exiles seized Phyle as an outpost, and on securing the Peiraeus a little later, the exiles were joined by those in the city who wished to be rid of the Thirty. Xenophon, Hellenica II.4.2, Diodorus XIV.32, 33; Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians XXXVIII-XL.
112. Aristotle, Politics V 1313a 39-1314a 29.
113. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1314a 30-1315b 10.
114. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1308a 25-1308b 7.
115. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1308b 25-31.
116. Aristotle, Politics II 1226b 37-1264b 25. The fundamental assumption behind Aristotle's criticism of Plato's approach in the Republic is that men are not in fact equal and that class divisions are both necessary and unavoidable. He argues that men do not respect what they share in common as much as what they privately own and that a far better system would be private ownership of property which would be

available for common usage. This would give the owner the opportunity to display generosity and 'virtue'. He further argues about the extent to which such equalization would be possible, and maintains that in Plato's system if the Farmers had a similar system to the Guardians, then there would be no difference between them and the whole system would collapse. Aristotle's attitude is even more clear in his discussion of the system proposed by Phaleas, the Chalcedonian: "For some persons think that the right regulation of property is the most important, for the question of property, they say, is universally the cause of party strife." (II 1266a 37-39). Aristotle criticises in detail any equalization of property, again on the basis that people themselves are unequal. He advises that men's desires need to be curtailed far more than the extent of their property and that inequality of honours is just as much a cause of *stasis* as inequality of property (II 1266b 38-40). Equality of property is only one factor in avoiding *stasis*, and not a very large factor at that. (II 1267a 38-40). In effect, he says that the upper classes would resent it since they were not getting what they believed they deserved and that the masses would be always wanting more since their appetites were unlimited. Thus, "the starting point in such matters therefore, rather than levelling estates, is to train those that are respectable by nature so that they may not wish for excessive wealth, and to contrive that the base may not be able to do so, and this is secured if they are kept inferior, while not unjustly treated". (II 1276b 5-9). As M. Wheeler, op. cit. (164) astutely observed: "It is to be noted that Aristotle totally fails to remark the possibility that, if the radical proposals of Phaleas were to be implemented, the term 'noble' might become obsolete."

117. Aristotle, Politics V 1308b 32-1309a 14.
118. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1309b 15-32, 1310a 12-23.
119. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1309a 33-39.
120. Aristotle, *ibid.* V 1308a 31-32.
121. Another type of association was the *συνμορία*, a group linked by a common oath. Such groups existed in Athens in the latter part of the Fifth Century B.C., and it appears that they pledged themselves for mutual aid in lawsuits and the gaining of appointments. It was these groups that Pisander approached on the eve of the revolution of 411 B.C., urging them to unite with the aim of dissolving the democracy. Thucydides VIII 54.4. The value of clubs for political purposes was realized by Lysander who, in 406 B.C., summoned eminent men from various cities in the Athenian Empire to Ephesus and urged them to form clubs. Plutarch, Lysander V 3. After the fall of Athens, the decarchies imposed in the cities were selected from the men of those clubs. Plutarch, Lysander XIII 3.
122. Aristotle, Politics V 1308b 16-20.
123. Thucydides, III.72.2, 3. Here, Thucydides speaks of those in power attacking *ὁ δῆμος* and of the concentration of the forces of *ὁ δῆμος*. It is clear from the context that he is referring to the politically powerful section of the demos and not to the demos as a whole.
124. Thucydides, IV.66.3. Here, the populace is clearly differentiated from the democratic faction for it was fear of the strength to be

gained from the *δημος* for the oligarchic exiles that led the leaders (*οἱ τοῦ δήμου προστάται*) to seek Athenian aid. Thucydides later mentioned that it was a revolution involving very few people. IV.74.4.

125. The role of the demos in civil strife is dealt with by R.P. Legon in Demos and Stasis : Studies in the Factional Politics of Classical Greece (Cornell University 1966). In that work he distinguished three distinct groups in a revolutionary situation. These were an oligarchic faction, a democratic faction, and the demos itself. By close study of six cases, five during the Peloponnesian War and one in the first half of the Fourth Century B.C., he concluded that "we have found it necessary, in every case, to recognise the distinctive role of the local demos in addition to those of the oligarchic and democratic factions. The demos, *ὁ δῆμος* -or- *ὁ πλῆθος* - has been seen to think and act separately from and sometimes differently than, the democratic faction - *οἱ τοῦ δήμου προστάται* ". (174).
126. Plutarch, Nicias XI.4, Alcibiades XIII 4. Ostracism, whatever the reason for its innovation, served a practical purpose in the avoidance of continued civil strife between factions. By the removal of a powerful leader, it enabled the faction in control of the assembly to operate more effectively, thereby giving the state some sort of unity and direction for the ten years that the leader was in exile. The utilisation of it in the manner in which it was used in 417 B.C.(?) removed its effectiveness as a safeguard. Much has been written about Alcibiades' genius in this manoeuvre, but the fact that Nicias agreed showed that he too was capable of abusing the constitution in the interest of political expediency. It shows, moreover, the self-centredness of those seeking political control.
127. Thucydides, V.43.
128. Thucydides, VI.61. It is obvious, as M.F. McGregor, in 'The Genius of Alcibiades' (Phoenix 19 1965), 27-46, pointed out, that popular though Alcibiades might have been, the populace did look upon him with suspicion.
129. W.L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle Vol. IV (Oxford 1902), 278.
130. Thucydides, III.82.8.
131. Thucydides, VI.38.2, 3.

CHAPTER TWO

1. See Table I : A Chronological table of the Principal Political Events.
2. Aristotle, Politics V 1302b 5-13 pointed out the two different types of aim of revolutionaries in general.
3. Aristotle, Politics V 1304a 29 spoke of the constitution brought in after the defeat of the Athenians as a *δημοκρατία* in contrast to their former *πολιτεία* and implied that it was the result of the part played by the people in that victory. But as H.D. Westlake noted in 'Timoleon and the Reconstruction of Syracuse', CHJ VII (1942), 73-100, at 87 n. 48, Aristotle was not always consistent on the Syracusan constitution for at V 1316a 32 he mentioned that after the fall of the family of Gelo, Syracuse became a *δημοκρατία*. Despite this looseness in

terminology, it is evident that Syracuse became more democratic as a result of the reforms of Diocles.

4. The limiting of the franchise and the removal of pay for office, in cases where officials were paid, was the key feature of oligarchic programmes. It was the essential part of the oligarchic programme in the revolution at Athens in 411 B.C.
5. Although Dionysius was only moderately wealthy at the outset of his career, he died extremely wealthy. Philistus was not supplied with an aim by the sources, but all insist that he was strong advocate of tyranny and the high positions he held under the tyrants would seem to indicate his motives.
6. Aristotle, Politics V 1306a 1.
7. Aristotle, Politics V 1312b 10-20..
8. Aristotle, Politics V 1312a 1-6.
9. These will be discussed later. See especially, 76-80.
10. On these sources see Appendix.
11. Diodorus, XIX.3.4, 5.
12. Diodorus, XIX.5.1-4.
13. Diodorus, XIX.5.5. On the Carthaginian involvement in these affairs see 96-102.
14. Diodorus, XIX.6.1-6.
15. Diodorus, XIV.7.6.
16. Diodorus, XIV.64.4-70.3.
17. The exact nature of the constitution set up by Timoleon is difficult to assess. For a discussion on this see below 125-128, 140-141.
18. Diodorus, XIII.75.5.
19. Diodorus, XIII.86.4. Daphnaeus did apparently have some skill and tact in dealing with soldiers - see Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.7.
20. Diodorus, XIII.87.5.
21. cf. Trial of the generals in Athens in 406 B.C. where the assembly was dependent on information that was either inaccurate or was given by people in the interests of their own advancement.
22. Diodorus, XIII.91.4.
23. Diodorus, XIII.91.4, 5.
24. On the wealth of the deposed generals : Aristotle, Politics V 1305a 27.
25. I take the fact that Hipparinus was a powerful supporter of Dionysius as the reason for the inaccurate statement in Plato's Epistle VIII 353B

that Hipparinus was elected along with Dionysius to supreme power for the "safeguarding of Sicily".

26. Diodorus, XIII.92.3.
27. A. H. Chroust, 'Treason and Patriotism in Ancient Greece', JHI 15 (1954), 280-288 is a general account of this aspect. R.P. Legon, Demos and Stasis : Studies in the Factional Politics of Classical Greece (Cornell University 1966) also discusses this aspect in relation to the political groupings of the city. In his section on 'Politics and Patriotism', (190-197), he reaches the conclusion that while both the democratic and oligarchic factions lacked patriotism and were ready to engage in subversive activity in order to gain or retain power, the demos as a whole did not.
28. Diodorus, XIII.94.1-5.
29. Diodorus, XIII.94.2, 3.
30. Diodorus, XIII.94.5.
31. G.C. Field, quoted in A.W. Gouldner, Enter Plato (London 1965), 57. A useful study of the pressures under which a Greek general of the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. operated is found in W.K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War Part II (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 1974), Chapter 1, 'Trials of Generals' (4-34) and Chapter II 'The Generals and the State' (34-59).
32. See later, 65.
33. Diodorus, XIV.64.4.
34. Diodorus, XIV.65.1-3.
35. Diodorus, XIV.66.5.
36. See for example, Plutarch, Lysander XIV.1, XIX.2, 3, XXI.2; Diodorus XIV.3.4, 5, 10.1, 13.1.
37. Plutarch, Dion VII.2.
38. Plato, Epistle VII 338D.
39. Plutarch, Dion XI.2.4.2.
40. G. Grote, A History of Greece, Vol. IX (London 1888), 72.
41. See especially, Plato, Epistle III 315E.
42. Plutarch, Dion XVII.1.
43. Plutarch, Dion XIX.1.
44. Plutarch, Dion XXII.2.
45. Plutarch, Dion XXVII.3; Diodorus, XVI.10.1.
46. Plutarch, Dion XXIX.2. Diodorus, XVI.10.3 places the election before the entry into Syracuse and does not mention the colleagues.

47. Plutarch, Dion XXII.4. Diodorus, XVI.10.3 numbers the exiles as thirty.
48. Plutarch, Dion XXIX.2; Diodorus, XVI.10.3.
49. Plato's Epistles III, VII and VIII are in fact propagandistic, albeit after the event. They are attempts to exonerate Plato and the Academy from blame over involvement in Sicilian affairs. In so doing they also seek to justify Dion's actions and hence they are biased in his favour.
50. Plutarch, Dion XXXIV.1, 2.
51. Plutarch, Dion XXXIV.3.
52. Plutarch, Dion XXXIV.1.
53. Useful discussions on the relationship between Heracleides, Dion and the Syracusans are found in H.D. Westlake, 'Dion : A Study in Liberation', DUJ N.S. (Vol. 38)7 (1945-46), 37-44 and A. Fuks, 'Redistribution of Land and Houses in Syracuse in 356 B.C. and its Ideological Aspects', CQ XVIII (1968), 207-223.
54. Diodorus, XIX.5.5.
55. Diodorus, XIX.6.4.
56. Diodorus, XIX.9.1.
57. Diodorus, XIX.9.5.
58. Hermocrates had encouraged support of the Spartans and hence a series of reverses while helping them in the Aegean was sufficient to discredit him. The exact date of his banishment is discussed by H.D. Westlake, 'Hermocrates the Syracusan', BRL 41(1958/1959), 239-268 at 259 note 1. Most modern scholars accept the date 410 B.C.
59. Xenophon, Hellenica I.1.28.
60. This is the view held by E.A. Freeman, History of Sicily Vol. III (Oxford 1892), 430-1. For a contrary view, see Westlake BRL 41 (1958/1959), 261 note 1, who believed that no such implication was intended. However, the statement in Xenophon is open to the interpretation accepted here.
61. Plutarch, Dion VIII.1, 2. Plutarch, in his idealistic attitude toward Dion, maintained, however, that the strongest reason for the hatred of Dion by the others in Dionysius II's court was the marked difference in their ways of life. This must be viewed with a great deal of caution, stemming, as it no doubt does, from Plato's letters which stressed Dion's adherence to Platonic ideals. The strict moral code and way of life of Dion can hardly have affected the other Syracusans until Dion tried to force it on them after his return from exile.
62. Diodorus, XIII.93.2.
63. Diodorus, XIII.95.1.
64. Diodorus, XIV.7.6, 7.

65. Diodorus, XIV.8.2. Hence Dionysius' action against them later, apart from his general imperialistic attitude. On the support given to revolutionaries by outside powers see below, 86-102.
66. Diodorus, XIV.8.3.
67. Diodorus, XIV.9.1-5.
68. Diodorus, XIV.14.2.
69. Diodorus, XIV.10.4.
70. Polyaeus, Statagemata, V.2.14.
71. H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers (Oxford 1933), 69. Details from Diodorus, XIV.43.2.
72. In Diodorus, XVI.10.3 the distribution came before the entry into Syracuse and would therefore have been to the rural Syracusans; in Plutarch, Dion XXIX.4, after entry and would therefore be to the city people as well.
73. Diodorus, XIII.95.3.
74. Diodorus, XIII.95.3.
75. Diodorus, XIII.95.3-6. On this assembly, see Grote, op. cit. VIII 423-424.
76. Aristotle, Politics 1286b 40. Aristotle had come to the conclusion that a ruler should have such a force as could ensure safety against subversive behaviour and hence be able to safeguard the laws, but not such as was stronger than the multitude as a whole.
77. See Map II.
78. Plutarch, Dion XXXIII.2.
79. Nepos, Dion 9.4. Although the stories of Plutarch, Dion LVIII and Nepos, 9.1-6 differ on the details of the manner of Dion's death, it is evident that Dion had some form of security at his place and that people could not enter his house armed.
80. Xenophon, Hellenica I.1.31; Diodorus, XIII.63.2.
81. The date of Heracleides' arrival in Greece varies in the sources. According to Nepos (Dion 5) he was in Corinth before Dion arrived there, to Diodorus (XVI.6.4) he arrived together with Dion in 366 B.C. and Plutarch, though he mentions the accusations against Heracleides, Dion and Theodotes (Dion XII.1) does not give the exact date of the exile, but implies that he worked with Dion in the Peloponnese (XXXII.2). From Plato's Epistle VII 348/349 it appears that he was not in fact exiled until 361/360 B.C. for he was exiled while Plato was in Sicily for the third time, as a result of his suspected complicity in the revolt of the mercenaries. This seems the more probable for Diodorus (XVI.6.4) mentions that he had been commander of the garrison, and Plutarch (XXXII.2) mentions the many commands Heracleides held under the tyrants. It would seem that he escaped from Dionysius II and went to Carthaginian Sicily from whence he made his way to Greece. The date of 361/360 would also give an added reason for the acceleration in

armament on the part of Dion, who had waited until that time to actively look for mercenaries. It was now, also, that Dion's rift with Dionysius II was complete.

82. Plutarch, Dion XXIII.1.
83. Plutarch, Dion XXII.5 gives less than 800; Diodorus, XVI.9.5 gives 1000. The 3000 given by (Aristotle), Rhet. ad. Alex. 8.1429b 17 presumably included Heracleides' force.
84. Diodorus, XVI.6.5 cf. Plutarch, Dion XXXII 2.
85. Diodorus, XVI.16.2.
86. For details of the composition and number of Dionysius' mercenaries see H.W. Parke, op. cit. 67-68 and cf. G.T. Griffith, The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World (Cambridge 1935), 195 note 8 where he arrived at the estimate of "over 10,000 strong" which is lower than that of Parke.
87. Diodorus, XIV.9.8-9.
88. Plutarch, Dion XLI.2, 3; Diodorus, XVI.19.1-4.
89. Plutarch, Dion XLI.3. Violence was also prominent on the part of citizens involved in civil strife. The treatment of Philistus, as recorded by Timonides and Timaeus and reported in Plutarch, Dion XXXV.3-5 is evidence of this feature. The violence sometimes spread to those who had no part in the political disturbances and killings became indiscriminate. In 317 B.C., violence on the part of an armed mob and the consequent disorder and killing for personal reasons was a feature in the rise of Agathocles : Diodorus, XIX.6.5-7.4. The misdirection of violence in a revolutionary situation had been commented on by Thucydides when speaking of the Corcyraean revolution of 427 B.C. Thucydides, III.81.4, 5; (84.1-3). (Plutarch, Dion XXXV.3-5 = FGrH 561 F2 and 566 F115.)
90. Diodorus, XIV.78.1, 2.
91. Diodorus, XIV.72.2, 3. The mercenaries were given an honourable position in the line of battle and left in the lurch.
92. Diodorus, XIV.78.1. The economic problem of paying the mercenaries would also seem to be the point of Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.2.11. It would appear from this that Dionysius had a policy of garrison duty as distinct from active service and that economic adjustments were made accordingly. Dionysius II tried to achieve economic savings simply by reducing pay in accordance with ability and old age. In this he was unsuccessful. - Plato, Epistle VII 348 A, B.
93. Aristotle, Politics V 1313b 26-28.
94. Aristotle, Oeconomica II 1349a.
95. Aristotle, Oeconomica II 1349b. It is interesting to note the same concern then, as now, for tax free goods and the same attempts to avoid tax.
96. Aristotle, Oeconomica I 1349a. cf. Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.2.19.
97. Aristotle, Oeconomica II 1349a, 1350a; Diodorus, XV.14.3, 4; Polyaeus,

Stratagemata V.2.21; Cicero, De Natura Deorum III.83, 84; Aelian, Varia Historia I.20.

98. Diodorus, XV.17.3.
99. Plutarch, Dion XXXV.2.
100. Plutarch, Dion XXXVII.3.
101. Plutarch, Dion XXXVIII.3.
102. Plutarch, Dion XXVII.1. Catana had been given to Campanian mercenaries by Dionysius I in 403 B.C. - Diodorus, XIV.15.3.
103. H.W. Parke, op. cit. 115.
104. Nepos, Dion 8.4; Plutarch, Dion LVII.1.
105. Diodorus, XVI.36.5.
106. Plutarch, Dion LVIII.2; Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.4.
107. Theopompus apud Athenaeus X 435e, 436a, attests to the general dissolute and drunken nature of both Hipparinus and Nisaeus and mentions that Hipparinus was assassinated because of his drunkenness. (FGrH 115 F187, F188)
108. Plutarch, Timoleon I.2.
109. Plutarch, Timoleon I.3.
110. Plato, Epistle VIII 353B.
111. Plato, Epistle VIII 355E-356B. The problem of the mention of Dion's son Hipparinus, who was dead at the stated time of composition of the letter can be resolved, I believe, by assuming that Plato was ignorant of his death. Furthermore, to propose Dionysius I's son, Hipparinus as a leader shows an ignorance of the dissolute nature of that person.
112. On the relationship between Timoleon and his mercenaries see below 119-121.
113. Plutarch, Timoleon I.1-2.
114. Plutarch, Dion III.1; Diodorus, XIII.112.2-4, XIV.44.5.
115. Diodorus, XIII.112.6.
116. Moreover, the people had elevated Dionysius on the basis of his opposition to the wealthy.
117. Diodorus, XIV.65.1-3.
118. A similar expectation on the part of the Syracusans had occurred in 404 B.C. when Aristus, the Spartan was at Syracuse. Aristus in fact worked for Dionysius, taking the opportunity to kill Nicoteles, a Corinthian who was a leader of the Syracusans.
119. Plutarch, Dion XXV.1.

120. Diodorus XIII.75.7-8. A more prevalent feature in the Greek world in general and in Sicily in particular was the admission of an external power with whose help the person or party concerned hoped to establish power. This was the case with the Greek cities in Sicily in relation to Syracuse. It was through such betrayals that Dionysius I gained Naxos and Catana. - Diodorus, XIV.15.1, 2.
121. Plutarch, Dion IX.2-5; Diodorus, XIV.2.2; XX.63.3; Plato, Epistle VII 332C; Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.2.3; V.2.13; Plutarch, Moralia 175F-176A; Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. V.20, 23; De Officiis II.7. Dionysius II was attributed with similar fears: Aelian, Varia Historia IV 18.
122. Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.2.13; Plutarch, Dion XXVIII.1; Aristotle, Politics 1313b 13-15 referring to Syracuse generally, mentions that female spies were used; Plutarch, Moralia 523A.
123. Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.2.14.
124. Plutarch, Dion XII.1.
125. Plutarch, Dion LIV.3.
126. Plutarch, Dion LIV, LVII; Nepos, Dion 8, 9; Plato, Epistle VII 333E-334A Nepos called Callippus, Callicrates and Lycon, Lyco but it is apparent that Callippus and his brother Philostratus were initiators of the deed which was carried out by Zacynthian mercenaries, assisted at the crucial moment by the Syracusan, Lycon.
127. Dion had himself replaced Dionysius II.
128. Plutarch, Dion LIII.3.
129. Diodorus, XIII.96.3. Daphnaeus was one of the generals deposed for his actions at Acragas. I assume that Demarchus was also one of those generals since the coupling of the names suggests that they were put to death on the same charge. Demarchus had been one of the generals sent out to replace Hermocrates and the other banished generals of 410 B.C. (Xenophon, Hellenica I.1.26). He may well have been associated with Diocles and the group that had caused Hermocrates' banishment. On Dionysius' charges, see also Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.2.2.
130. For accounts of the operation of these ties in relation to Athens, see W.R. Connor, The New Politicians of Fifth Century Athens (Princeton, New Jersey 1971) and G.M. Calhoun, Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation (New York 1913). I take the general role of associations and clubs to be the same at Syracuse as at Athens. Both cities were large by Greek standards, the estimated population of Syracuse at the time of Dionysius I's death is believed to have exceeded 100,000. (Beloch, Gr. Gesch. III 1,304). Both, though primarily agricultural, were subject to outside influences due to commerce. Both were democratic in the latter half of the Fifth Century B.C., although Athens' democracy was basically more stable than that of Syracuse. The evidence that Syracuse was a democracy after the death of Thrasybulus is conveniently summarized by P.A. Brunt in his review of H. Wentker, Sizilien und Athen (Heidelberg 1956) CR VII (1957), 244. The population of Syracuse was, however, far more diverse in content, especially after Dionysius I's transplants, and this diversity, I would maintain, created more tensions and more fragmentation of society than at Athens. Consequently, the tendency to form clubs and

associations was likely to be more, rather than less intense at Syracuse than at Athens.

131. The method whereby Critias secured the death of Theramenes in Athens is a notorious example of coercion by force. Xenophon, Hellenica II. 3.49-54; Diodorus, XIV.4.6.
132. Diodorus, XIV.74.5.
133. Hermocrates, whether in office or not, was an influential politician. He had been foremost in the peace negotiations at Gela in 424 B.C. (Thucydides, IV.58-64) and he was one of the three generals elected 415/414 B.C. to meet the emergency situation. He was deposed in 414 B.C. but still retained influence and was head of the Syracusan contingent to help Sparta in 412 B.C., a position he held until his banishment in 410 B.C. A useful analysis of Hermocrates' career has been done by H.D. Westlake, 'Hermocrates the Syracusan', Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Manchester 41, (1958/59), 239-268. His attempt, however, to show Hermocrates' patriotism and pan-Hellenic feeling causes him to gloss over the extent to which Hermocrates' behaviour was revolutionary when he returned to Sicily after his banishment, and dangerous to Syracuse insofar as he provoked the Carthaginians into further action on the island.
134. Westlake, *ibid.* 249 astutely noted that in the debate in 415 B.C., Athenagoras "does not attack Hermocrates directly, but makes his charges against the young oligarchs whom he addresses as *ὡ νεώτεροι* (6, 38, 5) and blames for the prevalence of civil strife". His conclusion, however, that since Athenagoras would surely have denounced Hermocrates personally as a would-be subverter of the democracy if this charge would have carried any conviction, his failure to do so points to the probability that Hermocrates stood aloof from factions and feuds (250-1), does not necessarily follow. Hermocrates had said nothing in his speech to which that charge could be remotely applied. He had concentrated on the defence arrangements necessary. It was only later, after the Athenians had arrived and the war had begun that he counselled limiting the number of generals and giving them unrestricted power. (Thucydides VI.72.5). Athenagoras did not in fact answer Hermocrates' defence proposals at all, but concentrated (foolishly as later events showed) on trying to persuade the people that the Athenians were not actually coming. To offset the fear of invasion, he used the political trick of creating a fear of civil strife. That he addressed *ὡ νεώτεροι*, among whom Hermocrates could hardly be placed in terms of age, had the advantage of his being able to play upon the two meanings of the word : young and revolutionary. In the absence of direct proof, Athenagoras cast aspersions against Hermocrates since although Hermocrates was not himself young, the speech was in response to his speech and it implied that Hermocrates had associations with the young and the revolutionary. It is not necessary to believe Athenagoras' assertions at this point, but his lack of direct attack on Hermocrates does not exonerate the latter from factionalism.
135. Diodorus, XIII.75.6-8.
136. Thucydides VI.35.2.
137. Thucydides VI.41.1-4.

138. Plutarch, Nicias XXI.4. The political sympathies of this group is difficult to guess. The oligarchs had nothing to gain from an Athenian victory and nor did the democrats since Syracuse was a moderate democracy at the time. Possibly they were radical democrats who saw, in the advent of Athenian victory, their own elevation due to services rendered. It was these men who were later firm advocates of the death of the generals lest the generals expose them - Thucydides VII.86.1.
139. Thucydides, VII.48.2, 49.1.
140. Thucydides, VII.73.3, 4; Diodorus, XIII.18.3-5; Plutarch, Nicias XXVI.1-2; Polyaeus, Stratagemata I.43.2; Frontinus, Stratagemata II.9.7.
141. Diodorus, XIII.34.6; Aristotle, Politics 1304a 26. Westlake, BRL 41 (1958/59), 258 made the interesting conjecture that Hermocrates' command of the force in the Aegean may well have been supported by his political opponents who were probably planning to take advantage of his absence.
142. The oath of the trierarchs to help Hermocrates after his exile illustrates the extent to which the Greeks believed friendship ties extended.
143. Diodorus, XIII.63.6.
144. Diodorus, XIII.75.5. Hermocrates succeeded in recovering the bones of the dead Syracusans at Himera and returned them to Syracuse. Diocles was then placed in an impossible situation for to vote for the burial meant an admission of his earlier neglect and to vote against it was to invite unpopularity. He did the latter and was exiled.
145. W.R. Connor, op. cit. 66.
146. Some of those wounded had been reported dead - Diodorus, XIII.75.9. Others had obviously not been active in the coup and had therefore not been exiled.
147. Aristotle, Politics 1305b 40-1306a 2.
148. Diodorus, XIII.91.4.
149. Diodorus, XIII.92.4-7.
150. Dionysius' second marriage was in fact a double one. He also married Doris from Locri in Italy, thereby obtaining that place as an ally.
151. See Table II; Family of Dionysius.
152. Plutarch, Dion VI.2; Nepos, Dion 2.4.
153. Plutarch, Dion XXI.3; Nepos, Dion 4.3.
154. Nepos, Dion 1.2; Plutarch, Dion XV.3. The property in Dion's time was valued at about 100 talents - Plato, Epistle VII 347B.
155. Plato, Epistle VII 345C, D, 347D, E.

156. Plutarch, Dion V.4; Nepos, Dion 1.4.
157. Plutarch, Dion XI.3.
158. Diodorus, XIV.102.3.
159. Diodorus, XIV.109.1-4; Lysias, Oration XXXIII. The date has been disputed by many historians who would prefer to place the occasion after the King's Peace of 387/386 B.C. and hence prefer the games of 384 B.C. But as W.R. Lamb noted "In 6 we have a probable reference to the Corinthian War as still proceeding which strengthens the presumption that the date given by Diodorus (388) is correct." W.R.M. Lamb (translator), Lysias (Loeb edition, London 1930), 683.
160. Diodorus, XIV.102.2, 3.
161. Diodorus, XV.7.4; Plutarch, Dion XI.3, 4.
162. Diodorus XV.17.1 mentions him as leading a wing of the army in 383 B.C. On Leptines' commands see Diodorus, XIV.48.4, 54.4, 60.2, 64.1, 102.2, 3 and Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.8.
163. The sources, Plutarch, Diodorus and Plato, Epistle VII are in the main hostile to Philistus and treat him as one of the worthless flatterers of Dionysius II's court. He was, however, obviously skilled in military matters as can be seen by the commands he held.
164. Plutarch, Dion XII.1.
165. Plato, Epistle VII 348B-349E, Epistle III 318C.
166. See above 54.
167. Dion had obviously alienated himself from his Syracusan friends. Rivalry with Heracleides had occurred at the outset of the expedition and as Plato mentioned in Epistle IV 320E, "now that Dionysius is overthrown there is every prospect that things will go to ruin owing to the jealous rivalry of yourself and Heracleides and Theodotes and the other notables".
168. A.W. Gouldner, Enter Plato, (London 1965), 158.
169. A.H. Chroust, 'Treason and Patriotism in Ancient Greece', JHI 15 (1954), 280-288 discussed the disruptive element of these groups and came to the conclusion that a man's attachment to his group was valued more highly than the most general citizenship and that his attachment to his city was fundamentally conditioned by his belonging to one or other of the groups which, in turn, frequently determined his basic attitude toward the city itself. See especially 282.
170. Diodorus, XIII.91.3-5.
171. Diodorus, XIII.95.1.
172. Diodorus, XIII.95.2.
173. Diodorus, XIV.7.6-9.8.
174. Diodorus, XIV.64.3-70.3.

175. Diodorus, XIV.70.3.
176. It must be noted that the Syracusans were without arms, but nevertheless no serious agitation seems to have occurred. Dionysius was in fact an example of Aristotle's maxims that two of the safeguards of a tyrant were to keep the people employed and not to be excessive in his habits. Aristotle, Politics V 1313b 19-22, 1314b 18-1315a 24.
177. Plutarch, Dion XXIX.2; Diodorus, XVI.10.3. Diodorus places the election before the entry into Syracuse and does not mention the 20 colleagues.
178. Plutarch, Dion XXXI.1-3; Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.2.8.
179. Plutarch, Dion XXXII.2; Diodorus, XVI.16.2.
180. Heracleides may well have tried to establish this point before the expedition left and hence Plutarch's comment.
181. Plutarch, Dion XXXII.1.
182. See above 73.
183. Plutarch, Dion XXXII.2. Plutarch underestimates the value of Heracleides and accordingly does not attribute him with worthy motives. As H.D. Westlake noted in 'Dion : A Study of Liberation', DUJ N.S. (Vol.38) (1945-46) "It is a reasonable inference that, as Heracleides is not unsympathetically treated by Plato and other authors, his character has been somewhat too luridly painted by Plutarch either through the influence of partisanship or to provide an ethical contrast to the virtues of Dion". (38).
184. Diodorus, XVI.16.2.
185. Nepos, Dion 6.3. (Loeb)
186. Plutarch, Dion XXXIII.1. Presumably the assembly was convened by the archons. See also, Westlake, Essays 255
187. Diodorus, XVI.17.3.
188. Nepos, Dion 6.4.
189. Plutarch, Dion XXXIII.1.
190. Plutarch, Dion XXXIII.2.
191. Plutarch, Dion XXXVII.3, 4. XXXVIII.2; Diodorus, XVI.17. Diodorus does not mention the land bill and has the dissension primarily centred around whether Dion or Heracleides should be in charge with the added problem of the inability of the Syracusans to pay the mercenaries in any case. Despite the discrepancy in the two accounts, both agree on the result - the withdrawal of Dion and his mercenaries. Diodorus' account is extremely compressed at this point. Although there was no doubt of rivalry between Heracleides and Dion at this point, the real division in the population over this issue only occurred after Dion's return from Leontini. Diodorus does not deal with the events in Syracuse after Dion's repulse of Nypsius and his death in 354 B.C.

192. The fleet blockading Ortygia was Syracusan.
193. Plutarch, Dion XLI.2, 3; Diodorus, XVI.19.1-4. Diodorus noted that part of the failure of the Syracusans against Nypsius was due to their lack of a commander. It would seem, therefore, that the Syracusans had failed to organize their defence successfully. It was an instance also of the lack of discipline among the Syracusans for, having just been victorious in a naval battle against Nypsius' forces (Diodorus, XVI.18.4), they abandoned themselves to revelry and neglected their defence. Plutarch also mentioned the utter lack of discipline on the part of the Syracusans after their victory (Dion, XLI.1). Both Diodorus and Plutarch stress the drunkenness of the Syracusans at the time, and Diodorus maintained that the guards were in fact asleep.
194. Plutarch, Dion XLIV.2.
195. Plutarch, Dion XLVIII.2, 3.
196. On the land question see below 173-174.
197. Plutarch, Dion XLVIII.3, 4.
198. Plutarch, Dion L.1.
199. Nepos, Dion 7.1, 2.
200. Plutarch, Dion LII.1.
201. Plutarch, Dion LIII.1.
202. Plutarch, Dion LIII.3, 4.
203. It is interesting to note in this context that Dion retained his body-guard even after the expulsion of Dionysius II's forces.
204. Diodorus, XIII.63.3. Selinus had been razed by the Carthaginians earlier that year.
205. Diodorus, XIII.63.3, 4. Westlake, in his article 'Hermocrates the Syracusan', observed that the raids into Carthaginian territory also had the advantage of securing booty which must have been welcome "for apart from the funds provided by Pharnabuzus his financial resources can hardly have been substantial and must have been strained by the growth of his army". (263). In an age when mercenaries were being employed, the ability of the revolutionary to pay them became crucial to his success.
206. Diodorus, XIII.113.3.
207. Diodorus, XIV.9.5.
208. Diodorus, XIV.14.2.
209. On the policy of Rhegium, see below 90.
210. Diodorus' account of the banishment is quite different, see 81-83.
211. Aelian, Varia Historia XII 47.
212. Plato, Epistle VII 329C.

213. Plutarch, Dion III.4.
214. Dion did have personal friends among the Carthaginians as is evident by his welcome by the Carthaginian commander at Minoa in 357 B.C. Plutarch, Dion XXV.5.
215. Plato, Epistle VII 329C.
216. Plutarch, Dion XV.1.
217. On Carthaginian actions see 96-102.
218. Plutarch, Dion VI.2; Nepos, Dion 2.4. On Dion's relationship to the tyranny see Table II.
219. Plutarch, Dion XV.3, XVI.3.
220. Plutarch, Dion XV.2; Plato, Epistle VII 388A. Plato mentions Dionysius as requesting Dion not to regard his position as an exile but merely as a change of abode.
221. Plutarch, Dion XV.2, 3; Nepos, Dion 4.1, 2.
222. Plutarch, Dion XIV.4 says he was lured to the boat by a trick; Nepos, Dion 4.1 says he was given a boat.
223. Diodorus, XVI.6.4.
224. Plutarch, Dion XV.2; Diodorus, XVI.6.4.
225. Plutarch, Dion XII.1.
226. On this point see above note 81.
227. Plutarch, Dion XVII.3, 4.
228. Plutarch, Dion XIX.5; Plato, Epistle VII 347E. Plutarch maintained that Dion did not turn his thoughts to war until after Dionysius forced Dion's wife to re-marry (XXII.1), but Dion had been gaining support in Greece and had had Speusippus sound out the condition of Sicily (XXII.2) before Dionysius arranged the marriage.
229. Plutarch, Dion XXII.5 says 800 men.
230. Plutarch, Dion XXII.4 says 25 out of 1000; Diodorus, XVI.10.5 mentions 30 exiles.
231. People from Acragas, Gela, Camarina and Messana joined him. So did some Sicanians, Sicels and some people from Italy. Probably Plutarch's estimate of 5000 followers is correct - Plutarch, Dion XXVI.2; Diodorus, XVI.9.5.
232. Diodorus, XIX.103.1.
233. Diodorus, XX.3.1.
234. Diodorus, XX.31.2-32.2.
235. Diodorus, XX.55.5.

236. Diodorus, XX.57.1. Xenodocus was in fact defeated twice. After his first defeat (XX.56.2), *orlos* broke out between him and his political opponents, and it was only as a result of pressure from those opponents that he fought again (XX.62.2-4), obviously with a seriously disunited army. Fearing the charges that were likely to be brought against him after his second defeat, he fled to Gela. It was at this point that reverses in Africa necessitated Agathocles' presence there. Since Deinocrates was increasing in strength, Agathocles took the precaution of discovering and killing any Syracusans who were hostile to him lest they recall Deinocrates in his absence. On his failure in Africa he deserted his army and returned to Sicily. The army then killed Agathocles' sons and came to terms with the Carthaginians (XX.69.3).
237. Diodorus, XX.77.2.
238. Diodorus, XX.77.3.
239. Diodorus, XX.79.2.
240. Diodorus, XX.89.2, 3. Diodorus maintained that the decisive action was the desertion of 2000 of the exiles who went over to Agathocles because of their disagreement with Deinocrates. However, this is not in accord with his statement that Deinocrates betrayed (*προδοσίαν*) his allies (XX.90.2) and the fact that Deinocrates retained a position as general after he came to terms with Agathocles (XX.90.1), a command he promptly justified by killing Pasiphilus and handing over the strongholds to Agathocles (XX.90.2).
241. Thucydides, VI.64.1.
242. Diodorus, XIV.15.1-3; Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.2.5.
243. E. Balogh, Political Refugees in Ancient Greece, (Johannesburg 1943) 44.
244. Diodorus, XIV.87.1.
245. Diodorus, XIV.87.1. Heloris was also commander of the Italian Greeks in 389 B.C.
246. Selinus and Himera, after their destruction by Carthage in 410/409 B.C. did not regain their former prosperity. It is worthy of note, however, that Hermocrates was able to use the remains of Selinus as a base for his operations in 408 B.C. (Diodorus, XIII.63.3, 4). Likewise, Acragas and Gela suffered from the invasion of 406 B.C. At that time, Dionysius I was able to use the troubled situation at Gela as a means of increasing his own power. By interfering in the *orlos* there and supporting the populace against the wealthy he gained potential allies, not only from the general citizens, but also from the mercenaries stationed there since he used the money confiscated from the rich to pay the wages due to them (Diodorus, XIII.93.1-3). Acragas remained a secondary power until c.340 B.C. when Timoleon resettled it (Plutarch, Timoleon XXXV.2). Gela also regained prosperity from Timoleon's resettlement but was again ruined when Agathocles confiscated the wealth of the place in 311 B.C. on the pretext that the Geloans were guilty of treason and desertion. (Diodorus, XIX.107.2-5). Naxos was destroyed by Dionysius I in 403 B.C. after its commander had betrayed the place to him and the

territory was given to the Siceli. Catana suffered a similar fate and was given to Campanian mercenaries (Diodorus, XIV.15.1-3). Except for the adventures of Mamercus, the tyrant of the place during Timoleon's time, it remained virtually an outpost of Syracuse.

247. M.N.Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions I (Oxford 1933), No.57. No. 58 attests to a similar alliance made between Athens and Rhegium at that time.
248. Thucydides, III.86.3, 4; Diodorus, XII.53, 54.
249. Thucydides, V.4.2; Diodorus, XII.54.7.
250. Diodorus XII.83.1, 2. They appealed together with the Segestaeans who made much of Leontini's loss of independence. From Thucydides VI.6.2, it appears that the Segestaeans alone made the first appeal and that they were joined by Leontini exiles when the Athenian embassy, sent to review the situation, returned. They then supported the Segestaeans in their attempt to persuade the Athenians to adopt Alcibiades', and not Nicias' advice about the expedition. Thucydides, VI.19.1.
251. Diodorus, XIII.94.3.
252. Diodorus, XIII.89.4.
253. Xenophon, Hellenica II.3.5.
254. Diodorus, XIV.14.1, XIV.15.4. By then it had also received Geloans and Camarinaeans who, being discontented with Dionysius had gone there in 405 B.C. (Diodorus XIII.113.4).
255. Diodorus, XIV.78.2.
256. Diodorus, XVI.16.1.
257. Diodorus, XVI.17.4; Plutarch, Dion XXXIX.2, XL.1.
258. Plutarch, Dion XL.2.
259. Diodorus, XVI.36.5.
260. Plutarch, Timoleon I.3.
261. Diodorus, XVI.82.7.
262. Diodorus, XIV.8.2, 3.
263. Diodorus, XIV.9.3.
264. Diodorus, XIV.40.4, 5.
265. Diodorus, XIV.44.4.
266. Diodorus, XIV.78.5.
267. Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.2.18.
268. Diodorus, XVI.9.5.
269. On three occasions. Diodorus, XIX.65.2-4, 102.1, 2.

270. Diodorus, XIX.102.4, 5.
271. Diodorus, XVI.9.5; Plutarch, Dion XXVI.2.
272. The majority of the 6000 exiles went there. Diodorus, XIX.8.2.
273. Diodorus, XIX.70.2.
274. Diodorus, XIX.102.1.
275. Diodorus, XIV.44.5.
276. Diodorus, XIV.87.1.
277. Diodorus, XIV.111.4.
278. Plutarch, Timoleon X.2, 3.
279. The Syracusans had driven back the Sicels when they first arrived, subjecting those who remained in what became their territory. This subordinate position of the Sicels existed at the time of the Athenian invasion (Thucydides, VI.45, 46). The only real resistance to Syracusan control had occurred earlier in 451/450 B.C. (under the leadership of Ducetius (Diodorus, XI.91) and the potential had existed again in 446 B.C. when Ducetius had returned to found Kale Acte (Diodorus XII.8). After his death, the Syracusans waged war on the independent Sicels, effectively destroying their power, but the statement that the Syracusans conquered all the Sicel towns, (Diodorus XII.29) must be an exaggeration for when Hermocrates urged the Syracusans to prepare for the Athenian invasion he said that "We must send to the Sicels, in some cases to make sure that we can depend on them, in others to attempt to make treaties of friendship with them". (Thucydides, VI.34.1).
280. Thucydides, VI.34.1, 45.2. In the earlier Athenian actions of the 420's, they had sided with the Athenians (Thucydides, III.103.1).
281. Thucydides, VI.48.1.
282. Thucydides, VI.103.2, VII.32.1.
283. Thucydides, VII.1.4.
284. Diodorus, XIII.114.1.
285. Diodorus, XIV.14.8. Initially he had tried to secure the place by domestic interference.
286. Diodorus, XIV.15.3.
287. Dion : Diodorus, XVI.9.5. Timoleon : Timoleon was welcomed by the Tauromenians and aided by them. Diodorus XVI.68.8, 9; Plutarch, Timoleon X.4, 5. But the city had become semi-Greek after the influx of Greek refugees from Naxos. It is also noteworthy that the Sicel town of Adranum was suffering from the Greek problem of *ordors* in 344 B.C., one faction calling in Timoleon for help and the other calling in Hicetas. Plutarch, Timoleon XII.2, cf. Diodorus, XVI.68.10.
288. Diodorus, XIX.6.2, 3.

289. C. Mossé, La Tyrannie dans la Grèce Antique (Paris 1969), 116-117. Mossé also equates these citizens with the Kylllyrioi mentioned by Herodotus as aiding the demos against the Gamoroi at the beginning of the Fifth Century B.C. (Herodotus VII.155). This may well be so but the whole question of the Kylllyrioi is shrouded in mystery. E.A. Freeman, History of Sicily Vol. II (Oxford 1892), 438-439, discussed the ancient references and came to the sensible conclusion that "One may doubt whether there was any real source of knowledge about the Kylllyrioi beyond the passage in Herodotus. His words seem to be the groundwork for the one fact which Aristotle or anybody else had to tell about them". 438.
290. Diodorus, XIV.66.5.
291. Diodorus, XIV.7.5.
292. Diodorus XIV.96.3, cf. XIV.58.1. Mossé, op. cit. maintained that the two references are to the same slaves and that they were freed in 396 B.C. but returned in 392 B.C.
293. Diodorus, XIV.10.2, 3, 62.1, 63.4, 70.1, 2.
294. Xenophon, Hellenica V.1.26, 28, VI.2.4, 33, VII.1.20, 28; Lysias, Oration XIX 20; Diodorus, XV.70.1 and Xenophon, Hellenica VII.4.12 for Dionysius II's help.
295. Lysias, Oration XXXIII 6, 7.
296. H.D. Westlake, 'Hermocrates the Syracusan' 240-241. See also his Athenian Aims in Sicily, 427-424 B.C.', Historia IX (1960), 385-402. In particular, in the latter article he discussed the expectation of the Athenians that civil strife in Syracuse would aid the Athenians and he demonstrated that it was, in fact, political disturbances that beset the Athenian allies and undermined their loyalty. He cited the cases of Rhegium and Camarina (398).
297. On this aspect during the Peloponnesian War see especially, L.A. Losada, The Fifth Column in the Peloponnesian War (Leiden 1972). On the Syracusan situation see 124-132. Losada made the interesting observation that Nicias' ability to communicate with dissidents in Syracuse and his knowledge of the Syracusan situation may well have been enhanced by the fact that he was the Syracusan 'proxenos' at Athens (106 and 131-132). Moreover, Thucydides pointed out that the Athenian failure against Syracuse was not only due to the fact that they were fighting a place similar to their own, equipped not only with naval forces but an extensive cavalry as well (which Athens lacked), but that "They had been unable to make use of a Fifth Column or to offer the prospect of a change in government as a means of gaining power over them". Thucydides VII.55.2. The necessity for placating dissident groups within a city to strengthen that city's capacity to resist an enemy was realized by Aeneas Tacticus: On Sieecraft XIV.1.
298. Tod, op. cit., vol. 2 (1948), No. 136 Athens had earlier tried to ally herself with Dionysius and had sent an embassy in 393 B.C. (Lysias Oration XIX 19-20) and had, at that time, proposed a decree honouring Dionysius, his brothers Leptines and Thearides and his brother-in-law, Polyxenus (Tod, op. cit. No. 108). Although he was not successful at that time, soon after, when Athens and Sparta were allied against

Thebes in 371 B.C., Dionysius must have been reconciled to Athens (Xenophon, Hellenica VII.1.20, 28). In 368 B.C. a further decree in honour of Dionysius was passed (Tod, op. cit. No. 133).

299. Plato, Epistle VII. See especially 333D-334C.
300. Thucydides, VI.73.2, 88.7-10.
301. Diodorus, XVI.6.5.
302. Diodorus, XVI.65.1, 7; Plutarch, Timoleon II 1, 2, III 1; Nepos, Timoleon 2.1.
303. H.D. Westlake noted that "The only evidence of contact after Timoleon's death was the presence of Acestorides in 319 B.C. and he was asked for." 'Timoleon and the Reconstruction of Syracuse', CHJ VII (1942), 76.
304. R.J.A. Talbert, Timoleon and the Revival of Greek Sicily 344-317 B.C. (Cambridge 1974), 54 claims that "After Dion had gained control of Syracuse some *συμβούλοι καὶ συνάρχοντες* did come out from Corinth, but their mission could have been sponsored by Dion himself rather than by the Corinthian government." This is sound enough from the point of view of the probable sponsorship of these advisers, but Talbert is more definite than the reference in Plutarch warrants. Plutarch, Dion LIII.1, 2 merely said that Dion sent to the Corinthians for assistance. There is no evidence that such assistance was actually given, or that it arrived.
305. Plutarch, Timoleon II.1. Talbert, op. cit. 122 noted this point.
306. Diodorus, XVI.65.2.
307. Diodorus, XIV.10.3.
308. Talbert, op. cit. 53 note 5 in response to the assertion in K.F. Stroheker, Dionysios I (Wiesbaden 1958), 56.
309. Aristotle, Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 8 1429b; Aelian, Varia Historia IV 8.
310. Plutarch, Timoleon II.1.
311. Westlake, 'The Purpose of Timoleon's Mission', AJPh LXX (1949), 65-75 at 67.
312. Plutarch, Timoleon VII.4.
313. Plutarch, Timoleon X.5.
314. Plutarch, Timoleon XI.4.
315. Nepos, Timoleon 2.1.
316. Diodorus, XVI.65.1.
317. Westlake, AJPh LXX(1949), 75.
318. On the decline of Corinth see Talbert, op. cit. 52-54 and D. Kagan,

Politics and Policy in Corinth 421-336 B.C. (Ohio 1958), Chapter 3. Kagan dealt with the decline that Corinth experienced as a result of the Peloponnesian and Corinthian Wars. Although some internal stability resulted from the resumption of oligarchy in 386 B.C., the wars of 371-366 B.C. further ravaged Corinth's territory. Kagan also noted that another reason for the minimal response given by Corinth to Timoleon's expedition at first can be found in the fact that they were "unprepared for a serious effort at short notice, since unlike imperial Athens they kept no fleet in being in peace time" (127). Kagan also saw the size of the second contingent sent to Timoleon as indicative of some sort of economic revival in the years which followed 366 B.C. that permitted the levying of such a force.

319. Westlake, CHJ VII (1942), 76. A similar view is held by Talbert, op. cit. 122-123 and A.J. Graham, Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece (Manchester 1964), 144-145. Talbert correctly noted that it was only after Timoleon was successful that Corinth took any real interest in the Syracusan expedition. I would further add that this interest seems to have ceased after Timoleon's death.
320. H. Wentker's emphasis on the connection between the family ties of the nobility of Corinth and that of Syracuse has little to recommend it - Sizilien und Athen (Heidelberg 1956), 14-18. His evidence rests on the highly propagandistic parts of Plutarch and, as Graham, op. cit. 145 note 3 commented, about 400 years had passed since the founding of the colony and the effect of family ties should not therefore be exaggerated.
321. The most exhaustive recent account of the policy of Carthage is found in B. Warmington, Carthage (London 1960). The relevant sections, (chapters 2 and 3), in the study by G.C. and C. Picard, The Life and Death of Carthage, translated from the French by D. Collon (London 1968), has nothing significant to add to Warmington's treatment.
322. It is difficult to date the conclusion of this war since, as M.I. Finley, A History of Sicily : Ancient Sicily to the Arab Conquest (London 1968), 83 remarked, Diodorus compressed the narrative into a single year. Finley dated the conclusion to c. 378 B.C. Other historians opt for any of the dates between 382 and 375, but all acknowledge the tentative nature of any conclusion.
323. Diodorus, XIII.91.2.
324. Diodorus, XIII.91.2, 3.
325. Diodorus, XIV.68.1-7.
326. Plutarch, Dion XIV.3.
327. Plutarch, Dion XIV.4, 5. = EGrH 566 F113
328. On the reasons for this exile see 82-83.
329. The commander was called Synalus by Plutarch (Dion XXV.5, 6) and Paralus by Diodorus (XVI.9.5).
330. Plutarch, Dion XXVI.2.
331. B.H. Warmington, op. cit. 97.

332. Plutarch, Timoleon II.2. This was later confirmed by the letter, sent while Timoleon was collecting his forces in Greece, to say that Timoleon's services would no longer be required since Hicetas had been forced to make an alliance with the Carthaginians against the Tyrant. VII.4.
333. Diodorus, XVI.67.1.
334. Plutarch, Timoleon IX.2, Diodorus, XVI.68.4-7. cf. Westlake, Essays 272 and n.26.
335. R.J.A. Talbert, op. cit. 79.
336. Westlake, AJPh LXX (1949), 72.
337. Plutarch, Timoleon XVII.1. This contradicts an earlier statement by Plutarch at XI.4 that Hicetas sent for many Carthaginians when he heard that Timoleon had landed. As H.D. Westlake noted, Timoleon and His Relations with Tyrants (Manchester 1952), 14 note 3, the later occasion is undoubtedly more accurate since Hicetas had by then lost the initiative in his siege of Ortygia. This is also more in agreement with Diodorus XVI.69.3 who places the use of a large Carthaginian force after the Battle of Adranum, although in his account the Corinthians had taken over part of the city but not Ortygia.
338. Plutarch, Timoleon XVII.2; Diodorus, XVI.69.3.
339. Plutarch, Timoleon XX.2-4.
340. Plutarch, Timoleon XX.5; Diodorus, XVI.69.5. Talbert, op. cit. 79-81 discussed the possible explanations for this apparently illogical move.
341. Hicetas was later to help Timoleon at the Battle of the River Crimisus against the Carthaginians.
342. Plutarch, Timoleon XXX.2, 3.
343. Plutarch, Timoleon XXXIV.1; Diodorus, XVI.82.3.
344. Diodorus XIX.4.3.
345. Diodorus, XIX.5.1.
346. Diodorus, XIX.5.4.
347. B.H. Warmington, op. cit. 104.
348. Diodorus, XIX.5.4.
349. The oath is mentioned by Diodorus, XIX.5.4. cf. Justin XXII.2.8.
350. Justin XXII 2.5-7; Polyaeus, Stratagemata V 3.7. There are useful discussions on the alleged agreement between Hamilcar and Agathocles in Freeman, History of Sicily, Vol. IV, Appendix VII, 521-523 and H.J.W. Tillyard, Agathocles (Cambridge 1908), 95-96.
351. Diodorus, XIX.71.6, 72.2; Justin XXII 3.1-7. In the dying speech of Bomilcar, as reported by Justin XXII 7.10, Bomilcar was made to say

that Hamilcar wished to secure for Carthage the friendship of Agathocles but was condemned for the offence.

352. Experience had shown that internal strife at Syracuse affected the surrounding Greek cities and that the ensuing unsettled conditions and contention had their effect on the Carthaginian section of the island.
353. Diodorus, XIX.103.1.
354. Diodorus, XIX.103.4.
355. Diodorus, XIX.106.1, 2.
356. Diodorus, XX.31.1.
357. Diodorus, XX.79.5; cf. Justin XXII 8.15.
358. After Agathocles' death civil strife broke out again in Syracuse, this time between those who wished to return to some form of oligarchy or democracy and the leaders of Agathocles' mercenaries. Carthage supported the latter to the extent of helping to bring about an agreement whereby all Syracusan exiles returned to the city and the mercenaries were given land and civic rights. This compromise was not, however, effective for disorders continued until the city fell under another tyrant, Hicetas who ruled until 279 B.C. when he was deposed by a rival, Thoenon. But Thoenon did not gain the confidence of the Syracusans. They shut him on Orgygia and appealed to Sosistratus, the leader of Acragas for help. The possibility of the coalition of these two cities induced Carthage to launch a full scale attack on Syracuse. The Syracusans then appealed to King Pyrrhus of Epirus for help and he successfully repelled the Carthaginians from 278-276 B.C.; after which Hieron II gained control of the mercenary army, came to an understanding with the Carthaginians, and assumed the kingship of Syracuse in 269 B.C., a position which he held until his death in 215 B.C.

CHAPTER THREE

1. Aristotle, Politics V 1301a 26-1302a 8.
2. Aristotle, Politics V 1302a 35-1302b 5.
3. Aristotle, Politics V 1270b 21-23. Translation T.A. Sinclair.
4. The more usual cry was to be giving the people back their liberty.
5. In 485/484 B.C. Gelo transferred half the population of Gela to Syracuse, as well as the inhabitants of Camarina. In 484 B.C. the wealthy citizens of Sicilian Megara and of the Leontine outpost or colony of Euboea were also moved. Herodotus, VII.155, 156; Diodorus, XI.49; Polyaeus, Stratagemata I.27.3; Pausanias VI.10.1 A further transplantation occurred in 461/460 B.C. with rivalry between the old and the new citizens of Syracuse. Diodorus, XI.72-76. The Leontines, Catanians and Naxians were again moved. In c. 423 B.C. the Leontines moved to Syracuse again as the result of a previous ~~orders~~ in Leontini over their new citizens. Thucydides V.4.2-5, cf. Diodorus XII 53.1-54.7 where the outbreak of conflict with Syracuse, the securing of an alliance with Athens, the arrival of the Athenians in Sicily, the

reconciliation with Syracuse and the Athenian departure are all compressed under the year 427 B.C.

6. Thucydides, VI.17.2. Translation, R. Warner.
7. Thucydides, V.4.2.
8. Diodorus, XIV.7.5. See above 91-92.
9. Diodorus, XIV.8.3.
10. Diodorus, XIV.15.3.
11. Diodorus, XIV.66.5.
12. Trouble had occurred over this issue in c.466 B.C. after the fall of Thrasybulus when the mercenaries were given citizenship. Aristotle, Politics V 1303b 1.
13. Aristotle, Politics V 1304a 27.
14. Diodorus, XIV.106.3, 107.2. The Caulonians were given the added privilege of five years exemption from taxes.
15. Plutarch, Dion LIV.2.
16. Diodorus, XVI.83.1; Nepos, Timoleon 3.1.
17. Plutarch, Timoleon XIV.4.
18. Diodorus, XVI.78.5.
19. Plutarch, Timoleon XXX.1.
20. *ibid.* XXIII 4, 5.
21. Plutarch, Timoleon XXII.3.
22. Diodorus, XVI.69.4.
23. H.D. Westlake, 'Timoleon and the Reconstruction of Syracuse', CHJ VII (1942) 79 n.34 estimated 13,000-15,000 on the basis of the Syracusan contingent at the Battle at the River Crimisus.
24. Diodorus, XVI.82.3; Plutarch, Timoleon XXIII.3.
25. Diodorus, XVI.82.5 and XIX.2.8 placed the appeal after the battle, while Plutarch, Timoleon XXIII.2 placed it before.
26. Plutarch, Timoleon XXIII.5, quoting Athanis. Diodorus, XVI.82.5 said 40,000 to Syracuse and 10,000 to Agrigum.
27. Diodorus, XVI.82.4.
28. Diodorus, XVI.82.5.
29. See B.V. Head, Historia Numorum (reprinted, London 1963), 118, 119, 135, 137, 157. For a discussion of the general revival of the area see Talbert, *op. cit.* 146-170.

30. Diodorus, XIX.5.2-8.6.
31. Westlake, CHJ VII (1942), 84. See also Diodorus, XIX.2.8 and cf. Justin 22.1.6.
32. Diodorus, XVI.82.7.
33. *ibid.*
34. Plutarch, Timoleon XXV.2.
35. Diodorus, XVI.83.1.
36. Diodorus, XVI.83.2.
37. Plutarch, Timoleon XXXIX.1. The term used by Plutarch, *ὑποπόλεοι* did not mean secondary citizens as in Laconia, but merely those dwelling in the countryside.
38. Diodorus, XIX.5.2, 3. On the Six Hundred see below 140-141.
39. W. Hüttl, Verfassungsgeschichte von Syrakus (Prague 1929), 77.
40. Thucydides, VI.72.5.
41. Thucydides, VI.73.1; Diodorus XIII.4.1.
42. Thucydides, VI.96.3.
43. Thucydides, VI.103.4. Westlake, BRL 41 (1958/1959), 254 noted that of the successors, two appeared again as generals when Diocles was at the height of his power (Xenophon 1.2.8). Hence he thought it likely that popular agitation, led perhaps by Athenagoras, caused the dismissal of Hermocrates and his colleagues. If an impeachment followed, the defendants must have been acquitted: the influence of Hermocrates continued to be strong, while Sicanus, who was dismissed with him, apparently served on the Board of Generals in the following year. Thucydides, VII.50.1, 70.1; Diodorus, XIII.13.2, 6. (Westlake, *ibid.* 252-255)
44. Xenophon, Hellenica I.1.27-31.
45. Thucydides, VI.91.4.
46. Thucydides, VI.93.2. The phrase used by Thucydides was *πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνους ἐπισηρᾶν τοὺς Συρακοσίους* which A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides Vol. IV Books V 25 - VII (Oxford 1970), 367 pointed out could mean that Gylippus was appointed to command the force for the Syracusans or that he was assigned to the Syracusans as a commander. A similar lack of precision occurs in the sources concerning Timoleon's appointment by Corinth - see below 113-115.
47. Thucydides, VII.3.1, 3.4, 4.2, 5.1-6.2.
48. Gomme, *op. cit.* 381. References from Thucydides, VII.74.2, 82.1, 83.2.
49. The sources vary on the content of that opinion: Thucydides, VII.86.2-4; Plutarch, Nicias XXVIII.2, 3; Diodorus, XIII.28-33.
50. Plutarch, Nicias XIX.5. Philistus' view would appear to be the

exception in the Sicilian versions. As Westlake, 'Hermocrates the Syracusan' 265 observed "Although Sicilian tradition, unwilling to admit that Syracuse survived mainly through the intervention of Gylippus and the Peloponnesians, pictures Hermocrates as its saviour, the more objective account of Thucydides shows that valuable as his contribution was, it was not the deciding factor." The playing down of the role of Gylippus is evident in Timaeus. In F.Gr. Hist. 566 F 100a (= Plutarch, Nicias XIX.4) and F 100b (= Plutarch, Nicias XXVIII.2-4) he says that the Syracusans found Gylippus uncongenial. This may well have been so for he no doubt insisted on the discipline and organisation which they lacked. In fact, part of their complaint was that "they had found it hard to put up with his harshness and the Laconian style with which he exercised authority". Timaeus, however, failed to concede that it was precisely because of this discipline and organisation that the Syracusans were successful. In F 102a (= Anon II) and 102b (= Plutarch, Nicias I.3) he further emphasised Hermocrates' role when he linked the mutilation of the Hermes at Athens prior to the expedition with the defeat of the Athenians at the hands of Hermocrates. Timaeus' view of Hermocrates was accepted by Polybius, despite his severe criticism of him. Polybius 12.25k.2, 11.

51. Plutarch, Timoleon II.1.
52. Diodorus, XVI.65.1
53. In Diodorus the debate over Timoleon's action was still occurring, whereas in Plutarch 20 years had elapsed since Timoleon's fratricide.
54. Talbert, op. cit. 122-123. M.I. Finley in A History of Sicily : Ancient Sicily to the Arab Conquest (London 1968) held a similar view but expressed it far more strongly. His comment is worth quoting : "Were it not for the myth which has been created about him (Timoleon), he would be called a tyrant. And rightly so : he had seized power with a mercenary force and he depended largely on mercenaries throughout, he was autocratic and ruthless and brutal and faithless (otherwise known as 'diplomatic') precisely like his allies and opponents, who frequently interchanged roles with him." (97). Finley also concluded that this was precisely what the contemporary Greek world saw in him since his name is not mentioned in any surviving work of the time.
55. U. Kahrstedt, Griechisches Staatsrecht Vol. 1, Sparta und seine Symmachie (Gottingen 1922), 365-368; (From Talbert, op. cit. 123 n.2)
56. W. Hüttl, op. cit. 127; (From Talbert, op. cit. 125 n.1)
57. H. Berve, Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen, Vol. 2 (Munich 1967), 666. (From Talbert, op. cit. 125 n.2)
58. Talbert, op. cit. 125. W.K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War : Part II (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1974), 34-35 and 94-96 disagrees with this view. Apart from Diodorus' comment discussed in the text, he mentioned that Timoleon was dispatched as a Corinthian and that the dedicants in the inscriptions on the spoils of Crimissus were said to be the Corinthians and their 'strategos'. In the first instance he quoted the evidence in Diodorus, XVI.65.2 and Plutarch, Timoleon, III.1 and VII.2 where the Corinthians were said to have voted to send Timoleon as general. But it must be stressed that the stories of both Diodorus and Plutarch show that it was not one of the normal Corinthian generals that was sent, but rather a person selected for the specific purpose of taking troops to Sicily. Timoleon then, was not regarded as a general

in Corinth, but rather as a general to lead troops (many of whom were mercenaries) to Sicily. In the case of the dedications the initiative came from Timoleon and not the Corinthians. Moreover, the Corinthians had by then become interested in Timoleon's actions after his successes and were no doubt prepared to share the glory attached to the defeat of the Carthaginians. On the question of terminology, it must also be noted that the term 'monarchia' (Plutarch, Timoleon XXXVII.6) must be seen as meaning sole autocratic rule rather than as denoting an official position as such.

59. Plutarch, Timoleon XXX.2-3; Diodorus, XVI.82.3-7.
60. Plutarch, Timoleon and Aemilius II.3. See also, Plutarch, Timoleon XXXVII.6; Nepos, Timoleon 3.4.
61. On this point see H.D. Westlake, 'Timoleon and the Reconstruction of Syracuse' 77.
62. Nepos, Timoleon 3.3; Plutarch, Timoleon XXII.1, 2.
63. Most notable, of course, was Callippus, the Athenian who seized Syracuse on Dion's assassination in 354 B.C. but there had been others. In Dionysius I's time they were more official in their role, Aristus and Pharacidas being sent with reinforcements in 404 B.C. and 396 B.C. respectively, to aid Dionysius against the Carthaginians (Diodorus XIV.10.2, 3; XIV.70.1, 2). During the troubled years of 356-354 B.C. the presence of Pharax (Plutarch, Dion XLVIII.3) and Gaesylus (Plutarch, Dion XLIX.3-5) is noteworthy. Plutarch maintained that the Greek cities in Sicily did not have confidence in Timoleon because of the earlier actions of Pharax and Callippus. (Plutarch, Timoleon XI.4).
64. Plutarch, Timoleon XXXVIII.2, 3; Nepos, Timoleon 3.5, 6, 4.2.
65. Plutarch, Timoleon XXXVII.1-3; Nepos, Timoleon 5.3. As Talbert, op. cit. 129 note 2 remarked, while it is true that non-citizens attended and spoke in the assembly, they would not have done so regularly.
66. Plutarch, Timoleon XXXVIII.4. Much of the discussion on Timoleon's position at Syracuse is indebted to Talbert, op. cit. 126-129.
67. Diodorus, XIX.5.1.
68. This was due to a Carthaginian invasion. (Diodorus XIII.80.5-7).
69. Diodorus, XIII.91.2, 3.
70. Diodorus, XIII.92.1.
71. Diodorus, XIII.95.1. Westlake, BRL 41 (1958/59), while discussing the alternatives open to Hermocrates in his attempt to return to Syracuse after his exile made the rather sweeping statement that, "He might have been content with the status of *στρατηγὸς ἀποκράτωρ* but apparently no one who was not a tyrant held the office before the time of Dion", (264). This assertion is not quite accurate. Dionysius I was elected *στρατηγὸς ἀποκράτωρ* by the people before he became a tyrant. His gaining of a bodyguard and his retention of absolute power in spite of the people's wishes made him a tyrant later. Moreover, Dion, once he held his position irrespective of the will of the people ought to be regarded as a tyrant, even though he did not live long enough to be deemed as such.

72. Diodorus, XIII.114.1.
73. Diodorus, XIX.3.3-5.
74. H.J.W. Tillyard, *op. cit.* 39-40. Although not fully established in power as Tillyard implies, the oligarchic clique obviously wielded much power at this stage under the guise of the democracy of the time.
75. Diodorus, XIX.4.2.
76. Diodorus, XIX.5.1.
77. Diodorus, XIX.5.4.
78. Diodorus, XIX.5.4; Justin XXII 2.1-7; Polyaeus, V.3.7.
79. Diodorus, XIX.5.5.
80. Diodorus, XIX.6.1-3.
81. Diodorus, XIX.6.4-8.2.
82. Diodorus, XIX.9.4.
83. Diodorus, XIV.70.2.
84. Diodorus XIV.57.6, 61.3; Polyaeus V.2.20. H.W. Parke, *op. cit.* briefly traced the careers of Deinarchus and Demareus after their actions in Sicily.
85. Diodorus, XIV.72.2.
86. Diodorus, XIV.78.1.
87. Plato, Epistle VIII 353E.
88. Plutarch, Timoleon XXX.4. A discussion on the points raised here can be found in Talbert, *op. cit.* 129.
89. Isocrates, Oration V 96, 120, 121. See also, Talbert, *op. cit.* 129.
90. G.T. Griffith, The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World (Cambridge 1935), 296-297.
91. Diodorus, XVI.61.4 See also, H.D. Westlake, 'Phalaecus and Timoleon', CQ XXXIV (1940), 44-46.
92. Plutarch, Timoleon XI.3.
93. Plutarch, Timoleon XIII.3; cf. Justin XXI.5.2.
94. Plutarch, Timoleon XVI.1.
95. Plutarch, Timoleon XXIX.4 merely mentioned a force under the two men. Diodorus, XVI.73.1 said a thousand men were sent.
96. Diodorus, XVI.78.5, 6; Plutarch, Timoleon XXX.2, 3. Plutarch, with his bias toward Timoleon, said that the men turned coward.
97. Plutarch, Timoleon XXVI.1-3; Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.12.1.

98. Plutarch, Timoleon XX.2-4.
99. *ibid.* XXXII.1.
100. *ibid.* XXIV.2.
101. Plato, Epistle VII 348 A, B.
102. Plutarch, Dion XIX.5; Plato, Epistle III 315E, VII 350A.
103. Plutarch, Dion L.1, 2.
104. Plutarch, Dion XXVIII.3, 4.
105. Plutarch, Dion XLIII.3, XLVI.3.
106. Nepos, Dion 7.1, 2.
107. Plutarch, Dion LVII.1; Nepos, Dion 8.4.
108. H.W. Parke, *op. cit.* 173.
109. *ibid.* 173 notes 1 and 2.
110. Diodorus, XIII.96.1.
111. Diodorus, XIX.9.4.
112. Diodorus, XIII.92.1.
113. It is not known whether any action was taken against the dismissed colleagues. From the context it is obvious that no such illegality such as occurred in Athens in 406 B.C., where the generals were all tried together by a single vote, contrary to Athenian law, happened.
114. Talbert, *op. cit.* 68. We hear of initiative being taken by Demaretus and Deinarchus in getting to Sicily (Plutarch, Timoleon XVI.3-4, XIX.2-3, XIX.6) and in their actions in Sicily (Plutarch, Timoleon XXI.3, XXIV.4 (cf. Diodorus, XVI.73.1), XXVII.6 (Demaretus only). Other lieutenants mentioned : Plutarch, Timoleon XIII.4, XVIII.3-5.
115. Plutarch, Dion XXIX.2. Diodorus, XVI.10.3 does not mention the colleagues.
116. Plutarch, Dion XXXIII.1.
117. Plutarch, Dion XXXIII.1, 2.
118. Diodorus, XIV.7.4, 5.
119. Leptines : Diodorus, XIV.48.4, 53.5, 54.4-55.3, 60.2-4, 72.1, 102.2, XV.17.1 Leptines seems to have been a particularly successful commander, see Polyænus, Stratagemata V.8.1 and Frontinus, Stratagemata II.5.11. Thæarides : Diodorus, XIV.102.3, 109.2. Polyxenus : Diodorus, XIV.62.1 At some time after this he was banished - Plutarch, Dion XXI.4.
120. Diodorus, XX.4.1. Antander remained loyal (despite Diodorus' assertion that he was contemplating surrender of Syracuse to the

Carthaginians in 310 B.C. on being told that Agathocles' African army had been defeated - XX.16.1) and promptly carried out Agathocles' orders in 307 B.C. to take reprisals against the relatives of those soldiers who had killed his sons in Africa - Diodorus, XX.72.1-5.

121. Diodorus, XX.55.5. Archagathus had been his principal lieutenant throughout the Carthaginian campaign.
122. Diodorus, XIV.8.5. cf. Isocrates, Oration VI 44-45.
123. Diodorus XIV.87.2, 90.5 (with the Rhegians) XIV.103.5, 104.3 (with the Crotonians).
124. Plutarch, Dion XI.2. Philistus and Dion's father, Hipparinus, seem to have got on amicably, combining their abilities to raise Dionysius I to the tyranny.
125. Plutarch, Dion VI.2; Nepos, Dion 2.4.
126. Plato, Epistle VII 327C; Plutarch, Dion XI.1, 2.
127. Plutarch, Dion VI.4.
128. The statements about Dion's attitudes and wishes as to the conversion of the tyranny smack of having been written with a view to justifying his later protestations when he claimed to be freeing the Syracusans.
129. Diodorus, XIII.92.1.
130. Diodorus, XIII.92.5-7.
131. Diodorus, XIII.95.1.
132. Diodorus, XIV.45.2.
133. Plutarch, Timoleon XXXVIII.3; Nepos, Timoleon 3.5-6. 4.2; Diodorus. XVI.70.5. The following section on Timoleon's constitution is broadly based on Talbert's ideas. Talbert, op. cit. 56-57.
134. Diodorus, XVI.82.5.
135. Plutarch, Timoleon XXIII.5.
136. Plutarch, Timoleon XXXIII.1.
137. Plutarch, Timoleon XXXIV.4; cf. Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.12.2.
138. Plutarch, Timoleon XXXVIII.2. Talbert, op. cit. 201, note H discussed the meaning of 'another race'.
139. Plutarch, Timoleon XXXIX.3; Diodorus XVI.90.1.
140. Plutarch, Timoleon XXXVII.1, 2; Nepos, Timoleon 5.2, 3.
141. Diodorus, XIX.3.4.
142. Diodorus, XIX.5.5.
143. Diodorus, XIX.3.5.
144. Diodorus, XIX.9.1.

145. M.I. Finley, A History of Sicily : Ancient Sicily to the Arab Conquest 98.
146. Dionysius I had done this after the attacks on his policies by Theodorus. Diodorus XIV.70.3.
147. R.J.A. Talbert, op. cit. 131.
148. Plutarch, Timoleon XXIV.3.
149. Diodorus, XVI.70.5-6 and 82.6 respectively.
150. Talbert, op. cit. 132.
151. ibid. 133.
152. The fact that Plutarch maintained that Dion had earlier summoned legislators from Corinth since they would be sympathetic to his political viewpoint (Dion LIII.3) is not of significance since the motives that he (as well as Plato) attributed to Dion were not borne out by events. We do not know if they even actually arrived. The opposition to Dion was largely due to the fact that he had acted without consulting the people and was highhanded in his manner, and not on the basis of the political sympathies of the intended lawgivers.
153. Plato, Epistle VII 337B, C. I do not mean to suggest that Timoleon was in any way specifically influenced by Plato's recommendations. For this extreme view see M. Sordi, Timoleonte (Palermo 1961). Her ideas on this influence are interspersed throughout the work. For a sensible refutation of those ideas see Talbert, op. cit. 116-122, *who drew my attention to Sordi's ideas*.
154. Diodorus, XVI.82.5, 6 links the second set of laws with the arrival of the colonists, a point noticed by Talbert, op. cit. 134.
155. Diodorus, XIII.35.3.
156. For example, G. de Sanctis, 'Diocle di Siracusa', Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica II (1903) 433-55 and V. Costanzi, 'Dioclea', Archivio Storica per la Sicilia Orientale, 16-17 (1919/1920), 1-7. (*From Talbert, op. cit. 136 n.1*)
157. Diodorus, XIII.34.6-35.1; Aristotle, Politics, V 1304a 26.
158. Talbert, op. cit. 134-136 came to a similar conclusion, but for different reasons. Part of his discussion centred on the fact that it seemed extraordinary to him that the Syracusans should reinstate laws as mentioned in Diodorus, XVI.70.5, only to revise them a few years later (XVI.82.6) because of difficulty in comprehension. This problem is removed, I believe, if the first set of laws are regarded as makeshift and that, although Timoleon had then formulated a democratic constitution, it was only of the most rudimentary kind, sufficient to give a semblance of constitutional government to meet the demands of the immediate situation. On the later occasion a thorough revision of the laws in reference to the earliest ones was worked out in detail and it was at this detailed level that difficulties occurred.
159. Diodorus, XIV.9.5.
160. Diodorus, XIV.9.8.
161. Diodorus, XIV.70.3. cf. Roman emperors with the urban populace at Rome.

162. Nepos, On Kings 2.2; Cicero also mentioned his temperance - Tusculan Disputations, V.20.57. The occasional reference alleging that Dionysius I did drink excessively was discussed by A.P. McKinlay, 'The Indulgent Dionysius', TAPA 70 (1939), 51-61. He arrived at two conclusions, firstly, "since such an interpretation (of Dionysius drinking heavily) does not fit in well with the other evidence, may it not be fair to suspect that though drinking deeply was in order at Dionysius the Elder's parties, he may have kept a close watch on himself" (57). This fits in with the statement that he used such occasions to discover subversive elements in Syracuse. Agathocles, it must be noted, used a similar method. (Diodorus, XX.63.6). Dionysius' supposed death as the result of a lingering disease after a drinking party was only mentioned by Diodorus, (XV.74.1, 2). Nepos (Dion 2.5), and Plutarch (Dion VI.2) both had his death as the result of his relatives who helped along his sickness (cf. Justin XX.5.14). Secondly, McKinlay postulated that where the reference to a Dionysius were not specific, Dionysius the younger was probably meant.
163. Diodorus, XIX.9.6.
164. Diodorus, XIX.9.7.
165. Athenaeus X 436A from Theopompus.
166. Diodorus, for example, speaking of Dion's entry into Syracuse, said that "Now that the city had put on the garb of freedom in exchange for that of slavery and that fortune had changed the sullen looks of tyranny to festival gaiety, every house was filled with sacrificing and rejoicing, as the citizens burnt incense on their own hearths, thanked the gods for their present blessings and offered hopeful prayers for blessings to come". He then continued to express the joy of the Syracusans at the magnitude and unexpected nature of the change (XVI.11.1, 2). Concerning Dionysius II's final eviction by Timoleon he mentioned that Dionysius spent the remainder of his life in Corinth, "furnishing in his life of misfortune an example to all who vaunt themselves on their success". (XVI.70.2, 3). Plutarch's narratives were similarly coloured. His story of Dion centres around the belief that Dion was the liberator of the Syracusans from an oppressive tyranny and was accordingly welcomed by them. His life of Timoleon shows Dionysius in a similar light. He digressed about Dionysius' life after he arrived in Corinth to illustrate his reversal of fortune and the power of Providence to effect such a change. (XIV.1-XV.6). For Plutarch, Dionysius' story formed a contrast to the "good fortune" of Timoleon cf. also, Aelian, Varia Historia VI, 12; XII 60. For a list of the references to and anecdotes about Dionysius II at Corinth, see H. Berve, Die Tyrannis bei der Griechen (Munich 1967), 664.
167. The sojourn at Locri was another matter (see Aelian, Varia Historia IX.8) and after his return to Syracuse in 346 B.C. his control was probably more severe.
168. Plutarch, Dion XXVII.3; Diodorus, XVI.10.1.
169. Plutarch, Dion XXVI.3.
170. Plutarch, Dion XXVII.1, XXVIII 2.
171. The absence of Dionysius was a crucial factor in Dion's victory, hence

the speed with which the latter moved from Minoa.

172. Plato, Epistle IV 321C
173. Callippus had sounded out Syracusan opinion before he arranged Dion's assassination (Plutarch, Dion LIV.4).
174. Diodorus, XIII.96.3. They were presumably condemned as traitors - see Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.2.2. Plato, Epistle VIII 354E committed the error of confusing Dionysius' action against the generals at Syracuse with the stoning of the generals at Acragas.
175. Diodorus, XIII.113.1-4.
176. Diodorus, XIV.9.3, 4.
177. Diodorus, XIV.45.1.
178. Diodorus, XIX.5.5.
179. Diodorus, XIX.6.4-6.
180. Diodorus, XIX.6.6-8.2.
181. Diodorus, XIV.7.2, 3.
182. Diodorus, XIV.10.4.
183. Diodorus, XIV.43.2.
184. Diodorus, XIV.10.4.
185. Diodorus, XIV.9.3, 4.
186. Plutarch, Dion XLI.2, 3; Diodorus, XVI.19.1-4.
187. H.D. Westlake, Timoleon and his Relations with Tyrants (Manchester 1952), 23. See also his discussion, 17-25.
188. Plutarch, Timoleon XIII.5; Strabo, 6.1.8; Athenaeus, XII 541C-E; Plutarch, Moralia 821D; Aelian, Varia Historia VI 12. Strabo certainly represented Dionysius as being very distressed at the capture of his family. For a discussion of the evidence for Dionysius' time at Lokri see P. Meloni, 'Il soggiorno di Dionisio II a Locri', Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica 25 (1951), 149-168; and on the date of that sojourn, W.A. Oldfather, 'The Date of Plato's Laws', AJPh XLIV (1923), 275-276. See also, Talbert, op. cit. 106 n.2.
189. Plutarch, Timoleon XVII.4-XVIII.1.
190. *ibid.* XIII.2.
191. Diodorus, XVI.70.1-3. Some of the points in the above discussion have been noted by Talbert, op. cit., 97-110.
192. Plutarch, Timoleon XVII.1.
193. *ibid.* XVIII.1.
194. *ibid.* XIII.4.

195. The sequence of events from the Battle at Adranum to the capture of the whole of Syracuse are quite different in Plutarch and Diodorus. In Plutarch's version, Mamercus and other Greek cities joined Timoleon and Dionysius offered to surrender Syracuse to him and he infiltrated 400 men into Ortygia through Hicetas' blockade. Timoleon thus took over the defence of Ortygia and Dionysius slipped through to Timoleon's camp from whence he was dispatched to Corinth. All this and the events since Timoleon's arrival in Sicily had occurred within 50 days (XIII.1-4) (XVI.1). Hicetas then called in the Carthaginians in full force and they blockaded the harbour. The Corinthians on Ortygia were suffering from hunger but food was slipped in from Catana to which place Mago and Hicetas sailed in the hope of preventing the food coming in. While they were gone the Corinthians took Achradina which they united in fortification with Ortygia (XVII.1-XVIII.3). At this stage the Corinthian reinforcements arrived (XX.1) and the Carthaginians unaccountably withdrew (XX.5). Hicetas was still eager for battle and determined to keep parts of the city he possessed but Timoleon with a three-pronged attack defeated Hicetas and took the city without any Corinthians being wounded or killed. In Diodorus' account, after Adranum Timoleon proceeded straight to Syracuse and captured parts of it. Dionysius still held the Island and Hicetas held Achradina and Neapolis (XVI.68.11-69.3). The Carthaginians then arrived (XVI.69.3) and Mamercus joined Timoleon as did many of the outlying Syracusan forts (XVI.69.4). The Carthaginians then left and Timoleon took Syracuse from Hicetas (XVI.69.5). Dionysius was then frightened into surrendering the citadel and he was sent to Greece (XVI.70.1). The only other information comes from Nepos, Timoleon 2.1-3, who placed Dionysius' departure to Greece before Timoleon overcame Hicetas and Oxy. Pap. 1.12. col.2 which dated the capture of Syracuse and the arrival of Dionysius in Greece to 343/342 B.C.

These conflicting accounts were discussed by Talbert, op. cit. 97-110 and Westlake, Timoleon and his Relations with Tyrants, 17-28. Westlake, on the whole, rejected Diodorus' version since he believed that Timoleon's men could not make the dash to Syracuse after the Battle at Adranum with such speed without Hicetas' trying to prevent it and that his forces would be unlikely to have been able to withstand the armies of Hicetas and Mago later. Talbert demonstrated that although the march to Syracuse would have required a feat of physical endurance it was not completely impossible and that Hicetas may not have known of Timoleon's intentions and therefore was unable to attempt to prevent Timoleon's march to Syracuse. Even if he did know of Timoleon's intention, Talbert pointed out that his army was in a disordered state and probably not capable of co-ordinated action. The unbelievable nature of Timoleon's small force retaining the positions it had captured after the arrival of Hicetas' Punic reinforcements Talbert believed to be mitigated, in part, by the fact that Diodorus himself stressed how the situation in Syracuse was unbelievable. In an attempt to reconcile the accounts, Westlake accepted Diodorus' chronology, but Plutarch's sequence of events. To explain Plutarch's allegation that Dionysius surrendered after the Battle at Adranum and that Timoleon captured Syracuse within 50 days of landing in Sicily, Westlake postulated that Dionysius entered into negotiations with Timoleon at that time, handed over the defence of Ortygia to him and Timoleon began his siege of the rest of Syracuse from there. However, it was only in 343/342 B.C., after the Carthaginians had come and gone, that Dionysius abdicated the tyranny and left for Corinth. Talbert quite rightly objected to this reconstruction since it leaves Dionysius at Timoleon's camp from

345/4 to 343/2 B.C. This would have been an obvious embarrassment to Timoleon in his relations with his other Sicilian allies. I believe that Talbert's objection is removed if Dionysius is left on Ortygia rather than going to Timoleon's camp. Furthermore, I would place the time of the negotiations between Dionysius and Timoleon and the infiltration of Timoleon's men into Ortygia to the time when knowledge of Punic reinforcements was known, but before they actually arrived. It was not impossible that this should happen within fifty days of Timoleon's arrival, but the short time mentioned by Plutarch may well be the result of later propaganda. If this is accepted, it could also explain how Timoleon's small forces in the outlying areas of Syracuse, together with the forces on Ortygia were able to withstand the combined actions of Hicetas and the Carthaginians as reported by Diodorus. I believe then, that Timoleon did move to Syracuse after Adranum and secured some of the outlying areas, negotiated with Dionysius and established a base at Catana, then, with the help of Dionysius, withstood the Carthaginian invasion. But I admit that this is conjecture and that other explanations are possible. After the Carthaginian departure, the accounts of Plutarch and Diodorus are substantially the same. Westlake's reconstruction, I believe, dismisses Diodorus' account too summarily. Talbert came to the conclusion that while both accounts are possible it is not possible to make a definite choice between the two, nor is it valid or possible to reconcile them and that those who are unwilling to leave the matter unsettled must firmly follow one account or the other. While I admit that a complete reconciliation is not possible, I believe that some sort of reconstruction is valid (particularly since Talbert believes that neither Diodorus nor Plutarch were likely to have invented parts of their narratives) insofar as it is admitted as a reconstruction. Allowance must be made for the fact that the seeming contradictions are probably the result of a difference in emphasis on different aspects of the capture and that some of the sources upon whom Plutarch and Diodorus relied had probably given the facts a propagandistic twist.

196. Plutarch, Timoleon XXI.2, 3.
197. Some of the Syracusan forts in the country and throughout Sicily had declared for Timoleon. Diodorus, XVI.69.4.
198. See Chapter two, note 121.
199. Plutarch, Dion IX.3-5.
200. Plutarch, Timoleon XXXVII.1, 2.
201. A cynical view would maintain that Timoleon only resigned because of his increasing physical disability.
202. The Roman Senate faced a similar problem in the last days of the Republic.
203. Plato, Epistle VIII 354D, E. The example given by Plato of the stoning of the 10 generals is inaccurate. Elsewhere Plato spoke about the luxury and indiscipline of the Syracusans as being a cause for their instability of government. - Epistle VII 326B-C, cf. Republic III 404D.
204. Diodorus, XIII.94.2.

205. Scholars disagree on this point. For example, K.J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte III 2, 197 believed Dionysius was appointed for life; Glotz, Histoire Grecque III 387 that he had himself re-elected annually. See Westlake, Essays 283 n.31.
206. Plutarch, Dion XXXVIII.2.
207. Plutarch, Dion XLVIII.2, 3.
208. Westlake, CHJ VII (1942), 78-79.
209. Diodorus, XIV.69.4.
210. Diodorus, XII.26.3.
211. In 439 B.C. the Syracusans stepped up their military armament. They built 100 new triremes, doubled the cavalry and reorganized the infantry (Diodorus, XII.30.1). This gave rise to fears on the part of Sicilian cities, particularly the Chalcidian ones. Leontini and Rhegium (Italy) renewed their alliances with Athens.
212. Aristotle, Politics V 1310b 15.
213. This can be seen by the election of chiliarchs and generals in Agathocles' time - Diodorus, XIX 3.4, 5.5.
214. The problem is further increased as there is no evidence of the existence of a council in Timoleon's time. However, its absence would have been most unorthodox and the Syracusan state at other times does not seem to have been without it, nor do we know of any other Greek city being without it. See Hüttl, op. cit. 75 and 101 n.14. Without a council of some kind, efficient government would have been impossible. While conceding this much, it does not follow that it was, at the time of Timoleon, composed of the best and most renowned citizens on the grounds that these were the men who appealed to Corinth for help, and that Corinth was oligarchic at the time, as Westlake and Talbert infer. Westlake, CHJ VII (1942), 88 and Talbert, op. cit. 140. For the time of Agathocles, Tillyard, op. cit. 92-93 discussed the problem. H. Berve, Review of M. Sordi, Timoleonte, Gnomon 35 (1963), 381 saw the Six Hundred as a club. Sordi, op. cit. 79 believed that Timoleon instituted a Council of Six Hundred, and C. Mossé, La fin de la démocratie athénienne (Paris 1962), 340 and 344 also leaned to this viewpoint, as has been noted by Talbert, op. cit., 142-143 n.3.
215. Diodorus, XIX.4.3.
216. Diodorus, XIX.5.6.
217. Hüttl, op. cit. 128 n.3 also held this view.
218. Diodorus, XIX.5.5.
219. Diodorus, XVI.70.6.
220. *ibid.*
221. Cicero, In Verrem Actio Secunda ii. 51.126-126.
222. Westlake, CHJ VII (1942), 90-91. See also, Hüttl, op. cit. 121-124

for a full account and Talbert, op. cit. 137-138 for a discussion of the position and of Hüttl's views.

223. Diodorus, XIII.91.4.
224. Diodorus, XIII.75.5.
225. Plutarch, Timoleon XXXVIII.2.
226. Diodorus, XIV.69.5.
227. Diodorus, XIX.5.1.
228. S.I. Oost, 'The Tyrant Kings of Syracuse', CPh 71 (1976), 224-236.
229. Lysias, Oration VI 4-6.
230. Oost, op. cit. 233.
231. Lysias, Oration XXXIII 5.
232. Oost, op. cit. 234.
233. Lysias, Oration XIX 19-20.
234. Tod, op. cit., Nos. 108, 133, 136.
235. Beloch, op. cit. 3 1 : 111 and n.1, 3 2 : 200-201, L'impero Siciliano', 227-8. For the view that Dionysius did not rule under this title, see also, Stroheker, Dionysiōs I (Wiesbaden 1958), 172-175. Useful discussions on the use of the title of 'archon' in these decrees can be found in Hicks and Hill, op. cit. 178, who mention that his victories over the Carthaginians entitled him to be called ruler of Sicily, and in E.A. Freeman, History of Sicily Vol IV (Oxford 1894), Supplement I (By the editor, A.J. Evans), 211-214. Evans came to the conclusion that the title Σικελίας ἀρχων rather suggested that it was intended to cover the more personal authority won by Dionysius himself outside Syracuse.
236. Finley, A History of Sicily : Ancient Sicily to the Arab Conquest, 80.
237. Line 20.
238. Diodorus, XIV.69.4.
239. Diodorus, XVI.16.4. Plutarch, Dion XXX.2 made a similar assertion, but he placed the initiative of the demand on Dion, who promised immunity for Dionysius II if he renounced his ἀρχή.
240. Diodorus, XIV.8.6, 10.2, XV.73.5, XVI.10.2, 13.1.
241. Dionysius' relations had also been honoured in the earlier decrees.
242. Oost, op. cit. 234.
243. Polybius, XV.35.4.
244. Oost, op. cit. 233.
245. Polybius, XII.25k.11.

246. FGrH 268 F4 = Athenaeus VI 251E, F.
247. Oost, op. cit. 233 n.42. Duris : FGrH 76 F14 = Athenaeus XII 535E, F.
248. Diodorus, XIX.9.7.
249. Diodorus, XVI.17.2.
250. Plutarch, Dion XIII.1. Again, Oost failed to mention that although the chariot was referred to as βασιλικός, in the same sentence, Dionysius himself is τύραννος. The story was repeated by Aelian, Varia Historia IV.18, but the chariot was not referred to as βασιλικός. Similarly, with the royal honours given to Theste by the Syracusans. These were of a regal nature, but Plutarch expressly noted that she continued to receive such honours after the dissolution of the tyranny - Dion XXI.6.
251. Diogenes Laertius, II.66.
252. Oost, op. cit. 235, 236 with examples at notes 47 and 50 respectively.
253. Plato : Epistle III 315D, 319D; VII 327B, 329B, 332A-C, 333D, 350C; VIII 352C, 353B. Aristotle, Politics V 1305a 25, 1306a 1, 1310b 30, 1313b 28, 1312a 4. In the latter reference, Dionysius II was mentioned along with monarchs who were attacked as a result of contempt. But it must be noted that it is part of the whole section beginning at 3111a 30 where Aristotle dealt with the motives of revolutionaries who attacked both monarchies and tyrannies. Diodorus: XIII.1.3, 92.7, 95.6, 96.2, 96.4, 109.1, 112.4, XIV.1.7, 7.5, 8.5, 10.2, 10.4, 18.1, 45.1, 54.2, 65.3 (where Theodorus claimed that Dionysius did not dispense justice like a magistrate or judge, but like a μόναρχος. This must be seen as comparative only and in the sense of sole rule. In any case, the context makes it quite clear that Dionysius was not justified in behaving in that manner, and Theodorus then immediately after referred to Dionysius' rule as a tyranny.), XIV.68.4, 70.2, XV.74.1, 74.5, 81.5, XVI.5.1, 6.2, 6.4, 9.1, 9.3, 9.5, 10.3, 11.1, 11.4, 12.5, 13.1, 13.2, 17.1, 18.2, 45.9, 57.2, 70.2, XX.63.3. Plutarch, Dion IX.2-4, X.1-2, XX.1, XXIX.1, XXX.1, XXXI.3, XXXIV.1, XXXVI.1, XXXVII.4, XLIV.3, L.3. Timoleon, I.1-2, VI.4, XIII.3, 4, XV.2, 3, 5, 6, XXIII.1, 2.
254. Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.2.1, 2.2, 2.13, 2.15, 2.22. Aelian, Varia Historia IV.8, VII.4, XIII.18.
255. Oost, op. cit. 234-235.
256. ibid. 235.
257. Plutarch, Timoleon XXXVII.6.
258. Plutarch, Dion XXIX.2.
259. Oost, op. cit. 236.
260. Oost, op. cit. 236.
261. Diodorus, XX.54.1. Diodorus also made the interesting point that Agathocles continued to wear the chaplet that was his because of a priesthood he held when he seized the tyranny. It could be speculated

that the confusion surrounding Dionysius I's position may have arisen since he held some such religious office similar to that of the Athenian *ἑρχων βοιωλεύς*. But this, I acknowledge, is mere guesswork and in any case, even if he held such a position, it was not the basis of his power.

- 262. B.V. Head, Historia Numorum (2nd edition, reprinted London 1963), 182.
- 263. Diodorus, XXI.16.4.
- 264. Diodorus, XIX.1.5.

CHAPTER FOUR

- 1. See Chapter 1, 21-36.
- 2. The prevalence of the latter type of motivation was dealt with by A. Fuks in 'Patterns and Types of Social Economic Revolution in Greece from the Fourth to the Second Century B.C.', Ancient Society 5 (1974), 51-81.
- 3. A. Fuks, op. cit. 'Isokrates and Greece', Ancient Society 3 (1972), 17-44, 'Thucydides and the Stasis in Corcyra, Thuc. III 82-3 versus (Thuc.) III 84', AJPh 92 (1971), 48-55. In the latter article he used the absence of socio-economic revolutions as a concept in the Fifth Century B.C. for a refutation of the authenticity of III 84, since he believed that the concepts expressed in that paragraph only became developed and common place after about 370 B.C. While a detailed discussion of the authenticity of III 84 is out of place here, I would like to point out that even if it is a later interpolation, the sentiments expressed are in accordance with Thucydides' own observations. For Thucydides, when speaking specifically about the slaughter of the Corcyraean oligarchs by the democrats at III 81.4, said that although the victims were accused of trying to destroy the democracy, some were killed because of private enmity and others were killed by their debtors because of the money the latter owned. Admittedly, Thucydides did not specifically contrast *πλοῦτος* and *πενία*, but the presence of debtors in sufficient numbers to warrant Thucydides' comment is a significant indication that such a division existed.
- 4. This was what Peisistratus had done as early as the Sixth Century B.C. and it is noteworthy that Cleisthenes opened the franchise for numerical support against Isagoras, not for reasons of political ideology - Herodotus, V.69.2.
- 5. G.E.M. De Ste Croix, 'The Character of the Athenian Empire', Historia 3 (1954/1955), 1-41 at 24. Passages cited: Xenophon, Hellenica IV.8.20, Memorabilia IV.2.36-37, Memorabilia I.2.40-46, Hell. Oxy. I.3.
- 6. Thucydides, VI.39.1.
- 7. Diodorus, XIII.91.4, 5.
- 8. Diodorus, XIII.92.3.
- 9. Diodorus, XIII.96.1.
- 10. For a useful discussion on the dating of the pamphlet see A.W. Gomme,

'The Old Oligarch' in More Essays in Greek History and Literature (Oxford 1962), 38-69.

11. There were, of course, shades of meaning between these terms. $\epsilon\delta\chi\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ for example, had far more derogatory overtones than $\epsilon\delta\eta\mu\omicron\varsigma$ and was used in instances which showed $\epsilon\delta\eta\mu\omicron\varsigma$ at its worst. $\epsilon\delta\eta\mu\omicron\varsigma$ could also be used to denote simply all those in the city. (See Chapter 1 notes 123-125.) That the terms could be used synonymously and in contrast to the rich reveals the basic Greek attitude on such matters.
12. Pseudo-Xenophon, The Constitution of the Athenians, I.3, II.10.
13. This point was made by G.E.M. De Ste Croix, Historia 3 (1954/1955), 24; as was the variety of Greek terminology mentioned above.
14. Such divisions were constant throughout the Fourth Century B.C. At the time of Dionysius' rise, similar groups existed at Gela where $\sigma\tau\omicron\lambda\omicron\iota\varsigma$ broke out between the most wealthy ($\epsilon\beta\pi\omicron\rho\omega\tau\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\iota$) and the $\delta\eta\mu\omicron\varsigma$. On that occasion, Dionysius sided with the people and confiscated the property of the wealthy (Diodorus, XIII.93.2). The references to Dion all attest to his wealth and fame and that he kept company with men of a similar standing, both at Syracuse and when in exile, and it was such a group that welcomed him back in Syracuse. (Diodorus, XVI.6.1; Plutarch, Dion XVII.3, 5, XXVIII.1, XLII.1-3, XLVII.2.) He was opposed later by the populace led by the $\delta\eta\mu\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\omicron\iota$. (Plutarch, Dion XXXII.3, XLIV.1.) The whole rise of Agathocles was narrated in terms of his support of the poor against those Syracusans who were first in reputation and property and who had formed part of the oligarchy of 600 or were believed to be supporters of it. See especially, Diodorus, XIX.4.3, 5.6, 6.3, 6.5, 7.1, 8.2, 9.5. It was the wealthy who remained hostile to Agathocles, hence his action against them before going to Africa in 310 B.C. (Diodorus, XX.4.6-7).
15. The comments about Dionysius I's supposedly obscure origins were no doubt exaggerated to give the colourful story of how he rose to greatness from nothing in contrast to his son who fell from greatness to nothing. On Dionysius' supposed humble origins see Plutarch, Moralia 176D and Isocrates, Oration V (To Philip) 65. That he was a type of secretary or scribe was stated by Diodorus (XIII.96.4) and Polyaeus (Stratagemata V.2.2). From Diodorus' use of the word it would seem that his family did not have a background of political power. But neither, it must be added, was he particularly poor. R.P. Legon, op. cit. 178-179 noted that within the Greek cities, the demos was too poor to run democratic states and that it followed that the democratic faction was composed of men of substance and that they were, in fact, similar to the oligarchs in background, and only differed in ideology, especially in terms of domestic policy.
16. Agathocles' low origins as a potter were mentioned by Justin XXII 1.1, 2, 6 and Polybius XV.35.2 and XII.15.6 where he attributed the reference of Agathocles as a potter to Timaeus. See also, Plutarch, Moralia 176E, Marcellinus XIV.11.30 and Athenaeus 466A. Tillyard, Agathocles (Cambridge 1908), 28-29 discussed this evidence and pointed out that since the story originated from Timaeus it must not be taken without suspicion and that when Agathocles fell from favour with the oligarchs it would have been natural for his enemies to cast discredit on his birth. It must also be noted that not only was Agathocles on favourable terms with the wealthy Damas, but his brother held a high command in the army (Diodorus XIX.3.3). The story of his extremely low origin should therefore possibly be discounted.

17. Note especially his fortifications and building programme - Diodorus. XIV.18.2-8, XV.13.5.
18. Diodorus, XIII.96.3 made the comment that Dionysius married Hermocrates' daughter so that he would become allied to a distinguished house. (ἐπίσημον οἶκον), Similarly, Aristomache was regarded as most notable (ἐπίσημοτάτη). Such alliances were extended to other members of Dionysius' family - see Table II.
19. Dion's wealth : Nepos, Dion 1.2; Plutarch, Dion XV.3. His wealth was also obvious from his offer to furnish 50 triremes at his own expense. (Plutarch, Dion VI.4) and from Plato, Epistle VII 347B where his property was estimated to be worth over 100 talents. Dion also had the use of this wealth when in exile and it was his wealth and status that enabled him to employ mercenaries and buy weapons. It was partly, I believe, for this reason that Dionysius II suspended payments to Dion c. 361/360 B.C. and sold his property. (Plutarch, Dion XVIII.1).
20. A. Fuks, 'Redistribution of Land and Houses in Syracuse in 356 B.C. and its Ideological Aspects', CQ XVIII (1968), 207-223 at 207.
21. A. Fuks, *ibid.* 210 and note 7.
22. Plutarch, Dion XXXV.2-3; cf. Diodorus, XVI.17.3.
23. Plutarch, Dion XLIV.2.
24. Diodorus, XVI.20.6.
25. Plutarch, Dion XLVIII.2, 3. Despite Plutarch's general equation good citizens = aristocracy, the poorer folk and those not sympathetic to the highest class must have been the larger group to make such a concession necessary. There is the continuous implication in Plutarch that the supporters of Heracleides were not the 'better citizens' and that they were motivated by a desire to create disorder purely for its own sake.
26. Plutarch, Dion L.1.
27. For his opposition to the land bill and reasons for it see above 46-47.
28. Fuks, Ancient Society 5 (1974), 75.
29. Plato, Epistle VII 336A, 337B-D, Epistle VIII 355A-357D; Plutarch, Dion LIII.2. Loeb editions used here and in the following paragraph.
30. Plutarch, Dion LII.4.
31. Socrates was charged with not believing in the gods of the state and with corruption of the youth. Plato, The Apology, especially 24B, C.
32. Aelian, Varia Historia XIII.18.
33. Plutarch, Dion XXVIII.1, Moralia 523A, Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.2.13 cf. Aristotle, Politics V 1313b 11-17 where a similar system was attributed to Hiero.
34. Plato, Epistle VII 332D.
35. Diodorus, XIII.91.4, 96.3.

36. Plutarch, Dion LIII.3.
37. Diodorus, XIX.6.5-8.6.
38. A.W. Gouldner, Enter Plato, (London 1965) 51-55.
39. Agathocles was motivated primarily by the failure of the government of the time to give him due recognition for the distinguished part he played when the Syracusans helped the Crotonians against the Brutti. Diodorus, XIX.3.4.
40. Diodorus, XIII.112.3-113.3, XIV.44.5; Plutarch, Dion III.1.
41. Diodorus, XIV.64.5.
42. A.W. Gouldner, op. cit. 54. A.H. Chroust, 'Treason and Patriotism in Ancient Greece', JHI 15 (1954), 280-288 also discussed this conflict between private interests and those of the community as a whole and showed that individuals placed the private interests first and tended to look to others with similar interests, hence the forming of *ἐταίρεια* where the individuals gave each other mutual support in law suits and political schemes. Such a coalition of interests was obvious in Syracuse in 406 B.C. when Philistus, Hipparinus, Dionysius and the remnant of Hemocratean supporters all combined to elevate Dionysius to power.
43. See above note 16.
44. M.M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet, Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece : An Introduction (translated and revised by M.M. Austin, London 1977) discussed this aspect in the chapter 'Concepts and General Problems'.
45. The value system inherent in this and its accompanying morality was discussed by A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility (Oxford 1960). Although much of the terminology derives from Homeric society, Gouldner made the pertinent remark that "The point is that the Greeks were raised on this literature and, for the most part, found the behaviour of its protagonists meaningful and admirable". Enter Plato, 54.
46. A useful discussion on what the Greeks meant by 'ancestral constitution' is M.I. Finley, The Ancestral Constitution (London 1971).
47. Diodorus, XIV.65.2.
48. Pseudo-Xenophon, The Constitution of the Athenians, translated H. Frisch (Copenhagen 1942), I.ii.
49. Aristotle, Politics VI 1321a 5-6.
50. Plutarch, Dion XXXVII.3
51. Fuks, Ancient Society 5 (1974), 81.
52. M.I. Finley, The Ancient Economy (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1973) also commented (40-41) on the fact that *τενία* meant compulsion to earn one's living by toil. On the widening of the division between the two groups in the Fourth Century B.C. see A. Fuks, 'Isokrates and the Social-Economic Situation in Greece', Ancient Society 3 (1972), 17-44.

53. On the status and role of slaves see the discussions in M.I. Finley (ed.), Slavery and Classical Antiquity (Cambridge 1960), and in particular Finley's own article, 'Was Greek Civilization based on Slave Labour', reprinted from Historia 8 (1959), 145-164.
54. Diodorus, XIV.66.5.
55. G.E.M. De Ste Croix, 'Karl Marx and the History of Classical Antiquity', Arethusa 8 no. 1 (1975), 7-41 at 27.
56. *ibid.* 26.
57. R.A. Padgug, 'Classes and Society in Classical Greece', Arethusa 8 no. 1 (1975), 85-117 at 109.
58. On the general economic situation see J. Hasebroek, Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece (translated L.M. Fraser and D.C. Macgregor, London 1933); H. Mitchell, The Economics of Ancient Greece (2nd ed. Cambridge 1957); F.M. Heichelheim, An Ancient Economic History, Vol II, (revised edition, translated J. Stevens, Leyden 1964) and more recently, M.I. Finley, The Ancient Economy (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1973).
59. H. Knorrhinga, Emporos (Amsterdam 1961), 98-99 cited the evidence for the export of corn down to the time of Hiero II.
60. Strabo, VI.2.4 and VI.2.7 (speaking of Roman times). Plato mentioned the general wealth of the Sicilians - Epistle VII 326 B-C and Republic III 404D. cf. Diodorus XIII.81.4-84.6 on the wealth of Acragas. But even amid the wealth at Acragas there were poor people as the story about the action of Antisthenes' son shows (XIII.84.4). It is also worth mentioning in this context that Diodorus believed that before the expedition of 427 B.C., the Athenians had always been covetous of Sicily because of the fertility of its land (XII.54.1).
61. His means were: indirect taxation, Aristotle Oeconomica 1349a, b; temple plunder, Aristotle, Oeconomica 1349a, 1350a, Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.2.21, Strabo V.2.8, Cicero, Ad Verrem III 83, 84, Aelian, Varia Historia I.20; compulsory loans and donations, Aristotle, Oeconomica 1349a. A discussion of the financial situation under Dionysius I can be found in E.A. Freeman, A History of Sicily Vol IV (Oxford 1894), Supplement III (by the editor A.J. Evans), 230-238.
62. Although some citizens were engaged in trade and industry, they were a minority and they were seen as socially degraded. Moreover, since such citizens were in competition with metics who were not concerned about their political status and slaves who had to work, they came off badly. The citizen was liable for war service in the army or navy or jury service in some states and this further disadvantaged him. It was on this basis that the poorer citizen sought some financial compensation from the State for his services. Aristotle saw this as a basic failure of democracy since it meant that the money to do this had to be extracted from the rich. Thus he counselled that democratic statesmen ought to see that the multitude was not extremely poor for they would then require no payment for their services - Politics VI 1320a 18-35. This tension between the rich and the poor over the issue of taxation was discussed by A.W. Gouldner, *op. cit.* 140-141.
63. Diodorus, XIV.7.4.
64. Diodorus, XIV.66.5.

65. Diodorus, XIV.106.3. Since the Caulonians became citizens they were therefore not in the class of metics and since they were given 5 years exemption from taxes they must also have been given land.
66. Diodorus, XIV.107.2. Their exact status was not given. Perhaps they received similar treatment to the Caulonians.
67. Nepos, Dion I. 2.
68. Diodorus, XVI.83.1; Nepos, Timoleon 3.1; Plutarch, Timoleon I.1-2, XXII.3.
69. L. Edelstein, Plato's Seventh Letter (Leiden 1966), 33.
70. F. Solmsen, Review of Edelstein's Plato's Seventh Letter, Gnomon 41 (1969), 29-34 at 32-33.
71. Talbert, op. cit. 121-122. The key features of the proposal were war against Carthage, colonization of Sicily with settlers from Magna Graecia and the Greek mainland, and legislation.
72. Dionysius' Carthaginian Wars did not have such a serious effect on Syracuse as has often been assumed. Most of the battles were fought in areas outside Syracuse and on only one occasion was there a Carthaginian incursion of any magnitude into Syracusan territory.

From Diodorus' account of the invasion in 406/405 B.C. (XIII.80.5-7, 85.1-91.1, 96.5, 108.2-111.6, 114.1-2), while the territory of Acragas, Gela and Camarina was severely ravaged, Hamilcar, because of an outbreak of plague in his army, sued for peace before advancing into Syracusan territory.

More serious and more widespread was the devastation resulting from Dionysius' declaration of war against Carthage in 397 B.C. In the war that followed (Diodorus, XIV.47.1-64.5, 70.4-75.9) the initiative was at first held by Dionysius who plundered the Carthaginian zone and captured Motya. In retaliation, Himilcon proceeded along the northern coast to Messana, captured it and prepared for an advance on Syracuse. After Dionysius was defeated in a naval battle off Catana the Greeks withdrew to Syracuse and the Carthaginians occupied the territory of Catana. Himilcon then advanced on Syracuse and succeeded in seizing and plundering the suburb of Achradina but was forced to withdraw on the onset of another outbreak of plague. This was the most destructive to Syracuse of Dionysius' wars. As well as the northern coast of Sicily, much of the east coast, including the land around Syracuse and parts of Syracuse itself were severely ravaged.

The third war in 393-392 B.C. (Diodorus, XIV.90.2-4, 95.1-96.4) was begun by Mago who ravaged the territory of Messana and camped near Abacaenum. Dionysius fought a successful battle there and halted any further advance. In the following year Mago proceeded through the interior of Sicily and encamped near Agyrium, but after minor conflicts made peace and retired. Thus, only the northern and central parts of Sicily were affected by this war.

Little is known of the fourth war, compressed by Diodorus into his narrative for 383 B.C. (XV.15.1-17.5). It mainly consisted of minor engagements except for two major battles, one near Cabala where Dionysius was victorious and one at Cronium where he was defeated,

after which the Carthaginians withdrew to Panormus and a peace was concluded. The location of both Cabala and Cronium is unknown, but since no mention is made of any effect on Syracuse or the cities within its territory I would tentatively hazard a guess that they were outside the immediate environs of Syracuse, possibly Sicel towns in the interior of the island.

Dionysius' final war (Diodorus, XV.73.1-4) consisted of another invasion by him into the Carthaginian zone where he succeeded in capturing Eryx and besieging Lilybaeum but on the onset of winter concluded an armistice. While the armistice was in force Dionysius died and it would seem that Dionysius II soon made peace with the Carthaginians. (Diodorus XVI.5.2).

Thus, the only Carthaginian war that had any real effect on Syracuse was the war of 397/6 - 396/5 B.C.

73. Diodorus mentioned that in 387 B.C. 6,000 citizens from Rhegium were sent to Syracuse, but these were either ransomed or sold as slaves. (Diodorus, XIV.111.4).
74. Aristotle, Politics V 1313b 26-30.
75. Aristotle, Oeconomia II 1349a, b.
76. Aristotle, Oeconomia II 1349a 25-32, 1349b 28-33.
77. Diodorus, XIV.46.1.
78. Plato, Epistle VII 347B.
79. Thucydides, II.13.2, II.70.2.
80. Thucydides, III.19.1.
81. Plato, Epistle VII 348A, B. cf. Polyaeus, Stratagemata V.2.11.
82. Plutarch, Dion XXXVII.3.
83. Plutarch, Dion XXXVIII.3.
84. Diodorus, XV.17.3.
85. Plutarch, Dion XXXVII.3.
86. On Dion's supporters see Plutarch, Dion XLII.1, XLIV.2, XLVIII.2, 4 cf. Diodorus, XVI.20.1.
87. Plutarch, Dion XLVIII.2.
88. Fuks, CQ XVIII (1968), 214.
89. The date of the return can not be precisely fixed, nor that of the Assembly and as Fuks, op. cit. noted, Westlake's claim of spring 355 B.C. in 'Dion : A Study in Liberation', DUJ N.S. 38 (1946), 37-44 is a guess.
90. Plutarch, Dion XLVIII.3.
91. Fuks, op. cit. 218.

92. *ibid.* 218-223 has a useful discussion on the ideological justification used for a redistribution of land and houses, in which Fuks shows that the basic concept was that economic poverty was in fact a form of slavery when compared with those who were rich and could be regarded as having freedom (*ἐλευθερία*) and that *ἐλευθερία* in the context was seen to mean economic equality. cf. D. Asheri, Distribuzioni di terre nell'antica Grecia (Torino 1966), 88ff. who postulates a more political interpretation.
93. Kokalos 4 (1958) dealt with the effect of Timoleon's revival of Sicily. See also, Westlake, CHJ VII (1942), 73-100 and Talbert, *op. cit.* *passim*.
94. Plutarch, Timoleon XXIII.4.
95. Westlake, CHJ VII (1942), 84.
96. Plutarch, Timoleon XXIII.4.
97. Nepos, Timoleon, 3.2.
98. Diodorus, XIX.9.5.
99. For the general revival see Westlake, CHJ VII (1942), 73-100 and for an account of the numismatic and archeological evidence for revival, complete with references, see Talbert, *op. cit.* chapters 8-10.
100. Diodorus, XVI.83.1. That Syracuse was producing sufficient corn for export is seen in Demosthenes' speech XXXII (Against Zenothemis), delivered c. 332-330 B.C., which was concerned with the purchase of corn at Syracuse and its shipment to Athens, and in a later speech, also attributed to Demosthenes, speech LVI (Against Dionysodorus) where a convoy bringing Sicilian corn was regarded as a seasonal event which automatically lowered corn prices at the Piraeus.
101. Diodorus, XIX.6.3.
102. Diodorus, XIX.9.5.
103. Aristotle, Politics V 1303b 16. Plato had also been concerned with the division in the state in terms of wealth and as Fuks commented, in Ancient Society 5 (1974), 63, "Hence the famous dictum about the state which is 'not one, but two states, the one of poor, the other of rich, and they are living on the same spot and always conspiring against one another' (Republic 551D)". Plato therefore wished to sever the connection between political power and economic activity. For a list of Plato's reference to poverty versus riches in the Republic and Laws see Fuks, *op. cit.* 64 note 15. Fuks also has a useful discussion on the relationship between wealth and poverty and *σφόδρα* as seen by Isocrates in his article 'Isokrates and Greece', Ancient Society 3 (1972), 17-44.
104. M.I. Finley, The Ancient Economy, 152.
105. Lysias attests to the latter on the part of the oligarchic government at Athens in 404/403 B.C. See especially Oration XII (Against Eratosthenes) 5-20, 82-84.
106. Diodorus, XIX.7.1.

107. Diodorus, XIX.7.2. Diodorus' description of the street fighting that occurred at this time (7.1-4) is reminiscent of Thucydides' description of the chaos and effects of revolution on Corcyra in 427 B.C. (Thucydides, III.81-84). Thucydides had also noted the hostility to the wealthy when he mentioned that debtors slew creditors (III.81.4). The same killing of wealthy citizens in order to gain their wealth was also part of the established procedure of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens. The pretext used in that case was hostility to the government. See Lysias, Oration XII (Against Eratosthenes) 21, 48, 52; Oration XIII (Against Agoratus) 44-46.
108. Diodorus, XIV.14.2.
109. Diodorus, XIX.102.7.
110. Diodorus, XX.29.3, 31.3, 32.3, 62.1.
111. On Isocrates and his view of mercenaries see Fuks, Ancient Society 3 (1972), 29 with particular reference to Epistle IX (Archidamus). Isocrates views on the evils associated with mercenaries are also found on Oration IV (Panegyricus) 115-116, Oration VIII (Pax) 44-48, and Oration XV (Antidosis) 123-124.
112. Diodorus, XVI.83.1. The same observation about the period was made by Nepos, Timoleon 3.1 and Plutarch, Timoleon 1.2, XXII.3. In the latter reference, the lack of population was attributed primarily to wars and ~~strife~~. For Nepos, Loeb translation used.
113. As M. Wheeler, op. cit. 165 astutely observed when discussing Aristotle's concept of economic conflicts and the place of economic interests as an underlying cause of ~~strife~~, "The idea of a radical redirection of the economic basis of society was conceivable to Plato, Phaleas, and perhaps other theorists, but was discounted in practice".

CHAPTER FIVE

1. M.I. Finley, A History of Sicily : Ancient Sicily to the Arab Conquest, 72.
2. This can be contrasted with the Athenians who believed that it was their democracy and the freedom they enjoyed under it that had been responsible for their defeat of the Persians at Marathon and Salamis.
3. I have shown in Chapter Two that outside intervention and support was minimal. The Greek cities of Sicily were not powerful enough to uphold any ruler they might wish to install at Syracuse. In fact the opposite was more the case - Syracuse interfered in the affairs of the other cities. The cities of the Greek Mainland gave moral support to the Dionysii and Corinth inexplicably gave support to Timoleon's mission, but otherwise they remained unconcerned. Carthage tried diplomacy, but only supported one or other of the contenders when the opponent had threatened Carthage's interests.

APPENDIX

1. N.G.L. Hammond, 'The Sources of Diodorus Siculus XVI. (II) : The Sicilian Narrative', CQ XXXII (1938), 137-151 at 137-139.

2. Hammond, op. cit. 141. Hammond cites as evidence the passage in Diodorus XVI.14.3 where Diodorus mentioned that Diyllus of Athens began his history of Greece and Sicily in 357/6 B.C. Since Diyllus was continuing the work of Ephorus, Hammond argues that Ephorus must have ended Sicilian affairs in 357/6 B.C. He then asserts that if both Group I and II were from the same source, then that source could not have been Ephorus and his continuator because Diyllus as stylist and historian had little in common with Ephorus.
3. Diodorus, XVI.71.3 states that Theopompus included in his Philippica an excursus of three books on Sicilian affairs which culminated in the expulsion of Dionysius II.
4. R.K. Sinclair, 'Diodorus Siculus and the Writing of History', Proceedings of the African Classical Association 6 (1963), 36-45 at 39-40.
5. H.D. Westlake, 'The Sicilian Books of Theopompus' Philippica, Historia II (1954), 288-307 at 301-2. Westlake believes that the discrepancies between Diodorus' account and that of Plutarch's Timoleon are most easily explained by believing that whereas Diodorus followed Theopompus, Plutarch followed Timaeus mainly, but checked with other sources. cf. Hammond, op. cit. 146 n.2.
6. Westlake, Timoleon and His Relations with Tyrants (Manchester 1952), 2 n.1.
7. Westlake, Historia II (1954), 302.
8. Hammond, op. cit. 140.
9. Westlake, Historia II (1954), 305.
10. *ibid.*
11. *ibid.* 306.
12. A. Fuks, 'Redistribution of Land and Houses in Syracuse in 356 B.C. and its Ideological Aspects', CQ XVIII (1968), 207-223 at 208 n.2.
13. Talbert, Timoleon and the Revival of Greek Sicily (Cambridge 1974), 27-33.
14. *ibid.* 33-35.
15. *ibid.* 37.
16. Sinclair, op. cit. *passim*.
17. Sinclair, op. cit. 41. See also T.S. Brown, 'Timaeus and Diodorus' Eleventh Book', AJPh LXXIII (1952), 337-355.
18. Plutarch, Nicias XIX.5.
19. See especially, FGrH 566 F102 and Polybius, XII.25k.2, 11 where Polybius, while castigating Timaeus, accepts Timaeus' assessment of Hermocrates.
20. Thucydides, VII.86.2.

21. Diodorus, XIII.28.1 - 32.6.
22. The Letters concerned with Sicilian affairs are I, II, III, IV, VII, VIII, XIII. Chief among the defenders of the letters is G.R. Morrow, Plato's Epistles (Indianapolis, New York 1962) who includes the previous bibliography on the subject. Morrow argues for their authenticity by building up a relation between the content of the letters and the extant authorities of the period. He demonstrates that the extant authorities who used the tradition embodied in the letters, Nepos and Plutarch, differ from Diodorus in some parts and explains this by asserting that Diodorus must have used a different source, probably Ephorus. Where Plutarch diverges from Plato Morrow believes this to be a result of carelessness in Plutarch except in the most serious divergence, that of the death of Dion's son. He believes that Plutarch's version that Hipparinus committed suicide was the result of a fabrication on the part of Dion's political enemies, something they were able to do if Hipparinus died shortly after Dion, having achieved nothing remarkable enough to be remembered (43, 83-86). Principal among the recent opponents to the authenticity of the letters is L. Edelstein, Plato's Seventh Letter (Leiden 1966). Edelstein starts with the assumption that the Letters are genuine and looks for positive evidence that they are. After discussing the various contradictions and the philosophical content in relation to Plato's other works comes to the conclusion that the letters are not in fact genuine. He does, however, believe that they were written shortly after Plato's death and are therefore representative of the time in question. cf. also Solmsen's review of Edelstein's book, Gnomon 41 (1969), 29-34.
23. J.E. Raven, Plato's Thought in the Making (Cambridge 1965), 19-26.
24. The earliest known record of the existence of the letters is that of the canon drawn up by Aristophanes of Byzantium toward the end of the Third Century B.C. (Diogenes III.62). From the canon of Thrasyllus, written in the First Century B.C. we know that they were thirteen in number. (Diogenes III.61).
25. Cicero, Tusc.Disp.V.35.100, De Fin.II.14.45, 28.92, De Off. 1.7.22.
26. For Plutarch's references to and use of the letters see G.R. Morrow, op. cit. 19-21.
27. See especially, Epistle IV, 320E, 321B.
28. Westlake, Historia II (1954), 295-296.
29. Diodorus, XIII.103.3, XV.89.3.
30. Plutarch, Dion XXXVI.2. Diodorus noted on occasions that Ephorus disagreed with Timaeus on events in Dionysius I's reign. (XIII.80.5, XIV.54.5-6). In both cases Ephorus' number for the Carthaginian forces was much larger than that of Timaeus. It may well be that Timaeus wished to underrate the achievements of Dionysius I by underestimating the number of his opponents, but so too, if Ephorus' numbers came from Philistus, they may well be exaggerated to magnify Dionysius' deeds. It is worthy of note also that we have evidence here of cross-checking by Diodorus, something Hammond seems not to credit Diodorus with. (Diodorus = FGrH 70 F203, 566 F25; 70F204, 566F108)
31. Diodorus, XV.94.4.

32. FGrH 115 F194. Both Westlake, DUJ N.S. 38 (1945-46), 38 and Fuks, CQ XVIII (1968), 208 n.1 believe that the latter part of Nepos' Dion, which is unfavourable to Dion may ultimately derive from Athanis, as may also the rare notices unfavourable to Dion and favourable to Heracleides in Diodorus.
33. G.R. Morrow, op. cit. 24.
34. Plutarch, Dion XXXV.3, Diogenes Laertius, IV.5.
35. K. Von Fritz, 'The Historian Theopompus', American Historical Review 46 (1940-1941), 765-787 at 768. The ancient opinion of Theopompus can be found in FGrH 115 T 20.8, 25, 28b, 40, F 333. Further valuable discussions can be found in Westlake, Historia II (1954), 288-307; I.A.F. Bruce, 'Theopompus and Greek Historiography', History and Theory 9 (1970), 86-109; W.R. Connor, 'History without Heroes : Theopompus' treatment of Philip of Macedon', Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 8 (1967) 133-154; and G. Shrimpton, 'Theopompus' Treatment of Philip in the Philippica', Phoenix 31 (1977), 123-144.
36. Polybius, I.5.1.
37. Diodorus, XIII.90.6, 7. It is worth noting in this context that Timaeus' father, Andromachus, had gathered together the survivors of Dionysius I's razing of Naxos to form the nucleus of his settlement at Tauromenium (Diodorus XVI.7.1) and that he was, from the moment of Timoleon's arrival in Sicily, an ally of Timoleon against Dionysius II (Plutarch, Timoleon X.4, 5.).
38. Plutarch, Dion XXXVI.1. A useful discussion on Timaeus' life and works is T.S. Brown, Timaeus of Tauromenium (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1958).
39. H.D. Westlake believed that the existence of such a biography accounts for the similarity between Nepos' Timoleon and Plutarch's Timoleon, and explains the fact that Plutarch's account was much fuller by assuming that whereas Nepos used a secondary biography exclusively, Plutarch used the same biography but supplemented it with a primary historical authority. 'The Sources of Plutarch's Timoleon', CQ XXXII (1938), 65-74.
40. See especially, XXXII.2, 3, XXXVII.3, XLV.2, XLVII.1-4, XLVIII.3, 4, XLIV.4, LIII.1, 3.
41. Some of the eulogy may derive from Timaeus whom Polybius attacked for praising Timoleon extravagantly. Polybius XII.23.4-7. Polybius is not, however, completely consistent in his own assessment of Timoleon for although he belittles his achievements at this point, he later mentions Timoleon as one of the most capable rulers after Gelo (XII.25k.2) and further criticises Timaeus for putting foolish speeches into Timoleon's mouth. Westlake, Timoleon and His Relations with Tyrants, 3-5 presents the case that the legend of Timoleon's good fortune was probably largely the result of Timoleon's own propaganda. This propaganda, together with Timaeus' account, resulted in the fact that Plutarch "thus inherited a tradition in which the good fortune of Timoleon was already allowed to bulk somewhat too large". (7).
42. Talbert, op. cit. 1-10. cf. H.D. Westlake, Timoleon and His Relations with Tyrants, 10.

43. A useful discussion of Plutarch's especial interest in the story of the successful political man can be found in A. Wardman, Plutarch's Lives (London 1974), chapters 2 and 3. Wardman demonstrates the basic view of Plutarch that there were three main types of ruler - the 'politicus', the tyrant and the demagogue. The latter two were odious but the true 'politicus' was a man with great virtue and whose true nature was often mistaken by his contemporaries, either through ignorance or malice. Such indeed is the way Plutarch treats Dion and Timoleon. This is not to say that Plutarch falsified his material, but merely that he emphasizes those parts that suited his purpose and interpreted motives and actions in the light of his own viewpoint. On Plutarch's special viewpoint and interests, see also R.J.A. Talbert, *op. cit.* 11-19.
44. A. Russell, Plutarch (London 1972), 102-103, further noted that the concentration on the *βίος* (way of life) of the individual led to three characteristics in the narrative: 1. Chronology and the development of time were of secondary concern, even though the overall arrangement was chronological 2. The answer to the question of what sort of man a person was involved an evaluation of vices and virtues so that we are expected to allocate praise and blame. 3. Plutarch was not concerned with people as decisive figures in history or their influence - on the contrary, he barely notices the wider historical influence because his eyes are occupied with the individual human qualities.
45. On this problem, see Sinclair, *op. cit.* *passim*.
46. Westlake, Historia II (1954), 299. See also his comments about Justin's treatment of Dionysius I - 294 n.29
47. Justin, XXI.1.1-3.10, 5.1-11.
48. Justin, XXI.2.4-8, 5.1.
49. Justin, Praef. 4.
50. This observation was made by Tillyard, *op. cit.* 5.
51. On one notable discrepancy, the accounts of the surrender of Ortygia to Timoleon, see above, Chapter 3 note 195.
52. Diodorus, XXI.17.4. = FGrH 564 T3
53. Diodorus, XXI.17.1-3. Polybius also attacks Timaeus for being unfair to Agathocles, XII.15.1-11. (FGrH 566 F124 d,b)
54. FGrH 76.
55. The variant details in these accounts is well discussed by E.A. Freeman, History of Sicily Vol IV (Oxford 1894), Appendix VII, 517-525.

TABLE IPRINCIPAL POLITICAL EVENTS IN SYRACUSE, 415-305 B.C.


- 415 Rivalry between Athenagoras and Hermocrates
Number of Syracusan generals limited to Three
- 414 The generals, Heracleides, Sicanus and Hermocrates dismissed from office
Arrival of Gylippus to take command of Syracusan forces
- 412 Reform of the constitution by Diocles
Hermocrates in charge of the forces in the Aegean
- 410 Exile of Hermocrates
- 409 Return of Hermocrates to Sicily
- 408 Banishment of Diocles
Hermocrates attempted coup d' etat
- 406/405 Dionysius I lodges accusations against the generals
Deposition of some of the generals, Dionysius becomes general
Recall of exiles
Accusations against the new Board of Generals
Dionysius elected 'strategos autocrator'
Dionysius gains a bodyguard and establishes himself on Ortygia
Daphnaeus and Demaretus condemned and executed
- 405 Revolt of the cavalry, Death of Hermocrates' daughter
- 404 Widespread rebellion of the Syracusan people against Dionysius
'stasis' amongst the people themselves
Dionysius victorious and confiscates the arms of the Syracusans
- 403 Syracusan exiles from the revolts of 405 and 404 flushed out of Aetna
- 398/397 Dionysius' double marriage
- 396 Opposition of the Syracusans to Dionysius, led by Theodorus
- 389/388 Transfer of the inhabitants of Caulonia and Hipponium to Syracuse
- 384 Banishment of Philistus and Leptines
Banishment of Polyxenus?
- 383 Recall of Leptines
- 368/367 Death of Dionysius I
Dionysius II succeeds to the tyranny
- 367 Recall of Philistus
Exile of Dion
- 361/360 Mercenary trouble under Dionysius II
Exile of Heracleides
Confiscation of Dion's property by Dionysius II

- 360 Dion and Heracleides prepare for a Syracusan expedition
- 357 Dion arrives at Syracuse
Timocrates fails to hold Syracuse and the Syracusans join Dion
Ortygia besieged by land
- 357/356 Arrival of Heracleides in Syracuse
- 356/355 Dionysius II leaves Ortygia, placing his son, Apollocrates in charge
Syracusans propose and pass Land Redistribution Bill
Dion withdrew to Leontini
Nypsius, Dionysius' commander, breaks through the siege wall and a general massacre of Syracusans takes place
Dion recalled from Leontini, takes over command and repeals the Land Bill. Rivalry between Heracleides and Dion continues
Capture of Ortygia
- 354 Murder of Heracleides
Assassination of Dion
Callippus takes over control of Syracuse
Fighting between Callippus and Hicetas and the friends of Dion
Hicetas and Dion's friends retire to Leontini
- 353 Hipparinus and Nysaeus seize Syracuse
- 351 Assassination of Hipparinus, Nysaeus retains command
- 346 Dionysius II recaptures Syracuse
Syracusan nobles go to Leontini and join Hicetas
- 346/345 Exiles at Leontini appeal to Corinth for help. Timoleon appointed
Hicetas and Dionysius II fight for Syracuse
- 344 Arrival of Timoleon in Sicily
Hicetas steps up the siege of Syracuse with Carthaginian help
- 344/343 Carthaginians withdraw, Timoleon defeats Hicetas' forces
Hicetas retires to Leontini
- 343 Surrender of Ortygia by Dionysius II
Dionysius II departs for Corinth
- 343/339 Resettlement and Colonisation of Syracuse by Timoleon
- 342 Makeshift constitutional arrangements by Timoleon?
- 340/339 Death of Hicetas?
Constitutional arrangements of Timoleon?
- 337 Resignation of Timoleon
- 320-317 Sosistratus and Heracleides refuse to give Agathocles due recognition for his military services
Formation of the Oligarchy of Six Hundred
Agathocles aids the Italians against Sosistratus and Heracleides
Syracusans revolt and expel the oligarchs who attach themselves to the Carthaginians
Agathocles returns to Syracuse

Acestorides placed in charge and a reconciliation between the democrats and oligarchs effected
Expulsion of Agathocles


- 317 Agathocles raises an army in the interior, but reconciled to
Syracuse through the mediation of Hamilcar
Agathocles made 'general and protector of the city'
Massacre of the oligarchs and other citizens, Deinocrates exiled
Agathocles elected 'strategos autocrator'
Syracusan exiles flee to Acragas, Gela and Messana
- 314 Syracusan exiles expelled from Messana
- 312-309 Deinocrates and the exiles in league with the Carthaginians against
Agathocles
- 309-307 Exiles and Acragas against Agathocles
- 307 Murder of Agathocles' sons by his African army
- 306 Desertion of Agathocles' commander, Pasiphilus to Deinocrates
Negotiations between Agathocles and Deinocrates
- 305 Victory of Agathocles over Deinocrates
Agathocles assumes the kingship

TABLE II
FAMILY CONNECTIONS OF THE DIONYSII AND DION



1. Plutarch (Dion XI.3) merely says that Philistus married a daughter of Leptines by a woman he had corrupted and later married. However, Dionysius I's reaction to the marriage makes little sense unless it was the daughter of Dicaeosyne, whom we know Leptines did marry. (Diodorus XV.7.4).

MAP II - SYRACUSE

From M.-P. Loicq - Berger, Syracuse (Brussels 1967) .

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adcock, F.E. The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1957).
- Adkins, A.W.H. Merit and Responsibility : A Study in Greek Values (Oxford 1960).
- Andrewes, A. The Greek Tyrants (London 1956)
- Asheri, D. Distribuzioni di terre nell' antica Grecia (Torino 1966)
'Tyrannie et mariage forcé. Essai d'histoire sociale grecque',
Annales Economies Sociétés Civilisations 32 no.1 (1977), 21-48.
- Austin, M.M. & Vidal-Naquet, P. Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece : An Introduction, translated and revised by Austin (London 1977).
- Balogh, E. Political Refugees in Ancient Greece (Johannesburg 1943)
- Barker, E. The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford 1946).
Principles of Social and Political Theory (Oxford 1952).
The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (Dover republication, New York 1959).
- * Berve, H. Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen (Munich 1967).
- Bluck, R.S. Plato's Life and Thought (London 1949).
- Bowra, C.M. 'Plato's Epigram on Dion's Death', AJPh LIX (1938), 394-404.
- Brinton, C. The Anatomy of Revolution (revised edition, London 1953).
- Brown, C.W. Jr. 'The Speculative Antagonism of Civil Disorder', Struggles in the State : Sources and Patterns of World Revolution, ed. G.A. Kelly and C.W. Brown Jr. (New York 1970).
- Brown, T.S. 'Timaeus and Diodorus' Eleventh Book', AJPh LXXIII (1952), 337-355.
Timaeus of Tauromenium (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1958).
The Greek Historians (Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto 1973).
- Bruce, I.A.F. 'Theopompus and Classical Greek Historiography', History and Theory IX (1970), 86-109.
- Brunt, P.A. Review of H. Wentker, Sizilien und Athen, CR VII (1957), 243-245.
- Calhoun, G.M. Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation (New York 1913).
- Calvert, P. A Study of Revolution (Oxford 1970).
- Chroust, A.H. 'Treason and Patriotism in Ancient Greece', JHI XV (1954), 280-288.
- Connor, W.R. 'History without Heroes : Theopompus' Treatment of Philip of Macedon', GRBS 8 (1967), 133-154.

- Coser, L.A. 'Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change', Struggles in the State : Sources and Patterns of World Revolution, ed. G.A. Kelly and C.W. Brown Jr. (New York 1970).
- De Ste Croix, G.E.M. 'The Character of the Athenian Empire', Historia 3 (1954/55), 1-41.
'Karl Marx and the History of Classical Antiquity', Arethusa VIII no. 1 (1975), 7-41.
- Dickie, M.W. 'Thucydides, not Philistus', GRBS 17 (1976), 217-219.
- * Dolce, C. 'Diodoro e la storia di Agatocle', Kokalos 6 (1960), 124-166.
- Dorso, G. 'Political Class and Ruling Class', Struggles in the State : Sources and Patterns of World Revolution, ed. G.A. Kelly and C.W. Brown Jr. (New York 1970).
- Dover, K.J. 'Problems in Thucydides VI and VII', PCPhS 183 (1954/55), 4-11.
- Dunbabin, T.J. The Western Greeks (Oxford 1948).
- Eckstein, H. 'On the Etiology of Internal War', Struggles in the State : Sources and Patterns of World Revolution, ed. G.A. Kelly and C.W. Brown Jr. (New York 1970).
- Edelstein, L. Plato's Seventh Letter (Leiden 1966).
- Finley, M.I. (ed.) Slavery in Classical Antiquity : Views and Controversies (Cambridge 1960).
A History of Sicily : Ancient Sicily to the Arab Conquest (London 1968).
Review of B.A. Groningen, Andrew Wartelle : Aristotle Economique, CR 20 (1970), 315-319.
Democracy Ancient and Modern (London 1973).
The Ancient Economy (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1973).
'Aristotle and Economic Analysis', Studies in Ancient Society, ed. Finley (London, Boston 1974).
The Use and Abuse of History (London 1975).
- Freeman, E.A. History of Sicily (Oxford 1891-1894).
- Fuks, A. 'Redistribution of Land and Houses in Syracuse in 356 B.C. and its Ideological Aspects', CQ XVIII (1968), 207-223.
'Thucydides and the Stasis in Corcyra : Thuc. III 82-83 versus (Thuc.) III 84', AJPh 92 (1971), 48-55.
'Isocrates and the Social-Economic Situation in Greece', Ancient Society 3 (1972), 17-44.
'Patterns and Types of Socio-Economic Revolution in Greece from the Fourth to the Second Century B.C.', Ancient Society 5 (1974), 51-81.
'Plato and the Social Question : The Problem of Poverty and Riches in the Republic', Ancient Society 8 (1977), 49-83.
- Gomme, A.W. More Essays in Greek History and Literature (Oxford 1962).
- Gomme, A.W. Andrewes, A. and Dover, K.J. A Historical Commentary on Thucydides Volume IV Books V 25-VII (Oxford 1970)

- Gouldner, A.W. Enter Plato (London 1965)
- Graham, A.J. Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece (Manchester 1964).
- Griffith, G.T. The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World (Cambridge 1935).
- Grote, G. A History of Greece Vols. VIII, IX, X (London 1888).
- Hammond, N.G.L. 'The Sources of Diodorus Siculus XVI (II)', CQ XXXII (1938), 137-151.
- Harward, J. 'The Seventh and Eighth Platonic Epistles', CQ XXII (1928), 143-154.
- Hasebroek, J. Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece, translated L.M. Fraser and D.C. Macgregor (London 1933).
- Head, B.V. Historia Numorum (reprinted, London 1963).
- Heichelheim, F.M. An Ancient Economic History Vol. II, revised edition translated by J. Stevens (Leiden 1964).
- Holden, H.A. Plutarch's Life of Timoleon (Cambridge 1898).
- * Hüttl, W. Verfassungsgeschichte von Syrakus (Prague 1929).
- Johnson, C. Revolutionary Change (London 1968)
- Kagan, D. Politics and Policy in Corinth, 421-336 B.C. (Ohio 1958).
- Kelly, D. 'What Happened to the Athenians captured in Sicily?', CR 20 (1976), 127-131.
- Knorringa, H. Emporos (Amsterdam 1961).
- Kopff, E.C. 'Thucydides 7.42.3 : An Unrecognized Fragment of Philistus', GRBS 17 (1976), 23-30.
'Philistus Still', GRBS 17 (1976), 220-221.
- Legon, R.P. Demos and Stasis : Studies in the Factional Politics of Classical Greece (Doctoral Dissertation, Cornell University 1966).
- Liebeschuetz, W. 'Thucydides and the Sicilian Expedition', Historia 17 (1968), 289-306.
- Loicq-Berger, M.P. Syracuse : Histoire culturelle d'une cite grecque (Brussels 1967).
- Losada, L.A. The Fifth Column in the Peloponnesian War (Leiden 1972).
- McKinlay, A.P. 'The Indulgent Dionysius', TAPA 70 (1939), 51-61.
- * Meier-Welcker, H. Dionysios I (Zurich, Frankfurt 1971).
- Meloni, P. 'Il soggiorno di Dionysio II a Locri', Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica 25 (1951), 149-168.
- Mitchell, H. The Economics of Ancient Greece (Cambridge 1957).
- Momigliano, A. 'Sea Power in Greek Thought', CR (1944), 1-7.
The Development of Greek Biography (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1971).

- Morrow, G.R. Plato's Epistles (Indianapolis, New York 1962).
- Mossé, C. La fin de la démocratie athénienne (Paris 1962).
La Tyrannie dans la Grèce Antique (Paris 1969).
- Newman, N.L. The Politics of Aristotle, Vol. IV (Oxford 1902).
- Oldfather, W.A. 'The Date of Plato's Laws', AJPh XLIV (1923), 275-276.
- Oost, S.I. 'The Tyrant Kings of Syracuse', CPh 71 (1976), 224-236.
- Padgug, R.A. 'Classes and Society in Classical Greece', Arethusa VIII no.1 (1975), 85-117.
- Parke, H.W. Greek Mercenary Soldiers (Oxford 1933).
- Post, L.A. 'The Preludes to Plato's Laws', TAPA 60 (1929), 5-24.
 'The Seventh and Eighth Platonic Epistles', CQ 24 (1930), 113-115.
- Pritchett, W.K. The Greek State at War Parts I and II (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1971, 1974).
- Pusey, N.M. 'Alcibiades and $\tau\omicron\delta\ \phi\epsilon\lambda\acute{\alpha}\sigma\pi\omicron\lambda\epsilon$ ', HSPH LI (1940), 215-231.
- Raven, J.E. Plato's Thought in the Making (Cambridge 1965).
- Russell, D.A. Plutarch (London 1972).
- Sinclair, R.K. 'Diodorus Siculus and the Writing of History', PACA 6 (1963), 36-45.
- Sjöqvist, E. Sicily and the Greeks (Michigan 1973).
- Solmsen, F. Review of L. Edelstein's Plato's Seventh Letter', Gnomon 41 (1969), 29-34.
- *Sordi, M. Timoleonte (Palermo 1961).
- Stroheker, K.F. Dionysios I (Wiesbaden 1958).
- Talbert, R.J.A. Timoleon and the Revival of Greek Sicily, 344-317 (Cambridge 1974).
- Tillyard, H.J.W. Agathocles (Cambridge 1908).
- Tod, M.N. Greek Historical Inscriptions Vols. I and II (Oxford 1933, 1948)
- Von Fritz, K. 'The Historian Theopompos', American Historical Review 46 (1941), 765-787.
- Walbank, F.W. 'The Problem of Greek Nationality', Phoenix V (1951), 41-60.
Polybius (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1972).
- Wardman, A. Plutarch's Lives (London 1974).
- Warmington, B.H. Carthage (London 1960).
- Wasserman, F.M. 'Thucydides and the Disintegration of the Polis', TAPA 85 (1954), 46-54.

* Wentker, H. Sizilien und Athen (Heidelberg 1956).

Westlake, H.D. 'The Sources of Plutarch's Timoleon's CQ XXXII (1938), 65-74.
 'Phalaeus and Timoleon', CQ XXXIV (1940), 44-46.
 'Timoleon and the Reconstruction of Syracuse', The Cambridge Historical Journal VII (1942), 73-100.
 'Dion: A Study in Liberation', DUJ N.S. (Vol.38) (1945-46), 37-44.
 'The Purpose of Timoleon's Mission', AJPh LXX (1949), 65-75.
Timoleon and His Relations with Tyrants (Manchester 1952).
 'The Sicilian Books of Theopompus' Philippica, Historia 2 (1954), 288-307.
 'Hermocrates the Syracusan', Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Manchester 41 (1958/59), 239-268.
 'Athenian Aims in Sicily, 427-424 B.C.', Historia 9 (1960), 385-402.
 Review of M. Sordi, Timoleonte CR 12 (1962), 268-270.

Wheeler, M. 'Aristotle's Analysis of the Nature of Political Struggle', Articles on Aristotle 2 : Ethics and Politics, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji (London 1977), 159-170.

Whibley, L. Greek Oligarchies (Cambridge 1913).

Wood, E. & N. Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory (Oxford 1978).

Woodhead, A.G. The Greeks in the West (London 1962).
Thucydides and the Nature of Power (London 1970).

* Books marked thus have only been used minimally since I have been dependent on translations of those sections of them referred to by authors writing in English.

I have been unable to obtain copies of the following works :

Berve, H. Dion (Abh. Akad. Mainz : geist.u.soz. kl. 10, Wiesbaden 1956)
Die Herrschaft des Agathokles (Sitzungb. Bay. Akad. 1952, 5)

Holm, A. Geschichte Siciliens im Alterthum (Leipzig 1874)

von Scheliha, R. Dion (Das Erbe des Alten xxv, Leipzig 1934)

ADDENDUM

At the time of writing this thesis I was unable to obtain a copy of H.D. Westlake, Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History (Manchester 1969). For ease of reference, I now include a list of the page numbers in that book for articles reprinted from earlier journals and cited in this thesis according to those journals.

Chapter 2 note 3 (p.210)	<u>Essays</u> 276-312 at 295 n.68
" " 53 (p.213)	" 251-264
" " 58 (p.213)	" 174-202
" " 133 (p.218)	" 174-202
" " 134 (p.218)	" 183-185
" " 183 (p.221)	" 253
" " 205 (p.222)	" 196-197
" " 296 (p.227)	" 175, 101-122, 117
" " 311 (p.228)	" 265-276 at 267-268
Chapter 3 note 23 (p.232)	" 284 n.34
" " 31 (p.233)	" 291
" " 43 (p.233)	" 188
" " 61 (p.235)	" 281
" " 214 (p.244)	" 297
" " 222 (p.244)	" 299-300
Chapter 4 note 89 (p.253)	" 251-264
" " 93 (p.254)	" 276-312
" " 99 (p.254)	" 276-312
Appendix note 5 (p.256)	" 226-250 at 242-3
" " 7 (p.256)	" 242-3
" " 9 (p.256)	" 247
" " 10 (p.256)	" 247
" " 11 (p.256)	" 248
" " 28 (p.257)	" 235
" " 32 (p.258)	" 253
" " 35 (p.258)	" 226-250
" " 46 (p.259)	" 240, 233 n.29